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Abstract
This thesis aims at testing Hart's theoretical model -- the effects of state- 
societal arrangements on international competitiveness, by applying it to Taiwan's 
situation in the 1990s through two empirical studies, namely, the public-private 
collaboration in the innovation process of NPC and HDTV industries. It is argued that 
the authoritarian explanation of the developmental state does not accord with the 
transitions that have had happened in Taiwan in the relation between the state and 
industry concerning the issues of promoting technology development in the emerging 
industries. More international and technological considerations need to be 
incorporated into the developmentalist analysis. Moreover, the state alone is 
inefficient in moving industrial development without active participation from the 
industrial sector. Under circumstances of fierce international competition, rapid 
technological changes, and heavy physical and human investment for innovation, an 
innovative arrangement is called for in which the state actors and industry can 
cooperate and associate.
The research findings suggest that a new type of institutional arrangement has 
emerged in the innovation process through collaboration between the public and 
private sector in both NPC and HDTV industries which has had a substantial impact 
on international competitiveness. Jhe NPC Alliance demonstrates an initial case of 
coupling the public sector research institute with the industrial sector in terms of 
R&D for a new industrial product, while HDTV consortia-complexes modelling the 
NPC example shows an extensive adaptation to bring this kind of institutional 
advantage for the revitalisation of declining consumer electronics industries. It arrives 
at the conclusion that Taiwan’s state-industrial arrangement in the 1990 characterised 
as the institutionalised strategic partnership (ISP), a reciprocal institution based on 
industrial policy-driven cooperation with prudent definition by the state. ISP, a new 
form of industrial governance, combines state-defined policy and an implementation 
network of state-industrial cooperation which differs from the conception of one­
sided interventionist governance and purely free market solutions.
The theoretical application of Hart's model to Taiwan's current situation is 
appropriate. Taiwan fits into his model in the position of the state-business coalition 
side which is assumed to be a more competitive arrangement than in the position of 
the state vertex. State-Societal arrangements have been an endogenous and 
institutional factor which forms a necessary part of the explanation and understanding 
of the promotion of international competitiveness. Institutional arrangements should 
be evolved to cope with changes in order to create institutional advantages rather than 
be subject to environmental constraints.
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C H A P T E R O N E
IN T R O D U C T IO N
1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The economic development of Taiwan is the subject of debate between political 
scientists and economists. There is no doubt about the scale of Taiwan's economic 
achievements, but there is a dispute about how it achieved its considerable success. 
There were two important competing approaches in the political economy of 
development before 1980, namely the neo-classical and the dependency perspectives. 
The state-centred perspective has emerged as another rival explanation in the field of 
East Asian development since the early 1980s. All of them provide some relevant and 
valuable insights, but there are significant variations in each in terms of their theoretical 
implications.
The earlier neo-statist theory’s applicability to the historical experience of East 
Asian development, however, was not seriously challenged before 1990. The changing 
international political economy and the change from an authoritarian regime towards a 
more democratic one in Taiwan, demands a revised theory. Taiwan is one of the leading 
newly industrialising economies (NIEs), and the next country in line to enter the club of 
OECD countries. If Taiwan hopes to improve its competitiveness further and get into 
the developed world earlier, it is necessary to consider the relevance for Taiwan of an 
analytical framework similar to that of the developed countries, rather than to use the 
theoretical framework generally provided for developing countries1.
1 There are many studies concerned with how countries enhance their industrial competitiveness, but there is a 
difference between studies focusing on developed and developing countries (Lall, 1990). The main concerns o f  the 
studies o f developed countries were on innovation, the function o f labour and capital markets, the education system, the 
management system and the linkages between scientific and applied research. In contrast, those o f  developing countries 
were focused on the orientation o f  trade and industrial policies, in particular, the debate about export-oriented versus 
import-substituting strategies. ‘The dominant set o f  explanations o f their industrial performance concentrates on 
incentive rather than structure factors (ibid.: 11).’ The neglect o f  the structural factors that the latter studies focus on
1
There are many theoretical frameworks advanced to interpret the relationship 
between national structure and international competitiveness, but none of them provide 
a model for framing public-private sector interactions that ensure maximum 
effectiveness in realising even the single goal of international competitiveness. Most 
studies focus on the significant role of the state and do not answer the question about 
what type of relationship there should be between the public and private sectors in order 
to achieve international competitiveness. It is almost impossible to propose a general 
public-private relationship for developing a nation's competitiveness because of the 
different cultural, economic and social conditions of each country. Rather, public- 
private sector relationships should be flexible instead of precisely defined, according to 
the World Bank's collected volume -- International Competitiveness: Interaction of the
Public and Private sectors (Haque, 1991). In this many authors agreed
(a) that the private sector had an important and legitimate role to play in economic development in 
all economies;
(b) that the public-private sector interactions are better articulated within a market-coordinated 
economy than one of central control and direction; and
(c) that public-private sector relations evolve and vary over time rather than being subject to a once 
and for all definition as is usually the case in systemic definitions, (ibid.: 16)
1.1. Defining ‘International Competitiveness' and ‘Technology'
While using 'international competitiveness' as a framework to analyse national 
economic problems in relation to growth and as an indicator to judge the strength of a 
country's manufacturing export in international trade has come a popular realm of 
political economy. Krugman (1994) devalued the concept of competitiveness when 
applied to national economies and suggested that the obsession with competitiveness 
would mislead domestic policies and threaten the international economy. But he 
neglected the fact that competitiveness is rather endogenous than exogenous and that 
the concept of competitiveness is dependent on the comparability o f  different 
economies based on a set of indicators, not a single number to sum it all up.
results in the chance to leant from the experience of developed countries in enhancing their industrial competitiveness 
being forfeited.
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Some works on international competitiveness have connected its dynamics to 
internal determinants. For example, Hart's book -- Rival capitalists (1992), used state- 
societal arrangements as a framework to analyse competitiveness amongst main 
industrial countries; Porter's book -- The competitive advantage of nations (1990), used 
the diamond (the determinants of national competitive advantage including: 1. factor 
conditions 2. demand conditions 3. related and supporting industries 4. firm strategy, 
structure, and rivalry) plus the role of chance and government to illustrate the issues 
that will govern the future development of a nation's economy. If a firm or an industry 
within a nation wants to become a strong competitor, The home-based advantage must 
then become the level to enter foreign markets’ (Porter, 1990:63). Accordingly, a 
nation's competitiveness is endogenous rather than exogenous.
Bradford argued that ‘development proceeds from inside outward rather than 
from outside inward (1994:42).’ He proposed a new paradigm of systemic 
competitiveness which is based on the interaction within a nation's economic system of 
its component systems, namely the financial, production, innovation and governance 
systems (ibid.). Velloso (1994) had the same concept, he defined international 
competitiveness from four internal bases -- technology, human capital, economic and 
institutional infrastructures, and interactions between various actors. National 
competitiveness is not simply an economic or market-driven phenomenon, a society­
wide vision is required (Haque, 1991). Not only have scholars emphasised the 
importance of domestic determinants in competitiveness, but they also required a 
redefinition of the government- industry (GI) relationship and the role of the state. In 
this sense, the GI relationship as one of the important factors to enhance 
competitiveness is back on the policy agenda. The private sector is given a new 
meaning of acting as a partner with the government to work hand-in-hand on the efforts 
of creating competitiveness, and it also calls for integrating industrial organisations into 
the national policy-making process.
To define 'international competitiveness' in terms of manufactured products is not
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easy. It is because two basic elements of manufactured product -  price and quality -  
are difficult to compare. Comparing the price between two products without regard to 
their quality is virtually meaningless, and quality is difficult to specify in terms of 
product differentiation. Unless your products are ‘sellable’, no one will buy them -  a 
business or marketing meaning of competitiveness. The global consumers care more 
about products’ price and quality which meet their needs and taste than the origins of 
products. In a common marketing jargon, is the product value for money?
However, international competitiveness can not be defined in such a 
microeconomic way, it should be defined in macroeconomic terms, at least for use in 
this thesis. There is a misunderstanding of believing that nations compete with each 
other in a similar fashion to the way firms do. Firms and industries, rather than the 
countries, which compete in the international markets are the main operators of 
business activities (Krugman, 1994; Porter, 1990). When we talk about a firm's 
competitiveness that means its market position is sustainable and promotable. A nation 
can not be the competitor acting in the international market. It has to engage in business 
through its nation’s firms or public enterprises. Thus, the meaning of competitiveness 
for a nation is to maintain and promote the market share of national industries in the 
domestic and international markets.
Basically speaking, world trade is somehow governed by the principles of 
survival of the fittest, but it is by no means a zero-sum game. The productivity of an 
industry rising in some countries, which implies their increasing competitiveness, is not 
necessarily at the expense of others. On the one hand, if they can improve their 
productivity to catch up with rivals, then they can sustain competitiveness; on the other 
hand, if they fail to do so, they can leave that industry to others. As far as a single 
country is concerned, if an industry within a country confronted fierce competition from 
foreign rivals, the government may help to strengthen its competitive advantages, or 
shift its resources to other industries where there are strong competitive advantages that 
can be created. When a country encounters decreased competitiveness in an industry, it
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might lead to an increasing competitiveness in some others if the resource can be 
efficiently used. The competitive advantages of firm/industry differ from firm/industry 
and from country to country (Porter, 1990). Therefore, there is no single country that 
can maintain strong competitiveness in all industries. “A country does not need to be 
competitive in all industries to be competitive overall, but it does need to be 
competitive in a variety of industries (Hart, 1992:6).’ In order to build some competitive 
industries, well-functioning GI interactions and well-focused policies are of paramount 
importance. Although some countries, notably the USA, do not operate their economies 
in this way. However, this point of view is held by many other countries.
The most frequently used single indicator of international competitiveness is 
trade balance, or trade surplus. However, trade balance and trade surplus sometimes 
indicate competitive strength, but it is not suitable to all cases. Taking Bolivia as an 
example (Hatsopoulos et al., 1990), its exports exceeded imports by more than 60%, 
and the trade surplus as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) was usually larger 
than that of Japan in most of years. It cannot demonstrate Bolivia's competitiveness 
because its per capita output of economy fell by 26%. Bolivia was forced to run large 
trade surpluses to pay back the large debts incurred from petrol-recycled money in 
earlier years. Thus, the proper test of competitiveness is not simply the ability of a 
country to balance its trade, but its ability to do so while achieving an acceptable rate of 
improvement in its standard of living which can keep pace with those of the other 
industrial countries (ibid.: 110).
Porter defined international competitiveness by a nation's industry as ‘possessing 
competitive advantage relative to the best worldwide competitors’ (Porter, 1990:25). He 
argued that either ‘(1) the presence of substantial and sustained exports to a wide array 
of other nations and/or (2) significant outbound foreign investment based on skilled and 
assets created in the home country’ (ibid.) as the best measures of international 
competitive advantage. Trade and foreign direct investment are two good indicators to 
present competitiveness, but the latter is more difficult to identify in terms of the home-
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based nation since increasing numbers of stateless firms and joint ventures operate 
internationally. There is no widely accepted criterion to assess a nation’s 
competitiveness. One definition proposed bv the USA President's Commission on 
Industrial Competitiveness seems to satisfy many experts: ‘the degree to which a nation 
can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the 
test o f international markets while simultaneously maintaining or expanding the real 
income of its citizens’2.
The word technology is defined in this thesis as ‘the ability to carry out productive 
transformations’, which are able to have the effect of ‘translating materials, energy and 
information in one set of states into another more highly valued set of states’ (Metcalfe, 
1995:455). In this sense, the concept of technology is more concerned with knowledge than 
with the use of machines to accelerate productivity. It clearly involves the ability to think 
and the knowledge to improve productivity, although technology is more than thoughts. 
Some of the knowledge is embodied in machines, but most of it is not. The following 
paragraph is worth quoting at some length, since it illuminates the linkage between
technology and structures which embrace knowledge:
It (knowledge) is embodied elsewhere -  in the brains of people, in organisational structures and in 
behavioural patterns, which in turn are conditioned by the strategies of different social factors and their 
patterns o f  conflict and cooperation technology changes cannot be separated from market structures, 
patterns of competition and social regulation, and from the quality of the educational system and of the 
labour force ..It (technology change) is derived, to a large degree, by the fundamental requirements of 
competition One cannot expect to understand the nature of international technology diffusion, and the 
chances o f different actors to gain access to key technologies, if one doesn’t analyse explicitly the driving 
forces behind global competition and the restructuring of productions and markets (Ernst & O'Connor, 
1989:20)
1.2. Changing Environmental Constraints
The role of the state is aggressive and crucial to economic development, and the 
paternalist industrial policy (IP) can be deemed to have been successful in the past. Two 
recent changes have weakened its autonomy in relation to IP in Taiwan. These are the
2 Global competition: The new reality, Report o f  the President'i Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Vol. 2 
(Washington, D.C.: U S. Government Printing Office, 1985), P6. This quotation has been used by Hart, 1992:5; and 
Cohen ft  Zysman, 1987:60. Hataopoulos et al. (1990) have similar views on defining competitiveness.
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change in the political system towards a more democratic system of government, and 
the significantly increased power of the private sector over financial matters and in 
relation to investment decisions. This will introduce new uncertainty to Taiwan's 
industrial development. This is not to say that the Taiwanese state is on the decline, but 
rather there has to be a redefinition of the state. For future development, the state may 
need to exercise its role as a coordinator more strongly than as a director in industrial 
matters. The future arrangements for Taiwan's system of IP-making and its 
implementation have to adjust towards a system of state-industry cooperation.
The international environment and Taiwan's domestic environment have changed 
dramatically since the mid-eighties. In terms of the international environment, trade 
conflicts and international competitiveness have replaced the traditional military race as 
the main concern of international affairs in the post cold war era. The increasing and 
continuing globalization of industrial activities, markets and competition affect the 
international competitiveness of a country and also affect economic development at the 
state and local level.
Two serious changes that have affected the world economic system can be 
observed in the period of 1970-1990. Firstly, rapid and sustained growth in international 
trade in the past two decades has led to an increase in the internationalisation of the 
world economy and an enlarged world market. International trade today is no longer 
concentrated on an exchange between primary and manufactured products. In fact, 
countries, whether developed or developing, reveal a pattern of trade increasingly 
concentrated in broadly similar industrial products. With an increasing range and 
sophistication of industrial products exported from developing countries, this has 
created considerable tension in world markets as most developed countries have 
experienced a decline of their market shares. Empirical and theoretical evidence also 
suggests that a country's economic success and influence depends to a large extent on its 
ability to expand export earnings, thus the competition in world trade has intensified 
over the years. This, then, is the global environment in which nations, as well as private
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industrial sectors, need to create their competitiveness.
Secondly, the accelerated rate of development of technology fostered a strong 
tendency in the leading traders towards the creation of science-based industries, and an 
orientation towards high tech goods and the production of high value-added products. 
However, a country's technology capability system can no longer survive depending on 
private technology development alone. It should include the network of institutions and 
agents in the public and private sectors, that make effective use of existing technology, 
that introduce into the local economy better goods and services regardless of whether 
they are new by world standards, and that improve and develop technology appropriate 
to local needs (Haque, 1991:48). Under the circumstance of the urgency of continuous 
technological and product innovation to 'catch up' with international demand, it tends to 
bring the state back in and to lead to the adoption of an appropriate state policy for 
techno-industrial innovation. This political attempt concerning the state involved in 
these new high tech world markets and in the global race for innovation has 
increasingly required a state-led rapid shift of both capital and human resources from 
sector to sector, or within the same sector. While it can be argued that the importance of 
an overall national framework for technology development has been overemphasised, it 
is about time to give an equivalent weight to its counterpart -- the private industrial 
sector, because that national framework could never succeed while lacking responsive 
private participation. Accordingly, to maintain international competitiveness and to 
promote exports are goals highly relevant to many aspects of govemment/private sector 
interaction, especially in the tasks of developing and diffusing technology.
Trade and foreign investment are two major indicators of the degree of 
internationalisation of a country and its firms. The volume of world trade has expanded 
significantly since the 1960s as tariffs and quotas have been reduced through 
multilateral agreement. The share of the world market and the resistance to import 
penetration were evidence of competitiveness, in particular, in the 1960s. In the 1970s, 
internationalisation was marked by its emphasis on industrial expansion through foreign
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investment and competition between multinationals. The competitiveness of a country 
and its firms came to include the proportion of global sales accounted for by production 
abroad.
In the 1980s. a new pattern of industrial competitiveness emerged largely due to 
the influence of technology. The key to global competition was neither Fordist mass 
production of standardised products nor the concept of comparative advantage on 
collective factors such as resource endowment, labour and capital inputs, but the ability 
to innovate and to adapt and implement technologies. For the purposes of technological 
sophistication, maximum flexibility, commercialised products, extensive supplier 
network, and most important, global competition, firms interact on a global scale of 
external alliances, for instance, joint ventures, subcontracting, licensing and inter-firm 
agreements. "Firms have gone beyond their traditional practices of exporting to foreign 
countries and building foreign facilities to establishing intricate international networks 
of research, production and information. These flexible webs of interaction exist 
alongside trade and foreign investment as evidence of the increasing globalization of 
industrial activities, but have proven far more difficult to measure’ (OECD, 1992:11).
The consequence of the internationalisation of industrial activities is the decline 
in the power of states to control economic events. Nations are more anxious to promote 
their competitiveness in an international setting of fierce competition, by the method of 
intervening in markets, negotiating with rivals, and making special arrangements for 
government and societal actors to co-operate. They can't easily control production 
which is aimed at a global market, in particular those production activities located 
outside their frontiers. ‘They find they cannot direct; they can only bargain' (Stopford & 
Strange, 1991:14).
Stopford and Strange argued that traditional government-government diplomacy 
has been replaced by a new form of triangular diplomacy -- government-government, 
government-company, and company-company relations, in a changing international
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political economy. They not only point out that states are losing the power to pursue 
independent policies and they have to learn the new game of triangular bargaining, but 
also that technology and the structure of international finance have become the primary 
driving forces for change (ibid ). That is not to say that the economic functions of the 
state for competitiveness are less important in the international environment. 
Conversely, ‘global competition is much more than rivalry among firms, for it involves 
the "structural competitiveness" of states within the world system’ (ibid.:63). The 
capacity of the state to produce internal wealth and to create exports to finance 
purchases of needed goods and service has the effect of easing the pressures for social 
and political change.
In terms of Taiwan's domestic environment, rapid economic growth has evolved 
from the results of economic liberalisation and political démocratisation in the post- 
Chiang-Ching-Kuo era. This is not only a phenomenon that has happened in Taiwan, 
but all over the Third World3. The state faces problems arising not only from demand 
for more public services and more opportunities for participation in the decision making 
of public policy, but also of growing economic power in the private business sector, 
which is weakening the previously dominant and pervasive role of the Taiwanese state 
in industrial development. It seems that two advantageous structural factors are on the 
decline. These are the highly pervasive presence of an authoritarian political regime and 
the strong system of capable economic bureaucracy. Now, the state is not the only 
player on the stage. Challenges have arisen from social classes, which were treated and 
exploited as defaulters by the 'strong and effective state'.
Taiwan has experienced unprecedented internal changes since the termination of 
martial law in 1987: the expansion of parliamentary legitimacy, the challenge from the
3 A survey o f  the relationship between democracy and economic development in cross-national perspective concludes 
that ‘the greater the increases in gross domesUc product (GDP) per capita between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, 
the greater the poaitive shifts on the democracy scale' (Moore, 1995:17), but not the other way round. This trend has 
been described as ‘the third wave’ by Huntington (1992) and ‘the political economy o f authoritarian withdrawals' by 
Haggard and Kaufmen (1995).
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opposition, and the rising influence of the private sector. Taiwanese society has no prior 
democratic experience, moreover, prior to 1987 the Kuomintang (KMT) state was 
characterised by the strong presence of the military in both the party and state power 
structure and by its institutionalised intervention in civilian affairs through martial law. 
Politically, to respond to the potential military assault of Communist China and to 
maintain political and social stability, the KMT state not only restricted human rights 
and civil rights, but also controlled the unions and the whole society through the reform 
and expansion of the party, the military, the government and the intelligence system. 
Economically, in the period of import substitution, there was intervention and severe 
regulation of interest rates, prices, trade, foreign exchange and finance. While the 
degree o f  state intervention into every aspect of civilian activities had been reduced to a 
lower level, up to the eve of the termination of martial law there was no fundamental 
change in the nature of state intervention.
If the Taiwanese government continues to follow the old tactic of state-led 
industrial development, it can be presumed that Taiwanese competitiveness will decline 
soon. In an era where that ideology is playing a lesser part in political life and where 
economic pressure for the opening of markets to international competition is increasing, 
the KMT's ability to reserve economic rewards for political supporters is being reduced 
(Ferdinand, 1994). The state must adjust its role in a fast-changing world. A 
conventional one-party authoritarian regime cannot deal with these new domestic and 
international transmutations and a new form of state-societal arrangements is required. 
The issue of finding compatible state-societal arrangements for industrial development 
is fundamentally different from changing the pattern of IP. It is an issue involving both 
economic and political considerations, and the interaction between actors which is more 
complex than ever before.
There is a trend in Taiwan to economise its previous state-driven industrial 
development towards a system of public-private cooperation in order to cope with 
changing environmental constraints. Taiwan has long been known to have a high degree
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of government intervention in its economy and a paternalistic IP of promoting industrial 
competitiveness. It demonstrates that the Taiwanese state has no choice but to adapt 
itself to the consequences of economic globalization and political démocratisation. No 
matter what kind of economy there will be in the future, it should be more like the open 
economies of the industrialised countries than it was. The role the state plays as the 
engine of growth that will get Taiwan into next century is highly contested.
To sum up, there is a need for a new model, instead of the state-centred model, to 
capture the complexity of the changes that have taken place in Taiwan. As far as 
competitiveness is concerned, the core of the new model should be the development of 
technology and the adjustment of the relationship between the state and industry.
1.3. Objectives
Proposals will be made for a new state-industrial arrangement in Taiwan which could 
help to ensure international competitiveness in a changing international and domestic 
climate. Basically speaking, this thesis is designed as a theory-testing one. To search for 
such a model, the situation in Taiwan will be examined according to a well-developed 
theoretical background-that of J.A. Hart's model: the effect of state-societal 
arrangements on international competitiveness. In his model, three variables are 
introduced, namely, international structure, state structure, and social structure, of 
which he uses state-societal arrangements (through their impact on the speed of 
diffusion of new technology) to explain different types of influence on competitiveness 
among the main capitalist countries. Although the framework of analysis is derived 
from Hart's model, emphasis is placed on state-industrial arrangements, in particular on 
the interaction between the government and industry. This is mainly to reflect the fact 
that labour is still too weak to affect national policy in Taiwan.
IP, focused on the development of technology, will be the main concern in 
analysis of the interplay between the state and industry. How a national IP will be 
affected under the pressure of competition and structural adjustment, and what kind of
relationship will be formed between the government and industry' under the changing 
environmental constraints are two main questions, which will be examined through the 
perspective of IP.
Hart's model provides a new tool for examining a country's competitiveness 
through arrangements among three domestic actors (the state, labour, and business). 
This model is the most appropriate for the analysis of those capitalist countries with 
industrial capacity to compete within the world economy whatever inherent domestic 
structures they might employ. Those without industrial competitiveness or outside the 
world economy are excluded from this model. While other approaches to the political 
economy of development in developing countries (especially, NIEs) are significant 
variations in each. Hart’s model, however, could provide an approach to remedy the 
shortcomings of these theoretical perspectives. It could be argued that none of the neo­
classical, dependency, and state-centred (neo-statist) perspectives is fully adequate by 
itself to elucidate what has occurred in East Asia, but all accommodate some relevant 
and valuable insights. Because of their bias to different concerns, for instance, the neo­
classical perspective stressed market mechanisms and limited state, the dependency on 
international linkage, and the statist focused on state interventions and IP, it is very 
difficult for any of them to confer a comprehensive explanation in the contemporary 
situation. Nations like Taiwan and Korea have increased their industrial 
competitiveness since the late 1970s, however, their state-societal arrangements for 
international competitiveness are still under-explored. It is thus worthwhile to restore 
the balance and to apply this model to the case of NIEs.
Besides, it would also be valuable for NIEs to find a superior system for 
themselves and by its application to learn the merits of a competitive model and to 
avoid the shortcomings of their predecessors. In this way, countries late to 
industrialisation will be able to take advantage of their predecessors' technical and 
developmental experiences. There will be an analysis of how Taiwan has evolved its 
arrangements for industrial development and whether these arrangements are
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competitive in practice and theory.
The objectives of this thesis are threefold: (1) to justify the theoretical application 
of state-societal arrangements in explaining the case of Taiwan; (2) to suggest an 
appropriate state-industrial arrangements which will enable Taiwan to transfer from its 
state-led one and remain competitive; (3) to interpret the impact of the 
political/economic environment on the evolution of institutional arrangements.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Assumptions
This thesis is not a theory-building one, but a theory-testing one. Accordingly, the 
research method will follow the theory-then-research school, rather than research-then- 
theory school. The principles of theory-then-research are, firstly, that the establishment 
of scientific knowledge depends mainly on the development of a theory, and that 
research testing the theory can justify or not its validity; secondly, the main function of 
the process of scientific research is theory-testing in which a hypothesis is deduced 
from theory, not theory-building in which theory is established by inductive logic.
The rationale of the research design proceeds from three associated assumptions:
(1) The model created by Hart which was designed to analyse the five largest 
industrialised countries is applicable to the case of Taiwan.
(2) The new state-societal arrangements will be formed under changing 
environmental factors. Because of the previous strong role performed by the state, the 
new state-societal arrangements could be either the Japanese type of strong state and 
business but weak labour or the type of strong state and labour but weak business. It is 
impossible for Taiwan to be the Germany type of strong business and labour but weak 
state in near future, unless there is a major political change. It is also difficult for any 
country to be the type of strong state and labour but weak business because how can a
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country with weak business compete internationally?
(3) Changes in domestic politico-economic conditions and increasing 
international competition influence not only the economic functions of the state in 
gaining international competitiveness and its role on IP per se, but also the reshaping of 
GI relations towards a new institutional arrangement.
2.2. Research Methods
This study employed made use of a hybrid design comprised of library data, public 
source information (press releases, government publications, local newspaper 
announcements, association publications), observations, archival materials, and field 
interviews with policy insiders and participants in the sample industries.
Collecting these empirical research materials was not easy, in particular, for those 
from government resources. Secondary sources, such as books, journals and periodicals, 
are abundant. There is also no lack of English versions of secondary research materials 
from Taiwan, since many academics educated at postgraduate level abroad, mostly in 
the USA, have published their works in English. Those secondary materials have 
provided general background knowledge for this study.
The collection of government materials was more difficult in the beginning when 
I tried to obtain materials for selecting industries for study4. The notion of free 
information was not yet well-developed in Taiwan. Getting inside information depends 
very much on intimate relationships. In 1995,1 was also frustrated by many officials at 
different government levels when I needed to arrange formal interviews. Finally, I 
overcame the situation by building and tracing some personal connections in 1996.
4 In 1995, 1 hod several informal interviews with technocrats in charge o f the administration o f specific industries 
within the different divisions o f IDB. The coverage o f  industries included, computer, semiconductor, steel, auto, ship­
building. consumer electronics, textile, machinery and petrochemistry industries. The materials they supplied were loo 
general and I felt there were bamers between them and me. I could not get further industrial information about the 
details o f policies Many officials at MOEA’s branches refused to give interviews by saying that they were too busy to 
do so. One even said, 'there are so many postgraduates wanting to arrange interviews, how can we have time to cope 
with all o f  you?' Since they did not know me, they did not want to damage their careers by releasing important 
information or stating something ‘wrongly’.
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Two turning points made the collection of information and the arrangement of 
interviews easier. The first is that I have three friends working at the central 
government5. They all made efforts to provide the information needed for my research. 
Some materials are characterised as involving sensitive issues, classified and circulated 
among certain “competent authorities' only, which I would never have obtained without 
their assistance. I had arranged some interviews with the higher officials at the 
Department of Industrial Technology (DIT) and the Industrial Development Bureau 
(IDB) through a friend at the Executive Yuan by only making a few phone calls, while I 
had made so many visits and calls but failed.
The second is that I participated in a government-held intensive course 
concerning the operation and management of high technology industry, on 18/03/96- 
28/03/966, which eased the pain of arranging interviews at the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI) and the private sector. Some interviewees, with professional 
backgrounds o f technology or high technology industries, were lecturers holding 
seminars in the course. Nine interviewees were from the course and some other 
interviews were arranged with their assistance. This course provided a stairway to enter 
the circles of Taiwan’s high technology industries, besides, it extended my analysis to 
the management perspective where I had only limited background knowledge.
Research materials are classified as secondary and empirical in the bibliography 
in which the latter will be precisely defined. Empirical materials include public 
publications, documents for internal circulation (including classified materials), and 
opinions drawn from elite interviews. The range of public publications is from 
government branches to ITRI and associations. Internal documents, mostly from
5 One is an alumnus o f  University o f Warwick, and we knew each other in 1993 The other is a colleague o f  mine when 
we campaigned for Dr. Ding at the 1989 legislator general election Another is also an alumnus o f  University o f  
Warwick, and we knew each other at National Taiwan University.
6 The course was provided by the government (the National Youth Commission in association with the Graduate 
Institute o f  Technology and Innovation Management o f  National Cheng-Chi University) in order to cultivate 
managerial human resources for the future neede o f  high technology industries and the participants are those who have 
a master or higher degree.
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government, will be listed in the bibliography, but classified materials have been 
selectively excluded because this might cause unnecessary trouble for the providers. 
These internal documents serve as the very foundation of empirical evidence in relation 
to policy. For instance, three research papers for ‘internal use only' from foreign actors 
(ADL, 1989; Dynatech, 1992; Dataquest, 1992) were the basis for the strategic planning 
of high-definition television (HDTV) policy.
Field interviews have occupied an essential place in empirical investigations. The 
practical content of policy implementation could not be understood from official 
publications and internal documents alone. Those interviewees supplied personal 
insights and inside information which sometimes told a different story from that of 
government propaganda. Thirty-two interviews were carried out in 1996, and most 
interviewees have had direct involvement in the field of the two case studies, while 
some others were involved in general IP (See Appendix).
Some interviewees had a conservative attitude towards releasing information (but 
they still provided valuable information) and asked that their information should be 
treated confidentially in case some developing countries might imitate Taiwan’s 
institutional arrangements and become future rivals, or in case of other international 
‘concerns’. But some have other thoughts, as Interview No. 6 stated, ‘don’t worry about 
the imitation by other countries, Taiwan’s system is quite unique, unless they have as 
supportive a government as Taiwan which is willing to invest in industrial technology.’ 
This concurs with my view, and many academic works (see chapter 3) which indicate 
that state-industrial arrangements are embedded in a national setting. Since every nation 
has a different culture, society and state, the institution can not be transplanted from one 
country to another one. To the fear of international criticism on ‘unfair government 
measures’, the answer, based on academic intuition, is that if Taiwan did not violate 
international regulations, it need not worry about the exploration of the detailed 
operation of its institutional innovation. If Taiwan did disobey ‘the rules of the game', 
sanctions are inevitable. The nature of academic examination is to find the reality,
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unlike that of the press which is to dig for scandal, so it is the duty of the academic to 
disclose the facts rather than to undercover ‘unfairness’. However, in order to respect 
the wishes of some interviewees, I shall not refer to their names on citing their opinions.
Concerning Chinese ideographs in this study, they have been used so as to avoid 
the confusion of many romanisation systems actually in use for transliterating from 
Chinese. There are, at least, four systems (Wade-Giles, Yale, Pinyin and Kuo-yu- 
chu-in-fa H§§?±E?i£), and all led to different English spellings. Thus, Chinese 
ideographs are appended to those names that have not an official standard translation in 
Taiwan, in particular, for those policies and documents that I have translated. It is 
sometimes difficult for me to understand what the romanised spelling refers to, let alone 
for international readers. Chinese ideograph could be meaningless to those who could 
not read it, so do romanisation forms. However, it would be easier for non-Chinese 
readers to trace the origin of documents or certain terms by showing the actual Chinese 
characters. In addition, translations are made to those Chinese titles. Those documents 
listed in the bibliography with both English and Chinese characters are available in a 
Chinese version only.
Many financial figures, mainly in New Taiwan dollars (NTS) and US dollars 
(USS) are used in this study without converting to the value of one currency. In the 
research time span from 1990-96, it was about NTS24-27 against US$1, but mostly 
stabilised at 25:1. Tables, figures, and charts used in this thesis are numbered in order of 
their appearance in each chapter.
2.3. Selection of Sample Industries
To decide objectives for empirical study is not just a question of combining the 
knowledge of existing literature and personal knowledge, it sometimes calls for the 
researcher to pay special attention to the linkage between theories and practice. In other 
words, in selecting a sampling mechanism to conduct empirical study, generally 
speaking, one must think about its application, or relationship, to the realm of theory.
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Thus a bad sampling procedure would lead to either a blurring of the theory to be 
tested/built, or superficiality. Moreover, the need for empirical study to test J.A. Hart's 
model lies at the heart of this thesis. This model cannot be discussed and tested without 
offering appropriate empirical evidence. For the sake of successfully testing the fit of 
Taiwan with this model, sampling industries for empirical study must be done very 
carefully. Linking the theory and the empirical study will be the central concern in 
selecting sample industries.
Because the main concern of this thesis is Taiwanese state-industrial 
arrangements and international competitiveness, the criteria for the selection of sample 
industries in this study are twofold: one concerns the academic development of GI 
relations and the other relates to competitiveness among Taiwan4s various industries 
with special reference to industrial innovation. Most empirical studies of Taiwan’s 
industries were conducted at a national level (undertaken by economists) or at the firm 
level (by business studies specialists). The first is too general and the second, too 
specific. Therefore, a sectoral investigation has been chosen as the empirical target, but 
even so, to analyse industries under a national structure is inescapable. This is mainly 
because industrial activities operate in a domestic environment which is created, 
regulated and maintained by the national government, and more importantly, Gl 
relations are about the ‘politics of reciprocal arrangements’, in which relations are 
shaped by the government and the private sector. In addition, only very few of Taiwan’s 
empirical industrial studies took international constraints into account which might 
result in a failure to cope with the ever-changing world market. As far as the 
development of industrial technology is concerned, only those industries with promising 
markets and with technology which requires further innovation will be taken as 
empirical cases. The so-called sunset and mature industries are excluded from the 
investigation.
The development of GI relations has shifted its emphasis from the national level 
to sectoral studies (Wilks & Wright, 1987). That is not to say that the states have to be
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excluded from analysis, but rather that the private sector should increase its relative 
importance in the analysis of GI relations. This rejection of a state-centred explanation 
in GI relations reflects at least two important facts. First, the relative decline of state 
autonomy to deal with industrial activities is evidenced, such as investment decision 
and financial matters, which have been highly internationalised (Strange, 1988). In 
particular, globalized production for world markets is far more than states can control. 
That is not to say that the state has lost its role, rather, the state must transfer its role 
from one of controller to one of bargainer. It still has the authority to define the 
boundary of the national market in a new era of international political economy. 
Moreover, the concept of GI relations in a national economy without a special focus on 
the variation between sectors makes it hard to generalise about the existence of 
particular kinds of sectoral GI interaction. It is rather as the ‘macro explanation of state- 
economy relations’, sheds light on culture, social structure and institution (Gamble, 
1995:526). Due to the differentiation of forms of production from industry to industry, 
which may affect the formation of distinctive patterns of GI relations, it is necessary to 
conduct research on a sectoral, sub-sectoral level, see for example, many articles in 
Wilks & Wright (1987); Grant (1989a); Genther (1990). Some even advocate that GI 
relations should not only be understood at the meso level, but also at the micro level. 
Cawson et al.( 1990) argued that the firm is more suitable to be the unit of analysis than 
the industry in the study of the European electronics industry. Furthermore, to measure 
competitiveness based on the data of a special industry is much easier to interpret than 
on that tested on the economy as a whole (Hart, 1992:7).
However, macro GI relations should not be ignored in the sense that a general IP 
influencing fundamental environmental factors which create a favourable context for 
industrial success cannot be observed just from sectoral studies. A comparative study of
six different industries in the UK, the USA and Canada concluded that:
First, any account o f  industry adjustment w hich fails to  take account o f  both national policy paths 
and sectoral influences is going to  be inadequate. Future research should be focus on the com plex 
interaction betw een the tw o patterns, rather than assigning a priority to either national or sectoral 
influences......... Second, the differences betw een the historical experiences, inherited institutional
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arrangements, technologies, and markets o f  sectors remain so significant that government must 
retain a capability to understand such differences, and to develop policies tailored to sectoral needs 
(Grant. 1989a 269)
Second, a general assumption that the degree of political attention is similar for 
different industries is inappropriate in contemporary G1 relations. Some are always 
more equal than others. Certain industrial sectors which have distinctive economic 
characteristics have attracted governmental concern. The economic importance of an 
industry to a nation is an important factor which shapes GI relations. A sectoral study 
based on the Japanese auto industry demonstrated that the Japanese government was 
more responsive to the auto industry’s needs because of its central role to the Japanese 
economy, leading not only to more interactions and negotiation between government 
and auto business, but also to shelter it from liberalisation for as long as possible 
(Genlher, 1990). The pictures of GI relation in sectors in structural decline and rising 
high-tech industries are different. An analysis which simply focuses on the management 
of industrial crises may lead to a distorted understanding of the pattern of GI relations 
(Grant et al„ 1987). In general, state interventions, --or in other words -  political 
attentions, tend to be in favour of ‘promising’ industries in the 1990s. Those 
advantageous sectors accept more government assistance and have easy access to the 
process of policy-making, thus their GI relations are different from those of the 
Cinderella sectors. Besides, different state strategies are appropriate for different sectors, 
because ‘industry structure as well as the source of competitive advantage are different 
(Porter, 1990:67)’. Thus, ‘economic centrality’ is an essential determinant to frame GI 
relations (Grant, 1989a).
The increasing competition o f  international trade raises the question of whether 
there is a way to foster a nation’s competitiveness in industrial products through a 
certain type of GI relationship. It is often argued that Japan’s GI relations provide 
evidence which demonstrates that a more effective IP can help to restructure industry 
and the economy. The Japanese government’s ability to intervene in the private sector
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and the willingness of industry to accept such 'administrative guidance7' seem two 
essential determinants for its economic performance. The Japanese case suggests that 
well-functioning G1 interactions could lead to the growth of international 
competitiveness. If so, GI relations become one of the factors which help to form a 
national advantage in global competition causing IP to be more effective and industry 
more competitive.
The competitiveness of an industry is also a very important determinant of GI 
relations. The stronger the competitiveness of an industry, the weaker the ability of the 
state to dominate GI relations. The ability of an industry to resist government 
intervention increases as it becomes more competitive. In general, the state will protect 
infant industries in their early stages of development based on the doctrine of economic 
nationalism and the purposes of state-building. Meanwhile, the private sector is also 
willing to ‘accept’ this paternalist kind of protection to restrict foreign competition. The 
goals of both sides are similar, since the state wants to promote economic growth, and 
the industry wants to increase productivity and market share. Under this condition of 
mutual understanding, GI relations are more likely to tend towards the state-led style. 
The situation will change in association with increasing sectoral competitiveness, which 
means that the development of ‘self-governing capability’ lets the industry develop and 
implement sector-generated solutions, instead of government-designed solutions 
(Grant, 1989a:258-70). The views on goals might diverge and the ability of the private 
sector to resist undesirable policies increase, leading to a changing pattern of 
interactions between government and industry. Two possible general directions of 
interaction may develop: one is that cooperative relations may be formed through 
negotiation between two sides, the other is that adversarial relations may appear 
because of disagreements on future goals. In this sense, GI relations will be affected by
7 Administrative guidance (gyoeei shido) is defined as 'an administrator's action, without any coercive legal effect, 
which encourage related parties to act in a specify way in order to realise some administrative aim (Wakiyama, 
1987:211)’ in Japan. These informal guidelines provide a fast IP instrument to solve short-term, low-key problems in 
specific industries. According to Okimoto (1989:93-5), administrative guidelines have often been argued as a tool o f  IP 
for sunset and declining industries or as trade-related agreements among domestic companies, but have served 
relatively infrequently as a versatile tool for high technology.
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sectoral competitiveness; in turn, sectoral competitiveness will also be affected by GI 
relations. A dynamic analysis of this changing relationship is necessary .
Accordingly, Gl relations are not static but alter through time (Genther, 1990; 
Kuo, 1995), from sector to sector and from country to country (Grant, 1989a; 
Hart, 1992). However, the effect of Gl relations on international competitiveness cannot 
be simply understood in terms of the role of the state or political institutions, such as 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (M1TI) and Taiwan’s IDB, as 
mediated through industry policy. GI relations are not controllable just by the state or 
the private sector. It is a complex phenomenon with many actors involved in shaping 
relations including agencies, domestic and international firms, foreign government, 
international organisations and individuals. In all this, the state remains as an important 
unit of analysis, especially given that the authoritarian Taiwanese state is undergoing a 
process of transition and is still involved in industrial activities, but the private sector 
and the international factors have to be incorporated into the account because of their 
undeniable importance in shaping GI relations.
In this study, the development of Taiwan’s notebook-sized computer (NPC) and 
HDTV have been selected as the empirical cases. Both are electronic-related industries 
which has emerged as the most important single industry since 1980s. Because of their 
economic centrality and increasing competitiveness in international markets, the 
relationship between government and industry is worthy of examination.
Manufacturing industries have long been the heart of Taiwan’s economy. Their 
share of GDP increased from 22% in 1965 to 34% in 1990. The average annual growth 
rate (in % of GDP) was 14.6% in 1965-80 and 7.7% in 1980-90 (TSDB, 1993:309,311).
The importance of the electronics industry to Taiwan’s economy has increased in 
accordance with its industrial structure shifting from light, labour-intensive industry 
towards capital- and technological-intensive industry since the 1980s. Taiwan’s highly 
successful export-oriented industries underwent a gradual transformation in the 1970s, a
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period of heavy industrialisation. The textile industry continued to play an important 
role, but other main exports declined, such as the products of agricultural processing 
which have been replaced by rising industries, for instance, petrochemicals, iron and 
steel, electronic goods. Electrical and electronics industries were characterised by 
relatively low technology and labour-intensiveness at that time. In early 1980s, textiles 
and garments were the largest single industry. After a decade of the state’s efforts to 
reallocate sources into the development of technology-intensive industries, the 
proportion of the export value of these industries has increased substantially and 
become the largest industry. In 1990 alone, heavy, chemical and technology-intensive 
products accounted for 54% of the nation’s total exports, while another 40% 
represented the output of the electronic (including information) and machinery 
industries.
In 1995, Taiwan became the largest producer of NPC. This leads to the question 
of whether the government’s programme on the development of NPC in 1990 had the 
effect of promoting technology and competitiveness. This programme was the first case 
of a special effort to incorporate public research institutions and individual firms to 
conduct research and development (R&D) together. How the public research institute, 
represented as the surrogate of state intervention in the field of innovation, ran this 
earmarked collaboration and solved the conflicts between government and firms, and 
between firms provides an experimental model to build public-private cooperation in 
technological development.
In the case of collaboration to develop HDTV the government realised the 
importance of HDTV development to integrate different industries into a ‘future’ 
industry. The government was afraid of losing future markets to rivals. Thus, 
cooperation between the government and different industries and firms is going on in 
order to make Taiwan’s HDTV R&D commercialised. Like the development of NPC, 
the potential market of HDTV is promising, but it is more difficult than NPC because 
its technology involves many industries, such as electronic, information technology and
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telecommunications.
In the case of collaboration to develop NPC, Taiwan has become a strong rival in 
the international market and it is possible that its HDTV programme will follow suit. 
Through a cooperative approach to develop and diffuse technology in strategic sectors, 
the flexibility of smaller firms, the strengths of larger firms and the R&D capacity of 
public institutions are brought together. The pace of innovation has increased by such 
alliances. It is still too early to say that the Taiwanese state is the main actor in the 
process of collaborative innovation before taking industry’s response into account. 
However, it is safe to argue that the private sector cannot produce technological 
innovation in such a short time without governmental efforts to promote and link it. In 
this sense, the GI relations in the case of collaboration to develop technology is more 
cooperative than adversarial.
3. THE ORGANISATION OF THESIS
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This chapter identifies the problems 
confronted in Taiwan’s economic development. Under the changing environmental 
constraints, the pattern of industrial development should be adjusted to a more effective 
and efficient arrangement. The second part of chapter one concerns methodology 
deployed in this study, including the objectives of the thesis, three associated 
assumptions, precise definition of research materials, and the selection criteria for 
sectoral investigations.
Chapter two reviews the literature in relation to the East Asian developmental ism, 
in particular, referring to the case of Taiwan. It clarifies the vulnerability of neo-statist 
theories on interpreting the current situation of Taiwan’s development. A new 
interpretation of theoretical developments, focused on state-industrial arrangements, is 
presented to remedy the universal application of an authoritarian perspective. A 
pragmatic approach have been taken to the analysis of the interface between the state 
and industry, as well as international factors which might seriously affect national
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policy towards industrial development.
Chapter three provides an analytical framework and theoretical perspective 
derived from the work of J.A. Hart. However, the related terms and definitions have 
been justified and modified to cope with the needs of this research. It highlights the 
relations between international competitiveness, technology innovation, and GI 
arrangements. The two relevant theoretical perspectives which are discussed, statism 
and corporatism, can each provide part of the explanation of GI relationship in Taiwan, 
but it is argued, according to the findings of this study, that the institutionalised 
strategic partnership (ISP) is more capable of explaining the current GI relationships.
Chapter four describes the innovation system in Taiwan with special emphasis on 
those IPs supporting industrial upgrading. It demonstrates that the Taiwan government 
was the biggest institutional actor in the field of innovative activities which could be 
observed from the enforcement of laws and regulations, the creation of public research 
institutes, and pervasive policies for supporting industrial upgrading.
Chapter five deals with the NPC Alliance which is the generation of a public- 
private cooperation in developing a product. Through the collaborative efforts of two 
sectors, NPC was created in a very short time which finally led Taiwan to become the 
largest NPC producer in the world. It is argued that the case of NPC Alliance built a 
model of tightly merging industry with the public research institutes that integrated 
technology innovation, technology diffusion and product creation. And these generic 
state-industrial arrangements have been institutionalised in the sense that most GI 
cooperation on technology development has followed suit.
Chapter six unveils the state-industrial arrangements of HDTV development in 
Taiwan, which basically modelled the case of NPC Alliance but extended it to a sector­
wide application in order to create more commercial products at the same time. This is 
also an initial case that the government intended to develop/revive a new/old industry 
through public-private cooperation. The state-industrial arrangements has penetrated
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deeply into the area of emerging industry'. The degree of state intervention has increased 
because of the strategic importance of this sector.
Chapter seven concludes that the three initial assumptions have been proved to be 
correct. The newly emerging state-industrial arrangements in Taiwan can be 
characterised as “institutionalised strategic partnerships'. Taiwan fits into Hart's model 
in the position of the state-business coalition side which is assumed to be a more 
competitive arrangement than in the position of the state vertex. State-Societal 
arrangements have been an endogenous and institutional factor which forms a necessary 
part of the explanation and understanding of the promotion of international 
competitiveness. It also suggests that a revision of East Asian developmentalist theories 
is desirable in which technological and international factors should be incorporated in 
the analysis.
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C H A P T E R T W O
L IT E R A T U R E  R E V IE W
1. DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVE
The main arguments of dependency theory are based on the rejection of a universal 
Western-based model of development and the development experience of Latin 
America, inspired from long standing analyses of imperialism and neo-imperialism and 
from structural theories about the effects of ineqalitarian or dependency relations in the 
international system. Dependency theory suggests that the structure of an international 
regime constrains the developmental opportunities for less-developed countries, and 
attempts to analyse economic development from the view of the interplay between 
internal and external structures. The world has been divided into two parts by 
dependency theorists, a core of industrialised nations in Western Europe and North 
America, and a periphery in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this Marxist tradition of 
analysis, the periphery is represented as the producer of raw material and the consumer 
of industrial commodities; moreover, the international division of labour exploits the 
periphery by multinationals from the core through either the colonial administration 
method of direct extraction of resources, or the neo-colonialist method of unequal terms 
of trade.
However, in response to the dynamic development of NIEs, a revised theory has 
evolved as the concept of ‘dependent development ‘ by Cardoso and Faletto (1979). 
They argue that even some of the peripheral countries will gradually achieve 
industrialisation as, for example, the case of Brazil, Korea and Taiwan. This is not to 
say that these countries will become core countries. The economic growth of these NIEs 
still relies on markets, capital, technology and operation from core countries on the one 
hand, and on the other hand these NIEs exploit less developed countries in the same
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way as they have been exploited. In this sense, according to I. Wallerstein's theory of 
the modern world system, NIEs are at best in the position of a 'semi-periphery’ in 
which the core states tend to specialise in manufacturing, the periphery' is relegated to 
the production of raw materials, and the semiperiphery is somewhere in between 
(quoted from Gilpin, 1987:67-72).
In the 1980s, the dependencista literature has shown that an active state is one of 
the keys to the movement from a situation of classic dependence to one of dependent 
development (Evans et al., 1985). Evans takes the argument further to demonstrate that 
there is clearly a ‘triple alliance’ (1987) behind dependent capitalist development, 
which is constituted by authoritarian state, transnationals and local private capitalists. 
The difference between Latin American and the East Asian NIEs is that the Asian states 
are the dominant partners in a triple alliance, which has contradicted the dependent 
development’s view that foreign firms are the dominant and constraining partner. The 
effort of the dependency theorists to extend its theoretical application to East Asian 
NIEs was unsuccessful. First, the dependency theory (or an historic-structural analysis 
of the political economy of Third World capitalist development) assumes that the 
structure of the global economy conditions economic growth, class relations, and 
political forms which tends to ‘ignore how domestic political forces constrain economic 
policy and shape state responses to the external environment’ (Haggard, 1990:21). 
Indeed, the unsupervised state administration of Korea and Taiwan is highly related to 
the success of economic development (Johnson, 1987). Second, the critique of a triple 
alliance is based on the argument that triple alliances can be observed all over the world 
(include the developed world), in which it is unclear who is dominant among the state, 
local businessmen and transnationals. Thus, a triple alliance is not an unique feature for 
economic development. As Schive (1990) argued foreign direct investment did 
facilitate Taiwan’s economic development, but it was not the main cause of its 
economic development. Moreover, ‘the countries which grew more rapidly used foreign 
capital relatively less intensively than those that grew less rapidly’ (Parry, 1988:127).
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Dependence on foreign direct investment in East Asian NIEs has been relatively low 
(Haggard & Cheng, 1987), and the relationship between foreign capital inflows and 
growth is at best tenuous (Parry , 1988). Furthermore, the demand for foreign capital is 
decided by a country's domestic policies, not by special foreign investment ‘incentives', 
which is behind the concerns of dependency.
2. THE NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE
The economic development of Taiwan, and of other Asian NIEs, have been cited as 
evidence to support neo-classical theories. The neo-classical perspective seems to be 
the mainstream interpretation of the successful development of East Asian NIEs in the 
1970s and the early 1980s, before the emergence of the statist or interventionist 
perspective. This perspective, including the neoliberal interpretation as a subset, 
emphasised the liberalised market, in particular the free trade regime and minimum 
state intervention, as the main cause of East Asian miraculous development.
According to the neo-classical explanation, import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) is the proper strategy for Taiwan and Korea to protect their infant industries in the 
early process of industrialisation, and export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) can be 
deemed the ‘engine’ factor of successful take-off growth in the late process of 
industrialisation. The notion of ‘government failure’ in the neo-classical tradition 
suggests that trade-related and market-oriented strategies are the main cause of 
increasing East Asian NIEs’ comparative advantage. Thus, operating under the 
assumption that ‘market failure’ is rare and exceptional, Lai argued (1983) that any 
attempt by the government to intervene in the market would retard economic 
development. The state in economic development should operate within carefully
prescribed limits in terms of the neo-classical perspective, thus:
1. The state should primarily rely on market-based, private-sector-driven initiatives in the 
mobilisation and allocation o f  resource to growth-promoting activities.
2. The state should intervene only in cases o f  clearly established 'market failure’ (i.e. In cases where 
private sector operations do  not correspond to  societal interests).
3. Even in cases o f  proven market failure, appropriate policy responses should be parametric 
measures (such as lump-sum taxes and subsidies) as well as incentives that establish a private
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market (such as a venture capital market)
4 The state should provide pure public goods’ (law and order, national defence, public 
infrastructure) including the proper assignment and enforcement o f property rights
5. The state should provide a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment through 
appropriate condition of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies
6. The state should adopt a free trade (or almost free trade) regime as a core component o f a neutral 
policy regime (Chowdhury &  Islam, 1993:46).
Therefore, the dynamic economic growth of East Asian NIEs relied on the private 
sector and free trade so that these economies have been able to minimise government 
failure so common in the Third World countries. But it is an overstatement that East 
Asian economic success depends on market mechanisms alone (Haggard, 1990; Wade, 
1990). There are two questions that challenged neo-classical political economy in terms 
of the contribution of international trade and the minimal role of the state in East Asian 
economic development.
First, free trade might be a fashionable rhetoric rather than a reality, or at least, 
the success of EOI could be limited to a particular period of time in an international 
setting of favouring free trade. Taiwan’s economic take-off of export expansion has 
benefitted from its own strategy of EOI in accordance with the neo-classical 
explanation, which is also a widely accepted conception by neo-statists. More 
importantly, it benefitted from the guardianship of the liberal trading order by the US -  
the biggest market for Taiwan. This factor implies that Taiwan had a relatively easy and 
privileged access to the most prosperous markets at a time of international economic 
expansion. Because of the slow growth of most industrial countries and the massive US 
trade deficit in the late 1980s, the favourable condition for exporting to those countries 
has disappeared. Moreover, the US has transformed the advocacy of a liberal trade 
regime into a relatively protectionist and defensive one. The ratification of the 1988 
trade act gives the US Trade Representative the right of being the ‘judge and jury’ in 
section 301 so as to force its trading rivals to comply with what the US required, which 
has been termed as ‘aggressive unilateralism’ by Bhagwati (1990). In addition, 
regionalised trade blocs also constrained opportunities for ‘trading free’. This being so, 
the replication of export-oriented growth is more difficult than it was two or three
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decades ago. the developing countries will only find difficulties if they try to imitate the 
outward-looking pathway of NIEs in a neo-protectionism era. Free trade as the engine 
of growth could be a short-term explanation confined to 1950-1985 but not a universal 
explanation. Therefore, the neo-classical view of free trade in relation to economic 
development fails to take the changing world trade climate into account.
Moreover, the notion of free trade is only valid in the sense of a general freedom 
from state intervention. In neo-classical analysis it is absolutely right to say that trade is 
the economic pulse of most outward-looking economies, but it may be wrong to say that 
the economic growth of East Asian NIEs can be attributed to free trade. The 
relationship between state intervention and success in international trade is more 
complex than the neo-classical explanation suggests. If we take government 
intervention in import controls and export incentives into account, Taiwan was not by 
any means a free trade regime (Wade, 1990, 1991; Gunnarsson, 1993). So an invisible 
hand is rarely the answer to the economic growth of NIEs.
Second, minimal government intervention as one of the essential components of 
economic success in the East Asian NIEs has now been challenged by developmental 
statist views. In particular, neo-classical considerations based on the absence of 
government intervention in promoting economic growth arrive at the conclusion that 
‘the industrial policy was either of negligible importance in understanding growth in the 
Asian Newly Industrialising countries, or that growth would have been faster without 
industrial policy’ (Nolan, 1993:72). The statist argument, that the East Asian states 
traditionally exercised a wide range of IP instruments and different patterns of state 
intervention, is far removed from the position of the liberal market-oriented economy in 
the form of neo-classical analysis.
Three features characterise Taiwan's IP (Liu, 1993). These are a high level of 
state intervention in the operation of the private sector, discretionary manipulation of 
assistance to targeted industries, and influence on the investment pattern. These have
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had the effect of accelerating Taiwan's industrial development and promoting 
international competitiveness. The state serves as regulator, protector, subsidiser, 
controller, and entrepreneur which corrects market failures and accelerates industrial 
performance. The state formulates and pursues IP according to a conception of the 
national interest, rather than the demands or interests of the private sector. The state as 
an IP actor has had an independent effect on industrial dynamics. This well-directed 
state action, utilising the capacity of the bureaucracy provides an institutional 
framework of state-driven industrial development.
Some authors, for example Wade (1990), suggest that the Taiwanese state tries to 
lead or to govern, not to follow or to replace, the market, which is inconsistent with the 
neo-classical account. He argues against the neo-classical explanation in terms of self­
regulating markets, of a free trade regime, and of neglecting the state autonomy over the 
economy development for creating advantages (Wade, 1988, 1990:chapter 3, 1992b; 
White & Wade, 1988). Moreover, the neo-classical explanation obviously does not 
specify the institutional sources of policymaking, and inadequately evaluates direct 
government interventions on individual industries within NIEs (Ting, 1992). Many 
factors, other than trade-related issues, which had deeply been influenced by the state 
are deliberately ignored in the case of Taiwan’s development by neo-classical 
economists, for example, the role of economic bureaucracy (Ho, 1987; Johnson, 1987; 
Wade, 1990), financial system and investment funds (Chiu, 1992; Shea & Yang, 1994), 
technological development (O.C.C. Lin, 1992; Liu, 1992; Simon, 1992), the 
exploitation of the labour force (Deyo, 1987), and nationalised enterprises.
3. THE NEO-STATIST PERSPECTIVE
Since the early 1980s, there has been a political, economic and sociological academic 
movement to ‘bring the state back in’ (Evans et al., 1985). In response to a lack of 
political institutional analysis in the political economy of East Asian development by 
‘international system-centred’ dependency theory and a ‘laissez faire’ neo-classical
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approach, new theories have been developed. These focus mainly based on the analysis 
of public policy and the role of the state to embody a new perspective on East Asian 
development process. There has been a paradigm switch in the "western social sciences' 
in the 1970s. As Skocpol (1985) argued, the society-centred work which treated the 
state as a dependent variable should be substituted by theories which treat it as an 
independent variable. Her arguments also demonstrated that not only does the scope for 
autonomous state action vary but so does the capacity and readiness of state bureaucrats 
to follow an independent strategy relative to non-state actors (1985:14-9).
Many researchers who are interested in the issue of Taiwan’s development, 
argued that Taiwan, with a capable economic bureaucracy and state autonomy free from 
social class, is not guided by free-market principles. Contrary to neo-classical 
misconceptions the state intervenes strongly in the process of economic development 
(Aberbach et al., 1994; Amsden, 1985; Clark, 1987; Cumings, 1984; Deyo, 1987; Gold, 
1986; Haggard, 1988 & 1990; Hughes, 1988; Ranis, 1992; Rueschemeyer & Evans, 
1985; Tien, 1989; Wade, 1990; Whitely, 1991; Winckler & Greenhalgh, 1988; 
WoronofT, 1992). This new trend of explaining the state as an engine of growth has 
emerged from the work on Japanese development by Johnson (1982), as well as the 
Korean case by Amsden (1989) and the Taiwanese case by Wade (1990). These cases 
have emphasised that East Asian ‘developmental states’ are very important to guide and 
promote economic development. Synthetically speaking, there are three main 
associational arguments in relation to the role of the state in promoting growth in the 
neo-statist literature, namely policy activism, strong capacity and relative autonomy.
3.1. The Policy Activism of National Governments
The state actively initiated policies in economic issues relative to three fields, which are 
very essential to industrial development, namely, finance, trade and nationalised 
enterprises. The most visible state action is the employment of people to produce goods 
and services; the least visible is the regulation of behaviour in the private sector (Lane,
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1993). Taiwan's trade and financial policies, as instruments of public regulation, play a 
great role in industrial development. These are often neglected by the neoclassicalists 
who pay attention to resource allocation and resource redistribution.
In terms of Taiwan's financial system, it was characterised by public-ownership 
and tightly controlled by the state before the opening up of private banking operations 
in 1990. There is no doubt that Taiwan’s financial system is rigid. This arises from 
following factors: (1) the state can control the financial ability of firms and can require 
the compliance of firms in other matters through credit allocation; (2) the state’s 
financial control is not based on political authority, but on its economic power to 
provide loans and funds through associated institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance 
and the Central Bank; (3) financial control has a direct effect on individual firms rather 
than specific sectors (Lee & Lee, 1992:117-8). Moreover, the state not only used 
concessionary credit for export production, but also listed priority industries for bank 
lending (Wade, 1990:167). However, Pack (1992) argued that the growth of the private 
industrial investment was based on the high savings rate rather than on government 
intervention in the capital market. He agreed that the sectoral structure of investment 
was affected by financial policy, but disagreed that Taiwan’s rigid financial system had 
a strong relationship to economic development. This view is in contrast to Wade’s 
(1990) suggestion that tightened financial control facilitated the government in 
implementing an IP in order to modify a market-determined allocation of investment in 
line with government preferences which would finally contribute to economic 
development.
In terms of trade policy, the influence of public regulations in imports and exports, 
which affected the production and trade structure significantly, demonstrated the policy 
activism of the government. Taiwan's trade policy in the past was characterised by its 
protectionism. Taiwan had a fairly high level of protection in place for the domestic market 
and a relatively weak industrial sector at least until the mid 1980s when trade liberalisation 
was enforced. The state has used special administrative means to achieve the protection of
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the domestic market through restrictive import controls, and the acceleration of 
manufacturing exports by giving rebates or exemptions to those import items that went into 
exports. In order to control imports, some imports were prohibited and others were 
controlled by licence (Riedel, 1992; Wade, 1992b) To accelerate manufacturing exports 
the government employed the duty rebate scheme (Wade, 1991), which is designed to allow 
export sales to be distinguished from domestic sales, with rebate or exemption from tariffs 
and other charges allowed for imports that go into exports. The adjustment of non-tariff 
barriers is also an administrative means to control trade. The purpose of tariffs is relatively 
oriented to raising revenue, but non-tariff barriers are relatively oriented to industrial 
promotion and protection. Taiwan’s non-tariff barriers are lower for the imports of strategic 
industries and industrial inputs in comparison to the imports of output which goes to 
domestic consumption.
The state provides public regulations of imports and exports for the industrial sector 
to follow, so as to control the direction of production. While this is not a direct intervention 
in the production process, it does affect the direction of production. Such regulations 
allowed the state to target winners, and to limit losers. Needless to say, the state's regulation 
affected, if not the growth rate of short-term productivity, the long-term developmental 
direction of selected industry. Some writers have deemed Taiwan a free trade regime 
because they have not taken the public regulation of trade into account.
In terms of the policy of the state to develop nationalised enterprises, the 
entrepreneurial role of the state is most clearly evidenced when it assumes the direction of 
public industrial enterprises. The Taiwanese state built nationalised enterprises for two 
purposes; to act as an entrepreneur and to influence the private industrial sector. The KMT 
state set up the public industrial sector also for political reasons. The state sector served as 
the mainlanders’ economic preserve, to counter and control a private sector, which for the 
most part was dominated by local Taiwanese. As Denis Simon notes in his analysis of 
Taiwan in the 1970s; ’Most local businessmen claim that state control is politically 
motivated -  that is, since the government lacks a widespread economic base, the state has
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strategically chosen to remain active in key industries where it can exert more influence 
over the economy in general, and the private sector in particular' (Quoted from Bello & 
Rosenfeld, 1990:253).
The need to control pnces of specific industrial goods, especially those of supplied 
raw matenals from the nationalised enterprises, led to further state intervention in the 
private sector. This situation became more concrete after the expansion of public 
enterprises in the 1970s, and after the first oil crisis. The public enterprises were 
concentrated mostly in upstream sectors, so it was very easy to gain control over the 
downstream private sector. Moreover, private productive capital depends heavily on the 
upstream public sector, for example, the state has indirect leverage on synthetic fibres and 
textiles (the largest private industrial groups before mid-80s) through the Chinese 
Petroleum Corporation. Besides, the KMT state has control not only over the domestic 
private sector through public enterprises, but also over the industries which would expect to 
be dominated by multinationals (Wade, 1990:273). Moreover, many firms are not 
calculated in the group of public enterprises, because the state only owned part of the 
company. In fact, the state shares over 50% or more in many firms. The wholly or partly 
party-owned enterprises in manufacturing (textile, paper and printing, cement, and fibre and 
glass) and the service sector (television and radio network, Central Daily News/CDN, 
insurance, and Central Investment and Trust corporation) adds to the weight of the state 
sector. The image of economic liberalisation and privatisation is obtained because the state 
may reduce its share in an important firm by transferring the ownership to a party-owned 
company.
Concentrated government control in the context of relatively dispersed private 
ownership and in the prices of supplied materials, creates a situation whereby private 
enterprises depend more heavily on the public sector than the other way around. Heavy 
private sector reliance on government inputs makes it easy for the state to manipulate the 
direction of industrial development. Therefore, the policies of a large share of public and 
semi-public enterprises in Taiwan's industrialisation increased the autonomy of the state in
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relation to private industrial development. This is also important evidence for the 
interventionist nature of Taiwan's IP.
3.2. Strong State Capacity as the Dynamics of National Policy
National policies lead the state to play the role of trade regulator, financial controller, 
and entrepreneur in the process of Taiwan’s economic development. However, 
Taiwan’s economic development could not have reached its current level without a 
strong state capacity to implement its policies. For the purpose of rapid industrialisation 
the state must have the power to direct some resources to the high priority sector and to 
require this sector to meet performance goals. In the neo-statist theories, the state 
capacity to implement policies effectively through a centralised bureaucracy is one of 
the important components of a miracle. Neo-statist theories emphasised the positive 
role of government in which the well-educated bureaucrats and efficient agents injected 
influence into economic development. Under this conception, Taiwan’s case has been 
described as ‘the reciprocal interaction between the structure of the state apparatus and 
the process of economic growth’ by Amsden (1985:101). Wade argued (1990:195-227), 
the ‘organisational advantages’ of economic bureaucracy were essential determinants 
leading to the successful government of the market. Johnson (1987) argued, the 
‘capitalist developmental state’ that includes an elite bureaucracy and an authoritarian 
regime, adopted the ‘market-conforming’ intervention to promote economic growth. 
This is in contrast to the rule of the liberal market.
The weight of the strong state-bureaucratic capacity is parallel with the degree of 
state intervention in East Asian developmental states. In the accounts of neo-statism (or 
new political economy of development), state intervention has been deemed as a 
necessary ‘sin’ to implement national policies. This new way of thought, based on the 
experience of Japan and East Asian NIEs and the comparative industrial decline of the 
US and the UK in the 1980s, argued ‘that it was incorrect to think of government 
intervention always as a market distortion’ (Jones & Kirby, 1991:4). The judgement of
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whether a policy is a success or a failure is made by the outcomes of the policy not bv 
the policy-making process. The outcomes of the policy depend very much on successful 
policy implementation. According to Lane’s conception of implementation (1993:91-2), 
the public sector ( including three independent actors-policy formator, implementor and 
initiator) is the most important actor in policy implementation to control three 
dependent variables (policy, outcome and time). Therefore, state intervention in the 
process of policy implementation is one necessary ‘sin’ in order to achieve a policy goal 
on the one hand; intermediary institutions to put state intervention into action is another 
condition to implement a successful policy on the other hand.
A simple definition could be given to the neo-statist notion of IP: ‘A strategic IP 
is a policy in which a government sets out a target for the selective future-oriented 
industries to promote their international competitiveness and to make substantial 
contributions to economic growth, and to some extent, state intervention should assist 
the implementation of this market-oriented goal’8. In this definition, the state underpins 
IP through exercising intervention not only by targeting a market-oriented goal and 
selecting future-oriented industries, but also by creating competitive advantage. Thus, 
the distinctive feature of state intervention is strategic and the meaning of ‘strategic’ in 
IP embraces three characteristics, namely, selectivity, targeting and creation. Moreover, 
the distinctive feature of institutional advantages are creatable. Some institutions can be 
created by the centralised government according to the needs of development in order 
to provide the capacity to tackle special industrial problems. A central planning agent is 
the basic example of this. The creation of special institutions for targeting industries in 
Taiwan is unique, for instance, III for the information technology industry and a supra- 
agent office for the promotion of HDTV. While ITR1 supports the technical needs of 
various industries and the commercialisation of industrial technology, Industrial 
Technology Information Service (ITIS) makes the technological outcomes of ITR1
8 This definition m derived from my M.A. thesis with a little amendment. For a full length o f  discusion of IP please 
refers to Liu, 1993:9*21.
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available to the industrial sector.
3.3. Relative Autonomy as the Institutional Foundation
The institutional foundation of effective intervention is possible in the sense that the 
centralised bureaucracy makes national policies enforceable without the influence of 
major social interests. Because relative autonomy leads the state to become the main 
actor in economic development, these social interests, such as landlords, industrial 
capitalists, labour and politicians are less able to exercise their influence over national 
policies. It is believed that the relative autonomy of the state is crucial in accounting for 
policy reform in the past experience of Taiwan (Chang, 1989; Chowdhury & Islam, 
1993; Evans, 1987; Haggard, 1988, 1990; Johnson, 1987; Wade, 1988, 1990; Weiss & 
Hobson, 1995). Without state autonomy free from the demands of particular interest 
groups, the pursuit of major policies such as land reform, shifting to the EOI, lowering 
of real wages, raising of interest rates, devaluation, and lifting of subsidies and 
protection, would have been impossible.
The power of landlords of being a political and economic actor has been reduced 
through land reform which has two effects on economic development: one is the 
distribution of assets in land resulting in a broadly equalising effect on income 
distribution (Haggard, 1990); the other is to build political support in the countryside 
(Wade, 1990). The worker’s concern is with raising wages and benefits, which could 
undermine the profit of the company. KMT government intervened to control labour 
organisations through the party mechanism in order to eliminate unionism and labour 
activism (Deyo, 1987). Politicians in general in economic activities are characterised as 
protecting local, narrow, factional and short-term interests which is often at the cost of 
national, long-term interests. However, the Executive Yuan held a relatively 
autonomous authority over the Legislative Yuan in economic policy-making before 
1988 (Liu, 1993:46-9). That is to say, the politician had very limited ability to change 
economic policy. Capitalists are characterised as profit-seeking, monopoly-renting and
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protection-searching from government to avoid internal and external competition. The 
autonomy of KMT state was strong in relation to capitalists before 1988, only those 
capitalist with cooperative, clientelist attitude would find it possible to get access to the 
policy-making process as an economic reward (ibid.:49-57). Therefore, the relatively 
autonomous state can make policy choices according to the national interest overriding 
societal interests.
Several interpretations of the origin of ‘relative autonomy’ have been advanced 
by neo-statist writers. Johnson (1987) regards Taiwan as the ‘most explicitly 
authoritarian country’ (in comparison to Japan and Korea) which makes it a participant 
and often the determining influence in most business decisions. In answering questions 
about conflict between the market and the authoritarian state, he takes the argument 
further as ‘the soft authoritarianism-capitalism nexus’ to illustrate the relation between 
political arrangements and economic performance9. Wade argues that the 
characteristics of the Taiwanese state are not only authoritarian but also corporatist. The 
following paragraph appropriately describes the situation of the relative autonomy of 
KMT state before 1990.
‘Taiwan’s economic bureaucracy fits into a wider set o f political arrangements o f an “authoritarian- 
corporatist” kind. The rules for selecting the rulers give little scope for the expression of popular 
preferences, and specially, do not allow competition between political parties (prior to 1987). 
Interest groups are not voluntary associations, but arc chartered or even created by the government 
They function more as dependent auxiliaries of government than as autonomous aggregators of 
members’ interests. This type o f political system enables the political leaders to articulate a public 
philosophy and broker political demands within the framework o f that philosophy In particular, it 
enables them to exercise much influence over public investment decisions and policy choice (Wade, 
1990:228).’
Haggard (1990) agrees about the links between authoritarian rules and economic 
performance, but he has concerns about the functions of institutions to solve the 
problems of collective-action and to reconcile individual and collective rationality. The 
‘dominant-party regime’, in which a monopoly of legitimate authority makes the state
9 Johnson argues that the coexistence o f  authoritarianism and capitalism in the political economy of capitalism in ways 
unprecedented in the West, and the outcome o f  this nexus is greater economic performance and less political 
participation. For detailed analysis o f  the issues o f the state associated with financial control, labour relations, 
autonomy, administrative guidance, industrial conglomerates and foreign capital, see Johnson, 1987.
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independent of societal forces, enables the KMT state to manipulate political and 
economic reforms gradually without reflecting the pressing needed to forge political 
relations with the private sector (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995).
4. CRITICISM OF NEO-STATIST THEORIES
According to a report of the World Bank's (1993) -  The East Asian Miracle, most of 
East Asia's extraordinary growth is due to superior accumulation and allocation of 
physical and human capital. It reaches two conclusions. Firstly, rapid growth in each 
economy took place primarily because of the application of a set of common, market- 
friendly economic policies, which got the fundamentals right. Fundamental policies 
referred to several broad policy areas, such as, ensuring low inflation and competitive 
exchange rates, building human capital, creating effective and secure financial systems, 
limiting price distortions, absorbing foreign technology, and limiting the bias against 
agriculture. Secondly, the institutional basis of the economy functioned well, selective 
interventions were possible which contributed to growth. Interventionist policies 
referred to as creating institutional mechanisms to promote growth and to implement 
fundamental policies, for instance, export push, bureaucratic capacity, and arguably as 
this report denoted, promoting specific industries, and repressing interest rates and 
directing credit. This report tries to understand how government policies, both 
fundamental and interventionist, may have contributed to faster accumulation, more 
efficient allocation, and higher productivity growth. It has sought to reconcile the 
debate between neo-classical and statist views on the issues of East Asia's miraculous 
economic growth.
To explain East Asia's outstanding growth as a result of reconciliation between 
fundamental and interventionist policy is plausible. But, the 'getting the fundamentals 
right' policy is the first prerequisite for development. The lack of such a policy easily 
leads to failure in economic development. It is extremely important to get the whole 
economy into a sound orbit of development, and we may suppose that the East Asian
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economies could not be in the position in which they are today, without a fundamental 
policy. However, it still leaves something to be criticised. First, if the fundamental 
policy was the basic element of economic growth, it could explain any case of growth, 
rather than being the specific causation of East Asian 'miracles'. A miracle means 
something with extraordinary features. 'Getting the fundamentals right' may be a 
prerequisite, but while this is a necessary condition for industrial success it is not a 
sufficient one.
Second, it is generally accepted that state intervention is characteristic of high 
growth rate economies, particularly the cases of Taiwan and Korea. However, there is a 
methodological difficulty since the growth of these economies cannot be observed in 
the absence of the interventionist policy. Nevertheless, a high degree of state 
intervention in the detailed operation of the private sector is unique in Korea and 
Taiwan, and cannot be observed anywhere else. At risk of overstatement, the suggestion 
is then, that the interventionist view is more persuasive than the fundamentals' view in 
terms of the specific causation of their success. In addition, it is an essential feature of 
the export drive and import protection which operates in East Asian countries. 
Historically, the special circumstances of the process of industrialisation in Taiwan 
make it very plausible and persuasive to theorise its developmental model as a state- 
driven one. However, that the policy concerning 'fundamentals' had undoubted effects 
on rapid industrialisation should not be ignored.
Neo-statist theories of the advocacy of the state to intervene and work through 
rather than to replace the market are more plausible than the neo-classical theories and 
traditional Anglo-American economic thought. The combination of policy activism, the 
strong capacity and the relative autonomy of the state have contributed to produce the 
institutional pattern of East Asian capitalism. In the neo-statist perspective, this explains 
the integral dynamics of rapid growth. A central idea that emerges from these studies, 
including the World Bank's report, is the significant role played by the state. Taiwanese 
state-led economic/industrial strategy has been deemed to be the main reason for its
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successful economic development, in both fundamentalist and interventionist policies. 
Concerning international competitiveness, most studies have focused on the response of 
the state in promoting the national interest and in implementing interventionist IP. The 
studies tend to the view that the state and state-society relations as invariant through 
time, across society, and across the industrial sectors. They fail to explain the complex 
interplay between the state and society under the changing structural constraints. Fewer 
studies have been conducted about other societal actors which may play an equally 
important role in affecting national policies and in creating their own interests. 
Therefore, there is a need to explore the interaction between the state, organised 
interests, and social classes in conjunction with international competitiveness.
The neo-statist perspective tries to use the idea of ‘authoritarian regime’ to 
explain the origin of relative autonomy. Thus, under the umbrella of authoritarian rule, 
the state, using its strong capacity, acts in the interests of national economy, rather than 
that of the private capitalist. This suggests that the private sector is subordinated to the 
national structure. However, there are many interests within the private sector. The neo­
statists only tell the story of picking up the ‘winners’, but fail to tell the other side of the 
story--how to comfort ‘losers’. Moreover, it is also in doubt whether ‘the interest and 
orientation of firms are necessarily convergent with the interests and orientations of 
states (Weiss & Hobson, 1995)’ in the neo-statist assumption. Since the attention of 
capitalists follows profit maximisation, it might conflict with the goal of the state. It is 
right to say that the structure and the operations of the state affect firms’ willingness to 
undertake long-term investments and their dependence on state agencies in making 
decisions (Cawson et al., 1987; Grant et al., 1987; Okimoto, 1989; Zysman, 1983). It is 
debatable, as neo-statists suggest, that the authoritarian use of power can lead to the 
compliance of industries without carefully examining the GI linkage. Without voluntary 
cooperation of the industry any IP will find difficulty in the process of policy-making 
and implementation. There must be channels to solve the problem when divergence 
occurred, which is ignored by neo-statist theories.
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The statist theories did not provide a clear picture of the interplay between 
government and industry'. Even some writers, for example, Wade (1990) and Haggard 
(1990), have emphasised the importance of the links between the state structure, 
institutions and industry, but there is not sufficient empirical evidence to support either 
Wade's authoritarian-corporatism or Haggard's coalitional approach. Moreover, most of 
the neo-statist descriptions of Taiwan's G1 relations are too general, not to mention their 
very weak empirical background. In particular, GI relations have changed over time and 
different industries will form different relations with the government according to their 
economic centralities and the strength of competitiveness. Some sectors might match 
the authoritarian-corporatist description or coalitional analysis, but others might not. A 
research finding based on Taiwan’s automobile industry suggests that the state capacity 
and government relation with the auto industry may not be constant across industry, and 
the developmental strategy at macro level may be in conflict with that at sectoral level 
(Arnold, 1989). Another research study conducted by Kuo (1995) on textiles, plywood 
and the electronic industry in Taiwan also demonstrated the same finding; besides, 
various type of Gl relations can be traced in different time spans10. This reveals that 
neo-statist theories not only failed to provide empirical justification for an authoritarian 
analysis, but also they were too general to reflect sectoral reality.
It is inappropriate to view development as a top-down process through which the 
state has been able to affect big business, guide investment, and promote exports, in 
particular, the firms reacting passively to state intervention. The private sector may 
have an influential capacity to resist state intervention.
According lo  Kuo (1995), there arc three main types o f  GI relations, namely clicnlclism, Laissez-faire and state 
corporatism. GI relations in the textile industry presented as dicntdism in the 50s, slate corporatism in the 60s & 70s 
and lassse/.-faire in the 80s; in the electronics industry, laisse/.-faire with mild dientelism in the 50s, and state 
corporatism rn the 60s-80s; m the plywood industry, basically. Laissez-faire
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5. NEW AGENDAS ON THE DEV ELOPMENT OF NEO-STATIST THEORIES
Beginning around 1990, the neo-statist concerns have shifted from a previous focus on 
state autonomy and institutional arrangements for intervention in relation to economic 
development towards new agendas, institutional links between the state and the private 
sector (Chu. 1989, 1994; Chowdhury & Islam, 1993; Fields, 1995; Kang. 1995; Kong, 
1995; Weiss, 1994; Weiss & Hobson, 1995:161-91). This is to overcome the 
inappropriate interpretation, or missing linkage, about the relationships between the 
state and industry. It rejects the authoritarian concept that the state power is exclusive- 
despotic-coercive. Rather, this new trend of research has placed a lens on the view that 
‘cooperation between state and industrial/economic elites is constitutive of state power 
(Weiss, 1994:28)’. To cope with changing environmental constraints which have 
inevitable impacts on Taiwan’s industrial development, neo-statist theories have to be 
revitalised and to dance to the tune of the new political-economic situation. Otherwise, 
they will soon become a historic explanation of East Asian development.
The political economy of developmental transition is a complex issue involving 
the explanation of national and international aspects of state autonomy decline. States 
are an integral part of the international political economy, in which they tend to 
influence one another. Taiwan has actively sought to incorporate and integrate itself 
into the global capitalist system economically, politically and militarily. For this 
purpose, the state has had to undergo political démocratisation and economic 
liberalisation and this has led to the changes in relative autonomy. ‘The state is no 
longer in a position of “commanding heights” relative to society; its autonomy and 
strength have declined. The state is being transformed by society (Chan, 1990:148)’. As 
Ross (1990) argues the pattern of capitalism has been transformed from monopoly 
capitalism to global capitalism. While the state was relatively autonomous from the 
immediate enterprise-based interests and political power of capital in the form of 
monopoly capitalism, this autonomy has now declined and global capitalism has taken
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over. 'When fundamental aspects of the strategic relations of capitalism change, class- 
to-state relation change also’ (ibid.:211). There is a research trend to explore the 
disaggregated state structure, in particular, relative to the effectiveness of state actions 
and the nature of state-industry relations.
C.H. Lee (1992) argues that close cooperation between government and big 
business in the policy-making process converts the state into a ‘quasi-internal 
organisation’ (QIO), the most important element of the East Asian state. QIO operates 
in two forms, one as an ‘internal capital market’ the state acts as a QIO through its 
financial control and regulation to exercise discretion in channelling credit to various 
sectors and industries, and the other as a ‘network’ state in which key representatives of 
the state and the private sector form a subtle network of long-term ties to exchange 
views and opinions on the future economic goals. When the state is organised in the 
form of QIO, the state would provide financial incentives and subsidies to targeted 
industries and those clients would meet state-imposed performance standards. Thus, 
QIO based on the use of performance targets allows the state to monitor economic 
development. The QIO explanation seems a very useful generalisation to describe East 
Asian government-business cooperation. Repeatedly, state interest may not prevail over 
private interest even in the case of a QIO. It is also difficult for the state to pick winners 
in the 1990s. An inappropriate selection of an industry/firm for the injection of financial 
resources may lead to ‘organisational failure’ (Chowdhury & Islam, 1993:54-5), as in 
the case o f the 1997-98 financial crisis in South Korea which was partly caused by the 
high concentration of bank lending to large industrial groups.
In Kong's argument, the state's success in establishing and securing societal 
compliance with national economic priorities has been transformed from authoritarian 
autonomy to ‘consensual development’ (1995). The case of Korea is characterised by 
three principal institutional pillars of consensual development. These are government- 
business partnerships, exclusion of labour influence over economic decision-making, 
and emergence of a dominant political party with close business and bureaucratic
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connections (ibid.:635). The consideration of consensual development, despite 
démocratisation and economic liberalisation, still calls for a continuing role for the 
developmental state and against the emergence of an economic free for all in Korea. 
Consensual development initiates an alternative means of viewing government-business 
relationships as a close partnership and tries to generalise an East Asian type of 
advanced capitalist state, that interventionist practices are consistent with the economic 
context of the 1990s. However, it is worth noting that political corruption is not taken 
into account in this model. The bribery scandals exposed in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
suggest a deeply rooted problem. If the excellence of consensual development is to 
build economic performance, the weakness must be that it is based on a dark consensus 
between government and business which is beyond public scrutiny.
Some argued that the character of GI relationship, which was indeed highly 
interdependent, was to strengthen state autonomy rather than to weaken it. In the 
‘governed interdependence’ thesis, proposed by Weiss (1994; see also Weiss & Hobson, 
1995; Weiss & Mathews, 1994), competitive collaboration under state sponsorship was 
the very nature of the GI relationship in terms of governed interdependence in which 
‘business compliance is not something spontaneously or voluntarily given, (but that) 
quite a good deal of public effort has gone into inducing it (Weiss and Hobson, 
1995:178)’. It concurs with the research findings o f this study that policy instruments 
have served as the leverage for the private commitment to accommodate IP. Collective 
benefits for all in a specific industry as the main motivation for business community to 
cooperate with the state is evidenced in the case studies. It implies that, unlike a cultural 
explanation, based on voluntaristic norms or a strong/authoritarian state interpretation 
based on power, business collaborates with the government in a state-defined area 
simply because it is advantageous. Thus, by the forms of governed interdependence, or 
closely collaborative GI relationships between bureaucratic and business elites, the East 
Asian states are not so much losing their autonomy in economic dominance as 
transforming them.
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In sum, the rising interest of GI relationships concerning economic growth in East 
Asian literature has been in remedying the bias of state-centred interventionism. As 
many neo-statist theories have come to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards the 
interactions between the public and private sector, it provides a better understanding of 
the ways in which the state can derive knowledge in relation to industry', market and 
technology via GI interchange. However, international and technological factors which 
are essential to economic growth, are still not the main considerations of neo-statist 
theories. The changes in international political economy have affected national policy 
to a very strong extent while the increasing pace of technological changes has 
influenced the competitiveness of industry as well as of the nation. It is necessary for 
the neo-statist to incorporate both factors into the development of theory since the old 
pattern of authoritarian approach will never fully explain the current and future 
situation of developmental states. In addition, the ‘miracle’ would have faded out if 
miraculous states failed to keep their footsteps abreast of international and 
technological changes.
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C H A P T E R T H R E E
T H E O R E T IC A L  F R A M E W O R K  A N D  J U S T IF IC A T IO N
Technological innovation was central in determining which firms and 
countries should come out on top of international competition. State- 
societal arrangements played a key role in the creation and diffusion of 
the necessary technologies and therefore had a major effect on 
international competitiveness. (Hart, 1992:20)
1. HART’S MODEL AS THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Using Hart’s model to be the analytical framework is basically based on two reasons. Firstly, 
Taiwan should be put into an analysis context for industrialised countries instead of that 
generally provided for developing countries since its international competitiveness has 
greatly improved towards the end of century. Secondly, 'the state-societal approach is the 
most general approach and the one that best fits the data at hand’ (ibid.:287), and this, Hart 
explains as the advantage of the state-societal arrangements approach based on the 
vulnerabilities of alternative approaches in explaining the changes in competitiveness of 
objective countries (ibid.:27-35 & 285-7)11. Besides, the concept of this approach is simple 
and clear, and not premised upon complicated assumptions and theoretical constraints. Any 
country, or industry, with competitive strength can be tested and then the pattern of state- 
societal arrangements can be figured out and its impacts on international competitiveness 
assessed.
1.1. The Impacts of State-Societal Arrangements on International Competitiveness
The main argument of Hart’s theory maintains that state-societal arrangements are the key 
to explaining recent changes in international competitiveness because state-societal
* * Tha main rejections o f  other approaches by Hart can be roughly summarised; Macroeconomic approach faces the 
problems o f  fitting data, same as others; the Marxist variant o f  coalitiona) approach (and pluralist) focuses exclusively 
on classes (interest groups) as social actors; culturalist explanations are historically naive with a bias to culture and 
ideology ; the statist explanations are empirically incapable to provide evidence on a comparative base, such as that 
Germany with a relatively weak state than France has better competitiveness, corporatist explanation is subsumed 
within state-societal arrangements approach, but not all countries can be characterised as corporatist
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arrangements can accelerate (or impede) the development and diffusion of technological 
innovations. The diagram (Figure 3.1) below explicitly illustrates his theory in outline and 
suggests cause-and-effect relationships between state-societal arrangements, innovation 
capacity' and diffusion, and international competitiveness.
Figure 3.1 The Impact of State-Societal Arrangements on International
Competitiveness
Source: Hart, 1992:2.
'S tate-societal a rrangem en ts a re  d e fin e d  as the 
m an n er in w hich sta te  and  civil societies are 
o rgan ized  an d  institu tionally  linked . T he state 
consists of a set of institu tions m ostly  associated 
w ith  the governm en t bu t a lso  inc lud ing  
trip a rtite  (governm ent-business-labor) boards 
a n d  com m issions, s ta te -ow ned  business 
en terp rises, an d  o ther parasta ta l o rgan isations. 
C ivil society is the dom estic social en v iro n m en t 
in  w hich the state operates. In co n tem p o rary  
advanced  in d u stria l countries, tw o  g ro u p s in 
civil society, business and  o rg an ized  labour, are  
o f  p rim ary  im portance, esp ec ia lly  w hen 
considering  com petitiveness in m anufac tu ring  
in d u stry '.
This theory is strongly supported by convincing empirical evidence in the 
comparability of France, Germany, Japan, Britain, and USA from a historical angle. 
However, the validity of this model on theoretical grounds is not comprehensively justified. 
It does advance good criteria to measure competitiveness (ibid.:7-20) and interpretations of 
the effect of technological diffusion in competitiveness in specific industries (ibid.:20-7), 
but it leaves many aspects not well-justified that are essential to build a theory/model, such 
as the origins of competitiveness, the role of technology as well as the state in promoting 
competitiveness. To redress the theoretical weaknesses of this model, the rest of this 
chapter attempts to strengthen the definition of relative terms and the justification of the 
linkage between institutional arrangements, technological innovation, and industrial 
competitiveness. In the final section of this chapter the two theoretical perspectives, statist 
and corporatism have been discussed because of their high relevance to the issue of G1 
relationship in a domestic setting. It is argued that ‘institutionalised strategic partnership’ is
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a more insightful explanation of the institutional evolution which has happened in Taiwan.
1.2. The Typology of State-societal Arrangements
The variations in state-societal arrangements are the best explanation for divergence in 
international competitiveness, Hart concluded (ibid. :280-292). Through examining the 
impact of differences in state-societal arrangements on the creation and diffusion of new' 
technologies, the performance of three industries (steel, autos and semiconductors) in five 
countries was found to depend on the ability to adopt new technology rapidly. Sectoral 
state-societal arrangements in one nation tend to be similar whereas national state-societal 
arrangements in different countries are represented in a quite different way which Figure 
3.2 illuminates.
Figure 3.2 State-Societal Arrangements in the Five Countries
Labour State
Source: H *rt, 1992:281.
'T he five coun tries a re  placed o n  the faces o r  
vertices o f  a tr iang le  tha t rep resen ts the 
influence o f the g overnm en t, business, and  
labor in  state-societal a rran g em en ts . A country  
on  the la b o r  vertex h as  s trong  labor, w eak 
g overnm en t, and  w eak  business. A country  on 
the b u sin ess  vertex has s trong  business, w eak  
labor, a n d  w eak  g o v e rn m e n t A coun try  
betw een th e  labor a n d  business vertices has 
strong lab o r and  business an d  w eak  
gov ern m en t. Each co u n try  has a d istinctive 
pattern . T h is  is, Japan  has a p a tte rn  of h igh  
influence for the sta te  and  business bu t low  
influence fo r labor; G erm an y  has a pattern  of 
high in flu en ce  of business an d  labor bu t low  
influence fo r the state '.
According to his research findings, state-societal arrangements with only one 
major dominant social actor in the realm of IP, on the comer of state-business-labour 
triangle (France, USA, Britain) tended to decrease international competitiveness 
relatively, and arrangements with two, on the side linking the state and business (Japan) 
or linking business and labour (Germany), to increase competitiveness. It suggests that a
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two actor coalition seems to be more conducive to the diffusion of new technologies 
than one actor dominance and that a one actor dominant country shall move from 
corner position to an adjacent side of two actor coalition ( ibid.:290-2).
1.3. Fitting Taiwan into Hart's Model: Some Adjustments
Accordingly, six patterns of state-societal arrangements can be found in this state- 
business-labour triangle (Figure 3.3). From Taiwan’s past experience in the process of 
industrialisation before 1985 when it was an authoritarian state, the state performed as a 
dominant actor, this placed Taiwan on the position A - ‘state comer’. For Taiwan now 
there is a strong possibility that the state-societal arrangement can be in position A, B or 
C and a weak possibility that it can be in position X, Y or Z because ‘it is easier to 
move from a comer to an adjacent side or from a side to an adjacent comer than to a 
nonadjacent position’ (ibid.:290).
Figure 3.3 The Possible Positions of State-Societal Arrangements for Taiwan
Business
Position A: French pattern,
State dominance
Position B: Strong state and labour 
Position C: Japanese pattern,
Strong state and business 
Position X: USA pattern,
Business dominance 
Position Y: British pattern,
Labour dominance 
Position Z: German pattern,
Strong business and labour
Position A: The KMT state remains the dominant actor in industrial matters and the 
industrial sector is compliant. If this happened, Taiwan would be in the 
same position as France whose competitive strength is not as good as those 
of the Japanese and German patterns. However, a state-dominated system 
without the commitments of business will lead to improved 
competitiveness is doubtful given that fast technological changes have
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increased fierce competition in a globalised market.
Position B: Taiwan moves from state vertex towards the state-labour side Taiwan 
should avoid this position since there is no case of a country with weak 
business which has become an international competitor in contemporary 
history. Besides, the rising power of societal actors are to be seen after 
1985 but in unequal terms where business has gained more influence in 
national policy because of the increasing competitiveness of certain sectors, 
while labour, strong at a time when radical labour movements did improve 
their rights, lost influence at the end of 1980s after a large amount of 
investment moved to foreign countries that affected domestic employment 
in Taiwan.
Position C: Taiwan could possibly become like the Japanese pattern of strong business 
and strong state which has been perceived as an effective and efficient 
institutional arrangement. This is the best position among possible choices 
that Taiwan can expect. There is also a trend that Taiwan is moving from 
state-driven economic management towards state-industrial interactions. 
However, it is still necessary to examine the degree of interactions and the 
evolution of institutional changes before confirming Taiwan’s current 
pattern of state-societal arrangements.
Position X, Y and Z: To move into the position X, Y, or Z is unlikely to happen in the 
near future, unless there is a major political change, such as being united 
with Mainland China. However, some sectoral transformation towards a 
business-dominated system may occur if competitiveness in some 
industries becomes sustainable by sector-generated solutions instead of 
state-designed solutions.
This explains the title of the thesis using “state-industrial' arrangements rather 
than state-societal arrangements and for that reason labour has been left out of the 
analysis. The evidence that labour is not an active player in national policy will be given 
at the end of this chapter.
Another adjustment is on the selection of sample industries. Three industries, the 
steel, automobile and semiconductor industries, have been used as empirical 
investigations by Hart. However, these three industries would not actually reflect the 
current situation of state-industrial arrangements in Taiwan. The competitive strength of 
steel and auto industry can not rival those of the industrialised countries, whose 
applications to Hart’s model would confront difficulty in explaining the situation.
The steel industry in Taiwan is structurally dominated by a state enterprise (China
54
Steel) which provides private steel manufacturers with necessary technical assistance. 
The steel industry, including a large-scale integrated steel mill produced flat steels and 
tubes by China Steel and several private mini mills produced specialty steels and alloys, 
not intended for export but to supply domestic demands. China Steel's products 
exported to Japan, counted as the second largest steel import of Japan. Taiwan 
depended more on imports from Japan of higher-quality specialty steels (Wade. 
1990:99-100). The value of imports is higher than the exports under the classification of 
basic metals & articles thereof in every single year in 1986-94 (TSDB, 1995:213, 224). 
This reveals that the competitiveness of Taiwan’s steel industry is not among top 
international competitors. Besides, a large public enterprise, as an upstream 
manufacturer, has dominated the development of the whole industry, which suggests 
that Taiwan’s steel industry is in position A (state comer).
Taiwan’s auto industry has never been a world competitor, and its auto IP has 
been cited as the unsuccessful case of state intervention (Arnold, 1989), in particular, in 
comparison with its Korean counterpart (Chu, 1994). In the 1970s, the auto IP was no 
more than trade protection when most attention and resources were assigned to other 
industries (e g. steel, plastics, petrochemicals and electronics). The domestic auto 
market was highly penetrated by foreign auto makers after reducing tariffs for auto 
imports and terminating the import ban of Japanese cars. In the 1980s, a government- 
led plan to build a big auto plant - a joint venture between a large foreign car maker and 
two state enterprises (China Steel and Taiwan machinery), failed after negotiation with 
General Motor, Nissan, Toyota and Ford because of harsh requirements imposed by the 
government, for instance, 45% ceiling for foreign equity, 50% export ratio, 90% 
domestic content and national control. Ironically, six domestic private producers were 
not invited, even consulted, to join this plan that implied another state attempt to 
control an industry. In the 1990s, policy direction shifted towards the reduction of the 
degree of dependence on Japan in critical components by technical upgrading, and to be 
part of the offshore sourcing strategy of large foreign producers aimed at the
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prospective China market. It aimed at building Taiwan into a base for parts and 
components, rather than by establishing a competitive export-oriented industry for 
industry-end products (vehicles). According to Chu's (1994:165) analysis, economic 
bureaucrats have failed to overcome the conflict between short-term business strategies 
and long-term state industrial goals in the auto industry' through the years. Any 
government attempt to establish vertical integration in this industry failed. The 
inefficiency of institutional arrangements of the auto sector makes it difficult to fit in 
Hart’s model.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the world’s fourth largest producer, can be a 
good example of sectoral investigation in Hart’s model. It demonstrates how Taiwan 
created its world-competitive semiconductor industry by an institutional arrangement 
mainly handled by the public sector (Hong, 1995; Mathews, 1995; Meaney, 1994). 
Leadership for the industry was vested in the public research institute and those spin-off 
ventures with larger public investment, from different stages of development rather than 
shared with existing large private companies (probably, there were none who could 
undertake technology transfer). The industrial sector would not have invested in its own 
R&D in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the situation changed in the 1990s since the 
industry showed signs of getting ahead of the public laboratory in developing more 
advanced technologies while the state launched the submicron project hoping to 
maintain its leading role in cooperation with the industry. It could be argued that state- 
societal arrangements in the semiconductor industry are in position A in its early stage 
of development, and in position C after 1990. The reason for abandoning this industry 
as a case was in relation to the intention of the originality of the thesis in the sense that 
there were many ongoing research projects and much existing literature in different 
disciplines concerning Taiwan’s semiconductor development when this industry was 
reviewed12.
12 In the process of collecting materials end selecting sample industries, some persons concerned have slated that they 
have been recently interviewed or requested Tor materials by scholars from US, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan, 
who were conducting research about the development o f the semiconductor industry m Taiwan (A Korea) Besides,
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The technology diffusion process of NPC and HDTV industry exhibits the rise of 
new industries in Taiwan's high-tech industrialisation which accommodates the 
description of Hart's theory. The state-societal arrangements in these two sectors have 
conditioned the diffusion and application of new technologies that eventually leads to 
increase sectoral competitiveness. The evolution of institutional arrangements can be 
traced by observing from the formation and implementation of both cases which shows 
two types of innovative institutions for public-private cooperation. The NPC Alliance 
provides an initial case for product creation, while the HDTV consortia-complex an 
inaugural case for upgrading the industry as a whole. Subsequently, both patterns have 
been extensively employed in the technology diffusion of other industries. The current 
development of state-industrial arrangements would be best understood by using the 
NPC and HDTV industries rather than by using the steel, auto and semiconductor 
industries.
1.4. Assessment Criteria of International Competitiveness
One can design one's own criteria or choose from existing frameworks, only if these are 
in sympathy with the research topic and its needs. The main concern of this research is 
with the interaction between government and industry/society in relation to the 
diffusion of technology. The focus is more on national actors, institutions and IP than 
on international competitiveness. However, to evaluate the success o f an IP and to judge 
the applicability of G1 relationship we still need a set of indicators as a criterion to 
illustrate the competitive strength.
Because this study aims at testing Hart's model on international competitiveness 
and state-societal arrangements, the tools to assess international competitiveness are 
derived from his criteria. The assessed criteria on international competitiveness, for 
both nation-wide and industry-specific levels, required in this thesis rely on statistical
throe ongoing Ph D. dissertations, cither in politics, economics or bisiness studies, in Taiwan and the US. as far as I 
know, also targeted this industry. All this made the interest in the semiconductor industry shift to the HDTV industry
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evidence.
The time span of this study focuses on the 1990s. The NPC Alliance was 
enforced in 1990-91, and the HDTV consortia were operated between 1991 and 1996. 
Moreover, there was no major change in the relations between the state and societal 
actors before 1990. In order to observe the nation-wide trend of increasing productivity 
in Taiwan, data is provided at five year intervals since 1955 but in every single year 
after 1985 for a decade. For those indicators in comparison with major industrialised 
countries, data is given mainly to reflect the general trend of growth in the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. Data for sectoral growth in the NPC and HDTV industries, 
concentrated on global market shares in the 1990s, is given principally to examine the 
subsequence of the NPC Alliance and the HDTV consortia and to contrast with those 
before the operation of public-private cooperation.
'A country that experiences growth in productivity, world export shares, and real 
wages is clearly more competitive than one experiencing declining productivity, world 
export shares, and real wages (Hart, 1992:8)’. For the evidence of national 
competitiveness in terms of trade, productivity, real wages at a nation-wide level, data 
shows that Taiwan is actually increasing its competitiveness. Table 3.4 indicates that 
Taiwan's growth on these terms in comparison with its past performances while Table 
3.5 demonstrates these terms in comparison with those of other countries.
Taiwan’s competitiveness at nation-wide level has increased faster than those of 
industrialised countries which implies that it is catching up with top international 
competitors. In Hart’s theory, it is because state-societal arrangements accelerate, not 
impede, the development and diffusion of technological innovations. If Taiwan kept on 
narrowing the gap o f  competitiveness with higher income countries, it would let Taiwan 
promote its status to that of the industrialised countries in the early 21st century.
Table 3.4 Taiwan's Economie Indicators
R ea l incom es M a n u fa c tu r in g
p ro d u c tio n
T ra d e
GNP annual P er cap ita Annual Indices T rade Foreign
Y e a r grow th ra te G N P growth ra le balance reserves
(%) (US$) (%) (1901=100) (USSmillion) (USSmillion)
1955 8.1 203 10.6 1.67 -57 -
1960 6.4 154 14.2 2.82 -78 -
1965 11.0 217 16.6 5.40 -59 245
1970 11.3 3 89 22.2 13.77 -94 540
1975 4.4 964 8.0 25.06 205 1,074
1980 7.1 2 ,344 6.2 49.68 -253 2,205
1985 5.6 3 ,297 2.5 68.14 10,776 22,556
1986 12.6 3 ,993 15.3 78.56 15,673 46,310
1987 12.3 5 ,294 11.1 87.27 14,440 76,748
1988 8.3 6 ,3 7 9 3.6 90.42 18,019 73,897
1989 8.0 7 ,626 3.6 93.71 16,895 73,224
1990 5.5 8.111 -0.7 93.02 11.188 72,441
1991 7.6 8 ,928 7.5 100.00 17,261 82,405
1992 6.2 10,470 4.0 103.95 12,756 82,306
1993 6.0 10,852 2.3 106.38 13,891 83,573
1994 6.1 11,604 5.9 112.60 16,437 92,454
Source: T SD B , 1995:4, 27, 32, 84 & 191.
Table 3.5 The Comparison of Taiwan's Economic Indicators with Major
Industrialised Countries
T a iw a n S . K o re a J a p a n G erm any F ra n c e U K USA
1993 per cap ita
G N P(U SS)
10,852 7,461 34 ,4 7 5 21,008 18,752 16,396 18,537
{Big M ac ind icato r
(minutes)*
22 30 9 20 24 23 12
1993 indices of 
industria l 
production
(1980“ 100)
211 366 135 115 111 120 132
Average 1980-92 
m anufacturing  
grow th  ra te  (% )
7.2 11.9 5.8 1.6 0 .9
E xports of goods & 
services
(as % o f GDP)
44.3 29.4 9 .4 31.9 21 .9 25 .0 10.4
A verage 1980-92 
export grow th ra te
(%)
11.0 11.9 4 .6 4.6 5.2 3.5 3.8
1992 term s o f trad e
(1987=100)
109 106 109 99 101 104 104
Foreign reserves
(USSbn)*
86.1 36.5 221 .1 78.0 28 .9 39.1 55.1
Source: TSDB, 1995.304-5, 308- 0 & 314-5. »Economist,! 1/10/97:17 -2.
f  Big Mac index provides a guide to  the purchasing pow er o f different countries which shows working time
required to buy a Big Mac. Data based on 2nd quarter, 1997.
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Another economy-wide indicator to measure the strength of competitiveness by 
Hart is the decreasing price elasticities of imports11. Generally, consumers in Taiwan 
are willing to pay for luxury imported goods (because o f  recently increasing incomes) 
and low-end standardisation products from developing countries (because of decreasing 
quality differentials). This is more like the situation in Japan. It is hard to say that the 
economy as a whole is characterised by low price elasticities of imports. Consumers 
would pay a premium for import autos, but not for imported computers. As for the 
electronics products, consumers bought local-made products which included domestic 
and international brands. However, there is difficulty in applying price elasticities of 
imports in the domestic manufacturing of foreign direct investment.
Assessment criteria for industry-specific competitiveness, as defined by Hart 
(ibid.: 12-20), are global production shares, sectoral employment, profitability, and the 
frequency of industry crisis. The quantitative evidence o f  global market shares in two 
empirical cases will be provided in the relevant chapters. Profitability of firms is much 
more difficult to assess than that of industry as a whole (ibid : 17), so industry-specific 
profitability will be discussed in the empirical chapters. Industrial crisis in both 
empirical cases seems not to have happened from 1990 up to 1997 except many 
financial collapses of NPC producers which did not seriously damage this industry. The 
two sectoral investigations of emerging industries in this study show that they are less 
likely to have negative development, but other industries, mainly labour-intensive ones, 
confront different kinds of crises. In these two cases, Industry-wide crisis can not be 
sensed which might be partly the consequence of continuing growing demand in 
international markets and partly the consequence of rising competitiveness in Taiwan’s 
products. If there is any crisis, it is limited in scope. In particular, the industrial crisis of *
* 3 According to the explanation o f price elasticity o f  demand, ‘if a change in price results in a more than proportionate 
change in quantity supplied then supply is price-elastic; if  a change in price produces a less than proportionate change 
in quantity supplied, then supply is price-inelastic' (Pass & Lowes, 1993:417). When this term is applied to price 
elasticity o f  imports, ‘low price elasticities o f imports will indicate quality differentials between domestic products and 
imports' (Hart, 1992:7). In this sense, consumers in Japan and Germany have low price elasticities o f  imports, and 
consumers in the USA have higher pnee elasticities o f imports while consumers in Britain and France have behaved 
more like those in the USA (ibid : 11-2).
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Taiwanese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would hardly have had a 
serious impact on the industry as a whole. According to Hart (ibid.: 19), the low 
frequency of industrial crises is also an indicator of industry-wide competitiveness. In 
this respect, Taiwan could be seen as competitive.
Using sectoral employment as one of the criteria for assessing competitiveness is 
arguably valid since increasing competitiveness of industries may be via automation 
and technological application but not necessarily by employment growth in some 
sectors, in particular, technology-led ones. The employment of the manufacturing sector, 
as the percentage of Taiwan’s employment decreased from 33.7% (2501/7428 thousand 
persons) in 1985 to 27.8% (2485/8939 thousand persons) in 1994, however, the labour 
productivity increased, in the same period, by 172% in manufacturing sector, and by 
222% in electrical and electronic sector (TSDB, 1995:20 & 24). This reveals that the 
decreasing employment in one sector may not necessarily lead to the decline of sectoral 
competitiveness.
2. THE CONCEPTS OF “INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS”
The increasing economic integration in the world market and production has been referred 
to as globalization, which also brings about its own consequences for the competitiveness 
of countries. The trend of economic globalization is a complex issue, which can be 
observed from increasing economic interdependence and globalization of markets in the 
form of a rapid acceleration of trade and investment flows, the creation and diffusion of 
new technologies, the explosive growth of capital markets and financial market integration, 
and the conduct of business operations on a global basis.
‘Global is clearly used as opposed to local and its use reveals local concerns' 
(Humbert, 1993:3). To make a firm profitable, to support local industry, and to ensure a 
nation's competitiveness one is required to think globally and to act locally. In other words, 
the consideration of a government policy or a corporate strategy should be concentrated on 
internal factors as well as on external factors. The trend of economic globalization will be
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critical - not only the response of private enterprises, as well as policy-maker; ‘failure to 
react will bring about permanent changes in "comparative advantage" for individual 
countries in an international economy, and result in a major set-back to further economic 
development' (San, 1991:57).
The world economy is experiencing a process of global restructuring that not only 
affects domestic policy (Keohane & Milner, 1996) but also redefines GI relationships, and 
the role of the state, while furthering the asymmetrical interdependency of economic 
functions across national boundaries. Governments have become more involved in the field 
of industrial and trade issues, assuming larger responsibilities with regard to creating or 
supporting competitive advantages for domestic industries through innovation policies. 
Under fierce competition, the government is actively attempting to build competitiveness 
and the firms are responsively seeking state assistance.
Competitive advantage in itself is not comparable, it only demonstrates its meaning 
in comparison with that of other countries, industries, firms, or over time. A country's 
'ability to compete in world markets, essentially depends on the resources, markets, 
institutional mechanisms and incentives available to its firms to organise the production of 
different kinds of value adding activities in that country; and the efficiency at which this 
task is undertaken' (Dunning, 1990:28). According to Dunning (ibid.:28), competitive 
advantage can be classified into static and dynamic competitive advantage. The former 
refers to the capability and willingness of countries -- or rather firms and industries in 
countries -  to allocate resources to the right sectors and to utilise them in the most cost 
effective way. Dynamic competitive advantage embraces the extent to which a country can 
sustain or advance its living standards by upgrading the quality of its resources, by 
innovating new products and production methods and by a better organisation of its existing 
resources and markets.
Even if we can realise the importance of government actions which have had a 
decisive impact on the competitiveness of the economy, it is still difficult to identify the
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responsibility' for the competitive advantages of nations. Dunning argues that 'gov ernments, 
acting on behalf of the societies they represent, are becoming an increasingly important 
conditioner of the level and direction of international business activ ity’* (1990:36).
Generally speaking, firms are frail in certain aspects that affect their production, such 
as that they only have limited control of economic structural and political environments, 
and that the behaviour of workers and IPs of government are sometimes beyond their 
control. Some firms or industrial organisations may have the ability to influence policy, but 
most of them have not. Nonetheless, the ability of national firms to influence policies 
differs from country to country due to cultural differences and the tradition of government- 
business relations.
The Asian ethos towards government intervention is more positive than the western 
liberal one. Government intervention has always been deemed as 'a necessary sin' in East 
Asia (Liu, 1993). The state acts in making industrial choices according to its own interest or 
a preference that is separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group. 
The tradition of the Confucianist culture and strong nationalism made it possible to 
view the state as a mobilizer for economic development that was accepted as a common 
good beneficial to all members of society (Lee & Lee, 1992). The East Asian states, such 
as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore, play the role for the visible hand by 
supplementing market forces. Nonetheless, most countries, either Asian, American or 
European, have adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards state intervention in terms of 
international trade and strategic industries, which is mainly a response to fierce 
international competition.
In explaining industrial success in international markets, the classical economist 
David Ricardo proposed the notion of 'comparative advantage', recognising that market 
forces will allocate a nation's resources to those industries where they are relatively most 
productive. However, although comparative advantage based on the factors of production 
has intuitive appeal, national differences in factor costs have certainly played a role in
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determining trade patterns in many industries. This view has often informed the state's role 
in competitiveness, because it has been argued that the state can alter factor advantage, 
either overall or in specific sectors through various forms of intervention (Porter, 1990; 
Zvsman & Tyson, 1983).
Competition in the post-war trading system was initially envisaged as competition 
among firms with the state establishing the rules and the enforcement process. The 
traditional concepts of free markets, the invisible hand, and the limited state as the 
framework for domestic competition has now been challenged by developmentalist 
countries that have found a positive role for the visible hand of the state. It can create 
comparative advantage and promote mobility of capital and labour in exploiting this 
advantage. Managing global competition requires the state to play a role in mediating 
decisions about who should give up what, and also to monitor compliance. Nowadays, 
nations, like firms, compete with each other for resources and markets, and especially for 
those which influence their future competitiveness. It is a age that might embarrass Adam 
Smith, who was in favour of a limited government, a laissez-faire economy, and self- 
interested individuals. It seems that the mercantilist idea of favouring state intervention in 
order to maximise national wealth and power through the expansion of foreign trade has 
been revitalised in the contemporary world.
The experience of economic development in East Asia is a revised theory of 
comparative advantage in which competitive challenge focuses on opportunity as well as 
resources. A country can mobilise whatever limited resources it has, and seize opportunities, 
instead of focusing on 'static' mobility and the possibility of declining long-term costs based 
on the learning curve as well as economies of scale. It is a theory that focuses on the 
opportunities for change over time -  a dynamic theory of comparative advantage which 
supplements the static traditional Western one. The continued industrial restructuring in 
East Asia is a case in which 'state policies' combine with 'corporate strategies' to ensure 
rapid adjustment for targeted industries in order to gain timely competitive advantage, not 
only for the nation but also for the company itself.
64
Countries with more competitive policies and competitive arrangements are likely to 
have a higher performance than others. IPs based on mobilising the resources of a nation to 
create competitive advantage in growth industries and industries in which technological 
change is rapid yields a higher growth over the medium temi than a strategy which accepts 
advantage as 'given'. It also reveals that a policy that promotes mobility and/or limits the 
rigidities associated with entitlement allows a country to capitalise more rapidly on the 
advantages it creates. Therefore, those countries where the state does not play an active role 
in guiding the private sector are increasingly challenged by those with more competitive 
policies based, in part, on collaboration between the state and firms.
Furthermore, the East Asian policy-makers sought to maximise growth by 
specialising in those sectors where a competitive advantage could be established by 
organisational/institutional superiority. ‘Organisation, a non-marketable input and the 
intermediate variable between the cost of resources and the value of output, can be the basis 
of competitive advantage, at least in certain sectors’ (Best, 1989). If competitive advantage 
based upon institutional linkage, or organisational superiority, has been established, it 
would be difficult and take a period of time for competitors to match even if they have 
better endowments.
A state's governance structure is constituted by institutions linking the state and 
societal actors. Institutions are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of 
economies (North, 1990:107). Between the state and industrial sector, there are many 
organisations functioning as mediators in relation to policy formation and implementation.
3. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
3.1. Technology and Competitiveness
Currently global restructuring is defined as a techno-economic process in which new 
technologies are at the core of the current process of economic restructuring, and the most 
immediate impact on productivity has been in manufacturing (Henderson & Castells,
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1987:5). The worldwide race to capture the lead in strategic technology has been 
characterised as the 'technology war' (Brandin & Hamson, 1987). Economic industrial 
issues must focus on technology' not only because it affects the standard of living and a 
nation's wealth, but also because technology is the key to the future. The technology war 
differs from the traditional conflict which is more sophisticated than the competition found 
in most of the existing political and economic systems. Nations, that prevail in this war, 
‘will control the resources of the world; they will control their Lebensraum; they will be the 
next global powers' (ibid.:v). ‘The consequences of losing the war are the loss of national 
wealth, prosperity, leadership, employment, national security, and freedom' (ibid.:4). The 
competition between states for markets is becoming a competition for leadership in the 
knowledge structure. Strange argued that the competition is for a place at the 'leading edge' 
of advanced technology, which is the means which both leads to military superiority and to 
economic prosperity (1988:136). Moreover, technological changes in the knowledge 
structure have had an impact on both the production and financial structure (ibid.: 133-5). 
Accordingly, international competitiveness is based on a technology /information-rich 
foundation rather than on a capital/resource-rich foundation.
The failure of structural adjustment in the industrial sectors will lead to a decline in 
industrial growth. Zysman (1983) suggested that three components -  the financial system, 
the state structure and economic conditions -  represent an enabling condition for a 
particular pattern of industrial adjustment. However, followed by fierce global competition 
and a shortened product life cycle, technological changes have become another important 
component highly relevant to industrial adjustment. Technology may not be the only 
element of restructuring industry, but it has at least equivalent effects on industrial 
reconstruction as factors such as financial system, state structure and economic conditions 
do, in relation to industrial competitiveness (Bradford, 1994; Dahlman, 1994; Haque, 1991; 
Hart, 1992; Porter, 1990). A nation can obtain increasing marginal productivity from the 
external effects o f the accumulation of knowledge -  the use of existing knowledge and the 
acquisition of new knowledge, which eventually contributes to trade and growth (Sodersten,
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1993). Moreover, technological change is also one of the sources of new investment w hich 
is the mam engine of economic growth. Because of that a rush of investment in the high 
technology sectors stimulates the economy out of recession and invigorates markets 
(Castells, 1987).
Furthermore, new technologies contribute to a qualitative increase in productivity in 
manufacturing, as well as in agriculture and services. The increase of productivity in 
manufacturing takes two forms. One is by moving production towards higher productivity 
sectors, for instance, from agriculture to manufacturing or from light and labour-intensive 
manufacturing to capital- or technology-intensive production. Another is by adopting 
increasingly efficient production processes, for example, using machines to replace labour 
or automation. Accordingly, technology is one of the key factors of the process of 
economic/industrial restructuring and has a decisive effect on the making of our future 
world.
As technology increases in importance in relation to economic performance, many 
efforts have been made to enhance both the nation's and individual firms' competitiveness 
in this technology war. ‘There clearly is a new spirit of what might be called 
'technonationalism' in the air, combining a strong belief that the technological capabilities 
of a nation's firms are a key resources of their competitive prowess, with a belief that these 
capabilities are in a sense national, and can be built by national action' (Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993:3). There is no strong empirical evidence to say that national economies 
are broadly advantaged if their firms are especially strong in high tech and disadvantaged if 
they are not (Nelson, 1993:517). However, there is also no one who will take the risk of 
suggesting that economic growth is irrelevant to technological improvement14.
Traditional economic remedies cannot in themselves reverse the deterioration of a 
nation's position in the international economy. The major reason for the decline in
14 Many author« have tha same view that Technological innovation has characterised economic development and 
industrial change, for instance, Castells, 1987; Cohen ft  Zysman, 1991; Coombs et at, 1987 ft  Verspagen, 1994.
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competitiveness lies in an erosion of manufacturing skills and capacities (Cohen & Zvsman, 
1987:8). In the case of American manufacturing industry, the difficulty of promoting 
competitiveness 'lies not in machines and technology', but in organisations and the use of 
people in production, in the strategies for automation and the goals we attempt to achieve 
with production innovation’ (Cohen & Zvsman, 1991:265).
Production innovation rather than technological innovation, is the most important 
element linking manufacturing output and consumption. Japan did not invent colour 
television, video recorder and semiconductors, but their market share of those products is in 
an unbeatable position in world market. Japanese producers developed designs and 
manufacturing systems that created a decisive competitive advantage. Technology in itself 
is an essential base to create new products, but it is not necessary to sustain and expand 
market shares. The rate of technology diffusion has become so fast, therefore that no one 
can secure a position of technological monopoly any longer. For the purpose of developing 
a technological advantage and differentiated products to sustain market supenority, the cost 
input into the R&D activities is tremendous. A competitor, either a firm or a state, must be 
able to sell simultaneously to the entire world in order to pay for the heavy technological 
investment. Without continuous innovation, any product and patent will soon become 
obsolete because of increasingly shorter product life cycles. Production innovation demands 
value-added designs in order to become competitive in manufacturing. It is not an 
overstatement to argue, firstly, that technology lacking the ability to transfer from an 
original design to a commercially viable and value-added design is in vain; secondly, 
technology without the ability to integrate itself into a production system is of little or no 
value.
Technological advantage will soon be eroded by a production disadvantage. By 
capturing the profit on an innovation through volume sales of a product, a firm/industry can 
repay its R&D costs and invest in R&D for a next-generation product. A firm with a strong 
market position can buy a portfolio of technologies at a relatively lower price than that 
needed to create technology by invention. It is because a firm will capture the technology
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rents through volume sales and compensate the cost of buying technology'.
Technology matters for manufacturing. Technological progress implies new and 
better quality products and more efficient production processes. Technological innovation 
embraces product innovation and process innovation (Stoneman, 1995:3). The former 
relates to the generation, introduction and diffusion of a new products, and the latter to a 
new production process. Both kind of innovations imply ‘a short hand for doing something 
new" (ibid.). Thus, technology is central to an economy's capacity to grow and compete 
internationally. The linkages between technology and manufacturing, which are the 
organisation of production and the commercialisation of technology, are not less important. 
International competitiveness is based on how effectively a firm/industry/country develops 
and diffuses technology and production know-how. The value of technology in terms of 
manufacturing is how effectively producers use those technologies, not the technology 
itself.
3.2. Government's Role in Technology Development
There are many arguments against govemment-led R&D measures, but more which 
advocate that government has a proper role to play in this new wave of global techno- 
economic restructuring. Some have argued that inappropriate policy measures implemented 
by the government may result in the misallocation of R&D resources because of 
information barriers (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980), and in subsidising second-best projects 
under the pressure of interest groups (Nelson & Eads, 1971). Some simply argue that 
government intervention may hamper rather than facilitate the necessary adjustment of 
industry. It is true that government intervention in private R&D activity is sometimes 
wasteful and misdirected, but it is also hue that collaborative innovation between the 
government and industry may lead to a certain pace of technological progress (Weiss & 
Mathews, 1994). To avoid misdirection of government intervention, the management of 
innovation activities should be organised appropriately (Metcalfe, 1995) and communicated 
mutually between the public and private sector.
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Government intervention in private sector R&D unavoidably causes administration 
costs and negative externalities, but this does not imply government intervention is 
unnecessary (J. Wang, 1991). Governments have to intervene financially to help finns 
avoid technological and market risks, because of the accelerating pace of technological 
change, and because of the broader technical capabilities firms must possess (Galbraith, 
1969). Some empirical evidence from advanced countries also shows good examples of 
government intervention. In many countries, simply helping an important industry has been 
accepted as an economic function of the state (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). Japan has a 
good record of this and is good at building new industry. It has promoted ties between MITI 
and industry, and a large proportion of research funding of private enterprises comes from 
MITI (Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1989). The US industry has benefited from some high 
technology through government-developed military and space programmes. The EC also 
has some technological programmes subsidised by the Community (Sharp, 1989).
Innovation is a process of socio-economic transformation. Technological R&D is 
only a part of the larger innovation picture. Traditionally, public laboratories and 
universities are the two major institutions funded by government. Increasingly, public 
money flows to help the development of industrial technologies that are in civilian use. 
Most cases of government support in industrial R&D are limited to projects of 
governmental targeted industry. The state is expected to play an outstanding role in
introducing tech-industrial innovation, according to Hilpert:
(1) Organizing academic research so that its structure and its techno-scientific progress serves the need 
o f  innovation. (2) organizing markets for new  science-products that are appropriate in size to  encourage 
the creation o f  new and innovative industries, and (3) to create circumstances that are appropriate for 
general innovative potential o f  the nation's industries and to provide the incentives for them to  engage in 
the fields that are regarded as being likely to  b e profitable. (Hilpert, 1991:3-4)
Because of this new role of the state and erosion of corporatist policy-making in 
national innovation system, it is argued by Hilpert (1991) and Naschold (1991) that a 
redefinition of the role of the interest group and of the relationship between politics and 
socio-economic development is necessary. It is undeniable that the role of the state plays in 
the innovation process become highly important for the understanding of socio-economic
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development in modem capitalist societies. However, it is still open to question, as Hilpert 
(1991) stated whether the state should take an active and leading role itself rather than 
intermediary organisations.
Increasing support for government intervention in promoting technological industries 
occurs because the market cannot be relied upon to allocate resources to R&D. There is a 
dispute over the cost of this involvement and the possible benefits that may arise. The cost 
of technological development is huge, and the outcome of R&D is an uncertainty. Some 
large firms do sustain high level of R&D, but it would cut their costs down and increase 
competitiveness if they had received government assistance. The state may financially 
support technological development in the name of national interest. But the notion of 
national interest in technological development is hard to define. Using public money to 
engage in defence and space programmes, as the USA government does, can be classified 
as, in the national interest, and part of the R&D results will contribute to the upgrading of 
industrial technology in the sectors such as communication and new material. In the case of 
supporting consumer goods (PC, HDTV, sport equipment and so on), it is doubted that 
public money is spent directly in the 'national interest'. Then the fruit of R&D will benefit 
only on the minority of certain firms and industries, this will be criticised in terms of social 
justice to the majority of civil tax-payers.
It is difficult to say that government or industry have a leading role in the process of 
technological innovation, because G1 relations vary from sector/country to sector/country 
and so this requires more empirical sectoral comparisons and individual country studies. In 
some countries, notably Japan, this relationship has been close and harmonious and has 
helped in securing competitive strength on tech-industrial innovation (Okimoto, 1989). In 
terms of the improvement of productivity and the commercialisation of technology, the 
industrial sector is always the one which knows the market and product creation better than 
the government. In other words, in manufacturing at least, the efforts of government may 
support, but cannot be a substitute for the technological efforts of firms (Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993). It is difficult to define concretely whether the state or industry has the
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active, leading role in G1 relations on tech-industrial innovation. Rather, there is a 
possibility of G1 cooperation where industries themselves are more cognisant of the social 
costs and benefits of their own actions. Collaborative innovation between both sides creates 
a new form of government intervention which may lead to rapid commercialisation of 
targeted products.
There are other structures involved in innovation within a nation, in which the state 
does have a major role to play in constructing national technological capability (Hilpert, 
1991; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). That is the educational system including schooling, 
training and retraining, which affects not only the quality of human resources required for 
innovation from skilled-labour to engineer, but also the attitudes of workers towards 
technical advance and the work ethic. Other factors, such as industrial relations, financial 
institutions, environmental issues, also influence national innovation systems. All these call 
for the state to synthesise them and for an IP to implement innovation. These factors are not 
in the parameters of discussion in this study which is confined to public-private cooperation 
in terms of technology innovation and diffusion and subsequent influence on 
competitiveness.
3.3. Technology Development in Taiwan
The influence of technological spread through a process of productive decentralisation 
reaches many peripheral countries. The NlEs are major beneficiaries of the required 
technological capacity after competing in the world economy for about two decades, 
mainly on the basis of lower production costs in traditional manufacturing. Those countries 
are now concentrating on more sophisticated and hi-tech production activities. In the case 
of Korea and Taiwan their technological sophistication in certain sectors could even rival 
some Western countries.
Now that Taiwan has made the transition from a developing country to an N1E, its 
industrial strategy should be correspondingly adjusted in order to cope with the new 
conditions of trade competition. Taiwan faces trade competition not only from the
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developed countries but also from the developing countries. Those developed countries 
compete with Taiwan in the field of technology-intensive products, not only in their 
markets and Taiwan's market, but also in the markets of other developing countries. Many 
rapidly developing countries compete with Taiwan in the field of labour-intensive products, 
especially in the markets of the developed countries and the NIEs. because these countries 
have greater purchasing power.
Taiwan's competitive advantage is subject to change. From past developmental 
experience, it would appear that competitive advantage in manufacturing has broadened 
and exports have become somewhat more diversified. This no doubt lessens the pain of 
structural adjustment which accompanies changes in competitive advantage. ‘As Taiwan 
comes to resemble more closely the economies of higher-income developed countries, it 
may find changes in comparative advantage more difficult to absorb’ (Riedel, 1992:275).
Taiwan used to be a producer of low quality products in 1960s and 1970s, and since 
the wage level was relatively low at that time, the price could compete in the world market. 
However, Taiwan no longer enjoys a low wage rate. This kind of low technology industry 
has become a 'sunset' industry. Some industries have promoted their level of technology 
through the transfer of technology from foreign companies, and can still survive in the 
world market. Since Taiwan has lost its competitive advantage in low-cost, labour-intensive 
products, those labour-intensive industries for which no technology is available to increase 
productivity and upgrade production should be abandoned, and technology-intensive 
industries should be developed to supplant them (Yu, 1990).
How to raise the level of technology is of paramount importance. Technological 
progress depends not only on the introduction of foreign technology but also on the 
development of indigenous R&D. For developing countries, the introduction of foreign 
technology is the most important step in raising the level o f technology, and Taiwan has 
taken advantage of this. For the developed countries, since there are limited opportunities 
for them to obtain technology from other countries, the development of R&D must be
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strengthened. As for the NIEs, the introduction of foreign technology and the enhancement 
of investment in R&D are both of importance to increasing competitiveness.
It needs to be noted that Taiwan’s industrial structure is dominated by SMEs15 
However, SMEs have very limited financial capacity to conduct R&D, particularly 
since the minimum scale of efficiency in high technology industries has increased 
rapidly16 and entry barriers exist. Because of the size constraints of SMEs, they are 
reluctant to invest in R&D. Consequently, sluggish R&D investment by the private 
sector is one of factors leading to slow structural transformation.
Available evidence shows that the Taiwan's research intensity (R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of GNP) is much lower than those in advanced countries (TSDB, 
1993:108; 1995:109). Even in comparison with Taiwan's powerful trade rival, Korea, 
Taiwan's research intensity is lower than that of Korea. Korea's industrial structure is 
dominated by fewer very large companies such as Hyundai, Samsung and Goldstar. So 
they have more capability to put into catch-up cooperative research. This is not to say 
that the large firms have more advantages than SMEs17. But rather, the SMEs in Taiwan 
need a big push from outside the industry community. Therefore, for the purposes of 
narrowing the technology gap between Taiwan and advanced countries and remaining 
competitive in the global market, government should prepare to adopt a strategic, long­
term approach to innovation policy.
^  SM Es accounted Tor 95% o f all firms and employed about 70% o f the industrial workers in 1982. If we take the 
manufacturing industry as an example, this contributed 36% o f GDP in 1986, and nearly 50% o f the manufacturing 
output was produced by SMEs. The value o f  SME exports reached 61% o f total export value while 94% o f export 
value came from the manufacturing industry as a whole (Chiu. 1992:156). The role o f SMEs in Taiwan and their 
importance to economic development has been widely recognised and documented since the 1980$, sec for examples, W Lin 
(1992); N. Wang (1992); Wu & Chou (1988).
16 For example, minimum progress in integrated circuit. DRAM, fax modem, and liquid crystal display, can improve 
product design and reduce production cost substantially
17 In the last few decades, the attitude toward SMEs has changing because o f  the need for efficiency and flexibility o f  
response to the ever-changing world market. In Japan, the macroeconomic development policies o f the early years 
favoured large industries Korea's 'bigger is belter1 policy was less successful in promoting external trade than Taiwan's 
'small i i  beautiful' philosophy. And both Japan and Korea realised that heavy industries could not be operated 
efficiently without the development o f  the domestic parts and components industries. Therefore, SME policies and 
programmes were introduced to counter balance a previous bias m favour o f large enterprises. (W. Lm, 1992)
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4. GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP IN TAIWAN
The increasing competition in international trade raises the question about whether 
there is a way to create a nation’s competitiveness in industrial products through a 
certain type of GI relation. It is always argued that Japan's GI relations provide 
evidence to demonstrate a more effective IP to restructure industry and economy than 
others. If so, GI relations become one of elements for creating the national advantages 
in global competition leading to IP more effective and industry more competitive.
’Picking winners' to create the competitive advantage of industry in Taiwan's 
industrialisation is evident (Liu, 1993; Wade, 1991). The state is deeply involved in the 
investment decisions of the private sector and has intervened with subsidies or 
protective trade measures to create favoured conditions for the strategic industries. 
‘Companies compete in the new international economy, but many of them are no longer 
creators of disinterested market forces; they are the agents of government policies for 
national economic development’ (Cohen & Zysman, 1990:63). It is doubted that an 
interventionist state can get Taiwan into 21st century without jeopardising its economic 
growth. The state should function more as a catalyst and facilitator of private sector 
development, rather than a leading actor in economic development. Institution building 
to complement market development, to diffuse and promote innovation throughout 
society, and to accelerate human capital investment, ought to supersede old 
interventionist measures, such as protection of domestic markets from foreign 
competition, operation of public enterprises, and controls on the financial system. It is 
presumed that the role of the Taiwanese state is characterised fundamentally as indirect, 
interactive, and associative in the future, which is different from an interventionist, 
paternalist, and authoritarian role in the past.
Recent experiences o f economic development in Taiwan show that the public and 
private sector do not operate as adversaries. Much attention has been devoted to 
defining the respective roles o f  the two sectors and establishing practices and
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institutions to harmonise their interactions. However, conflicts still arise from both 
sides. While governments often feel that their policies and reforms aimed at developing 
internationally competitive industries are frustrated by a lack of private support, the 
private sector tends to deem those policies and reforms either as inadequate or as a 
disturbance of their own strategies. There is a fundamental conflict in the pursuance of 
goals between government and industry. While the state needs to sustain a high rate of 
economic growth and to improve its people's living standard, the firms hope to 
maximise their profit. Government tries to use private industry as an instrument for 
economic growth, a public goal; industries give cheerful applause to incentives and 
financial assistance, but they dislike those regulations imposed on their development 
and any notion that government should act as a director involved in their detailed 
operations.
Generally speaking, government adopts a long-term perspective on industrial 
development and wishes to expand the share of certain world markets in particular 
industries. In contrast the private sector focuses on short-term profits and is reluctant to 
invest in those sectors which returns are uncertain or highly risky in the developing 
countries. Taiwanese firms face more difficulties in developing a longer-term operation 
because of the constraint of relatively small firm size, unlike Japanese firms which can 
deploy a strategy, say, a plan for one decade, so as to capture future markets through the 
effective deployment of conglomerate resources. Thus, the new state-industrial 
arrangements have formed to constitute the innovative collaborations for industries to 
upgrade technology.
In Taiwan, policy makers, as well as academics, paid too little attention to 
domestic interactions between government and industries affecting the nation's 
industrial competitiveness, not to mention how international political economy affected 
such interaction the other way round.
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4.1. The State and the Private Sector in Economic Growth
It is not easy to understand GI relations without a clear picture of the evolution of the 
balance between the public and private sector involving their interactions on the process of 
growth or industrialisation. Economic policies for growth, whether the economy is one of 
the industrialised, developing or Eastern European countries, are characterised by two main 
tendencies after the end of the World War U. These two tendencies are the emergence of an 
interventionist state on the one hand and state disengagement in favour of a liberal market 
system on the other, both of which have deeply influenced attitudes towards the role of the 
state and the private sector in the growth and development process.
The preference for the interventionist state predominated until the late 1970s or the 
early 1980s. During this period, the role of the state was as a builder, investor, regulator, 
entrepreneur and provider of welfare. In the industrialised economies, the state's role 
expanded greatly in terms of direct or indirect intervention through increased government 
spending, nationalisation, regulation and so on. The trend was even more marked in 
developing countries as, following independence, everything had to be constructed or 
reconstructed. Due to the inability of governments to redirect domestic economies back 
onto the path of growth in some industrialised economies and international organisations 
dealing with the difficult task of correcting trade, monetary and fiscal disequilibria in some 
developing countries, the 1980s saw a shift to more liberal policy approaches. Liberalising 
economic environment, privatising nationalised enterprises and reregulating economic 
activities were the main structural adjustment programmes. This approach implies a 
radically different interpretation of the respective role of the public and the private sectors.
The ongoing change in favour of the transfer of responsibility in economic 
development to the private sector demonstrates that the allocative efficiency of the market 
and the productive efficiency of private management is regarded as significant, at least, that 
view has taken hold.
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A nse of state theory has been a central feature of a number of studies from all social 
science disciplines in the 1970s (Skocpol, 1985). In trying to answer third world 
development problems, however, both modernisation and dependency theories failed to 
explain the role the state played in the development process. The theoretical focus was not 
‘state-centred’, but ‘society-centred’ in the case of modernisation theory and ‘international 
system-centred’ in the case of dependency theory (Kim, 1987). In this sense, current state 
theories, focusing mainly on the role of the state and public policy in the development 
process, do offer substantial literature and arguments to shed light on this matter (Dunleavy 
& Oleary, 1987; Jessop, 1990a).
The state, defined to include executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state 
apparatus, and not simply 'government', has a pervasive role in most economic systems, 
whether capitalist or socialist. In the past two decades, we have witnessed a growing 
demand to 'bring the state back in' as a key explanatory variable in social analysis. Skocpol 
(1985) argued that there has been a paradigm switch in the 'Western social sciences' in the 
1970s: from society-centred work which treated the state as a dependent variable to theories 
which treat it as an independent variable.
It is a general concept recognised by the statists that the role of the state, as an actor 
and as a force, has an independent effect in social dynamics. Moreover, 'the state, conceived 
as an organisation claiming control over territories and people, may formulate and pursue 
goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or 
society' (ibid. :9,20-1). In addition, Skocpol suggests that the overall configuration of the 
state 'unintentionally influences the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, 
and demands of various sectors of society' (ibid.:21).
The state has powers of autonomous action which have been ignored by most 
'society-centred' theories. However, although there are arguments about their contents, all
4.2. State Theory— a Missing Linkage with Society
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'state-centred' theories, no matter under which classifications, emphasise different factors 
but all agree that the state is a force in its own right and not just a reflection of civil society. 
As the state theorists 'bring the state back in' to its proper central place in explaining social 
change and practice, it is necessary to develop a grounded understandings of the causal 
relations with respect to social structures and other group actors in the modem world.
The state may be viewed as a set of organisations through which bureaucracy may be 
able to formulate and implement IP. The state as an actor makes strategic choices according 
to national interest. The content and process of state strategies can be understood in terms 
of state system: the state strategies could have been developed within that system and/or at a 
distance from that system; and they could have been concerned to maintain and/or change it. 
In this sense the current strategic choice of the state is in part the emergence of the 
interaction between its past patterns of strategic choice and the strategies adopted for other 
actors in society.
In explaining social change and public policy, it seems that other societal actors are 
presented as passive in statist analysis. It is mainly because the statists one-sidedly 
emphasised the importance of the state as a crucial causal factor (Jessop, 1990b), to some 
extent ignoring the possible reactions which may arise from the private side. However, 'the 
state is constituted by society, and society in turn is shaped by the state (Held et al., 
1983:ix)'. Thus, there are many different forms of the state and each individual state has a 
different mix of institutions and relations within it. In rejecting the 'state-centred' approach, 
‘the state system should be analysed through its compenetration and articulation with the 
rest of society, and neither should be privileged as an automatic starting point for 
explanation’ (Jessop, 1990b:53).
As state power has grown in different policy realms, it reveals that different 
departments in charge of various affairs have also expanded, which leads to a more 
complex intra-govemmental conflict for resources and a blurring of government as a 
distinctive identity. It is thus that departmentalism is reinforced and state power is
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fragmented among different branches and policy networks. Moreover, the state depends 
increasingly on the cooperation of other social forces to secure success for its interventions 
so that state power is increasingly interlinked with external forces (Offe, 1985). 
Accordingly, state autonomy over public policy is therefore disrupted by forces other than 
the state itself.
Furthermore, ‘social-political forms of governing are forms in which public or 
private sectors do not act separately but in conjunctions, together, in combination, that is to 
say in ’co'arrangements’ (Kooiman, 1993: 2). The increasing interactions, or to a strong 
extent, cooperations between government and industiy/business in the eighties, are due to 
fierce international competition on trade and technological development. The need of the 
private and public sector to channel or even to exploit mutual interdependencies by means 
of cooperation is motivated by two accounts, financial-economic and managerial-strategic 
(cf Kouwenhoven, 1993). In the financial-economic accounts, contrary to the limited 
financial capacity of government and its budget deficit, the private sector shows a financial 
surplus. And the expectation of commercial returns and the prospects of diversifying 
investment risks are the main determinants to form a public-private partnership in some 
joint projects. In managerial-strategic accounts, to bring about a more businesslike effective 
and efficient functions for government and to get a better understanding of administrative 
operations and be able to anticipate policy making for the private sector, a mutual 
reappreciation by government and industry has led to a convergence on public policy. 
Under these conditions, public-private partnership based on 'mutual interdependencies by 
means of cooperation' has emerged as a new type of GI relation in the 1990s.
The state theorists stress the significant role played by the state and most of them 
failed to explain the respective role of industry which might be an important factor 
contributing to a nation’s competitiveness. The potential vulnerability of the state theory is 
that it left unanswered what the ideal type of state-industry relations ought to be. Even when 
some of the theorists provide specific views on the relationship between industry/capital 
and the state, for example, Jessop’s clientelism & parliamentarism, however, the
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perspective still cannot meet the theoretical requirements of this thesis. State theorists 
analyse the GI relationship from the angle of state system and may neglect the influence of 
the private sector through informal channels. It would be wrong to argue that the state is 
always relatively more autonomous than the private sector, in particular in the account of 
economic/capital issues.
4.3. Corporatism
It is necessary to discuss corporatism for two reasons. First, there should be a position for a 
corporatist state in Hart’s triangular model given that this model is conceived similarly to 
corporatism by its nature. Although there is no match of nations presented as corporatist 
arrangements in his analysis, there is a question about the position of corporatist states, such 
as Austria and Sweden. The policies of a corporatist state are seen as the result of tripartite 
arrangements, then they will be at the central point of his model. Or, they will be in the state 
comer position as the undeniable corporatist characteristic o f a high degree of centralisation 
in the process of collective bargaining. Besides, changes in competitiveness are not 
explained by the analysis in the literature of corporatism (Hart, 1992:33) and ‘in no time 
period did corporatism have a significant impact on economic growth’ (Crepaz, 1992:161). 
The intention is neither to give a concrete answer to the position of a corporatist state in 
Hart’s model, nor to assess the international competitiveness of corporatist states, rather to 
examine interest intermediation in Taiwan.
The second reason concerning the description of Taiwan is based on the experience 
before 1990 as a corporatist state, by some writers. Wade’s authoritarian corporatism in 
Taiwan argued that ‘only those economic interest groups sanctioned by the state get access 
to the state’, but ‘the government has only weakly developed a policy network linking the 
central economic bureaus with the private sector, relying more on public enterprises and 
other public agencies’ (1990:294-6). It implied that interest groups were lacking a 
framework for bargaining with the state on strategic issues (even though not totally 
impossible). Haggard & Cheng (1987:101) pointed out that the nature of corporatism is
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state-controlled rather than societal in Taiwan, and that the channels for corporatist 
arrangements do exist in Taiwan. According to Winckler (1992:41-2), incorporation is the 
state strategy which draws corporatist associations under state control ‘to prevent anyone 
from organising social forces to challenge Nationalist rules' under hard authoritarian 
regimes. However, the functions of corporatism might change from corporatist control 
towards corporatist consultation which could tackle difficult social issues under 
‘democratic corporatism’ (ibid.:42-3). Taiwan’s political system is essentially corporatist in 
which ‘group autonomy is held suspect as the party-state seeks to utilize civil groups for 
political mobilization and as auxiliary instruments for policy implementation’ 
(Tien, 1992:7).
The term corporatism has been used loosely and not been precisely defined in the 
area o f theoretical applications when the historical case of Taiwan is referred to, let alone 
the different concerns between the above arguments. However, most corporatist 
explanations of Taiwan’s political economy highlights the ‘macro’ corporatist means of 
state control over sanctioned organisations which is a feature of state corporatism. A 
distinction between state and societal corporatism was made by Schmitter (1979:20-2, 67) 
in which state corporatism is characterised as authoritarian and anti-liberal, and the interest
groups were created by the state. According to the description of Schmitter,
‘State corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly 
subordinated to  central bureaucratic power, elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary, party systems are 
dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and 
more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or 
regionalism are repressed (1979:22).’
This is very similar to the concept of statist political structure where civil society is 
brought under the leadership and guidance of the political structure. Even though Taiwan 
could be described as state corporatist in the past (but writers on this issue did not specify), 
it is highly questionable whether the theoretical application of state corporatism in Taiwan 
after 1990 is appropriate because démocratisation might break state-corporatist 
arrangements. The discussion of corporatism thereafter is connected to the modem usage 
rather than state/authoritarian corporatism to reflect the environmental transition in Taiwan.
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This will help us to understand the relationship between the Taiwanese state and societal 
interests and the degree of civil participation in relation to intermediary organisations.
Corporatism is one of the conventional analyses of government-industrial relations. 
The modem usage of corporatism stresses the role of interest organisations which are at 
intermediary position between the state and the society. The particular value of corporatism 
is in explaining a form of economic management in relation to the economy and issues of
production. The definition of corporatism in this thesis follows that of Cawson,
‘Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which organisations representing monopolistic 
functional interests engage in political exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which 
involves those organisations in a role which combines interest representation and policy implementation 
through delegated self-enforcement (Cawson, 1986:38) ’
In his concept, the state is at the heart of corporatism, because ‘the state is the arena 
in which the process of corporatist politics takes place’; and ‘policy becomes a series of 
bargains between state agencies and organised interests’ (ibid.:36 & 67). Accordingly, 
reciprocity of the relationship between the state and interest association in terms of the 
fusion of intervention, interest representation and policy implementation, can be found 
within a relatively closed corporatist bargaining process.
Even though corporatism is arguably in decline (Gobeyn, 1995:431), in particular, in 
explaining macro-political forms of bargaining, it provides some valuable insights to 
interpret how corporatist countries lowered inflation and solved political and economic 
crises in conjunction with the demands of labour in the 1970s and 1980s (Crepaz, 1992:161) 
and macro-political bargaining arrangements do manage, in periods of economic crisis, to 
restructure the productive side of the economy (Taylor, 1995). However, corporatism is a 
set of concepts originally developed to interpret reciprocal relationships between the state 
and interest organisations from the division of labour in society in the post-war European 
countries. According to Grant (1985:25), ‘it offers the possibility of transforming the 
process of economic management into a non-zero-sum game, so that everyone is better off 
than they would be in the absence of corporatist arrangements’. In this sense corporatism 
might be a useful analytical tool to examine the situation in Taiwan where the polity is
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being transformed from an authoritarian towards a more democratic one. If the situation 
matches Cawson's definition, it can be said that corporatist arrangements do open more 
opportunities for societal participation in policy and show the willingness of the state to 
share its power with monopolistic functional interests; if not, then, w hat would it be?
Corporatist arrangements may be seen as an intermediate mechanism by which state 
intervention has become involved in the process of bargaining. The attributes of 
corporatism vary with the degree of state intervention18. The degree of state intervention in 
a state corporatist country is higher than that in a societal corporatist country; the degree of 
societal partnership in a state corporatist country is lower than that in a societal corporatist 
country. For an authoritarian regime transforming towards full democracy, which is simply 
defined as representing opinion through voluntary pressure groups and open election, it is 
presumed that the degree of state intervention in interest intermediation is decreased. In 
Taiwan’s case, given that it is almost impossible for the state to change its nature over night, 
then corporatism is an appropriate mechanism by which to reduce the degree of 
authoritarian intervention and to promote social partnership. That is to say, statist control 
over intermediary organisations, to ensure the compliance of the private sector and policy 
implementation should move towards societal corporatist agreement to incorporate social 
participation in the policy process.
4.3.1. Weak labour in Taiwan
One of the reasons leading to Taiwan not having been referred to as a strong example of a 
societal corporatist country is the weak bargaining nature of Taiwanese labour to represent 
its own interests through the corporatist system. Although bipartite corporatism is possible, 
in particular at meso level, this should exclude the bargaining agreement between union 
and business associations (Cawson, 1986:76,82).
18 This idea is derived from the work o f  Cawson (1985:223) in which he attempted to couple corporatism and state 
theory by using the degree o f  autonomy o f the state as an underlying variable in the form o f  a continuum:
Strong slat« - » State corporatism -* Societal corporatism -* Weak state. The countries with strong state autonomy (eg. 
France and Japan) tend to be at the left side and those with weak state autonomy (the UK and USA) on the right side
84
Labour never actively played an essential role in Taiwan's politics. The activities of 
the unions were tightly controlled by KMT representatives through the party mechanism. 
Neither of the mainstream of ruling and opposition parties have paid serious attention to the 
labour issue. Even labour movements which occurred after political liberalisation during 
the late 1980s, were mild in an international perspective (unlike those of South Korea in the 
1980s and Britain in the 1970s) and constrained in scope. In the 1990s, social/labour 
movement leaders are concerned more about the ideological issue over Taiwan’s future in 
relation to Mainland China than the welfare of the working class. Labour has become ‘quite 
demanding’ compared with earlier times, but ‘not yet developed into a mature class’ 
because the state is not willing to grant autonomy to union organisation by legislation 
(Hsiao, 1992:165-6).
According to the analysis of Wang (1993:120), labour movements did not promote 
labour’s influence over national policy but strengthened the allied relationship between the 
state and the capitalists to depress the collective actions of labour. As a bizarre result, 
labour movements, intended to strengthen their class interests through collective actions, 
made the working class lose some of the interests that it had (ibid.: 119). An article - ‘The 
Angers of Capitalists’ (Economic Daily News: 04/01/89) jointly published by eight 
heavyweight capitalists, claimed that the origins of the deterioration of the domestic 
investment environment were ‘radical’ environmental and labour movements and 
condemned the government for its impotence in ‘regulating’ these social movements. 
Formosa Plastics, the largest manufacturing group, announced its termination of domestic 
investment (and went overseas), and this gained a great deal of support from the industrial 
sector. Subsequently, the state increased the level of its intervention in managing social 
movements. It could be said that the basic rights of labour have been nominally recognised, 
but the means to realise their rights has been strictly limited, such as strike and 
demonstration. The voice of an investment strike is apparently louder than that of a labour 
strike.
After 1989, labour movements lost influence over the political economy and the
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ability of labour mobilisation decreased (Wang. 1993:216). Active labour leaders attempted 
to gain political influence on labour policy through legislator elections, but the results were 
frustrated in 1990 and 1992 elections. Thus labour in Taiwan did not acquire a significant 
degree of political power, nor did it challenge the system of political economy. However, it 
did affect the state which divided labour affairs from the Ministry of the Interior, as a quasi- 
ministerial level organ in 1987.
Inside the state apparatus, labour authority -  the Council of Labour Affairs (COLA) 
supervising the welfare of workers, was never a powerful government branch to influence 
national policy. As the statement of ex-chairman19 of the COLA on answering why he 
resigned as a chair of COLA and intended to join the 1997 election of Taipei County 
Magistrate that is abnormal because the political level of a COLA chair, a cabinet position
is deemed much higher than that of a county magistrate:
It has to be admitted that COLA is a relatively weak organ in the Executive Yuan Usually, the COLA- 
led labour policy has been rejected in the meeting of Executive Yuan by the Ministry o f Economic 
AfFairs (MOEA), the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), the Ministry o f  Finance, 
and the Directorate General o f Budget, Accounting & Statistics, even sometimes by the Environmental 
Protection Administration, because of the conflicting situation o f the departments COLA chair’s 
attitude should be very resolute, otherwise, the labour policy is very difficult to move. Promoting the 
welfare o f labour as far as COLA is concerned, is very important to get the support of other ministries If 
you could not obtain support, the policy would only be frustrated But you have more space, resources 
and administrative discretion when you are a mayor or magistrate The policy at local government level 
might be easier to promote than at central government level (Business Weekly, 28/04/97 48)
The introduction of foreign workers also weakened the bargaining power of local 
labour. Not only is the pay of foreign workers low, but also they make fewer demands 
because if they are fired by a contracted employer, they will lose their work permits and be 
repatriated immediately. In 1989, foreign workers were only permitted for public 
construction projects. This was the first time that foreign workers were introduced into 
Taiwan, but they were already working in manufacturing illegally. However, the 
introduction of foreign workers, mainly from Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, has
19 Mr. Hsieh, Shcn-Shan, a politician with blue-collared background and once head o f  the National Federation o f  
Labour, has been deemed to be the heaviest weight labour spokesman. Before being invited to be COLA chair in 1994, 
he was a very senior legislator representing the working class in the Legislative Yuan. He got this cabinet position as a 
deal to give up his intention of participating in the election for vice chair o f  the Legislative Yuan This might be 
because o f  his strong labour linkage the KMT preferred that he did not chair the Legislative Yuan. During the period o f  
being COLA chair, the promotion o f labour affairs has been handicapped. He failed in the 1997 election.
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been extensively employed in many industries, primarily labour-intensive ones, and the 
quotas have been increased rapidly. In 1995, there are about 200,000 foreign workers in 
Taiwan and 70,000-80,000 more are awaiting approval20 (Free China Review, Aug. 
1995:39). Importing foreign workers has had a serious impact on industrial relations for 
local labour, in particular, for low-skilled labour who actively supported labour movements. 
It also indicates that COLA failed to defend the interest of local workers.
4.3.2. Peak associations and the party-state in Taiwan
State corporatism at macro level is the characteristic of authoritarian rule by KMT state in 
relation to peak associations. It is argued that the state corporatism at macro level, in 
general, is bipartite rather than tripartite, and party-led rather than state-led. The situation 
has not changed fundamentally, so far.
Unlike the chairs of both the General Chamber of Commerce (COC, for business), 
and National Federation of Industries (FOI, for manufacturing), who are selected members 
of the Central Standing Committee -  the most powerful organ of the KMT, the leader of 
National Federation of Labour (NFL) is not always admitted to this body21. The decision of 
the Central Standing Committee (held on Wednesday) directs the meeting of the 
Executive Yuan (held on Thursday), where state policies are made. ‘Also, economic 
officials were not entrusted with the power to dispense economic privileges. Instead, 
they had to consult with the party leadership for politically sensitive economic decisions 
(Chu, 1992:133).’
20 From the same source (pp38-40), a statement by Mr. H.S Chan (Vice Chairman of COLA): ‘It’s especially difficult 
to determine how large a supply o f foreign labour Taiwan needs. There is. o f  course, a huge demand for foreign labour 
because it’s relatively cheap But COLA has to protect local workers But we worry that admitting more might delay 
the closure o f those labour-intensive industries that have already lost competitiveness in the global market, thereby 
hindering our overall industrial development... But remember, we've introduced a large number o f  foreign workers in 
just the past five years. This is unprecedented in Southeast Asia - and in most places around the world. .. It is ama/ing 
that we could hire so  many foreign workers. O f course, it’s going to have some unpacts on our economy and society '
2 * Th# moat influential organ o f  the KMT is the 3 1-member Central Standing Committee which meets every 
Wednesday to deliberate and approve important policies for the government, and to nominate people for important 
party and government positions (1993 ROC Yearbook: 135-6). Half o f its members is selected by party chairman, and 
another half it elected between the members o f  Central Committee. Two leaders o f capitalist organisations (FOI & 
COC) are always members while leader o f  the unions has to take part in an election and, most o f the time is 
unsuccessful
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It is safe to say that business and industry have more influence on economic 
policy through corporatist measures, at least in terms of a macro environment favouring 
business, than labour in the KMT one party-dominated Taiwan. Nonetheless, this does 
not necessarily mean that FOI and COC are in a position of “insider groups’ (Grant. 
1989b:20). The KMT state incorporated the leaders of national business associations 
into its power centre for two main reasons. Firstly, it needs the views and opinions of 
business circles to reflect the demands of the private sector in order to make 
manageable policies. They can make suggestions, not manipulations, at the meetings of 
Central Standing Committee since there are another 29 members from powerful party 
staffs to important state technocrats. Secondly, it also needs control of associations at 
all levels and sectors through its major party members because, politically speaking, the 
government shall not intervene in the operation of associations except by laws but the 
party can. Observing from recent leaders of FOI and COC, they were KMT party- 
spirited capitalists who closely matched the direction of government policy and kept 
good relationships with the highest level of KMT22.
Bipartite corporatism rather than tripartite corporatism is more suitable to 
describe state corporatism in Taiwan. Although COC and FOI are two functional 
associations, which are normally integrated into one in some other countries, they both 
represent capitalist interests in contrast to trade union from the labour class. Thus, COC 
and FOI are counted as the same functionally corporatist association for capitalist 
interests to negotiate with the state. In respect of interest intermediation, it is still 
corporatist in nature, even corporatist agreement principally happens inside party 
mechanism rather than between associations and state agencies. Basically, corporatist 
consultation can be found in Taiwan, but to what extent associations can affect 
macroeconomic policy requires more investigation.
22 There ii no way to rule out whether the KMT gave special assistance via party mechanism to the chairs of 
associations whan they campaigned for their leaderships in FOI and COC. The staffs interviewed in both organisations 
refused to answer politically sensitive questions o f  this kind.
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However, the characteristics of government-sanctioned groups and of compulsory 
membership are very state-corporatist in Taiwan. The establishment of NFL, FOI and COC, 
and all their local counterparts, is according to respective Organisation Laws. Under the 
principle of ‘every firm/local organisation must affiliate to an association national 
counterpart’ (jg£>3>?&), the private sector has no choice but to join a related organisation23. 
This strengthened corporatist control through different level of associations. The functions 
of these economic organisations have been stipulated by law, the government lists the 
functions that organisations shall perform and those activities unlisted are prohibited. In the 
case of the Industrial Organisation Law, many functions of association are designed to 
assist the government to promote IP and none allows FOI to act as pressure group. 
Under this constraint, economic organisations tend to cooperate with the state rather than 
act against it (Interview No.4 & 12). It is argued that industrial associations in Taiwan 
function on behalf of the government more as a means of collecting information, 
propagating IP, and implementing export promotion measures, than playing a role in policy 
formation, and shaping industrial development strategy.
Under the structural weakness of organisations, liberal corporatism at macro level is 
less clear because corporatist agreement is based on legal coercion rather than on voluntary 
agreement. Policy formation is the area that was performed by the state apparently, and 
policy implementation is the area where peak organisations had to exercise some control 
over the behaviour of their members, and some sanctions backed up by state authority 
(Coleman, 1985:107). However, the administrative capacity of corporatist bodies, as well as 
state authority, to regulate those members who disobeyed corporatist agreement is doubted 
in the 1990s, for instance, on the issue of destination constraint for outward investment.
Taiwan’s situation at macro level in the 1990s matches more of the characteristics of 
state corporatism than those of liberal corporatism. However, if the general conception of
23 Taking manufacturing firms as an example, whenever and wherever more than five manufacturers o f the same field 
exist in a district, they must form a local industrial association, industrial associations o f  the same trade in Taiwan must 
jointly form a Taiwan regional association. There are 132  regional associations which come under the umbrella o f  FOI.
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corporatism is a method of policy-making by incorporating corporatist association into the 
process (let alone policy implementation), then Taiwan is hardly a corporatist system.
4.3.3. Meso corporatism in the electronics industry?
Meso corporatism is much more flexible in explaining sectoral interest intermediation than 
the ‘system-steering’ concerns of macro-corporatism (Cawson, 1985:11). The interest 
intermediation in Taiwan’s electronics sector is similar to macro corporatism in terms of 
labour which is excluded from corporatist arrangements. There is no such evidence in the 
two case studies suggesting that the special sectoral interest association affects the decision 
in conjunction with selecting winners at the KMT centre. Rather, consultation from 
international sources is much more significant than within a meso corporatist system.
However, cooperative measures in terms of policy implementation is not corporatist 
even though sectoral association is highly involved in the process (see chapter 5 & 6). The 
policy implementation between the 1TR1, association and the association’s members was 
based on contracts rather than a corporatist agreement. The association plays a very 
important role in relation to administrative assistance to the NPC Alliance and HDTV 
consortia-complexes. But it can not be seen as meso corporatism because association’s 
involvement in the process of policy implementation is rather on administrative support 
than on interest intermediation and collective bargaining. Given a closer look at the firm’s 
level, the individual firm, representing itself, had contract relations with ITRI which was 
not monopolised by functional association collectively. It could be argued that the meso 
corporatist characteristics of interest representation and policy implementation in the NPC 
and HDTV cases is implicit; but, in practice, contract relations underlie the cooperation 
between different parties, a characteristic other than meso corporatism.
Neither state corporatism, macro corporatism nor meso corporatism provide a 
comprehensive explanation of Taiwan’s G1 relationships in the 1990s. In particular, the 
absence of labour at every level is the major obstacle to the application of corporatist 
theories. The corporatist perspective does provide some useful insights in explaining some
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phenomena in Taiwan, in particular, state corporatism and macro corporatism. But 
liberal/societal corporatism has not been developed in Taiwan because of the association's 
structural weakness of authoritarian inheritance in w hich political exchange w ith the state is 
less possible; meso corporatism can not be used to interpret the situation in Taiwan's 
electronics sector. Although interest intermediation is a good starting point to examine the 
interaction between the state and interest associations, the application of corporatist 
theories to Taiwan will not reflect the current situation which occurred in the 1990s in 
relation to GI corporation for technology innovation.
4.4. Institutionalised Strategic Partnership (ISP) as an Ideal Type
None of these traditional approaches alone can fully interpret the current GI relationship in 
Taiwan. Statist and corporatist theories both provide insights to interpret partly the GI 
relationships in Taiwan. They do not pay special attention to the examination of GI 
relationships in the process of technology diffusion. They also neglect, how a country, by 
institutional arrangements, actively responds to the competitive requirements of the global 
economy. Thus, a new theoretical pattern of GI relationship should be developed to explain 
the current GI cooperation that has happened in Taiwan’s electronics sector and other high- 
tech sectors.
The empirical findings in chapter 4-6 arrived at a suggestion that Taiwan’s state- 
industrial arrangements can be characterised as an institutionalised strategic partnership 
(ISP). ISP, defined as an institutional arrangement of mixing the state-designed policy 
and GI cooperative policy implementation, has proved to be an effective method of 
promoting competitiveness. It differs from neo-statist theory, in which the state 
authoritatively distributes resources to the industrial sector by imposing performance 
criteria on them; from corporatist theory in which the outputs of policy formation and 
policy implementation are through corporatist exchange with the state. Neither the statist 
autonomous concept nor the corporatist societal partnership give a fair account in relation 
to technological and international factors that have influenced the changes of political
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economy and GI relationships substantially. In fact, under the ISP. the state assigned 
resources to a particular sector in the hope of stimulating more private investment and the 
accommodative efforts of firms: the policy-making process was hardly penetrated by the 
industrial sector and unions, rather by foreign advisors and international consultancies: 
business associations played the role of administrative assistance to project implementation 
instead of pressing for more benefits. The private sector is given a new meaning in the 
notion of ISP, unlike that defined in the developmentalist explanation which was seen to be 
a docile and unresisting subordinate. It is now performing as a partner with the state to act 
hand-in-hand on the efforts of innovation and diffusion.
It seems that the government, in this wave of technology-led structure adjustment, 
can accelerate and assist industrial development, especially in the situation of Taiwan 
where public research institutes are the major dynamic for innovation. Even though the 
government plays a dominant role in the technology development process, the fact that 
private firms share the efforts of technology development as well as risks, is also important. 
The industry is the end user of technology, a fact that the state can not substitute. IPs are 
very essential for the success of industrial development, an institutional mechanism that 
can effectively enforce IPs is of paramount importance, however.
ISP, seen as a form of effective GI relationship in accelerating the pace of technology 
diffusion by linking the public research institute and the industry, has a decisive influence 
on the creation of both new products and the new sector. This, in the long run, contributes 
to the increasingly competitive advantages of some industries. Through ISP, the flexibility 
of smaller firms on the production of components, the strength of large firms on product 
designs (in particular, HDTV complex), and the R&D capacity of ITRI are brought together. 
Three different stages in the process of technology development, namely, technology 
innovation, technology diffusion and the commercialisation of technology, are integrated 
into one stage by this new institutional arrangement. Thus, it has shortened the time for 
technology development and the time for the product to reach the market. This has led to an 
increase in profit and competitiveness.
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An ISP identifies the essence of state-industrial arrangements in technology diffusion 
in the 1990s in Taiwan. It embraces three elements, as shown by the individual meanings of 
the words: 'institutionalised' stands for IP-driven institutionalisation; ‘strategic' for 
selective intervention; and ’partnership' for reciprocity' between the state and industry;
IP is the basic element underlying the whole picture of ISP. Two different kinds of IP 
constitute the institution for the effective operation of GI cooperation in relation to 
technology innovation and product creation. A technological IP, Special Technology 
Project, is the main determinant to bring about the consequence of linking the public 
research institute and private firms while other supporting IPs contribute to strengthen the 
R&D in the private sector. The evolution of the Special Technology Project and its relation 
to the NPC and HDTV cases will be discussed in chapters five and six (in particular, in the 
section 3.2. of chapter six). The general IPs supporting technology development will be 
explained in full in the second section of the next chapter.
The word ‘strategic" denotes selective intervention of the state in technology 
development. State intervention concentrates on the emerging industries which are 
perceived and planned as the future industries for Taiwan by the government. Selective 
characteristics of state intervention will be disclosed in the first part of chapter four which 
shows a economic-biased national innovation system, and in the section 3.1.1. of chapter 
six which relates to the choice of HDTV as a winner. The rapid rise of high tech sectors is 
the result of functional and selective intervention.
The state-industrial partnership represents a reciprocal and cooperative relation in 
which the willingness of the state to invest in key technology and the accommodation of the 
industrial sector to technology development are the bases on which to consolidate ISP. 
Even though policy making is hardly penetrated by the industrial sector, this partnership is 
built upon the fact that the firms can get more benefits by joining government projects than 
by keeping outside the institutional arrangement. There is no coercion in this partnership, 
but institutional ‘sweeteners’.
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The conception of ISP and its three elementary characteristics will be 
comprehensively elaborated with supporting empirical evidence in the final chapter. It is 
argued that, first, ISP is the main factor leading to effective GI interaction and 
conducive policy implementation; second, ISP will become a viable model for the 
development of high-tech industries and a very common scenario for the foreseeable 
future.
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C H A P T E R F O U R
N A T I O N A L  I N N O V A T I O N  S Y S T E M  A N D  IN D U S T R IA L  
P O L IC IE S  S U P P O R T IN G  T E C H N O L O G Y  D E V E L O P M E N T  IN  
T A IW A N
The globalization of industrial activities and the increasing number of strategic 
alliances between different country-originated firms seems to blur the boundaries of so- 
called national innovation systems. The process of innovation is characterised as 
transnational and global rather than national. Many big corporations are loosening their 
ties to their home country and starting to spread innovative activities and to ‘source’ 
from different national innovation systems. That is not to say that to study a national 
innovation system of supporting industrial technology development is less important. 
As many authors suggest, the strength of the national innovation system based on 
different degrees of cultural homogeneity and of political centrality is a good indicator 
to explain why different countries have different economic performances, see for 
example, Hart (1992), Nelson (1993) and Patel & Pavitt (1994). Moreover, national 
production systems (e.g. the supply system of Computer components in Taiwan) and 
geographical technological areas (e.g. the overall manufacturing ability in East Asian 
region in consumer electronics) have formed an industrial cluster to strengthen 
technological specialisation (Porter, 1990). This kind of national or geographical 
network in technology and production implies that marrying with a strong and big 
foreign firm is not the only way to conduct R&D. Innovative activities under a national 
framework still play an important role in directing and supporting processes of 
innovation and learning (Lundvall, 1992). Besides, the small size of Taiwanese firms 
constrains their opportunities to form strategic alliances with foreign firms, but does 
serve as the main motivation to create group cooperation in technological R&D.
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It is increasingly assumed that innovation is a key element in national economic 
growth and national government should play a proper role in innovation policy. More 
and more attention has been devoted to understanding organisations and agencies 
operating at national, or even international level, and the interaction between the public 
and the private sector. ‘The assignment of proper roles for, respectively, government 
and the private sector in enhancing technological capabilities should build upon a better 
understanding of national system of innovation (Lundvall, 1992:5).’
Innovation involves much more than R&D activities. A national innovation 
system does not confine its range either to innovative capability in relation to economic 
performance, such as the behaviour of firms at the forefront of technology, or to 
institutions influencing national technological capabilities. According to Nelson 
(1993:4), ‘the concept is a set of institutions whose interactions determine the 
innovative performance of national firms.’ The meaning of ‘system’ is ‘a set of 
institutional actors that, together, plays the major role in influencing innovative 
performance (ibid.)’, not simply the actors doing R&D. In the language of Lundvall, 
there are two definitions of a national innovation system in the narrow and the broad 
sense.
The narrow definition would include organisations and institutions involved in searching and 
exploring - such as R&D departments, technological institutes and universities. The broad definition 
which follows from the theoretical perspective presented above includes all parts and aspects o f  the 
economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and exploring - 
the production system, the marketing system and the system of finance present themselves as sub­
systems in which learning takes place (Lundvall, 1992:12).
National innovative capabilities are based upon a set of institutions in which 
R&D activities are conducted through interactions between institutional actors. Both 
Lundvall and Nelson agree that a definition of a national innovation system should be 
open and flexible. And the argument of Lundvall concerning the need to incorporate 
some of the most important sub-systems (production, marketing and finance sub-system) 
in the national innovation system is very useful to the argument of this thesis, in 
particular, since some strategically specific industries might form a closed sub-system.
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The evidence in the empirical chapters reveals that exclusive R&D sub-systems have 
been formed by strategic industries and the public research institutes within a national 
innovation system.
The first part of this chapter will introduce the national innovation system in 
Taiwan which includes the trend in government participation in R&D, the 
administrative system governing technological development, and the functions of public 
and semi-public organisations related to industrial innovation. The second part 
emphasises industrial and technological policies and laws and regulations deployed to 
enhance technological capabilities. This is a basic element underlying ISP which has 
been operated under and facilitated by these policy measures.
1. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM
1.1. The Trend in R&D Activities
It can be observed from the process of economic development that the weight of the 
government in R&D has been incrementally increased along with its shift from 
agricultural production, to light and labour-intensive production in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and to capital- and knowledge-intensive production in the 1980s and 1990s. In the past, 
Taiwan depended on its cheap labour to explore its competitive advantage rather than 
on R&D. However, R&D has become the engine to expedite economflf growth.
There were no so-called industrial R&D policies in the early stage of economic 
development. The level of industrial technology required by light and labour-intensive 
industries was comparatively very low and this could not motivate the state to invest in 
R&D. Rather, Taiwan depended on transfer of technological, marketing and managerial 
know-how through the investment of transnational corporations. The first three four- 
year economic development plans (1953-1956, 1957-1960, and 1961-1964) did not 
contain any industrial R&D activities. Even in the Fourth four-year economic 
development plan (1965-1968), the emergence of R&D activities were rather on
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agricultural than industrial R&D. Before the implementation of the 1965-1968 plan. 
Taiwan could have been called preindustrial, since the share of the agricultural sector in 
GDP was bigger than that of the manufacturing sector.
In 1966 (See Table 4.1). the share of both sectors in GDP was the same at the 
percentage of 22.5. After 1966. the manufacturing sector increased its importance 
rapidly and reached a peak of 47.1% share of GDP in 1986, while the agricultural sector 
decreased to less than 5% in 1988. In response to the increasing economic centrality of 
the manufacturing sector, the fifth four-year economic development plan (1969-1972) 
included some measures for the development of industrial R&D activities. These 
measures were (1) raising capital for industrial and applied science research; (2) 
bolstering research facilities and fostering personnel; (3) improving the utilisation of 
research resources; (4) encouraging R&D directed towards new production technologies 
and new products; (5) establishment of the Hsinchu science-based Industrial Park; (6) 
encouraging industry to establish specialised research and testing organisations to 
improve production technology and develop new products. It indicated that the 
government had realised the importance of technological development to the future of 
the industrial sector. However, the effect of these measures was limited because the 
technological infrastructure in Taiwan was very fragile and could not be improved in a 
short period of time. For example, the Hsinchu science-based Industrial Park was put 
into operation in 1981, a decade after the fifth plan; most of the public or semi-public 
industrial R&D organisations were mainly established in the 1980s. This plan could be 
deemed rather as a plan to strengthen the foundation of technological development than 
to improve technological capacities in practice. There is no evidence to show that the 
goals o f improving production technology and developing new products were attained.
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Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product by Industry
Period Agriculture Manufacturing Industry
Construction
Electricity, 
Gas & Water
Service
1952 32.2 12.9 3.9 0.9 48.1
1955 29.1 15.6 4.8 1.0 47.7
1960 28.5 19.1 3.9 1.7 44.6
1965 23.6 22.3 4.0 2.1 46.2
1966 22.5 22.5 4.0 2.1 46.9
1967 24.6 25.0 4.2 2.0 46.4
1968 19.0 26.5 4.3 2.1 46.5
1969 15.9 29.1 4.2 2.3 47.3
1970 15.5 29.2 3.9 2.4 47.7
1971 13.1 31.5 3.9 2.3 48.0
1972 12.2 34.3 4.0 2.2 46.2
1973 12.1 36.8 4.0 1.9 44.1
1974 12.4 32.8 4.5 2.2 46.9
1975 12.7 30.9 5.3 2.6 47.4
1976 11.4 33.8 5.7 2.4 45.5
1977 10.6 34.2 6.1 2.5 45.4
1978 9.4 35.6 6.1 2.5 45.4
1979 8.6 35.9 6.2 2.3 46.1
1980 7.7 36.0 6.3 2.5 46.6
1981 7.3 35.6 5.7 3.4 47.2
1982 7.7 35.2 5.0 <■> ^ 48.0
1983 7.3 35.9 4.6 3.7 47.7
1984 6.3 37.5 4.3 3.8 47.5
1985 5.8 37.6 4.1 4.0 47.9
1986 5.6 39.4 3.8 3.5 47.3
1987 5.3 38.9 3.9 3.4 48.0
1988 5.0 37.2 4.2 3.0 50.1
1989 4.9 34.6 4.5 2.9 52.8
1990 4.2 33.3 4.7 2.8 54.6
1991 3.8 33.3 4.7 2.7 55.1
1992 3.6 31.7 5.0 2.7 56.5
1993 3.7 30.5 5.3 2.7 57.3
1994 3.6 29.0 5.3 2.7 59.1
Source. T S D B , 1995:42. Tonl-luuv.
The subsequent six-year plan (1973-1978) had a major emphasis on industrial 
R&D aimed at upgrading industrial standards and improving industrial structures. The 
measures adopted in this plan followed those of the previous plan and continued to 
carry out those unfinished plan goals. By 1978, the manufacturing sector accounted for
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35.6% of GDP and industrial products composed 89.2% of total export value. These 
figures did not mean that the level of technology had been upgraded by technology- 
related measures. In the 1970s, Textile, Garments and Footwear industries continued to 
play an important role, but some new industries increased their shares in exports to 
replace the declining agricultural sector. The rising industries, such as petrochemicals, 
iron and steel, electronic and electric goods, were characterised by relatively low 
technology and labour-intensiveness then24. At best, the 1970s could be seemed as a 
preparatory decade to step into the ‘real’ high technology era in Taiwan.
It can be argued that a well-functioning administrative framework of industrial 
technology was not established until the formation of the Science and Technology 
Advisory Group (STAG) under the Executive Yuan in 1979 and the respective 
counterparts under many ministries. The establishment of STAG represented a new era 
in that industrial technology development became a regular administrative task, rather 
than an addition to the national economic development plan. It denotes that 
technological administration increased its significance in national development, and 
more importantly, that government had shifted its resources from other policy areas to 
the development o f industrial technology.
Unlike the development of industrial and applied technology, the development of 
basic science and technology (S&T) occurred much earlier. The earliest government 
office charged specifically with planning basic science research and science education 
was the National Long-term Science Development Council (NLSDC,W£&$]$$f4i£® 
M&), which was founded in 1959. Its main functions were limited to the promotion of
24 According to Hobday (1994b), the rising importance o f  the electronic and the electric industry in Taiwan was mainly 
due to large foreign buyers from United States and Japan. He proposed a simple market-technology model to explain 
how the East Asian dragons overcame the initial difficulties o f  market and technological entry The foreign buyers 
wanted to access cheap labour through licensing agreements, subcontracting arrangements, joint ventures and OEM 
(original equipment manufacturing). The foreign firms not only bought finished goods for export, but they would often 
supply technical specification, training, and advice on production and management. Through international linkage, 
domestic firms learned assembly skills and basic production capabilities to produce mature products He argued that 
Taiwan's technological evolution in electronics industry w u  firstly by assembling simple consumer electronics in the 
1960s mainly from OEM , then by a more advanced technological method o f  ODM (own design and manufacturing) in 
the 1980s, finally by building competitive R&D capabilities in the 1990s.
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academic research by conducting long-term scientific research, by reviewing and 
allocating funds for scientific research, and by deciding who should be sent abroad to 
continue their studies. The National Long-term Plan for Science Development
1959-1968) was aimed at magnifying the foundation of scientific 
development. At that time, there were very few technological programmes controlled by 
competent authorities. They were presented as individual programmes without relevant 
consultation about what they developed with other agencies. The similar research topic 
might be done under two different departments and this led to a waste of government 
resources owing to a lack of a national review body on technological programmes.
In 1967, NLSDC had been reorganised into a National Science Council (NSC). In 
1969, NSC was further reorganised and became an official member of the Executive 
Yuan. Today, NSC is the highest government organ responsible for the development of 
basic science and applied research. Between 1969-1980, there was a National Twelve- 
year Plan for Science Development which focused not only on magnifying the 
foundation of scientific development but also on strengthening and promoting academic 
research, and on fostering technical R&D to cope with the needs of national 
development.
The task of promoting technological development was launched in 1959 in the 
era of NLSDC, but the overall policy, to plan and promote national S&T development, 
started at the First National S&T Conference in 1978 (ROC 1994 S&T Yearbook, 
1995:11). The National S&T Conference, organised by NSC, became a regular 
conference held at a four to five year interval in 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1996. The 
participants included scientists, engineers, business leaders and government 
administrators, and those who deliberated on the direction and strategies of S&T 
development.
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Table 4.2 National S&T Conferences and Plans. 1978-96
Policy Goals Focal Technology
1 Program for S&T -Promote economic development -Energy
9 development, 1979 -Raise the quality of life of the -Material
7
8
people
-Establish self-sufficient defence 
capability
-Information
-Automation
1 Program for S&T -Promote economic development Aiding another four
9 development, 1982 -Raise the quality of life of the -Bio-tech
8 revised. people -Food tech
2 Coordinated with -Establish self-sufficient defence -Hepatitis control
1982-85 4-year 
economic 
development plan
capability -Electro-optics
1 Ten-year long-term -Raise the level of S&T Aiding another four
9 plan for national S&T -Promote economic development -Oceanography
8 development, 1986- through industrial R&D -Synchrotron radiation
6 1995 -Raise the quality of life of the people
-Establish self-sufficient defence 
capability
-Green tech
-Disease & disaster prevention
1 Extend 10-year plan to -Develop industrial tech 10 ‘star’ industries selected by
9 12-year long-term -Improve scientific R&D CEPD: telecommunication,
9 plan, 1991-2002. environment information, semiconductors.
1 A new 6-year mid- -Raise basic research standards aerospace, advanced materials,term S&T plan which -Coordinate overall S&T consumer-electronics, specilaty
integrated into 6-year development chemicals & pharmaceutical
National Development 
Plan
-Integrate technology into society products, medical & health care, 
pollution control, automation & 
precision machinery.
1 Continuing and -The strategic planning and efficient 10 emerging industries
9 amended 1991-2002 employment of technological
9
6
Plan resources
-The establishment of high-tech 
innovation system 
-Technology-driven state 
modernisation
Source: ROC Yearbook, 1993 CH20. ROC S&T Yearbook, 1994 CHI NSC. 1993, Sep. 1996.
Table 4.2 shows government efforts on the planning and promotion of the overall 
S&T development through national S&T conferences and various programmes. The 
S&T Development Programmes, followed the conclusions of National S&T Conference 
and the suggestions of STAG, provided the guidelines for national development. These 
programmes became the legal base of the government in establishing technological 
agencies in various administrative branches, in setting up more than twenty five new 
laboratories and R&D institutions in different fields, and in ratifying laws and
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regulations in relation to technological development. The infrastructure of technological 
development has been improved gradually by resource inputs of manpower and budget 
w hich eventually contributed the strength of overall national technological capability.
The distinctive role of the government in creating a ‘dynamic technological 
environment’, in which technological administration is well-established at different 
levels of government; laws and regulations governing technological development are 
updated to the changing needs of the private sector, and research institutes are 
established to cope with the timely necessity of industrial upgrading, can be identified 
in Taiwan after 1980 (Table 4.3). The successful implementation of the S&T 
Development Program made certain both the maintenance and the renewal of the 
learning process inside the public sector. This implies that resources inside the public 
sector must be channelled continuously to S&T.
Table 4.3 ROC S&T Chronology since 1978
Y e a r M ain  E vents A gen cies E stab lish ed  &  Law R & D  Institu tes E stab lished
19 7 8
•  First National S&T  
C onference
1 9 7 9
•  S& T D evelopm ent 
Program
•  STA G
•  Office o f  S&T Advisors 
(Ministry o f  National D efence)
•  O ffice o f  S&T Advisors 
(Ministry o f  Education)
•  Institute for Information 
Industry
1 9 8 0
•  First STA G  Board 
M eeting (once a year)
•  Office o f  S&T A dvisors 
(M O EA )
•  SIP
1981
•  First 5-year Plan 
(A cadem ia Sinica)
•  Institute o f  Bio-m edical 
Science (Academia Sinica)
•  Electronic Research &
Service Organisation (ITRI)
•  Institute o f  Harbour & Marine 
Tech
19 8 2
•  Second  National S&T  
C onference
•  S& T D evelopm ent 
Program (revised)
•  NSC  Reorganised •  Institute o f  Atomic & 
M olecular Science (Academ ia  
Sinica)
•  Institute o f  M olecular B io logy  
(Academ ia Sinica)
•  Materials Research Lab. 
(ITRI)
•  Mechanical Industry Research 
Lab. (ITR I)
103
1983
•  Technical Manpower 
Cultivation & 
Recruiting Program
•  Regulations for Encouraging 
the Development o f  New 
Industrial Products by Private 
Enterprises
•  Institute o f Aeronautics & 
Aerospace (NCKU)
•  Institute o f Applied 
Mechanics (NTU)
•  Micro-Electronics & 
Information S&T Research 
C enter (NCTU)
1984
•  Defence S&T
Development Program
•  Development Center for 
Biology
1985
•  Materials Science Center 
(NTHU)
•  Synchrotron Radiation 
Research Center
•  Center for Measurement 
Standards (ITRI)
1986
•  Second 5-year Plan 
(Academia Sinica)
•  10-year S&T 
Development Program 
(1986-1995)
•  Third National S&T 
Conference
1987
•  Office o f  S&T Advisors 
(Ministry o f  Transportation & 
Communication)
•  Environmental Protection 
Administration
1988
•  4-year S&T Mid-term 
Plan
•  Sub-Micron Device Research 
Lab. (NSC)
•  National Lab Animal 
Research Center (NSC)
•  National Center for 
Earthquake Engineering 
Research (NSC)
•  National Plant Genetic 
Resources Center
1990
•  Statute for Upgrading 
Industries
•  The Preparatory Office of 
National Space Lab (NSC)
•  National Super Computcr 
Center (NSC)
•  Electro-Optic Research Lab 
(ITRI)
•  CCL (ITRI)
1991
•  4th National S&T 
Conference
•  Program for the Development 
o f Critical Components and 
Products
•  TLP
•  Space Program Office
•  Wafer Design and 
Manufacture Center
1992
•  12-year Long-term  
S&T D evelopm ent 
Program
•  6-year M edium S&T  
D evelopm ent Program
•  National Institute o f  Health
1993
•  Office o f  S&T A dvisors
reorganised into D IT  (M O EA)
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1994
•  Development Fund for Military 
and Civilian Common 
Technology
1995
*  Statute for Upgrading 
Industries (amended)
1996
•  5th National S&T 
Conference
•  Humanities and Social 
Science Research Center
1997
•  Civilian STP
•  The Bill for S&T Basic Law
The government recognised that high-tech and high-value-added manufacturing 
industry would be the backbone of Taiwan’s growth-oriented export trade as well as a 
driving force for future economic breakthroughs. Many efforts have been made to 
emphasise and to promote manufacturing prowess and to ride with the tide of progress 
in technology. The government is expecting, through the strategy of picking up winners 
to create new ‘cash cow’ sectors that can transform ‘industrial Taiwan’ with a sound 
infrastructure of manufacturing industry into a ‘S&T island’.
1.2. Taiwan S&T Development Framework
Figure 4.4 shows the national framework of S&T development. There are many 
government agencies involved in S&T development. Not all agencies are directly 
deploying resources aimed at industrial upgrading, but this does affect the progress in 
improving a sound S&T infrastructure for future development. Taiwan’s overall 
technology development proceeds in accordance with the guidelines of the S&T 
Development Program carried out through a division of responsibilities.
These agencies and their subordinate organisations constitute the national web for 
technological development. Each ministry has its own unit responsible for promoting 
R&D and an office of advisors. Among them the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) 
is the authority responsible for the advancement of industry-related technology and in a 
relatively important position in the national innovation system. The following analysis 
will show the significance of the MOEA and the preference of industrial technology in 
Taiwan’s national innovation system.
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Figure 4.4 The S&T Development Framework of Taiwanese Government
tifo gffe festal
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1.2.1. Academia Sinica
The Academia Sinica, the highest academic research institution in Taiwan, is under the 
supervision of the President and responsible for scientific research and the guidance, 
coordination, and encouragement of academic research. It aims at promoting the level 
of basic and natural science, rather than those of economic-related and strategy- 
considered applied research. There is no direct connection between the basic science 
work of Academia Sinica and the innovative and commercial nature of industrial 
research. The expenditure of Academia Sinica was substantially less than that of MOEA, 
which accounted for industrial R&D expenditure alone. In comparing the R&D budget 
of Academia Sinica and of MOEA, the former’s budget was only 36.8%, 29.0%, 25.7% 
and 21.5% of the latter’s in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 1997 respectively; the former has its 
budget enlarged at 3.4 times and the latter nearly 6 times in 1985-97 (Table 4.5). This 
not only implicitly reflects the consequence of increasing international competition and 
the national fear of losing competitive advantages, but also explicitly implies that the 
government has shifted more resources to industrial R&D than to basic scientific 
research.
1.2.2. National Science Council (NSC) and Science a n d  Technology Advisory Group 
(STAG)
NSC serves as the Executive Branch’s agency specifically responsible for S&T. Its 
principal duties are the planning and promotion of the overall development of S&T in 
the entire nation and assisting academic research and developing Science-based 
Industrial Parks25. The organisational goal is to assist the nation in its modernisation 
and development through raising the level of S&T.
STAG is an intra-Executive Yuan office whose task is to hasten the
1Jlt is rather unusual for NSC to operate a science-based industrial park since it is a science administrative organisation 
aimed at promoting academic research. But it is politically and economically desirable because science-based industrial 
park is the base for high-tech manufacturing in Taiwan.
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implementation o f the 1979 S&T Development Program. STAG is made up o f two 
main bodies to tackle different missions: a body of advisors constituted by twelve 
internationally outstanding foreign and two Chinese advisors to provide 
recommendations for S&T policy-making, taking a global view, to provide 
recommendations to promote the R&D activity o f the private sector and to enhance the 
across-the board effects, and to assess national S&T development projects; and a body 
of the STAG office to coordinate R&D of applied technology through the integration of 
industries and research institutes at the inter-ministerial level, to review budgets on 
national S&T development projects, and to conduct other matters concerning S&T 
assigned by the Premier.
Table 4.5 ROC Government S&T Expenditures, 1985-97
Unit: NTS thousand
Y ea r
"Academia
Sinica
M inistry  of 
N ational 
Defence
M inistry of 
Economic 
Affairs
National
Science
Council
A tom ic
Energy
Council
O thers Total
1985 1,114.934 8,930,387 3,027,650 2,862.292 1,517,289 78.106 13,954,661
1986 1,172,834 12,667,400 4,087,592 
(35 0)
3.654,843 1.572,170 364,007 22,518,846
(613)
1987 1,041,179 13,078,870 4,504,700
(10.2)
3,550,477 1,616,295 444,034 24,235,555
(7.6)
1988 1,269,933 13,085,250 5,128,835 
(13 8)
4,735,362 1,649,272 657,471 26,526,123
(94)
1989 1,435,704 16,952,350 5,472,674
(6.7)
4,713,381 1,600,453 2,095,612 32,270,174
(216)
1990 2.223,788 18,157,630 7,659,593 
(39 9)
6,623,998 1,651,696 2,912.874 39,229,579
(215)
1991 2,605,127 18,215,260 9,294,582
(21.3)
8,585,310 1,796,154 3,742,798 44,239,231
(12.7)
1992 2,864,935 11,913,850 12,623,360 
(35 8)
9,652,949 2,125,176 3,668,044 42,848,314
(-32)
1993 2,910,533 9,248,090 13,042,004
(33)
11,632,919 2,211,004 2,887,447 41,931,997
(-22)
1994 2,995,799 7,962,340 12,899,178
(-21)
11,725,813 2,231,487 3,130,746 40,945,363
(-2.4)
1995 3,306,022 7,083,093 12,843,873
(-04)
12,287,926 2.319,544 2,745,860 40,586,318
(-.<?. 2L -
1996 3,762,222 7,897,652 16,915,358 
(31 7)
13,595,766 2,728,842 2,919,575 45,191,797
(H3)
1997 3,830,001 7,600,356 17,819,563
(» >
13,807,025 2,422,994 4,316,339 49,796,305
n Q1)
Source: STAG
* A cadem ia Sinica is not a branch o f  central government 
( )  *  Annual grow th rate, %
It seems that the administrative coverage of STAG overlaps the functions of NSC.
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But it does not in three aspects. First, the STAG responds directly to the premier and 
has support from the highest authority. It has the privilege of reviewing the proposed 
budgets of departments and of deciding the distribution of resources to avoid 
overlapping projects before these are ratified by the Legislative Yuan owing to its upper 
ministerial position. It has to be noted that STAG serves as the Executive's assistant 
office in S&T matters whose main function is coordinating inter- and intra- 
departmental affairs, rather than implementing policy directly. NSC and relevant 
departments are the respective agencies for implementing the projects and policies of 
their concerns. Besides, ‘if necessary, STAG will make macro-adjustment on S&T 
budgets between ministries’ (Interview No. 29).
Second, STAG itself is a mission-oriented organisation affiliated to the Secretary- 
general Office of the Executive Yuan in terms of budget and employee under ‘the 
guideline for the STAG of the Executive Yuan not an
individual organisation settled by national organisational law. This does not affect its 
responsibility for supra-agency affairs, but it does affect its administrative capacity in 
terms of efficient manpower26. The STAG, as a main macro-controlled monitor on S&T 
affairs, is to concert efforts of ministries under the guidelines of 1979 S&T 
Development Program, while the NSC, as an implementation ministry, is to promote 
national S&T development and support academic research.
Third, the NSC has been given the duty of approving, controlling, and evaluating 
all essential government-funded S&T projects so as to improve promotional efforts for 
S&T development carried out by each government agency and to strengthen their 
coordination. That is not to say that other ministry’s projects are at the mercy of the 
NSC. If the NSC, at the same hierarchical level as another ministry, tries to disapprove 
of the other’s plan, inter-departmental conflicts may arise. In fact, the S&T
“  In response to the small staff team, there are some mission-oriented ad hoc Committees, also known as Technical 
Review Boards made up o f  advisors and experts from related industries and institutes, to plan and promote specific 
strategies on the development o f high-tech industries. This makes many temporary functioning projects viable without 
expanding STAG itself, for example, many industry-specific review boards and conferences, and some nation-wide 
plans, such as government office-automation and National Information Infrastructure.
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Development Program has precisely assigned different tasks to related agencies. The 
Executive Yuan formulates policy and directs other ministries to plan and implement 
(Science and Technology Development Program, 1982:3). The NSC is there to 
communicate and coordinate research plans so as to avoid overlap and to ensure 
efficient deployment of resources.
Even though the NSC is the competent authority in charge of national S&T 
development, its weight in the national innovation system is no more important than 
that of MOEA in terms of its annual budget to develop technology. The NSC has 
increased its S&T budget by 4.8 times, from NT$2,862 million in 1987 to NTS 13,807 
million in 1997, while MOEA budget has increased 5.9 times, from NT$3,027 million 
to NT$17,819 million in the same period (Table 4.5). The MOEA’s technological 
expenditure is comparatively higher than the NSC’s in every single year. In 1997 alone, 
the S&T expenditure of central government distributed 45.61% to the MOEA and 
35.55% to the NSC27.
Moreover, the disbursement o f NSC inclined towards technological development 
rather than basic research. Among the total proposed budget (NTS 16,919 million) of 
NSC in 1997, basic research shared 30.1% (NT$5,100 million), applied research 13.2% 
(NTS2,226 million), technological development 24.9% (NT$4,219 million), and 
technological assistance 31.8% (NT$5,373 million). Under the category of 
technological assistance, the NSC offers financial support in applying for patents, 
copyrights, or other intellectual property rights for any relevant research results. It also 
assists in carrying out any transfers of technology to industry. More importantly, if the 
potential exists for new technologies or new products but the investment risk is too 
great, the NSC will commission research institutes or private industry to continue the 
project under the innovative technology development program. This demonstrates that
27 The research expenditure o f the Ministry o f  National Defence and Academia Sinica arc excluded from central 
government expenditure on S&T development, the former hat been counted u  Defence expenditure and the latter's 
expenditure comes from the President Hall. The figures in 1997 are based on NSC’s 1997 plan. The NSC 1997 budget 
proposal has been cut from NTSI6.9I9 million down to NTSI3.807 million by the Legislature Yuan
110
there is a substantial proportion of NSC money spent on non-basic research.
1.2.3. The Ministry> o f  National Defence (MONO) am i the Chung-Shan Institute o f  
Science and Technology (CIS)
MOND is responsible for the development of military technology. It was the largest 
recipient o f the R&D budget at the time when Taiwan could not get necessary weapons 
from the advanced countries, in particular, the US government, due to its ambiguous 
political identity in world politics. Thus, Taiwan had to develop its own weapons, such 
as Skybow missile and Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF), to replace obsolete ones. 
Before 1992 when Taiwan finally made agreements for sales on F-16 and Mirage 2000 
fighters with both US and French government21 *8, the military R&D body, CIS, had 
received a larger budget more than those of MOEA, NSC and Academia Sinica put 
together. After Taiwan was able to purchase F-16, Mirage 2000, and other desired arms, 
many of the R&D projects developing at CIS ceased or diminished their scope, for 
instance, the Taiwan-made IDF aircraft reduced its proposed production from 300 to 
12029.
The expenditure for military R&D reached its peak at NTS 18.2 billion in 1991, 
was halved at NTS9.2 billion in 1993 and dropped nearly 60% to NTS7.6 billion in 
1997. Meanwhile, the R&D expenditure of MOEA increased steadily. MOEA’s
21 The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, a replacement of previous US-ROC Mutual Defence Treat}’ after Washington built
its diplomatic relationship with Peking, was not only intended to reassure the Taiwanese and deter China from any
attempt to use force against Taiwan, but also to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character The 1982 US-
China Joint Communique constrained the US arms sales to Taiwan in qualitative and quantitative terms and intended 
gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan. This reflected the US view of China as a strategic partner and balanced 
the threat of the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. Arms sales declined from around US$830 million in 1979 to around
US$670 million m 1990 gradually (Klintworth. 1995:66). In 1992, the Bush Administration in its final stage at White
House agreed to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft and related parts and weapons to Taiwan in a deal worth US$5 8 billion 
based on reasons to redress balance in Taiwan straits (China got sophisticated Su-27 from Russia) and that China never 
gives up the idea of reunification by using force In fact, the US changed its attitude to selling F-16 to Taiwan only after
Taiwan had signed a procurement agreement on 150 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft and warships with France. The US feared
that il might lose this big business to France and announced that it had lifted the ban on selling F-16 to Taiwan. Taiwan 
soon announced that it would sign a contract with US and reduce the procurement number of Mirage 2000-5 down to 
only 60 on the grounds that Taiwan's Air Force was used to US aircraft and logistic systems. This shows that Taiwan 
leans heavily on the US and can’t afTord to lose this ‘big brother’.
29 Taiwan wanted to buy US advanced lighter jets and missiles since 1979, but the US government didn't approve those 
deals until 1992. Therefore, Taiwan has no other choice but to develop its own IDF and missile in the 1980s That's 
why the MOND had the largest expenditure on SAT. Once more advanced weapons could be imported from foreign 
countries, there is no need to support so much military RAD.
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expenditure was only one third of MOND's in 1980s and it was half in 1991. It has 
dramatically exceeded MOND's since 1992, and is about 2.3 times of MOND's in 1997. 
It shows a substantial shift of R&D resources from the field of defence to that of 
industry in the 1990s. Taiwan could not have reached its current level of technological 
capacity if it had continued spending R&D resources on arms, not on industrial R&D.
The use of the manpower and facilities of the CIS to assist the development of 
industrial technology is an ongoing effort of government. Its aim is to accelerate the 
pace of industrial upgrading and to transform the functions of CIS. Since the budget of 
CIS has been reduced to a large extent, its primary task will be to find ways of 
maintaining its operations in order to avoid the waste of hard-won researchers and 
heavy investment in facilities30.
CIS is open to public access instead of being a closed military research institute. 
Four special research parks affiliated to the CIS (see Table 4.15) designed by the 
government in 1995 under a plan to develop military and civilian common technology 
and to accept research projects on new technology and new products from private 
enterprise and government agencies. The MOEA entrusted the CIS with special 
technology projects amounting to NTS800 million in 1995, and it is estimated that there 
will be a further NT$6 billion from MOEA’s special technology projects up to the year 
2000. Besides, CIS is also entrusted with research projects from private enterprise and 
its research outcomes are transferable to the respective enterprises. An Industrial 
Cooperation Group of the CIS serves as a means of exchanging the views of the CIS 
and the entrepreneurial insights of industries so as to prevent overlapping investment 
and keep the CIS up-to-date on current economic trends and needs.
The MOEA, in association with the CIS, is engaged in promoting investment and
30 National defence industries were hardly developed in Taiwan before 1979 because the national defence and the 
military-hardware needs were primarily supplied by the US. The CIS was established in 1968. It employs over 6,300 
scientists and more than 8,300 technicians and has four research departments, six R&D production centres, and 
planning task force for specific projects such as Sky bow missile and IDF. The capacity o f  CIS is much stronger than 
that o f  the ITRJ in a single term o f the number o f employees (about 14 6)
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establishing spin-off companies so as to accelerate the development of related industry 
by selecting related technologies and researchers from the CIS and the private sector. 
The Aero Industry Development Center of the CIS was reorganised into Taiwan 
Aerospace Co., a subordinate of MOEA, in July 1997.
1.2.4. MOEA ~  D1T, 1DB, and 1TR1 ■
The Department of Industrial Technology (DIT) was reorganised from MOEA’s Office 
of S&T advisors in 1993. It is an internal department of MOEA dealing with the task of 
promoting industrial technology through the enforcement of ‘MOEA’s special project 
for the research and development of industrial technology’ S;
thereafter special technology project--STP STP is a government-funded effort
on industrial technology R&D with a special focus on the field of a high technical level, 
confined as applied research development, key technology development and key 
component development. STP started in 1977 as a national effort to promote industrial 
technology, but has been greatly increased its weight and budget since late 1980s. To 
hasten industrial upgrading, the government has targeted ten emerging industries, eight 
key technologies and sixty-nine key parts and products in the 1990s.
MOEA hopes to promote industrial technical development and strengthen 
industrial competitiveness which would eventually contribute to assist stable economic 
growth and to advance living quality. The characters of STP on developing specific 
techniques and products are based on market niches, technology-intensiveness, practical 
technology, or generic and experimental technology. As the budget of STP is from 
MOEA, the aims of these projects are expected to improve the economic performance 
of the industrial sector. Therefore, STPs are highly product-oriented and market- 
oriented.
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Table 4.6 ÌVIOEA's Special Technology Projects -- Inputs, 1991-96
B u d g e t 
I N T S  B illion)
P ro je c t
|N u m b e r |
M a n p o w e r
|P e r s o n |
1991 79.5 48 3741
1992 108.4 (36 .3 ) 56 4104  (9 .7 )
1993 1 1 3 .6 (4 .8 ) 58 4 3 1 0 (5 .0 )
1994 108.1 (-4 .9 ) 63 4 5 4 9 (5 .5 )
1995 1 1 6 .5 (7 .8 ) 71 4751 (4 .4 )
1996 1 3 1 .2 (1 2 .6 ) 76 5 1 6 9 (8 .8 )
Source: DIT, 1996c: 14 & 15 ()= Annual growth rate.
Table 4.7 1993 STP Expenditure Allocation by Project Classification
N T  $ th o u s a n d P e r c e n t a g e
E le c tro n ic s  &  I n fo rm a t io n 5,127,621 45 .14
M a c h in e r ie s  &  A u to m a tio n 1,818,335 16.01
M a te r ia ls  &  P ro c e ss 9 15 ,579 8.06
F o o d  & M e d ic in e 1,011,762 8.91
E n v ir o n m e n t  &  R e so u rc e s 505 ,096 4.45
G e n e ra l 1,979,858 17.43
T o ta l 1 1,358,251 100.00
Source: DIT, 1993: Figure 4
Table 4.8 1995 STP Expenditure Allocation and Manpower Input by Institute
N T  $ m il l io n P e r c e n t a g e M a n p o w e r
D IT 197.5 1.70 84
IT R I 7410.3 6 3 .6 3 2980
C IS 1019.2 8 .7 5 413
C h in a  T e x tile  In s t i tu te 298.1 2 .5 6 119
D e v e lo p m e n t C e n te r  f o r  B io te c h n o lo g y 631 .4 5 .4 2 260
A u to m o tiv e  R e s e a rc h  T e s tin g  C e n te r 228 .2 1 .96 66
M e ta l I n d u s tr ie s  D e v e lo p m e n t C e n te r 529.1 4 .5 4 170
F o o d  I n d u s t r y  R & D  In s ti tu te 311.5 2 .6 7 116
I n s t i tu te  f o r  I n fo rm a t io n  I n d u s try 818.5 7 .0 3 429
O th e r s 202 .7 1.74 114
T o ta l 11.646.5 10 0 .0 0 4751
Source DIT, 1996c:40
In 1990s, STPs are characterised as increasing resources inputs, heavy investment 
on electronics-related technologies, with ITRI as the largest STP recipient. Table 4.6 
shows a major growth of STP resources in terms of budget, project, and manpower 
between 1991-96. In 1993, electronics and information industry shared 45% of total 
STP expenditure due to their economic centrality in exports (Table 4.7). ITRI, the 
biggest public research institute for industrial technology with the most of its internal 
research organs connected to emerging industries, had been entrusted with 63.63% of
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total STP budget in 1995 amongst more than ten MOEA's research affiliates (Table 4.8). 
It reveals that STPs are for ‘winners'.
D1T itself is not a research organisation, which is responsible for formatting 
industrial technology policy and for planning STPs. The industrial technology policy is 
in accordance with the IP from the IDB (Interview No.6). This is to say, IDB decides 
the developmental strategy of a specific industry, while the DIT’s STP concentrates on 
the technological development of the future needs of a specific industry.
The IDB was established in February, 1970, as the most important agency in 
charge of industrial affairs. The formation and implementation of IPs are the main 
functions of IDB. In a nominal sense, IDB followed CEPD's (Council for Economic 
Planning and Development) guideline for the initiation of detailed sectoral and general 
IPs, and its proposed IPs have to be evaluated by CEPD. CEPD is an advisory body to 
the Executive Yuan without administrative authority of its own, whose major work 
consists o f reviewing economy-related policy proposals or investigating policy issues 
generated in other ministries or in the Executive itself. IPs suggested by CEPD are 
readily approved by the Executive because most CEPD councillors are cabinet members. 
However, in a realistic term IP is formatted by IDB technocrats, those who have direct 
contact with industrial sectors. Hence, IDB technocrats have a better understanding of 
the problems faced by a specific industry in IP formation than if the IP is designed by 
politicians or the CEPD staffs, who lack the contact experience with individual firms or 
industries. Close linkage between IDB technocrats and the industrial sector reduces the 
problem of poor quality information required in IP-making and contributes to the 
effectiveness of IP implementation. This explains the outstanding performance of 
Taiwan's IP compared with those of other developing countries.
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Chart 4.9 IDB Organisational Chart
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All sectoral detailed IPs and problem-solving IPs are formulated within IDB’s 
functional divisions directly. The organisational chart (4.9) of IDB demonstrates the 
different divisions that are in control of distinct industrial tasks. Division 1-4 undertake 
the administration of specific industries and their relatively sectoral IPs, while Division 
5-7 tackle general IPs in relation to industrial development. Three internal offices 
maintain the management of logistical matters. The Information Service Center 
provides all information in relation to industrial affairs including regulations, standards, 
incentives, measures and funds; Service Center accepts all applications for assistance, 
incentives, advice, loans and funds.
IDB has a strong administrative capacity to put policies into action. The coverage 
of its functions varies from trade protection to financial incentives. Its capacity, 
generally speaking, includes setting up lists of tariffs and imports control, to issue
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import licences, to encourage domestic purchasing agreements, to operate the duty 
draw-back schemes, to approve applications for loans from various special loan scheme 
and for loan guarantees, to list those firms qualifying for fiscal incentives, to target 
industries for R&D support, and most importantly, to identify industries and firms to be 
targeted (Liu, 1993:Chapter 3 & 5). It also helps to establish orderly export marketing 
agreements in industries and overseas price negotiations in sensitive sectors like 
petrochemicals (Wade, 1990:202).
The organisational advantages of IDB can be understood from two perspectives. 
First, IDB has the responsibility for trade policy and the authority to redistribute 
financial incentives. This gives IDB more power than it would have if trade policy and 
the authority for giving financial incentives were the duties of other agencies. Basically, 
the Board of Foreign Trade is an administrative department, which cannot initiate any 
trade policy by itself, in particular, the measures of trade protection, but it has to follow 
instructions from IDB on industry-related matters. Besides, IDB, as the competent 
authority on the operation of funds and the distribution of financial incentives, led it to 
shift resources between sectors with less inter-departmental friction in the process of IP 
implementation and planning. IDB’s strengthened functions covering the field o f trade 
and finance, which are generally divided horizontally within the same hierarchy, makes 
for a better integration of various functioning policies into IP.
Second, IDB plays the roles of policy-initiator, policy-maker and policy- 
implementor which are different functions normally performed by vertical divisions 
within the same hierarchy. In the theory of public policy, the actors which decide on 
policy are generally different from those who are responsible for policy implementation. 
IDB is an exceptional case of one body playing three independent roles. Therefore, the 
coherence of industrial policy in the different stages of the policy process can be 
moderated (policy itself, policy outcome and planned schedule) by IDB entirely. Under 
these circumstances of converging vertical and horizontal functions, the organisational 
advantages of IDB serve as the principal impetus in supporting Taiwan’s continuing
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industrial development.
2. STATE POLICIES SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT
‘Industrial technology policy is essentially a fusion of technology policy and industrial 
policy implemented by a government in order to assist, instigate, direct, or even restrain 
industrial technology activities (Wang & Tsai, 1995:69).’ It aims at achieving the 
nation’s short-term and long-term economic goals through the encouragement of R&D 
investment in a set of promotion measures and the creation of an environment 
conducive to innovation.
Figure 4.10 Taiwan's Industrial Technology Promotion Instruments
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IDB and DIT are two government branches charged with industrial technology 
policy. The main tasks of IDB are in sectoral IP, general IP for encouraging investment 
and the policy concerning the innovative activities, while the DIT concentrates on the 
planning and the implementation of technology IP presented as STP.
Figure 4.10 gives an overview of Taiwan’s industrial technology promotion 
system in which industrial technology policy is divided into three different kinds of 
measures, namely, the demand-side, the supply-side, and the environment-side 
measures*1. In the category of demand-side measures, the government plays the role of 
the market so as to provoke private R&D efforts. These measures enable the 
government to provide a stable market demand as a lure to guide the direction of 
technological development by contract research and government procurement 
programmes. In the category of supply-side measures, financial, manpower and 
technical assistance are provided by the public branches to lessen the burden of the 
private sector so that government directly intervenes in technology supply to 
corroborate those developed technologies as state wishes. In the category of 
environment-side measures, a favourable infrastructure for technological development 
and sound economic climate are deployed in order to attract more investment into 
technology-based production. Under this industrial technology promotion system, there 
are many government agencies involved in promoting industrial technology policies. 
Figure 4.11 demonstrates an outline of the interactions between public agencies and the 
industry in which public resources to assist technology development are deployed by 
state actors. The following discussion stresses the operation and related law of each 
measure and the institutions in charge of these policy instruments.
11 This classification o f technology policy measures arc originally derived by Wang & Tsai (1995) from R. Rothwcll & 
W. Zcgveld (1981) Industrial Innovation and Public Policy, London: Frances Pinter. But this is not the only 
classification o f  technology' policy , for example, Mowcry (1995) has throe categories for the practice o f  the technology 
policy: supply policies, adoption policy, and competition policy. The reason to use Rothwcll &. Zcgvcld s classification 
is because it is easier to identify and appropriate for Taiwan's environment than others It is also easier to add some 
new sub-categories to the framework, such as government-firm venture capital and iimovation-oncntcd regulations
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Figure 4.11 The Main Interactions between Government Agencies and the 
Industry in Relation to Technology Development in Taiwan
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2.1. Demand-Side Measures
2.1.1. Contract research
Contract research is funded by many public sources, for example, NSC, state enterprises, 
MOEA, and several government institutions. There are opportunities for the private 
sector to enlarge technological research, but it is difficult to get a complete picture of 
contract research at present. A major reform of STP, which was solely assigned to the 
public research institutes, incorporating the private sector into the contract research 
started from 1997 would be a significant landmark of contract research as a demand- 
side measure. This new source of contract research from the DIT, also known as 
Civilian STP is important not only because of the huge amount of allocated
expenditure in the contract, but also because the developer of technology will become 
the user of technology. It is a big improvement in STP in two senses: first, it saves the 
time taken to transfer technology from the public research institute after it has been 
developed; second, it shortens the period from technological development to the 
commercialisation of a product.
2.1.2. Public procurement
Public procurement policy is a very effective way of enhancing long-term 
competitiveness for certain industries, for example, the US defence industry. At present 
in Taiwan, laws or regulations in relation to public procurement include the 
'Administrative Law of Public Enterprises’, and laws defining procedures for the 
purchase of military equipment, and methods by which public enterprises may apply for 
imports. However, the enforcement of'local content requirement’ in the public sector is 
intended to support the industry.
2.2. Supply-Side Measures
2.2.1. Financial assistance
In order to promote industrial development actively and to accelerate industrial
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upgrading, the government provides financial facilities in terms of low interest loans to 
various special projects, or joint ventures, and to subsidise R&D expenses. The 
financial source of loans, subsidies, and venture capital are from the Development Fund 
which should be appropriated from the National Treasury. The use of this fund is for the 
following purposes:
1. To participate in the investment in important enterprises or plans relating to industrial upgrading 
or improvement o f  industrial structure which are beyond the capacity or financial ability o f  private 
investors;
2. To provide financial facilities to important enterprises or plans which are relating to industrial 
upgrading or improvement o f industrial structure but with insufficient capital,
3. To provide loans in line with the government industrial policy for assisting the sound development 
o f  industries;
4 To set aside an appropriate percentage o f the fund in support o f  the plans relating to providing 
necessary assistance to the development o f medium and/or small enterprises;
5. To take coordinative actions in the furtherance o f  the plans initiated by competent authorities 
concerned for acquiring o f  advanced technologies from abroad, promotion o f  R&D, training o f 
personnel, pollution control, acceleration o f improvement o f industrial structure and/or betterment 
o f  economic development, and
6. Other purposes as specifically approved by the Executive Yuan.
(IDIC, Jun. 1995: Statute for Upgrading Industries, Article 21)
A .loans
Many loans use the special fund appropriated from the Economic Development Fund 
controlled by the Executive Yuan and the available funds of participating banks (see 
Table 4.12). Private companies eligible for loan No. 1-4 & 8 can apply directly to 
participating banks. Applications for loan No.5-7 must be approved by the 1DB. Those 
applying for loan No.9 must submit their investment plans to IDB for review and 
comment, and transmit them to CEPD for approval. Among them, loan No.7 is 
exclusively for technology intensive industries and major exporting industries. The 
largest total amount of loan available to private enterprises is the US$10 billion for loan 
No. 8. For the purpose of positive and effective use of the foreign exchange reserves, 
government may provide outward investment projects, public infrastructure investment, 
and the investment projects in the ten major newly emerging industries and/or in the 
establishment of in-country capability of the eight major fields of technology.
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Table 4.12 Favourable Financing Facilities
No. Name of the Loan Object of Loan
Total
Amount of 
Loan
1
Loan for purchase o f local-made automated 
machinery and equipment 
i W I K i f l  £ 3  f t  f f c M t t K t t f f « .  * » C >
General production enterprise, 
warehousing business NTS 10 
billion
2
Loan for purchase o f imported automated 
machinery equipment 
d l l f t t n  S f t f b M M & t t i l C f U I l t )
General production enterprise, 
warehousing business NTS20
billion
3
Loan to SMEs for purchase o f local-made 
automated machinery and equipment
(4>/Jv±«nmCSffr1b1RWMNI*i9lk)
Manufacturing enterprises and 
processing enterprises conforming to 
the qualification standards o f  SMEs
NTS5
billion
4
Loan for assisting the upgrading o f  SMEs Same as above NTS15
billion
5
Loan to  private enterprises purchasing 
pollution control equipment
Private factories purchasing pollution 
control equipment
NTS 10 
billion
6
Loan provided by ROC-US Fund to  
Medium/small Industries for Purchase o f 
Pollution Control Equipment
SMEs purchasing pollution control 
equipment NTS0.06
billion
7
US dollar Loan
C A « * Æ i 1« i r * D
Technology intensive industries, major 
exporting industries
US$0.6
billion
8
CBC’s foreign currency Accommodation 
Facilities
* Public/private enterprises making 
outward investment
* Public infrastructure investments 
under 6-year National Reconstruction 
Project
* 10 major new industries
* Investment in 8 major critical 
technology fields
* Major investment projects approved 
bv government
US$10
billion
9
Medium/long term loans provided by CEPD * Government major construction 
projects
* Any private investment project in a 
total amount over NTS200 million
NTS100
billion
Source: IDB, May, 1995:27-30
Yang (1990) used a questionnaire to conduct a survey on the effect of preferential 
policy to firms in the 1980s. This showed that one third of the total loans from 
government were used to fund strategic industries12. However, Taiwan government's 
preferential policy of low interest loans in the 1980s did not reduce the interest burden, 
or increase the fixed capital formation, nor did it improve the operation performance of
12 The coverage o f this survey includod one fund, about NTS70 billion, managed by the Bank o f  Communications and 
the other about NTS28 billion issued by Medium Business Bank in 1982-89. Those loans are similar to loan No 1-5 at 
present in terms o f  the object o f  loans, but the amount o f  loans available is relatively smaller than those o f present loans 
i f  we take loan No. 6-9 into account.
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the firms3 ’.
B. subsidies
There are two 'subsidy' policy measures provided for the purpose of encouraging 
private enterprise to engage in the R&D of new and leading industrial products (see 
Table 4.13 for details). One is 'Regulations governing encouragement of development 
of new industrial products by private enterprises’ (NIP JffiS&gR] $  JXIKISI X3g#ntoalito£), 
promulgated by the MOEA in December 1984; the other is ‘Regulations governing 
assistance in the development of targeted leading products’ (T L P ,£^ tt^ r^^r^S liW  
$?;£), promulgated by the MOEA in June 1991.
NIP should be classified as an interest-free loan measure rather than as a subsidy 
measure in the sense that firms are obliged to pay back the loan. However, the fact that 
a firm does not need to amortise any loan or pay the interest on the loan during the 
period of developing a new product makes it different from other loan measures. 
Besides, it can be seen as a supplementary measure to TLP. Thus, it has been classified 
under subsidy’ here.
TLP is a combination of subsidy measures and repayment-deferred interest-free 
loan measures. It has been deemed to be one of the main industrial technology policy 
measures in an effort to promote new emerging industries defined by government. 107 
plans have been approved among 195 applications for TLP from July 1991 to June 1994, 
and about NTS2.16 billion have been granted from the Financing Fund to approved 
cases. It is estimated that this NTS2.16 billion government input has stimulated private 
investment in relevant products and technologies to about NTS 17.62 billion (NTS6.82 
billion on R&D expenditure and NTS 10.8 billion on production investment) (IDB, Dec. 
1994:56-7).
”  Yang (1990) did not analyse the factors leading to the negative performance of loan measures, but it was mainly a 
reflection o f his survey, a questionnaire replied by surveyed firms. The result o f this survey was vuluublc for die 
government in reforming its preferential loan policy, however, the result o f the survey is not applicable to the loan 
scheme in the 1990s because loan programmes and the amount o f loan have increased substantially, in particular, in the 
high technology field
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Table 4.13 Subsidy Policy Measure: NIP & TLP
N I P T L P
S co p e  o f  
a p p lic a tio n
(1) critical technology in industrial 
development.
(2) Available, and prototype o f  the new 
product can be developed in a short 
period o f time
(3) the new product has a great adaptability 
and market potential and can trigger the 
development o f other relevant industries
( 1 )  10 emerging industries,
(2) the critical technology relating to the 
new product must be above the 
technology level currently available in 
ROC,
(3) the new product has a great adaptability 
and market potential and can trigger the 
development of other relevant industries
C o n d itio n
o f
a p p lic a t io n
( 1) limited to national private companies including manufacturing and technical business;
(2) having a sound financial and economic ability and outstanding business performance;
(3) having a R&D department in ROC and actual R&D development achievements and 
capable of implementing the proposed development plan and commercialising the new 
products to be developed;
(4) In case the applicant is composed o f two or more manufacturers, at least one o f them 
shall meet the conditions.
S o u rc e s  o f  
F u n d
(1) Counterpart Fund ‘Industrial New 
Products R&D Program Account’ 
specifically established by the 
Development Fund o f the Executive 
Yuan,
(2) Donation and contribution by individuals 
and the relevant organisations,
(3) amortised counterpart fund and 
technical royalties received
(1) Counterpart Fund: ‘Industrial New 
Products R&D Program Account’ 
specifically established by the 
Development Fund o f the Executive 
Yuan;
(2) Financing Fund: ‘Targeted Leading 
Products R&D Program Account’ from 
MOEA’s STP
O p e ra t io n  
o f  F u n d
The Counterpart Fund to be appropriated 
upon request o f  private enterprises are 
classified into, the counterpart fund for 
development expenses and counterpart 
fund for loan interest expenses.
50% of the development expenditure of 
approved plan will be subsidised by 
Financing Fund, while the other 50% may 
be loaned by a Counterpart Fund in 
accordance with the NIP (no more than 
50%).
IP R
Patent right(s) derived in the course o f  new product development is (are) jointly owned 
by the  developing manufacture(s) and the government pro rata to their respective 
contribution to the development fund However, patent right may be vested in the 
developing manufactures with the approval o f  the Executive Yuan in the near future
O b lig a tio n
Amortisation o f the Counterpart Fund: The user o f the Counterpart Fund shall repay the 
(und in installation in 2-5 years from the day one year after the selling o f  the product 
Royalty fee Firms shall pay the NIP account the royalty fee at the rate o f  1-3% (subject 
to the decision o f  New Product Review Board, in most cases 1%) from the selling day 
o f the product for no more than 3 years by utilising the Counterpart Fund.
There is no need to repay the ‘subsidy’ Financing Fund ofTLP
C o m p e te n t
A u th o r i ty
IDB (implementation agency)
New Product Review Board in charge o f 
the approval o f  applications (established by 
M OEA, with representatives from STAG, 
CEPD, NSC, MOEA, IDB, III, ITRI & 
relevant specialists)
IDB (implementation agency)
New Product Review Board 
screening committee to evaluate plans and 
firm’s technical capability (established by 
IDB, with representatives from 
government agencies, scholars and 
experts)
Source: IDB (May. 1995); IDIC (Mar 1995), MOEA (Feb. 1995).
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IDB's efforts to create new industries are much greater than its efforts on the 
technology upgrading of traditional industries in terms of financial input. Taking 1994 
as an example, TLP's expenditure (NTS8.9 billion) was 7.8 times of that of ‘Assistance 
Plan on the Upgrading of Industrial Technology for Traditional Industries (tMjBaftiSItc 
(NTS1.13 billion), Jet alone NIP’s expenditure. The recipients of 
TLP is limited to those ten ‘star’ and high-tech industries, this shows that government 
efforts on upgrading the technology of traditional industries, which are several times 
than ten ‘star’ industries in number, are less positive in comparison.
C. venture capital
Venture capital is provided by the government in order to stimulate investment in high- 
tech-based enterprises through a special fund totalling NT$200 billion. This has been 
contributed: 40% by the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan and 60% by the 
Communication (Chiao Tung, 3&i) Bank. This ‘participation in investment’ policy 
measure allows government to take part in the investment projects launched by newly 
created advanced-technology-based enterprises or the investment projects launched by 
existing enterprises for acquiring advanced technology.
Any newly created high-tech enterprise which needs to increase capital for 
acquiring new technology, to invest in R&D for new products, or to expand production 
capability, and with a project amounting to more than NT$2 billion, may submit its 
investment plan to the competent authority (normally, manufacturing enterprises to 
IDB). The competent authority must forward the application to the CEPD for final 
review, if the technical and economic evaluation of the investment plan reveals positive 
cost effectiveness. The government accepts the recommendation of the CEPD for 
participation in the investment project. The government investment in any individual 
project has been limited to an amount up to 40% of that particular project.
The government has invested in many new high-tech firms, notably in the 
semiconductor industry, by using this venture capital. Besides, KMT has also
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concentrated on investing in new technology-based firms by using its party-owned 
capital to form joint ventures.
2.2.2. Manpower assistance
The shortage of R&D manpower is a major obstacle to Taiwan's enterprises engaging 
in R&D activities. The government tries to enhance R&D manpower through university 
education, but the result is not very encouraging. The annual rate of increase in 
graduates in science and engineering from 1981 to 1993 was Ph.D. twenty times (24 to 
481), master of science, six times (1,050 to 6,081), and bachelor of science, twice 
(11,342 to 20,856) (1994 ROC S&T Yearbook: Table 4-1-2). The postgraduate level 
shows a substantial increase compared with the undergraduate level. This does not 
mean that a quantitative increase in education leads to a qualitative improvement in 
research ability, because Taiwan’s educational system focuses on cultivating teachers 
and professors rather than on qualified researchers. It is necessary to adjust the 
education system to reflect industrial demands, for example, encouraging cooperative 
research between universities, R&D institutes and industries, cultivating researchers in 
coordinated educational planning.
The COLA and the IDB are cooperating to meet the requirements of industrial 
development by combining institutions of higher learning with research organisations to 
promote aggressively the cultivation of the professionally trained technical personnel 
required by manufacturing industry through on-the-job training (IDB, 1992:23). This 
kind of training is vocational in orientation and can promote labour's skill but it does 
little to strengthen R&D ability. Training courses provided by non-profit organisations 
is another channel by which to improve the quality of the researcher. ITRI is one 
example that provides this kind of service to train researchers and technicians through 
courses, seminars and conferences, in the same way as Science-based Industrial Park 
(SIP) Administration’4, The effect of those training and seminars is hard to measure in 14
14 For statistics in this matter refers to Industrial Brief (Sep. 1995) & ITIS (1996).
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qualitative terms in relation to R&D. but it has spread knowledge and technological 
know-how within the industrial sector.
The most effective method of strengthening R&D manpower is by providing 
incentives to recruit overseas Chinese S&T manpower, for example from those who 
went to the US to get a higher degree and never came back to work in Taiwan. These 
researchers also bring new knowledge, technological know-how and valuable 
experience. Most scientists and engineers who have returned are employed at 
universities and research institutes. Some have invested in their own high-tech business 
at HsinChu SIP. It could be argued that Taiwan would be unable to build its 
semiconductor industry without the return of experienced researchers from abroad. The 
team of researchers at ITRl’s Electronics Research and Service Organisation (/the 
Computer and Communication Research Laboratories--CCL), the technology 
development and diffusion Center for semiconductors (/computer and communication), 
was mainly from RCA (/AT&T) in the 1970s and 1980s (/1980s and 1990s).
The recruitment of overseas Chinese researchers is very important to the supply 
of R&D manpower at present time, and also to the continuing efforts of government to 
introduce more outstanding researchers in the future. But to cultivate indigenous 
qualified researchers through the educational system and national training is no less 
important than that in the long term. An ideal national innovation system should be 
built upon educating its own researchers instead of borrowing “foreign" talents, even if 
these technicians are somehow ‘local’.
The Industrial Development and Investment Center (IDIC) of MOEA is the 
authority to promote the recruitment of high-tech specialists (Interview No.21). The 
Technology Transfer Service Center, a division of IDIC, built a network system with 
updated information on technologies and specialists, in which domestic-side data listed 
the demand of technologies and specialists, and overseas-side data the supply. Besides, 
the firm can get salary subsidies for headhunted specialists from IDIC for up to two
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approved cases per firm in which the government pays up to US$80,000 in each case in 
a three year span, but the firm has to pay at least an equal amount to the specialist.
2.2.3. Technical assistance
In the past Taiwan's industries did not pay enough attention to R&D, and therefore 
neither the accumulation of technological know-how nor the development of high 
value-added technology and products were within their reach. Abundant capital has 
been accumulated, but niches for investment cannot be found, nor can the technical 
problems which have arisen in the process of investment be solved.
Three types of government policy measures can be justified as technical 
assistance to help the private sector in Taiwan. The first is the provision of technical 
consulting services to local firms in relation to the operation of manufacturing industry 
in areas, such as financial matters, management issues, market intelligence, products 
information, and technological know-hows. The second is the transfer of technology 
from state-sponsored research institutes to the industrial sectors. The third is the 
emerging trend of the formation of govemment-led/financed research consortia between 
state-sponsored research institutes and private firms.
A. technical consulting service and information service
IDIC is the major agency which provides industrial investment information, including 
domestic and overseas investment. The Technology Transfer Service Center established 
in 1989 under the IDIC provides general consultation on technology transfer.
Industrial Technology Information Service (ITIS) is a plan created by the DIT so 
as to provide the industrial sector with the relevant industrial information and 
intelligence. The main tasks of ITIS are collecting and analysing industrial information 
through around 200 experienced industrial analysts in diverse industries. It aims to 
cultivate a group of outstanding specialists in industrial information as a think tank and 
data bank providing updated and correct industrial information and worldwide
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intelligence in relation to industry as a whole, particular products, firms within 
industries, markets, and technology trends (ITIS, 1996). Those industrial analysts are 
affiliated with the respective research institutions, such as the Institute for Information 
Industry (III) and ITR1, to some extent, they also help to format industry-specific 
policies.
Besides technology and management services from many governmental 
consulting institutions, the government also subsidised 60% of the total consulting 
expenses of the firms, up to a total of NT$1 million, to other sources. According to 
Yang’s survey (1990), those firms which took advantage of technological and 
management guidance had better performance than those did not, no matter whether the 
guidance was from the government or other institutions.
B. technology transfer
Taiwan’s industrial firms have benefited in terms of technology transfer through the 
state policies of developing industrial technology from public research institutes. This 
also includes technical innovation in the improvement of manufacturing process and the 
provision of key components in many industries. There are more than 25 state-owned 
and state-sponsored non-profit research institutes under the MOEA’s supervision, which 
are the powerhouse for industrial innovation.
The expenditure of these research institutes is mostly from the government. It 
means that private firms can get their necessary technical assistance without paying a 
large amount in royalties. These research institutes also accept research contracts for 
certain technologies either in the improvement of the production process or in the 
creation of a new technical know-how, entrusted by private firms. Private firms can 
obtain from the ID1C and respective research institutes information about these 
technologies which have/had been developed. If there is no such indigenous technology 
to match the demand of the private sector, the information on foreign technology is 
provided by IDIC. IDIC takes a leading role in assisting local firms to search for foreign
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technologies through MOEA's 63 international offices.
The government is also involved in the activity of marrying local firms with 
international firms in terms of technology transfer. Taiwan is an odd case in forming 
strategic alliances with multinationals by the government rather than by private firms. 
During February of 1993 to June of 1995, MOEA worked actively to sign Letters of 
Intent for the formation of strategic alliances with multinationals, striving for prominent 
enterprises from throughout the world to invest in Taiwan, engage in technical 
cooperation/technology transfer, and set up Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centres in 
Taiwan. There are a total of 25 firms which have signed agreements with MOEA 
among which 11 firms are among those ranking in the top 100 firms in the world 
(Taiwan Industrial Panorama, July 1995). The commitment of MOEA to these strategic 
partners is that IDIC serves as a coordinator and service window and provides much 
assistance and many services. The situation is the same for those public research 
institutes , for instance, ITRI was also buying from or co-operating with foreign firms to 
get technologies for the industry.
The provision of technology transfer from public-funded programmes and foreign 
sources, and the provision of information on new technologies, their access and 
applications, can be called ‘diffusion-oriented’ industrial technology policy. The 
performance of government in this respect is appreciable as the evidences in the 
empirical chapters, but it also reflects the limited structure and resources of Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector.
C. coliabQiatiY^R&D
A new form of technical assistance has been introduced since 1990, that is a research 
consortium established by the private firm(s) and a state-sponsored research institute. 
Generally speaking, the research ability of state-sponsored institutes is much higher 
than that o f private enterprise in terms of budget and research manpower, but the ability 
of firms in product design and commercialisation is better than that of the research
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institute. The combination of both public and private resources, in theory, will increase 
the strength of R&D, but it is subject to the management o f the R&D project.
The first case of collaborative research was formed under the agreement between 
CCL/ITR1, the Taiwan’s Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association 
(TEEMA) and private firms on developing NPC in 1990. The effect of this research 
consortium was very positive in terms of upgrading the technological ability of 
Taiwan’s computer industry as a whole. So, many R&D collaborations followed the 
collaborative model of NPC afterwards.
The state-sponsored institute played a very important role in such consortia. And 
private firms benefitted not only by the upgrading of their technology but also by the 
development of research manpower of their own through R&D collaboration. Also, 
business interest organisation was involved in the formation and operation of the 
processes o f R&D consortia. Two case studies of R&D collaboration will be examined 
in the following chapters.
2.3. Environment-Side Measure
The aim of environment-side measures are to try to create an enabling environment to 
engage in R&D investment and to provide tax incentives to stimulate technological 
upgrading. There are other policy measures conducive to innovation by environment, 
such as, trade protection and intellectual property protection.
2.3.1. Innovation-oriented regulation
There are many government regulations which might affect the shape and direction of 
technological innovation, such as the acquisition of industrial land, safety and pollution 
regulations. Trade policy and competition policy affect not only market structure and 
conduct, but also the competitive performance of a firm’s innovation activities 
(Mowery, 1995:539).
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In recent years, Taiwan's trade policy has been liberalised from its old tactic of 
import control and export subsidy. The tariff for the importing of material, equipment 
and related items aimed to upgrade the level of technology and to the production of 
high-tech industry is much lower than the average. For machinery' and equipment 
imported for self use by corporations, the payment of import duty may be deferred for 
five years.
The enforcement of the Fair Trade Law in 1991 ensures fair competition and 
maintains order in trade and protects the interests and welfare of the consumer. This has 
the effect of encouraging firms to engage in R&D investment under a fair and 
competitive environment. Besides, the legislation and amendment of laws concerning 
intellectual property rights can also be incentives for firms to invest in R&D activities, 
because the protection of royalties and patents is very important to ensure appropriate 
rewards for innovation activities for investors. Once the fruits of R&D can be protected 
and product piracy can be halted and punished, the willingness of firms to invest in 
R&D will be more highly motivated’5.
According to the spirit of the Fair Trade Law, cartel activities of enterprises are 
forbidden. However, if situations and the cartel activities are beneficial to the economy 
as a whole as well as to public interests, the government will permit certain kind of 
cartel activities. In relation to this study, jointly conducting R&D on products in order 
to upgrade technology, improve quality, reduce production cost, or increase efficiency, 
has been legalised. For the sake of promoting international competitiveness, the state 
has not only excluded joint R&D activities from cartel activities, but also this is the 
field that has been promoted by the state particularly.
The world trade rules also affect the amount of industrial subsidy to domestic
M The legislation (the cable TV law, the industrial design protection law, the Integrated Circuit Layout protection law, 
and the trade secret protection law) and revision (the patent law, the copyright law, and trade mark law) o f  several laws 
concerning intellectual property’ rights in Taiwan were mainly a response to the economic pressure o f the United States 
and that Taiwan expected support from the US in joining GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Thus, 
Taiwan's IPR Laws achieved neither a ‘high standard' nor ‘low standard', but no standard at all (Kao, 1995: Chapter 
6). However, they did contribute towards keeping a fair market order and advancing innovation.
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industry in a form of R&D assistance. Trade-related subsidies were an agenda item in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. As the result of negotiations, subsidies had been 
classified into prohibited, actionable and non-actionable categories in which subsidies 
for industrial R&D were in the non-actionable category (Groome. 1995:200-5). The 
agreement of subsidy under the World Trade Organisation follows the 1992 Brussels 
agreement, but with a precise definition and a percentage limitation. The subsidies to 
industrial R&D should not be in excess of 75%, and the subsidies to the precompetitive 
stage of production should not be in excess of 50% (BOFT, 1996).
Taiwan tries not to violate these international regulations. In response to the new 
regulation on subsidy under the World Trade Organisation, the subsidy to the R&D of 
new leading products is 50% and another 50% is given as loan in Taiwan, as discussed 
in 2.2.1. There is no subsidy to the pre-competitive R&D of new product, but 50% 
R&D cost is obtainable in a form of loan. In addition, the state has been actively 
organising product development consortia, a method that has not yet been regulated by 
international agreement.
2.3.2. Tax deduction schemes
In order to create a conducive investment environment and to further industrial 
upgrading, the government promulgated the ‘Statute for Upgrading Industries’ (SUI) by 
presidential decree at the end of 1990 and amended it in 1995 to cope with the changing 
needs. Table 4.14 lists the summaries of incentives under SUI.
Table 4.14 The Policy Measures of Financial Incentives in Taiwan
(1 ) In c e n tiv e s  fo r  A u to m a tio n _______________________________________________ _
(a ) Purchase o f  automated production technology and equipment qualify for tax credits relative 
to  the cost according to the follow ing rates automated production technology 10%; domestically 
produced equipment 20%; im ported equipment 12%.
(b) Investment plans involving the purchase o f  autom ated machinery and equipment qualify for 
low -interest loans: the interest rate on loans for dom estically produced equipment is 1% higher 
than the Center Bank’s rediscount rate, the rate on loans for imported equipment is 2.155%  lower
_______ than C hiao Tung Bank’s basic interest rate.____________________________________________ _
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(2 )  R & D  In cen tiv es_______________________________________________ __ ____ ____
(a) Any outlays a company makes for purposes o f  new-product R&D, or improvement of 
production technology, improvement o f  service technology or upgrading production processes, 
may credit five to twenty percent against the amount o f  profit-seeking enterprise income tax 
payable for the current year
(b) Service life o f instruments and equipment for exclusive use in R&D purposes and/or 
inspection o f pilot products may be accelerated by two years,
(c) Privately-owned companies engaged in R&D o f new industrial products mav applv for 
matching funds to cover basic R&D expenses New leading products may be eligible for further 
financial assistance
(d) In order to assist the R&D of products manufactured by traditional industries or the design of 
new production technology, companies can apply for professional consultation assistance or
_______interest free loans covering R&D costs___________________________________________________
(3 )  In c e n riv e s  f o r  P u rc h a s in g  N ew  E q u ip m e n t____________________________________
Manufacturing machinery and equipment and research, experiment and quality inspection 
apparatus and equipment which are not manufactured locally and are imported, with the approval 
o f MOEA, by manufacturers and technical service enterprises conforming to the regulations 
governing administration o f factories fo r the purposes o f  development o f  new products, 
improvement o f product quality, enhancement o f  productivity, saving o f  energy resources, 
promotion o f  waste reclamation, or improvement o f  manufacturing process shall be exempted 
_______from import duties____________________________________________________________________
(4 )  ln c e n tiv e s  f o r  P e rso n n e l T ra in in g __
A company which undertakes personnel training which is provided either by the company itself or 
by an outside agency and is relevant to  the  company’s activities, may credit 15% against the 
_______ amount o f  profit-seeking enterprise income tax payable for the current year___________________
(5 )  In c e n tiv e s  fo r  E s ta b lish in g  I n te r n a t io n a l  B ra n d s
A company promoting its name brands o r  symbol o f  service on the international markets, may 
credit 10% against the amount o f profit-seeking enterprise income tax payable for the current 
year, however companies which use the M ark of Excellence for Taiwan-Made Products with the 
_______ authority o f  MOEA may credit up to 15% ________________________________________________
(6 )  In c e n tiv e s  f o r  I m p o r ta n t  E n te rp r ise s_________________________________________
(a) Investors making investments in important technology-based enterprise, important invested 
enterprises and venture capital investment enterprises, may credit up to 20% o f price paid for 
acquisition o f  their respective capital investment against the amount o f  profit-seeking enterprise 
income tax or the consolidated income tax payable for the current year
(b) An important technology-based enterprise or an important investment enterprise conforming 
to the requirements set forth in the proceeding Article may, within 2 years from the beginning 
date o f  payment o f the capital contributions by its shareholders, select, with the approval of its 
shareholders meeting, for application o f  the investment incentive in the form either o f the 
exemption from profit-seeking enterprise income tax or o f the shareholders investment credit
_______ against payable income tax.______________________________________________________________
(7 )  A n ti-P o llu t io n  Incen rives_____________
(a) manufacturers are eligible for a company-tax credit o f  20% for expenditure on locally-made 
environmental protection equipment, and 10%  for imported equipment
(b) Exemption from import duty is available for equipment designed specially for prevention and 
control o f  air, noise, or water pollution, vibration control, environmental monitoring, or waste 
processing (including components),
(c) Low-interest loans are available for anti-pollution investment plans as well as anti-pollution
_______construction projects, related equipment production and waste treatment investment plans ___
(8 )  E n e rg y  C o n s e rv a t io n  Incen tives_________________________________________ ____
(a) 5-20% o f any expenditure on energy conservation technology for facilities may be credited 
against profit-seeking enterprise income tax.
(b) Energy conservation projects qualify fo r low interest loans.
(c) Service life o f  devices and systems that reduce energy conservation or serve as effective
_______substitutes for energy may accelerate depreciation by 2 years.________________________________
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(9 ) R ecyc ling  In cen tiv e s______________________________________
5-20% o f  any expenditure on recycling technology- or facilities may be credited against profit- 
______ seeking enterprise income tax_____________________________________
(1 0 ) In c e n tiv e s  fo r  R ecyc ling  o f  W a te r  U sed f o r  In d u s tr ia l  P u rp o s e s_________________
5-20% o f  any expenditure on technology or facilities for the recycling of water used for industrial 
______ purposes may be credited against profit-seeking enterprise income tax._______________________
(1 1 ) In c e n tiv e  f o r  P e rs o n a l C re a t io n  a n d  In v e n tio n _____________________________
ROC citizen’s creation or invention provides o r sells to the use o f  domestic firms whose gains are 
______ exempted from income tax_____________ ________________________________________________
(1 2 ) M e rg e r  In c e n tiv e s  ___________________________________________
With the approval o f  MOEA, companies that merge to rationalise operations are entitled to the 
following incentives:
(a) The normal stamp tax and deed tax incurred as a result o f  the merger will not apply.
(b) Land-value increment tax incurred due to  transfer o f  land titles can be charged to the merger 
and paid by that company at the time the land is further transferred.
(c) W here the land, plant building, machinery and equipment previously used directly by an 
enterprise are sold, the proceeds realised from such sale and subsequently used for payment in 
whole for machinery, equipment, land, or factories needed for a merger plan involving said 
company shall be exempt from stamp tax and deed tax.
(d) W here a company sells factory and land that was directly used by that company, and buys 
land to build a factory in an industrial zone or on the land zone by the government as industrial, if 
the purchase price o f the original land after deducting land-value increment tax, the company can 
apply for return o f  the increment tax to cover the shortfall on the new land. The sum returned
______ may not exceed the tax figure that the company paid on the sale of its land___________________
The investment incentive and assistance measures being provided and 
implemented by the government in accordance with the SUI and relative laws and 
regulations are indiscriminately applicable to any domestic and foreign 
manufacturer/firm making investment in Taiwan. SUI is almost the most important 
policy measure to remove investment obstacles by improving the investment 
environment and encouraging the willingness of investors, and to accelerate the 
upgrading of technical levels of domestic industries as well as to enhance the 
competitiveness of local industries in international markets.
However, the effect of these measures is hard to assess in the sense that no tool 
is executed alone because when a firm is eligible to apply for tax deduction schemes, it 
is also eligible for loans and other incentives. Thus the substantial growth of a firm’s 
R&D investment can not be attributed to a single factor. There are many other factors 
(demand-side, supply-side, and infrastructural) which support successful innovation, 
and policy measures may have only a marginal impact on rising private investment in 
R&D. According to the results of some empirical investigations, there is a positive
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relationship between government R&D promotion schemes and the increase of private 
R&D expenditures ’6. Moreover, the effects of money-term incentives (R&D tax credits, 
other tax incentives and low/non-imerest loans) is greater than those of non-monev-term 
incentives (patent & intellectual property rights protection, technical & information 
assistance from public research institutes)34 *7.
2.3.3. Privileged park fo r  emerging industries
The establishment of SIP is aimed at introducing high-tech industries and technological 
human resources, to promote the innovation of domestic industrial technology, and to 
promote the development of high-tech industries. The industries at SIP are characterised 
as high-value added, high productivity, high capital-intensive and high technology- 
oriented.
The Hsinchu SIP was established by NSC in 1980. This is the earliest Silicon 
Valley-tvpe industrial park in Asia. In the same way Taiwan’s export processing zones 
are also the first in Asia (the earliest export processing zones founded at Kaohsiung, 
Nantze and Taichung in 1966). The SIP administration is a public undertaking under the 
supervision of NSC. The SIP was home to over 179 private scientific and technical 
companies in 1994. These enjoy certain tax advantages, access to funding for innovative 
R&D programmes, and advanced training courses for employees. The SIP combined 
with ITRI and two leading technological Universities (National Chiao Tung University 
and National Tsing Hua University) to form an ‘extraterritorial’ high-tech area which 
received more governmental concern than any other industrial site. The intention is to 
promote close cooperation between high-tech industries, Universities and ITRI.
34 According to the surv ey o f  Wang & Tsai (1994) concerning the effect o f promotion tools on private R&D investment
in Taiwan's electrical industry, the investment tax credit is the most influential, the Tariff cxcmpUon the next, and
accelerated depreciation the last The larger the firm, the less sensitive to the change o f  government promotion tools, 
the smaller the firm, the more dependent on these tools. Further evidence provided by Wang & Chen (1995) concerning 
the effectiveness o f  R&D tax credit in the manufacturing sector shows that the efTects o f tax credit on research 
efficiency and economic benefits is positive.
”  In this regard, Wang & Chen (1995) admitted that some firms may have a selfish attitude in responding to 
questionnaires which calculate that the more R&D tax credits the government will prov ide, the more benefits they can 
obtain, if  they exaggerate the effects o f R&D tax credit.
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The average R&D expenditure as a percentage of sales at SIP was 5%. which is 
relatively higher than 1.5% of non-SIP companies. However, it does not take 
government assistance into account. In order to encourage companies to invest in R&D. 
there were 319 assistance cases up to 1993 with a total amount of NTS4.9 billions and 
43 cases with a total amount of NTS1.02 billions in 1994 under “Rules governing SIP 
assistance plan for innovation of technological R&D' $
¿). Besides, there is a total budget of NT$45 billions for the period of July 
1992 - June 1997 to assist the R&D investment in Key components and products. All 
the assistance is given to high-tech companies at SIP. It is another example of subsidies 
provided by the government and NSC’s budget for industrial development.
According to a survey by the SIP Administration, more than half of the 
manufacturing techniques for the main products were created by companies themselves 
(Industrial Brief, Sep. 1995:65). Technological indigenisation can be deemed as one of 
the consequences of SIP. The turnover of SIP was increased by 37.81% from NTS1289 
billions in 1993 to NTS 1778 billions in 1994, which surpassed the total turnover of the 
export processing zones. Moreover, the per head turnover reached NTS5.3 millions, 
twice of that of the export processing zones (Industrial Brief, Jan. 1996:78).
Encouraged by the economic performance of high-tech firms in the SIP, the 
government is keen on establishing 20 to 30 intelligent industrial parks (^jSSSiXUBSSS) 
on the island in 1996-2005 (Table 4.15). Likewise, the government will organise joint 
venture corporations between the public and private sector for development and 
investment. Besides, a modern telecommunication link will be established to connect 
the new industrial park with the traditional ones (MOEA, May 1995:4).
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Table 4.15 New Intelligent Industrial Parks in Taiwan *
Name Time Table Situation Type
Hsinchu SIP
<*rW 4»X.*Hli>
Jan 1993- Dec 1997 The third term expansion is developing. GD
Maoli SIP
( s m n ,£ i * s i $ )
On Planning Location has decided In the process o f  obtaining 
industrial land
GD
Tainan SIP On Planning Location has decided In the process o f  obtaining 
industrial land
GD
Tainan TIP
(s& T W t IStffi)
Aug. 1995-June 2001 In the process o f construction GP/ID
Yunlin TIP
( # « 4 « S X J * l )
Aug. 1995- May 2000 In the process of selecting companies GP/ID
Hsinchu TIP
( t i t t m i i f E )
On Planning In the process o f  evaluating GP/ID
Nankang SWIP Dec. 1995-Dec. 1997 In the process o f construction GP/ID
Taichung SWIP On Planning In the process o f changing urban planning on the use of 
this SWIP
GP/ID
South SWIP 
( i m m i i i s )
On Planning In the process o f evaluating GP/ID
Taichung AIP Jan. 1997-Dec 1999 In the process o f planning report and evaluating 
environmental impacts
GP/ID
South AIP On Planning In the process o f  evaluating GP/ID
Hsinchu BIP On Planning A special area located inside HsinChu SIP with a 
budget o f  NT$8 39 billions
GP/ID
Taichung NIP 
( 6 4 * y * * i s )
On Planning A special area located inside Taichung industrial zone GP/ID
’ ’ Chingshan RP
(WOlW^IBUffi) 
Lungyuan RP
Lungmen RP 
( « H W f t l lS )
Coordinating with the 
MOND
■’ >»
Located inside CIS, the main R&D institute o f  the 
national defence.
C S. RP on chemical & material research,
L.Y RP on information & telecommunication research, 
L M RP on precise machinery & quality control.
GD
*’ Taichung RP Coordinating with the 
MOND
Located inside C C K (¡11*153) Military Airport. On 
Aerospace research ^  *
GD
Sources ‘How to  build Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Manufacturing Centre’ — Conference paper, Taipei: June
6th, 1995 (CEPD, Jun. 1995).
* TIP=Technology-based Industrial Park RP=R&D Park 
SIP=Science-based Industrial Park GD=Development by government
SW IP” Software-based Industrial Park GP“ Planning by government 
NIP=New-enterprise Industrial Park ID=Development by industries
AIP^Aerospace Industrial Park BIP~Bio-tech Industrial Park
*’ There are two main budgets for the operation o f  four Research Parks, one is from STP with a mount o f 
NTS68 billions up to  year 2000, the other is the ‘Development Fund for Military and Civilian Common 
Technology (B R flff lttff iB IlS ft)’ o f  CIS. 3
3. CONCLUSION
The overall picture of Taiwan’s national innovation system will be addressed in this 
short summary in terms of three dimensions: technological capability, economic-
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oriented innovative performance, and institutions.
The efforts of government in trying to strengthen Taiwan’s overall technological 
capability through S&T conferences and plans have achieved considerable progress in 
many aspects. The focus here is on the factors influencing national technological 
capabilities rather than on the performance of the industrial sector or institutions 
conducting the most advanced scientific research. Firstly, the government has created 
many technology-related agencies and public-owned research institutes in the past 
twenty years. These constitute a very sound national framework for the development of 
S&T. Secondly, the R&D expenditure in Taiwan has increased substantially which 
implies a shift of the industrial foundation from a labour-intensive one towards a more 
technology-oriented one. Besides, the government S&T expenditure share of total 
national expenditure dropped from around 60% to less than 50% reflected an increasing 
weight of private investment on S&T. Thirdly, the growth of research outputs in 
quantitative terms also demonstrates that national technological capabilities have been 
strengthened18.
More and more concern for a national innovation system is tied to economic- 
oriented innovative performance. It is necessary to discuss the issue since the broad 
concept of competitiveness is highly relevant to economic-oriented innovative 
performance. First of all, the sharp decrease in R&D expenditure on national defence in 
the early 1990s and the steady increase in industrial R&D expenditure since mid­
eighties has led Taiwan into a new era of high technology industrialisation19. Besides,
31 For data about the indicators of technological capacities refers to 1994 ROC S&T Yearbook in chapter 2 & 3 The 
exports of technology-intensive products have increased by 4.4 times in a decade, NTS284 billion in 1984 and 
NTS1255 billion in 1993, while those as % of total export products has increased from 23.6% in 1984 to 55.7% in 
1993 (ibid.:36).
19 In most of the countries among high-income and newly industrialised countries, military R&D shares the largest part 
of government funding to R&D. The USA has the largest portion of R&D on military projects, it did help its aircraft 
and electronic industries to dominate the world market in the 1960$; Britain has the second highest part of R&D on 
military projects, but most of the companies having defence RAD contracts have shown little ability to penetrate the 
commercial market, os well as the case of France ‘Civilian commercial spillover seldom has been the central objective 
of military R&D (Nelson, 1993:512)’. Two reasons might lead to that Taiwanese government would rather invest in 
civilian R&D than in defence R&D. One is that Taiwan can obtain advanced weapon in the 1990s; the other is that the 
commercial returns of developing industrial technology is more promising than that of defence technology, not to 
mention that Taiwan-<ieveloped defence technology it not among the best in the world which makes it hard to be 
commercialised.
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R&D budget for MOEA is much more than that of NSC and other government branches. 
This bias reveals Taiwan's innovation system is economic development-led rather than 
scientific discovery and invention-led. Moreover, industrial technology is the core 
concern o f R&D activities (Table 4.16).
The state’s efforts to promote industrial technology can be captured by the 
operation of IPs through supply-, demand-, and environment-side measures. The 
government-sponsored research institutes, which share a very high proportion of R&D 
budget in the public sector, have been an important source of new designs later taken 
over by manufacturing firms in Taiwan. For example, the creation of the semiconductor 
industry followed this type in the 1980s. Furthermore, the high-tech industries which 
have been developed/developing in Taiwan are aimed at the international market rather 
than the domestic market. The source of competitiveness of high-tech industries comes 
from constant innovative activities, and this is the area which the government makes 
every effort to improve.
The institutional prospects of Taiwan’s national innovation system are threefold. 
At the central government level, the administrative system governing the development 
of S&T is well-organised and the responsibilities for diverse agencies are clearly 
defined. This is one of the preconditions of running a national innovation system in 
relation to planning and managing S&T-concemed affairs. In legal terms, the 
institutions have been built upon the ‘S&T Development Program’ through which many 
tasks have been done, such as the creation of new agencies, the establishment of 
research institutes and laboratories, the ratification of relevant laws and regulations, and 
the direction of national S&T development. Under Taiwan's innovation system, sub­
systems exist made up of specific functions. Financial institutions with the goal of 
fostering industrial innovation are for the easy access by the industrial sector. Incentives, 
technical services and the provision of information under MOEA are also 
institutionalised aijd available to the industrial sector. Thus, the government is the 
largest institutional actor in Taiwan's innovation system.
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Table 4.16 National R&D Expenditures, 1982-94
Unit: NTS million 
( ):%
By G< 
Pri
jvernm« 
vate sec 
=100%
*nt vs. 
to r
By Industry, 
Academic &  Research 
Institutions (=100%)
By Type o f Research 
(=100% )
By Field of Research 
(=100%)
Year
Govern
Private
For- Indus- R&D Univer Rasic Appli- Expert- Engineer Nature, Huma
-ment eign try Inst -sity ed mental -ing Medic &Soc
& Aun Sei
1982 9,813 6,984 67 8,057 5,660 3,147 1,742 9,741 5,381 10,399 6,465
(58 2) (414) (0 4 ) (47 8) (33 6) (187) (103) (57 8) (319) (617) (38 4)
1983 11,756 7,418 26 9,553 5,805 3,842 2,324 5,342 11,535 11,987 7,213
(6 1 2 ) (38 6) (0.1) (498) (3 2 ) (200) (12.1) (2 7 8 ) (60 1) (624) (37.3)
1984 14,197 8,041 205 10,971 7,325 10,149 3,173 7,232 12,040 14,870 7,017 557
(63.3) (35.8) (0.9) (48.9) (32.6) (18.5) ( M l ) (32.2) (53.6) (66.3) (19.3) (2.5)
1985 16,141 8,978 278 12,715 8,401 4,282 3,672 8,368 13,357 17,947 5,070 597
(63.6) (35.4) (1.1) (50.1) (33.1) (16.9) (14.5) (32.9) (52.6) (70.7) (269) (24 )
1986 17,253 11,301 148 15,921 8,356 4,424 3,809 11,747 13,146 19,759 8,344 600
(60.1) (39.4) (0.5) (55.5) (29.1) (15.4) (133) (40.9) (45.8) (68.8) (29.1) (21 )
1987 18,701 17,868 211 21,763 9,844 5,173 3,819 12,170 20,791 28,617 7,864 300
(50.8) (48.6) (0.6) (59.2) (268) (14.1) (10.4) (33.1) (56.5) (77.8) (214) ( 0  8 )
1988 24,793 18,922 124 20,948 15,627 7,265 5,413 20,971 17,635 30,895 11,241 1,702
(56.5) (43.2) (0.3) (47.8) (35 6) (16.6) (12.3) (47.4) (40.2) (70.5) (25.6) (3.9)
1989 26,127 28,393 269 30,695 15,827 8,267 5,777 19,823 29,189 42,535 10,965 1,289
(47.7) (51.8) (0.5) (56.0) (289) (15.1) (10.5) (36.2) (53 3) (77.6) (20.1) (2.4)
1990 32,772 38,659 117 42,240 19.830 9,478 7,100 25.665 38.783 56,116 14,054 1,378
(45 8) (54.0) (0.2) (59.0) (27 8) (132) (9 9) (35.9) (54.2) (78 4) (19.7) (19)
1991 42,574 37,977 1,241 43,836 25,280 12,649 9,390 32,983 38,392 64,420 15,240 2,105
(52.0) (464) (15) (53.6) (30.9) (15.5) (115) (40.3) (48.2) (78.8) (186) (26)
1992 49,509 44,803 516 49,825 31,316 13,687 11,811 34,511 48,506 70,641 21,348 2,839
(52.2) (47.3) (0.5) (52.6) (33.0) (14.4) (12.5) (36.4) (511) (74.5) (22.5) (3.0)
1993 51,292 52,219 106 58,968 29,697 14,952 14,193 37,143 52,281 75,867 23,772 3,978
(49.5) (50.4) (0.1) (56.9) (28.7) (14.4) (13.7) (35.8) (50.5) (73.2) (22.9) (3.9)
1994 55,286 59,235 161 65,921 31,448 17,313 17,138 40,384 57,160 83,018 26,816 4,848
J 4 S 2 1 Ü L É L JO T ) (57.5) ( i l l i (14.9) (35 2) <4* 8> (724A. (23.4) (42)
Note: 1 R&D expenditures for national defence are not included
2. Government R&D expenditures includes that o f  public enterprises 
Source: Data for 1982-1992 from TSDB, 1995: Table 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. 
Data for 1993-1994 from 1994 ROC S&T Yearbook: 19 & 24.
There is no standard to judge a national innovation system. One system 
concentrates on scientific R&D and another on commercial technology, so it is difficult 
to compare the performance of two systems. A system might perform very well in the 
short term, but it is not guaranteed in the long term, and vice versa. The national 
innovation system in Taiwan, it could be argued, is excellent in term of its supporting
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policies for the development of industrial technology and the environment created by 
government in favouring of economic-oriented innovation. But there is not much 
evidence to argue that it is also good at basic science.
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C H A P T E R FIV E
C A S E  S T U D Y : N O T E B O O K -S IZ E D  C O M P U T E R  R E S E A R C H  
C O N S O R T IU M
'Fundamentally, the effective of operation of an evolutionary innovation 
system depends on the effective coupling between firms with other 
knowledge-based institutions to jointly enhance processes of learning 
and creativity (Metcalfe, 1995:497).’ ‘While every nation pays lip 
service to this goal (strong links between research institutions and 
industry), in reality the connections are often distant (Porter, 
1990:632).’
The electronics industry is one of the largest industries in the world economy today. As 
the service industries have become more dominant economic activities than 
manufacturing industries in most mature economies, the importance of the electronics 
industry as an ‘engine of growth’ is increasing in the eyes of industrial economists and 
policy-makers in the light of its contribution to production and trade. In particular, 
information technology is central to the process of industrial transformation in the sense 
that the promotion of electronics capacities through computer power is the modem way 
to improve productivity and competitiveness.
The integration of different fields of technology into electronics-based industries 
reveals ‘the interdependence of systems of products' (Cawson et al., 1995:29-33). 
Technological development in information technology makes it possible to integrate 
more functions into home automation and electronic products. The high volume data 
storage capacity and high speed of semiconductors leads to a continuous upgrading of 
the functions of computer and a rapid expansion of multimedia. The trend of 
digitisation in electronics-related technology links one technology to another and is 
blurring the boundaries between industries. It can be predicted that visual products, 
audio products, home automation, information technology, and communication will 
become one unit due to their increasing compatibility.
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In this case study, the development of Notebook-sized PC (NPC) in 1990 in 
Taiwan will be examined in terms of a collaborative R&D consortium. This NPC R&D 
consortium is of paramount importance for three reasons. Firstly, this was an 
unprecedented experience of large-scale collaboration between a government-sponsored 
research institute, intermediary association and individual firms in relation to the rapid 
commercialisation of industrial technology. It became a model of technology diffusion 
and application and a very effective way to create a new industrial product. Thereafter, 
many R&D consortia have been formed by the same method. Secondly, in the light of 
creating a new product for Taiwan’s computer industry the NPC consortium is an 
economic success. There was no such product before this NPC consortium, but Taiwan 
became the number three NPC manufacturer in 1993, the number two in 1994, and the 
number one in 1996. This product even made Taiwan’s computer industry grow in the 
1992-3 worldwide recession of production in information technology. Thirdly, the time 
span of developing a new product is astoundingly short because of the effect of 
collective action. The NPC consortium took four months (from July to October 1990) to 
create a prototype NPC as a result of the efficiency of R&D teams and the strong 
commitment of firms in the R&D stage. The timely effect of the very short period of 
R&D meant that Taiwan’s NPC product was able to capture the demand of the world 
market-only a few months behind Japan’s Toshiba.
Previous studies on the NPC consortium were biased towards the management 
perspective of strategic alliances (S. Wang, 1991; D. Lee, 1992), and neglected the role 
of government in the promotion of the development of NPC. To understand the internal 
management of a R&D consortium is one thing, to analyse the successful factors in 
relation to government support leading to the rapid commercialisation of an industrial 
product is quite another. Many government efforts to promote the development of NPC 
are keys to the success of the NPC consortium. Moreover, the role of the ITRI as a 
public sector research institute in developing the economy-related technology deserves 
more attention. In the case of NPC R&D consortium, there was no direct government
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intervention, but ITRI, acted as a quasi government agent to navigate and assist the 
application of industrial technology. It thus could be seen as a policy instrument for the 
fulfillment of upgrading industrial competitiveness. Attention must also be given to the 
role played by the intermediary organisation bridging the R&D institute and the 
individual firm. Without the coordination of business associations, the implementation 
of a large scale R&D consortium with 46 participating firms would not be manageable 
by ITRI alone.
1. GOVERNMENT PROJECT SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
The computer industry expanded rapidly in Taiwan in the 1980s. However, computer 
products were low value-added and the technology was relatively basic. The upgrading 
of computer technology in terms of manufacturing was necessary to ensure high value- 
added and high intensive technology. The structure of the local industry was based on 
SMEs. Both the technology and R&D capabilities were insufficient. In particular, 
investment in long term R&D was subject to lack of skill and capital. The development 
of computer products always lagged behind that of foreign companies. Therefore, 
Taiwanese businesses were always controlled by foreign companies and local 
companies were asked to pay technological royalties or licence fees. Thus, 
competitiveness was lowered.
In order to reduce manufacturing costs and raise quality, a four year Special 
Technology Project (STP)-- the Development of Packaging Technology for Computer 
Products (Packaging STP), was introduced by the MOEA in July 1990. Packaging 
technology was aimed at developing the critical technology for precision mechanical 
processing and electro-mechanical integration which could be used in the process of 
high-intensive physical design and mechanism structures for the miniaturisation of 
electric and computer products. The total budget was nearly NTS500 million in a four
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year span. With reference to the development of NPC. the first year plan with a budget 
of NTS116 million emphasised the technology for the application to manufacturing of 
Might, thin, short, and small' electrical products4". Three main programmes and eight 
sub-programmes were developed in order to solve the problems in the pre-competitive 
and mass production stage. In terms of physical design, the designer applied a 
computerised analysis instrument to assist the design of electrical board and systematic 
structures so as to prove their testability and ability to produce a satisfactory product. 
This approach matches the demands of high tech production and shortens the time of 
development. In terms of manufacturing, the plan was intended to enhance product 
quality and to reduce the cost of mass production. The core of Packaging STP was, to a 
certain extent, to develop the technology needed for miniaturisation in the first year 
(Interview No. 30).
However, the coverage of high-intensive physical design and the technology of 
manufacturing engineering relative to packaging technology involved many specific 
fields such as modules analysis, physics, chemistry, material, engineering, electrics, and 
automated control, which were far more complex than the private sector can tackle 
because the R&D teams in the private sector were relatively small. Therefore, the use of 
government power of planning and financing an STP to develop an overall packaging 
technology as a contribution to the electrical and computer industries, was expected and 
effected.
ITRI is the institute for implementing the Packaging STP. The CCL of ITRI is the 
leading R&D unit conducting R&D in conjunction with the coordination of the 
Electronics Research and Service Organisation (ERSO) and the Materials Research 
Laboratories (MRL).
The total manpower and capital input in this STP was 76 persons and NTS116 40
40 The discussion of the 4-year computer packaging technology STP is stressod on the first year plan because that the 
NPC consortium derived its technological application mainly from the result of the first year of this project.
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million in 1990. The research team is larger than that of anv private enterprise in 
Taiwan. Some local companies (Acer and Mitac) had larger research teams than those 
of SMEs, however, they were 'big' in Taiwan but not by international standards or in 
comparison with those of 1TRI. In addition, researchers were from different 
backgrounds of technology, for example, ERSO, CCL and MRL, so that the coverage of 
R&D ability was also stronger than that of the private sector. The large amount of 
government investment also exceeded the ability of any local companies. The financial 
input of Packaging STP from the government in 1990 alone was twice the fund of the 
NPC Alliance paid by 46 private participating firms.
Nonetheless, the significance of Packaging STP as a government contribution 
was not so much the vast manpower and capital investment, but rather the fruits of its 
R&D which were directly applied to the development of NPC and eventually applied to 
the computer industry. If the resource inputs did not lead to promising technological 
outputs, all investment would be in vain. According to Mr. Chen (Interview No.6), a 
technology advisor to DIT, it is not necessary for every government technological 
project to lead to a commercially viable product because the success of a technological 
project can not be judged in market terms alone. In Taiwan, however, six or seven out 
of ten cases could be deemed successful in government STPs. In his view, it is very 
unusual to have such a high rate of success since the R&D investment can be repaid if 
one in ten cases were successfully commercialised.
As far as the DIT/MOEA is concerned, the review criteria of technology 
development plan is the combination of industrial policy and industrial demands in 
future 2-4 years which emphasises a market-oriented project leading to the development 
of technology or a product with a potential market niche. Accordingly, Packaging STP 
is a success.
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2. THE FORMATION OF NPC ALLIANCE
2.1. The Notebook-Sized Computer
The portable PC used today includes lap-top PC, Notebook PC and palm-top PC. In the 
1990s, NPC is the main portable PC in the market with functions almost equivalent to 
the desk-top PC and in size the same as a note book or A4 size paper. After the 
successful development of NPC technology, the lap-top PC has gradually decreased 
market share because of its larger size and relatively heavier weight than NPC. The 
palm-top PC also finds it difficult to compete with the NPC because its functions are 
too simple and basic, in particular, the size of keyboard is not very user-friendly. Some 
even think the electronic diary can be deemed as a portable PC, however, it does not 
embody the basic functions of a PC. The emerging product in the portable PC family 
after 1995 is the sub-notebook PC. Its functions are equivalent to NPC, but the size and 
weight are reduced to a substantial degree, and most important, the keyboard is about 
the same size as that of NPC. There is no precise definition about the size and weight or 
even the functions which should be included in the portable PC, but normally the 
weight of a lap-top PC is more than 10 kgs, the weight of a NPC is less than 5 kgs, and 
the weight of a sub-notebook PC is between 2-3 kgs41.
Before 1990, there was no so-called NPC on the international market, but some 
portable PCs were in the market. At that time, the portable PC was defined as easy to 
carry for uses other than those available on a fixed desk PC, and it was mainly referred 
to as the lap-top PC. The life of the lap-top PC on the market is about one year. It was 
soon replaced by the NPC. In the 1989, the 1TRI successfully developed the technology 
of the lap-top PC which was under a NT$7 million contract with Tatung42. However, no
41 Following the progress in the technology of miniaturisation, the weight of latest model of NPC is less than 3 kgs, 
Sub-notebook PC between 1.5-2 kgs in 1997. The market for Hand-held (palm-top) PC, weighed less than 1 kg, also 
increased to the amount of 80-110 thousand sets in 1997 due to the development of a mini-edition of Windows by 
Microsoft (CDN, 21/04/97).
42 This NT$7 million contract was signed between ITR1 and Tatung in 1989. The arrangement of this contract is not a 
coordination of R&D activities between two parties, it is as the old pattern that the private company entrusted ITRI to 
develop the technology desired. In this lap-top development case, ITRI successfully developed a product and which was
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other company wished to accept the transfer of lap-top PC technology' because the 
market for this product was ambiguous. The domestic companies would not take this 
risk and accept a soon-to-be-outdated technology , and still observed the market trends.
2.2. A Birth of NPC Alliance
While most firms hesitated whether to choose a lap-top PC or NPC to develop, some 
domestic companies (Acer, Twinhead, Cha-cha) had started the R&D for NPC because 
of the trend to miniaturise the size and to reduce the weight of the portable PC, but 
progress was limited. Meanwhile, ITRI decided to advance its lap-top PC technology to 
NPC technology because the technology needed would be developed by Packaging STP. 
ITRI’s position as a public-sector research organisation, allowed it to apply to the IDB 
for R&D finance to conduct the development of NPC. However, the IDB denied this 
kind of product-oriented R&D because government funding is assigned to the 
development of frontier and basic technology. The IDB also recognised the potential 
market of NPC and the importance of rapid commercialisation of NPC to match the 
demand of market, so it advised ITRI to search the private sector for support for the 
further development of NPC technology.
Besides, Taiwan’s industrial policy makers were keen to see new and smaller 
computer firms benefiting from the market niche created by the NPC, so it led to an 
open-to-all policy for the private sector to join the NPC Alliance. The rationale behind 
IDB’s preference for an open-to-all policy rather than a large/competitive-firm-only 
policy is threefold. Firstly, the investment o f NPC R&D was huge and not every firm 
could afford it. If the government does not give the smaller firms a chance to join NPC 
R&D consortium, they would never have shared a piece of the NPC cake due to high 
R&D entry barriers in both financial and technological terms. Secondly, the government 
would like to see more domestic firms accepting NPC technology rather than only a few 
large firms under the consideration of technology diffusion. Obviously, the effects of
shown at the 1989 Hanover computer exhibition.
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transplanting technology into the majority of industry is preferable to its monopolisation 
by some large firms. Thirdly, ITRI had failed to attract large firms to the consortium. In 
the initial stage of planning an ITRl-firms cooperative project, the CCL ITRI intended 
to look for 5-8 larger companies to invest NTS3-5 million each to cover an estimated 
budget of NTS30 million. However, the larger firms deemed NTS5 million too much 
since the development of a successful NPC is still an uncertainty.
That is not to say that SMEs would be more competitive than large firms in the 
eyes of IDB. The innovatory performance in industry judged by the size of firm is 
highly sectorally influenced, but SMEs can play an important role in the emergence of 
new technology-based sectors of industry (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1994)41. In addition, 
the flexibility of SMEs in relation to export and manufacturing was one of important 
factors underlying Taiwan’s economic growth. Given that SMEs still shared more than 
half of total exports, the government expects that the flexible operation of SMEs can 
catch the fast-changing market requirements since the principle of fast follower is the 
strategy for Taiwan’s products survival in the high-tech industry.
One thing that has to be noted here is that the ITRI is a subordinate of the MOEA, 
in particular, the main financial resource is from the government budget. Any projects 
of the ITRI should be agreed with the MOEA, and this is also true in the case of the 
NPC Alliance. Thus, the guidance and advice from the IDB/MOEA should strongly 
influence the direction o f  ITRI's project. Even the NPC Alliance is a contract between 
ITRI, the Taiwan Electric Appliance Manufacturers’ Association (TEAMA) and firms, 
IDB remains the ultimate monitoring body.
The Japanese Toshiba was the first NPC on the market in February, 1990. The 
appearance of Toshiba’s NPC has accelerated the decline of the lap-top PC and started 
the battle for the market of the NPC. It is certain that the NPC will become the main 43
43 According to Rothwell & Dodgson (1994), small firm advantages are mainly behavioural (little bureaucracy, 
effective communication, fast marketing reaction, and fast learning capability), while those of large firms are mainly 
material (high market power, high technical manpower, finance, and ability to cope with government regulations and to 
defend patents).
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product for portable PCs. The idea of developing a uniform NPC was advanced by the 
office of planning/ITRl ten days after Toshiba launched its NPC on the market, but 
ITR1 still awaited the response of the private sector. Some firms feared that the NPC 
might become tomorrow's lap-top PC and the palm-top PC would be the leading 
product. However, many firms showed their interest in joining the alliance because 
CCL has a technological team with experience in design and development of the lap-top 
PC and a logistic team supporting market information and the movement of related 
technology. Moreover, a new STP with a year budget of NTS 116 million concerning the 
packaging technology for electrical and computer products would be launched in July, 
1990.
In the computer industry, the quality of the progress of developing a NPC differs 
between firms in terms of their technological capability, financial ability and market 
awareness. Some bigger firms have invested in the development of NPC, most firms 
have entry barriers in the technology.
In general, the development of NPC in the private sector is not promising. Three 
factors explain the difficulties faced by the Taiwanese computer industry at that time (S. 
Wang, 1991:40). First, the technology related to the development of a NPC is a highly 
intensive construction which involved not only the idea of 'how to put so many tiny 
things into a limited space’, but also the interior design for the efficient functioning of a 
PC and the reshaping of many components. Second, no technicians in the private sector 
were familiar with NPC technology, not to mention not having experience of 
constructing and designing a NPC. Last but not least, there is no product standard to 
follow. This is the biggest problem confronted by the computer manufacturing sector. 
Many components (liquid crystal displayer/LCD, hard disk, keyboard, etc.) available in 
the market do not fit in with NPC product design, so firms might develop their own 
components. Because o f different standards between firms’ products, they have to 
enlarge their orders for safe storage. No intra-industrial division o f labour means that 
one firm which wishes to develop a NPC must take responsibility for many tasks which
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are supposed to be done by many other component suppliers. This is in contrast to the 
case of desk-top PC where a centre-satellite supply system has been well-developed. All 
these had led to an expensive investment and a slower development of the product.
The CCL proposed a plan for 'the uniform set’ so as to use a uniform NPC to 
reduce investment risk, to promote an intra-industrial division of labour, and to produce 
a standard NPC in the computer industry. This proposal with the assistance of TEAMA 
was announced in May 1990. It hoped to recruit 15-35 firms to join the NPC Alliance 
with each firm contributing NTS 1.2 million. This immediately met with an enthusiastic 
response from the private sector. In the beginning, the CCL planned to develop a 286 
NPC and gave training courses on the construction and interior design to participating 
firms. When the number of participating firms reached 30, it was decided that an extra 
prototype model should be given to each firm. Finally, there were a total of 42 firms 
joining the NPC Alliance by 27th of June, 1997. Meanwhile, the ITRI and the TEAMA 
gave a name to this uniform set as ‘Teamate’44. The funds raised by the Teamate project 
exceeded ITRI’s expectation. It was a total fund of NTS50.4 million equivalent to about 
US$2 million. This extra budget made the CCL decide to upgrade Teamate from 286SX 
to 386SX while the 286 model was still the dominant PC in the market. Even if this 
decision did not make the development of Teamate a step ahead of other competitors, at 
least it led Teamate to be a very competitive product.
The contract o f NPC Alliance was signed in July 1990 with 42 participating firms. 
However, there were some firms that hoped to join the alliance after the alliance started 
work. Eventually, there was a total of 46 participating firms in the NPC Alliance in 
which four late comers should pay an extra 50% joining fee.
The participating firms can benefit from the Teamate project in several ways.
44 Tcamate {£ & )  in Chinese means ’a friend for tea (lime)'. The name of Teamatc reflects its connection to TEAMA 
and its market segment aiming at second set of PC for using outside business environment. NPC has been defined as a 
second set of PC for user in its earlier concept of marketing, which is the same idea as the second car for leisure 
purpose in a family, but the share of NPC on the PC market has increased in a way that it can not be seen as a 
secondary product on the PC market.
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They receive a technical report at each development stage: access to production models 
created by the alliance: motherboard designs: samples of mass production modules: 
participation in training courses: and a Teamate. In addition, IDB required that each 
firm should organise a ‘learning by doing' team in order to cultivate some experts in the 
industry in case the project failed to create a commercially viable product, at least the 
aim of technology diffusion could be realised through a learning process. This made 
NPC technology diffused through learning by doing teams organised by the private 
sector, which has had an effect on the cultivation of experts.
2.3. The Complex Background of Participating Firms
In the beginning, ITRI intended to recruit intra-industrial companies, those who had at 
least the basic production line, and researchers and engineers to make further 
advances45. However, ITRI could not reject any domestic firm that wished to join the 
alliance under the guidance of IDB's open-to-all policy. The qualification for joining 
the NPC Alliance was loosely related to membership of TEAMA, but eight firms in the 
NPC Alliance were not members of TEAMA. Most firms were in the information 
industry, some were not. All firms joined the alliance with a common objective of 
expecting the transfer of NPC manufacturing technology, in particular, those that were 
PC producers.
However, the companies of peripherals (modem, mouse, etc.) and the suppliers of 
components (power adopter, keyboard, plastic case) are expecting to have easy access 
to the large number of business orders created by a new product. Other firms which are 
not in the PC industry, such as home electronics, communication, terminals and even 
textiles, might seek an entry opportunity into NPC manufacturing. Strangely, trade 
companies without any previous manufacturing experience also joined the alliance in
41 According to Mr. Lo (Interview No.25), who is the General Director of the Office of Planning at ITRI and was as 
rcscarcher/technical division's vice director of CCL in charge of the operation of the NPC Alliance, one of the aims of 
NPC Alliance is to diffuse technology in the industry so that ITRI expected participants themselves embodied basic 
technological capability to join the Alliance for ‘learning by doing', not for the final product and the production 
module.
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the sense that they hoped to seize the opportunities of export in the future, anticipating 
that if they could learn the design of NPC, they would find a manufacturer to do the 
OEM. Even new firms, created just before the formation of the alliance, simply wanted 
to share this big cake. Because of the complex background of the participating firms 
and their differences in motivation and engineering capability, the organisation and 
management task was very difficult.
2.4. The Taiwan Electric Appliance Manufacturers' Association (TEAMA)
TEAMA was renamed as the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' 
Association (TEEMA) in October 1993. TEAMA and TEEMA refer to the same 
organisation. The name of TEAMA is used in this chapter because the NPC Alliance 
was run mainly in 1990, but TEEMA replaces TEAMA in the next chapter concerning 
the development of the television industry when the time span crosses the year 1993.
TEEMA is the largest association among 135 associations for manufacturing 
industry in Taiwan which are registered under the Ministry of Interior. It has about 4500 
member companies, 85% of which are SMEs, defined as an enterprise having a paid-in 
capital of less than NTS60 million, and only 15% are large enterprises. The total 
number of employees under TEEMA’s member companies was around 460 thousand in 
1995, which was about 19% of total employment (2,485 thousand) in manufacturing 
sector in 1994 (TSDB, 1995:19).
The role played by TEEMA can be divided into two kinds, as a service provider 
to the industry and as an intermediary institute between the industry and government. In 
terms of its service provider role, TEEMA provides many services to the member 
companies, such as trade-related services (export promotion and exhibition), investment 
services, industry services, information services, legal services, and training services. In 
terms of its role as an intermediary institute, TEEMA is the bridge between the industry 
and government in relation to the fulfillment of policy requirements and the reflection 
of members’ opinions. In this two-way communication, TEEMA works as a coordinator
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to relay government policies, regulations and administration instructions on the one 
hand, and to collect members' opinions on certain issues, protect members' rights and 
proposes plans to competent authorities. This is important as a means of promoting 
mutual understanding. Eleven functional committees, eleven product committees and 
eighty-six product groups were established in the TEEMA to ensure well-functioning 
intra-industrial communication in terms of market, product, and technology 
information.
A function that TEEMA has never actively performed is as a pressure group 
against government. The business associations in Taiwan act more as subordinates to 
support the implementation of government policies than as pressure groups to strive for 
their own interests. As Mr. Chen, the director of TEEMA’s business department, states 
the relation between government and business associations is very harmonious in 
Taiwan, and TEEMA corresponds to government policies most of the time (Interview 
No.7). He stresses that the majority of domestic firms are not big enough to act as a 
pressure group, given that SMEs constitute 85% of TEEMA’s membership46.
To form the R&D consortia under the plan of TEEMA is an unusual function for 
business associations, which is generally unfamiliar to its foreign counterparts. The 
detailed operation of R&D consortia and the role of TEEMA will be explored in this 
and the next chapter. Due to the very successful development experience of the NPC 
Alliance, many TEEMA-led industry-wide R&D consortia were operating between 
1990-95, as shown on Table 5.1.
The members of TEAMA hold a certain degree of collective bargaining power to 
gain government financial subsidies in terms of cooperation R&D (J.C. Wang, 1991:14). 
This is a consequence of the fact that the electrical and electronic industry is more 
research-intensive than most of the other industries in Taiwan. Under the condition of a
44 In answering the question (hat the export of TEEMA's members is in a leading position compared to other 
manufacturing associations so TEEMA should have a great bargaining power with government, Mr. Chen did not give 
a direct answer But he gave me a very thoughtful smile when I asked whether many sweets came from the government
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short product life cycle and the severe international competition in this industry, 
dom estic firms have formed more R& D collaboration to obtain new technologies and 
maintain their com petitive advantage in the world market.
Table 5.1 Technology Collaboration Organised by TEAMA, 1990-95
1 Integrated service digital network PABX
2 Synchronous optical network
3 Notebook PC
4 Laser facsimile
5 G4 ISDN computer facsimile
6 X window terminal
7 Palmtop PC
8 Integrated service digital network customer premises equipment (ISDN CPE)
9 Digital tape recorder
10 Small size satellite telecommunications ground station
11 Encoded multi-task telephone
12 Network gate information system
13 Advanced television (ATV)
14 Liquid crystal projection television (PTV)
15 Wide screen 36 inch monitor (16:9)
16 Ethernet network multi-port bridge fiber optic cable digital interface technology
17 IC card
18 PowerPC alliance
19 Interactive TV/Set-Top Box (ITV/STB)
20 Digital Video Disc (DVD)
21 Persona] Accessory Communication System
However, the argument here is that this is more as a reflection of the economic 
centrality of TEAMA’s members than simply as a effect of autonomous coalitional 
politics. Economic bureaucrats are still the steering force in the policy reform, although 
some associations, or larger enterprises gradually increased their influence in policy 
decisions, which they did not during the authoritarian years (Chu, 1994:147). In recent 
years, the shift of R&D resources from the military sector to the economic sector, in 
which electric and electronics shared the largest part (See Chapter 4), reveals the 
changing priority of state concerns and the rising importance of hi-tech industry. But it 
is not perceived as a major policy concession to the private sector. Moreover, the very 
nature of state-sanctioned business associations prevented them from becoming an 
institutional base for autonomous collective actions. This structural characteristic of 
business associations inherited from past authoritarian rule made the private interests
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depend on the state for economic resources. It is inappropriate in the sense that textile- 
related associations successfully influenced the state policy preference, when the textile 
and garment industry received more incentives, subsidies and protections in the 1970s. 
However, the 'work-out' of textile and garment industry to overseas countries and the 
deprivation of previous privileged economic resources in the 1980s and 1990s was not 
caused by the declining ability of the associations to strive for their interests, nor by the 
increasing influence of other sectoral associations, rather by the changing nature of 
industrial structure. State priority is given to the technology-based sector which has a 
heavy weight in the national economy.
3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEAMATE PROJECT
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the major interactions between actors in the Teamate project. 
The resource inputs of the public and private sector into the Teamate project are 
identified, and the outputs of research collaboration also produce as the expectations of 
project. Invisible effects of the project, such as R&D cross-subsidisation and cross­
fertilisation are disclosed. These elements which constitute a successful process for new 
product creation in a cooperative technological project will be analysed in the rest of 
chapter.
In order to promote the Teamate project, a tripartite contract was signed by 
CCL/ITRI, TEAMA, and individual firms in July 1990. The total payment from firms 
was divided into three parts according to the contract. 50% of budget was assigned to 
CCL for the cost of R&D; 45% to ‘the NPC Joint Development Committee’; and 5% to 
TEAMA for the administrative costs. ‘The NPC Joint Development Committee' has 
four divisions, a R&D Division for product development, a Product Planning Division 
for suggestions about product design and standards, a Promotion Division which is in 
charge of media-related tasks, a Production and Marketing Division which is in charge 
of issues relevant to the post-R&D stage. The committee men and the directors of 
divisions were represented from the staffs of CCL, TEAMA, and firms.
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Figure 5.2 The Interaction of Teamate Project
3.1. Product Planning Division
The final decision on the systematic standard of Teamate was made about a month after 
the contract was signed after many long and intensive meetings between the three parts. 
The efficiency of the Product Planning Division in setting out the product standards in a 
short time was motivated by the hope that the Teamate project could produce a 
prototype in time for COMDEX, a computer exhibition held in early November, 1990 
in the United States. The 386DX NPC the size of A4 paper, height 5.4 cm, and weight 5 
kgs with key components and interior design was technically standardised. Soon after 
this, the R&D Division started its tasks.
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3 .2 . R & D  D iv is io n
Among the four divisions, the R&D Division was most important to the success of NPC 
Alliance. For the purpose of the division of labour and of accelerating product 
development, the R&D Division was further divided into six Technical Functioning 
Groups, namely, the Motherboard Technical Group, the Mechanism and Keyboard 
Technical Group, the Power Supply/Battery Technical Group, the External Procurement 
Group, the Integration Test Group, and the Electromagnetic Group. The operation of 
these Technical Functioning Groups was organised by the technical leaders of CCL with 
the participation of the firms’ engineers.
The main task of these groups was the transfer of laboratory technology to a state 
suitable for manufacturing. In the process of development of certain components, many 
international (mostly, Japanese) and domestic firms wished to make a free offer of 
modified or specially designed components to accommodate the needs of Teamate. 
Some suppliers were also the participating firms in the NPC Committee, which led to 
an accusation of monopoly. All component suppliers calculated that once their parts or 
components became the standard of Teamate, the rewards would be considerable. 
However, ITRI had abundant choices from which to select the most suitable component 
without paying a high cost in the development process. It also shortened the 
development process in such a way that many components could be developed by the 
suppliers.
The hard-working researchers and engineers in the Technical Functioning Groups 
were also very important in meeting the target of creating the prototype NPC by early 
November 1990. Between the final decision of a standard in the middle of August and 
the USA COMDEX in early November, there were only two and half months left to 
produce sample NPCs (1-2 samples to each member). Because the Teamate project was 
the first case of a R&D consortium in Taiwan which had attracted national concern 
about its results, CCL, TEAMA, participating companies, and component suppliers
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were enthusiastic about the progress of the Teamate47. Because of the pressure of time, 
some teams and supplier factories had to work exceptional hours (Interview' No.25 & 
30).
The experience of developing a lap-top PC at CCL and the supportive technology 
developed in the Packaging STP were the main factors leading to the rapid 
commercialisation o f a NPC. The technological capability of CCL in the field of 
miniaturisation was in a leading position at a time when most domestic firms in the 
computer industry manufactured only less sophisticated products, such as keyboard, 
mouse, monitor, and diskette. The timing of Packaging STP added to ITRI was able to 
meet the need of the Teamate project in view of the fact that the core technology in 
packaging a miniaturised PC could be funded by government instead of using the 
resource of NPC Alliance. It has to be noted that this STP was aimed at developing the 
technology of high intensive packaging, not at directly developing the NPC product, but 
the application of the packaging technology had a substantial influence on the design of 
the NPC (Interview No.30).
However, the ideas and suggestions of firms’ engineers were equally crucial to 
the extent that they provided practical manufacturing experience to overcome problems 
not envisaged by laboratory-based researchers in relation to mass production. 
Consequently, the integration of theoretical techniques and practical skill in the process 
of R&D created two advantageous elements. One was to offset the time gap between 
the transfer of technology and its transformation into a suitable state for manufacturing; 
the other was to build a model that firms could put into assembly line immediately. 
Both had a significant impact on matching the demand of the market, in particular, to 
the fast-changing market of a high tech industry.
47 The topic of a strategic alliance was very new to the society at that time, in particular, a very large-scale indigenous 
public-private RAD consortium, which can be observed from the frequent news concerning the development of the 
NPC Alliance in the local media (Table 5.7).
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When the prototype Teamate was exhibited at COMDEX, the response of the market 
was very positive. The market potential of Teamate was recognised which led to 
eagerness on the part of participating firms that CCL should provide the final 
production module and pass the test under the regulations of the US Federal 
Communication Committee in order to manufacture products as soon as possible. Many 
interviewees hold the view that the achievement of NPC Alliance has been very 
successful in terms of product development so far. It is primarily as the result of the fact 
that the basic goal of the R&D consortium was clear and that every member was 
urgently asked to cooperate. However, soon after the sample model was developed, the 
motivation to cooperate for a common goal was eroded by the conflicts of the market 
potential for each firm. The situation between firms changed from ‘we are all in the 
same boat’ to ‘on the same bed but with different dreams’. Gradually, the NPC Alliance 
broke up, and cooperation turned into competition.
The CCL kept on modifying and testing the functions of Teamate to make sure its 
final model could be mass produced after COMDEX. The output of the first 
experimental production was 1,200 Teamate NPCs which would be exhibited at CEBIT, 
a computer show in Hanover, Germany. In February 1991, the 1,200 Teamates became 
the focus at the CEBIT. The total of orders received from international buyers was 
twice that expected. However, the price of NPC in the international market dropped by 
twenty percent because the Taiwanese firms were competing with each other in terms 
of price rather than of quality48.
The failure of the Production and Marketing Division to reach an effective 
agreement on the price led to a price war. Every firm hoped to expand its market share,
41 The functions and design of Taiwanese NPCs in the CEBIT were the same at that time, the only difference was their 
appearances and marks because that their on gin came from the same resourcc-Tcomatc. Taiwanese firms with the 
same product could not diversify market, but to fall into a ‘bloody price battle' (Economic Daily News, 05/04/91). The 
international price for a NPC dropped from US$2,000 to 1,600 in few days during the CEBIT which was caused by the 
entry of Taiwan's Teamate.
3.3. Production and Marketing Division
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but buyers knew that there was no difference in quality' as the consequence of collective 
development. Fierce price competition was unavoidable. It showed the disarray of the 
management of the NPC Alliance. There was no way to regulate firms' marketing 
behaviour. Even ITR1 and TEAMA could not help to solve the marketing disorders. 
‘CCL/ITRI, as a technology provider, would not involve any marketing issue', Mr. Lo 
admitted that ‘it is better to let businessmen solve their problems in a business wav' 
(Interview No.25). The government was also unwilling to intervene in such an issue 
because there were too many interests involved (Interview No. 13).
There was a ‘common price’ agreed between firms in early September, 1990 after 
one month’s negotiation, but it was soon broken when the products were marketed. The 
idea of collective production and marketing was advanced by TEAMA. It not only 
collected the related market information of international enterprises, but also invited the 
marketing directors of participating firms to form a coordination association in order to 
build a consensus on price and to discuss the issue of market division through product 
differentiation. However, in terms of marketing, the price coordination was destroyed 
by firms’ ‘profit first’ expectation. In terms of product differentiation, most firms’ 
technological capability was too unsophisticated to modify and add functions to 
upgrade their products. Thus, product convergence was high and all they could do was 
to make the appearance of products attractive and smart. Mr. Chen of TEAMA 
commented it as 'the selfishness of firms has spoiled the high-profit honeymoon period 
for a new products Interview No.7).
3.4. The End of NPC Alliance
The CCL had completed the task of creating a commercially viable NPC model by 
April 1991. According to the tripartite contract, CCL should prepare the transfer of 
technology and training courses to participants. As defined in the contract, CCL left the 
NPC Alliance and the diversification of NPC was the task of private firms.
The running of the NPC Joint Development Committee should have lasted for
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another three years in contractual terms, but no member paid attention to the function of 
the NPC Committee in practice. This was principally due to a lack of a common goal to 
keep the Committee in energetic operation. No decision of the NPC Committee could 
authorise or regulate members' behaviours. Besides, individual firms were too busy on 
the matters of production and marketing for themselves. Meanwhile, the activities of 
developing a second-generation NPC Alliance was started in February 1991. Members 
and non-members of the NPC Alliance were anxious about the new alliance instead of 
keeping an eye on the ‘old’ alliance. The NPC Alliance came to an end after CEBIT.
4. THE AFTERMATH OF THE NPC ALLIANCE
The evaluation of the NPC Alliance, in particular, its impact on international 
competitiveness, is extremely difficult for two reasons. Firstly, to judge a R&D 
consortium based on a short term perspective is inappropriate since most R&D 
investment can not boost commercial returns immediately. In 1991 and 1992, the 
criticism of NPC Alliance was very serious, for instance, distrust and quarrels between 
members, key components shortage, price competition and high product convergence 
(Table 5.7). However, it did create a champion product for Taiwan’s export 
manufacturing in a longer term. Secondly, the effects of NPC Alliance on the corporate 
strategy and on the industrial policy are likewise difficult to assess. In theory, the aim of 
a strategic alliance is to create a win-win or all-wins for members of the alliance. 
However, in a micro view, Taiwan's NPC Alliance resulted in many bankruptcies of 
member firms, a most-of-them-lost lesson. There are less than ten survivors among 
forty-six members. In a  macro view, this Alliance not only made the information 
industry as a whole more competitive, but it also discovered a more efficient way for 
technology diffusion.
4.1. International Reflection
Very little attention has been paid to the reactions of the international actors (foreign 
governments and enterprises) towards the NPC Alliance. The reflections about the NPC
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Alliance of international actors were much stronger after the successful creation of a 
commercial NPC than in the development process.
4.1.1. In the process o f  development
Before the commencement of the NPC Alliance, Taiwan was an important supply 
source of less sophisticated parts and components, and an original equipment 
manufacturer of desk-top PCs. So, the NPC Alliance did not attract too much concern 
from large international PC companies. Meanwhile, international companies were 
developing their own NPC. The efforts of Taiwan’s NPC Alliance might have been 
deemed as an effort of trying to enlarge the industrial base of PC manufacturing, but not 
as a challenge, or even a threat, in the eyes of international PC companies.
During the development process, some international companies kept an eye on 
the potential markets for high level key components, such as the key IC, the high power 
battery, and the LCD, if the Teamate could be accomplished. For example, Intel and 
Motorola offered a specially designed IC to fit in with Teamate, and Hitachi supplied a 
notebook-sized LCD. For other components, such as the motherboard, the case, the 
keyboard, and the IC card, Taiwan had the strength in design and manufacturing. In 
order to acquire foreign components, ITRI represented the NPC Alliance in negotiations 
with foreign suppliers, instead of each individual firm having to purchase their own 
requirements. Collective bargaining made the negotiation easier and the cost cheaper49. 
During this period, international enterprises were interested in the business 
opportunities which might originate from the NPC Alliance. They did not realise that 
this Alliance would lead to the generation of a strong competitor in the field. *
** This method not only reduced the cost of obtaining key components, but also made the foreign firms willing to 
provide special service to cope with the standard of Tcamatc which they would otherwise to do, if the buyer only 
purchased a limited amount. Whatever the demands of alliance members in the foreign components, ITRI represented 
as a collective negotiator. It might be the desired components for Tcamatc in the pre-competitive developing process or 
the future needs of common components m the manufacturing stage
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4.1.2. A fter the birth o f Teamate
The exhibition of a Teamate in COMDEX (US, November 1990) revealed the 
successful development of a Taiwanese NPC using its own technological capability. 
International actors were shocked by the fact that Taiwan had generated a prototype 
NPC through a public-private consortium in only four months. Moreover, the NPC price 
dramatically dropped on the international market after the appearance of the final 
Teamate in CEBIT (Germany, April 1991). The entry of Teamate into the international 
market had a serious impact on international companies. On the one hand, they were 
frightened, witnessing the cannibal marketing behaviours o f  NPC Alliance’s members 
which led to the price slide of 20% in few days and of 35% in six months. On the other 
hand, international companies who had developed NPCs were annoyed about the 
shortening of the market skimming period, abnormal for high tech products. For those 
who were developing or planning to develop, they feared that further investment in 
NPC development might be wasted or the return might take a longer time.
Foreign firms and governments were also very curious about the formation and 
the operation of NPC Alliance50. The firms saw it as a good example of a strategic 
alliance to strengthen R&D, and foreign governments showed their interest in imitating 
a public-private R&D consortium to promote competitiveness. This is the case for 
international actors from developing countries, principally, from Southeast Asia. 
However, foreign actors, from the United States and Japan whose technological 
capabilities were ahead of those of Taiwan were more concerned about whether the 
government had a deeper and more direct involvement than simply the detailed 
operation of the Alliance in technology development.
Vl According to the interviewees, the overseas visitors from all over the world (including media correspondents, 
enterprise representatives, and government officers) hoped to get information about the NPC Alliance from IDB, ITRI, 
TEEMA, and firms. However, the visitors from different fields had different concerns. The media simply look this 
event as a story worth reporting; enterprises and governments were interested about how and what to form and run this 
alliance. From the statements of interviewees, their attitudes towards the overseas visitors were very conservative in the 
sense that they did not hope to cause any negative impression which might harm the future development of industry, in 
particular, the new form of ‘public-private' collective collaboration. They pointed out that some visitors collected 
information for investigation rather than other purposes.
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Japanese enterprises and government were eager to know how to form and 
operate a public-private R&D consortium which commercialised a product in a very 
short period of time. Japan has been perceived as a country with government 
involvement in the development of technology', so Taiwan's experience might provide a 
superior model for their future manoeuvres. Besides, many components manufactured 
through the Alliance have not only increased Taiwan's self-reliability to provide 
components rather than rely on Japanese sources, as in the past, but also to become the 
most important supplier of NPC’s components and parts to a large market. This 
changed the condition of supply system of international NPC industry from a situation 
in which Japan and USA were dominant in the markets to one where Taiwan has 
became a new supplier gradually, starting from less sophisticated parts to high-value- 
added components51.
The US was keen to know how and to what extent the Taiwanese government 
was involved in the Alliance. At that time (1991) international regulations on R&D 
subsidy had not reached any agreement in terms of permissible areas and financial 
limits for subsidy. If NPC Alliance had a large government subsidy, the US might apply 
countervailing measures to the export of NPCs from Taiwan, or more severely, they 
might deploy section 301 sanctions. The US left no stone unturned in order to 
investigate the matter52, but the Taiwan government provided no financial assistance. 
The CCL researchers and technologies applied in the NPC Alliance, although cultivated 
by government, could not be deemed to have received financial assistance in relation to 
the NPC Alliance. As a matter of fact, the NPC fund (slightly more than US$2 million), 
contributed solely from private firms, is enough to develop a product, while the related
!l This evidence shows the Taiwan indigenous efforts to upgrade its technological capability, instead of taking Japanese 
technologies os ‘given’ like the theory of Flying Geese model suggested that Japan as Asian technological driving force 
has diffused technology through relocated its production facilities to Asian tigers Besides, the flying geese model also 
neglected the importance of the US economy as a market and as a source of technology, and the feature of personal 
connection in Chinese business circles (Hobday, 1944a).
”  They did not believe that a successful commercialisation of a product in a short time could be achieved without direct 
government involvement in financial terms. When they could not find any evidence from government branches, ITRI, 
and TEEMA, the direction of investigation turned to the participating firms (Interv iewee No 7)
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experience, technologies, and researchers were available from CCL5’.
After the NPC Alliance, large international corporations frequently required 
information from 1TRI about what kind of products it was developing or planning to 
develop. Their concern was that profits would be less good once Taiwan entered the 
product market. They wanted to avoid the overlap of market. Mr. Lo always asked them 
in return ‘why should you ask what is the next product that ITR1 will develop? All 
products were advanced by you (large international corporations). Taiwan, at best, is a 
fast follower’ (Interview No.25). This demonstrated that international actors 
acknowledged Taiwan as a competitor in the field of high tech industry after a 
prosperous public-private R&D alliance.
4.2. The Criticism of NPC Alliance
The critiques of NPC Alliance were for the most part concentrating on detailed aspects 
in relation to its operations, rather than on the R&D outputs. The pessimistic voices 
towards the NPC Alliance were strong at a time when many members were bankrupt 
and when the price of NPC was in disarray, but soon to be overtaken by prosperity in 
the global market.
4.2.1. In a  management perspective
CCL/ITRI was the leading actor in the NPC Alliance. It called for the formation of a 
strategic consortium which should take the responsibility of managing the operation of 
the alliance, at least nominally. However, the staffs of CCL were not sufficient to tackle 
the task. They were good at laboratory activity not at management, so CCL could only 
concentrate on R&D. Therefore, the general administration was moved to TEAMA, and 
the management and decision making were under the supervision of the NPC Joint 
Development Committee. The logistic support of TEAMA in terms of documentation,
M In (his respect, the income of ITR1 is about US$1 million (half of the total payment from private firms) for providing 
technologies, facilities and researchers to conduct RAD However, the budget for Packaging STP was about US$4 5 
million in this year.
168
accounting, providing meeting places, and communication, left little to be criticised, 
similarly the R&D progress monitored by CCL.
A development fund, 45% o f the total payment from the private sector, was 
controlled by the Committee in order to procure materials and to designate suppliers 
who took contracts for design components. The outsourcing contracts and material 
procurements were in total disarray because there was no well-defined procedure and 
written penalties for delayed supply and poor quality (S. Wang, 1991:57-8). Besides, the 
phenomenon of participating firms getting outsourcing and procurement contracts 
revealed the result of dysfunctional management. This had been caused by taking 
advantage of ‘insiders’ and not regulating the overlapping identities of member and 
supplier which could lead to materials and components being supplied which were not 
the best choice. However, it was flexible enough for the R&D technical groups to 
obtain what they needed without experiencing a long procurement procedure which 
might delay R&D.
Even the Committee itself raised many problems. Firstly, the Committee 
announced itself affiliated to TEAMA, but TEAMA had no great say on its decisions 
due to the fact that participating firms were TEAMA’s members and any action in 
favour of a particular firm would cause difficulties. Secondly, the organisational charter 
of the Committee was provided two months after the tripartite contract was signed. This 
charter failed to give a precise definition of members' obligations and rights. Thirdly, 
the Committee also failed to regulate the firms’ cut-throat competition in terms of 
production and marketing because it lacked lawful authority to do so. This is an 
inherent defect of this type of arrangement since R&D resources and risks can be shared 
by members, but the market cannot. However, a cartel-like price agreement would lead 
to the violation of the fair trade law.
The inefficiency of the Committee in a management perspective was not really 
the result of a dysfunctional management, but rather an unworkable arrangement for the
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whole management. This was because the tasks of the Committee had not been properly 
thought through in advance, as well as an ambiguous delayed charter. In the perspective 
of learning about management and strategic alliances, the NPC Alliance is a failure in 
the sense that most members sank in the market. A successful strategic alliance is 
aimed at created a winning position for their partners. In the NPC case, it was a market- 
oriented R&D consortium which should lead to winning market share for its members. 
The result of this alliance in terms of corporate strategy hardly matched the nature of 
the alliance-to win together.
4.2.2. Selection o f  participating firm s
There was no qualification required to join the NPC Alliance except that the firm had to 
be a registered firm with the ability to pay NTS 1.2 million (about US$45,000). Thus, 
CCL and TEAMA did not have right to examine the background of members in terms 
of technological/manufacturing capability and financial capacity. This brought on 
bankruptcies in the stage of mass production. After firms accepted the technology and 
production module from the NPC Alliance, they could produce NPC either by self­
manufacturing or by OEM. The situation for firms with weak technological or 
manufacturing capability was that they could not differentiate the product by extending 
functions, so the competitiveness of their products decreased gradually; for firms 
without a sound financial structure, they went insolvent when market returns would not 
balance their investments. According to Ms Cheng (Interview No.9), firms which fell 
down in the very beginning were those which underestimated the market competition 
and expected a rich return to repay their investments; firms bankrupted in the later stage, 
were those could not upgrade their products to catch the ever-changing demands of 
market. For less than ten survival firms, they all have/had the financial capacity to 
support continued investment and the technological capability to upgrade their 
products.
Too many entrants in an alliance also contribute to chaos in management and
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coordination. The management of NPC Alliance has been termed the integration of 
‘many chicken heads on a cow's body’ which illustrated the difficulties in the process 
of decision making and management (Interview No.25). For example, the large firms 
required a relatively high standard of product reliability and comprehensive technical 
reports, and the requirements of smaller firms were biased towards a highly 
commercialised product and the complete production module (S. Wang, 1991:59). 
Besides, the larger the firm, the stronger the influence in the Alliance. Thus, how to 
reconcile various intentions added to the burden of management. It was suggested that a 
longer time of pre-alliance activities to survey the intentions of the private sector would 
have solved this problem (Interview No.30).
The low-cost sharing principle of NPC Alliance attracted many business 
opportunists to join in. Many opportunists free rode the result of research without a 
positive contribution in the process of R&D. Most of them might have an intention of 
‘hit and run’ in the market, so they did not make a strong commitment to the Alliance. 
Once their product was marketed, they lost commitments to the Alliance. However, 
how to determine an appropriate cost sharing is a dilemma since a high cost deterred 
firms’ willing to participate and a lost cost created free riders.
According to a survey on the relationships between NPC members’ evaluation of 
the Alliance and their attributes (D. Lee, 1992), the background of firms and the rate of 
NPC production shared in a firm's turnover would affect their evaluations. The intra­
industrial firms and the higher rate of NPC shared firms’ turnovers led to a positive 
evaluation. Besides, a highly active attitude of a firm towards the Alliance also showed 
a confident evaluation. However, some variables (the size of the firm, the age of the 
firm, and the firm’s expenditure on R&D) did not appear to be clear differences on 
evaluation54. ‘Firms from the same industry create fewer conflicts than firms from
54 This survey was conducted m 1991 at a time when most members were in their profitable period. If possible, a re­
survey of participating firms on this point in 1993-4 would tell another story, but many firms hod disappeared at that 
time. They might change their attitude towards the success evaluation after the appearance o f  financial difficulties and 
the appearance of technical hindrance of upgrading the level of product.
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different industries in a R&D cooperation' (J.C. Wang, 1991:27). Correspondingly, 
selecting members should be restricted to intra-industrial firms, or at least, firms in 
related industries, and to active participants rather than those motivated by ‘a chance to 
share the cake*.
4.2.3. High dependence o f  key components and high product convergence
The sources o f key components, in particular, CPU and LCD, were controlled by 
foreign companies which made the Taiwan NPC industry subject to their supplies. 
Taking the supply of Japanese LCD as an example, Taiwan's shortage of LCD was very 
serious in 1991-92, for two reasons, as D. Lee (1992:20) suggested: first, the suddenly 
increasing global NPC market resulted in supplying Japan's domestic demand as a 
priority; second, Japan depressed Taiwanese firms’ price-destroying competition by 
controlling the supply of LCD in order to protect a high profit.
The high dependence on foreign components limited the product profit in the 
short term. In the long term, however, it is better to reduce this dependence and rely on 
home manufacture. Otherwise, it is likely that the outcome would simply be a foreign 
company’s assembly factory. Nonetheless, the time to create a prototype NPC for the 
Alliance was just a few months, and it would be too severe to criticise dependence on 
foreign key components in these circumstances. It was more important to make a 
commercial product rapidly so as to capture the immediate demand of market than to 
avoid using foreign components at this stage. Some components take a long time to 
develop, and Taiwan took 3 years in R&D to produce indigenous LCDs, for example.
As a consequence of the NPC Alliance high product convergence was also 
inevitable. Limited time for development could be the reason. To differentiate product 
should be the responsibility of each firm since the aim of the NPC Alliance was to 
create a uniform NPC. However, it provided a lesson to other alliances to avoid the 
same coverage of firms’ backgrounds.
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In response to the high dependence on key components and high product 
convergence, to incorporate up-, middle-, and down-stream industry into an alliance 
would provide a solution. Then, the firms in up-stream industry are in charge of parts; 
middle-stream, components; and down-stream, industry end products. The division of 
labour in an alliance solves problems of dependence and convergence. Most 
importantly, a centre-satellite supply system in a product/industry will be established 
through the consortium. It also avoids members competing with each other on the same 
market segment or the final product. It is true that, sometimes, the profit on component 
is much higher than that of final product, in particular, the components can capture a 
large market share55.
4.2.4. Competition and subsidy problems
Some large firms criticised the fact that a public research institute should not organise a 
R&D consortium because small firms could get technology for a tiny payment 
compared to the R&D investment of large firms. In their language, it is a punishment to 
those firms with technological capability which had invested in NPC development 
because the government equipped small firms with technology to compete with large 
firms. Moreover, it also discouraged small firms from doing R&D because if they could 
get technology from ITRI’s alliance, why should they do R&D themselves (Interview 
No.9).
Acer and Mitac, the two largest computer companies, complained that a 
cooperative research consortium was organised by a public research institute because 
the market would be monopolised by them if there were no such alliance (Interview 
No.l & 19). However, Mitac took part in the NPC Alliance for two reasons (Interview 
No. 19). First, it could enlarge its technology source. Second, it could monitor events
55 According to the smiling curve theory of Acer's Stan Shih, a anti-tradiuonal business theory which rejected the 
product assembly as the highest value-added industrial activity, stressed that the components and distribution were the 
ones. The cost snd speed sre two important factors leading to the competitive components on a global market. 
(Interview No.l)
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and avoid the risk that rivals might gain from the project56. Acer, one of the top three 
international PC manufacturer in 1997, did not join the NPC Alliance in a consideration 
that if it did, their NPC product would lost its distinctive character, so Acer in spite of 
its good reputation in quality, did not catch the market shares in the beginning 
(Interview No.l). The market share of Acer's NPC did not perform as well as their 
desk-top PCs and other peripherals. The result was that Acer was in financial difficulty 
in 1991-2 which was probably caused by a failure to catch NPC market demand. 
However, Acer’s NPC is still the best-seller in Taiwan now and among the top ten in 
international markets due to their brand name and strong technological capability.
The case of Packaging STP is an issue of R&D cross-subsidisation57 to create 
private benefits, but not necessary at the expense of the exchequer (or large companies) 
because the whole economy will benefit. Taking the industry as a whole, the total 
investment in NPC production was increased as well as the productivity by the 
government project. This could not be considered as a direct subsidy to production from 
the government in terms of unfair measures, unless a new setting of international 
regulations, because the government involvement in the technology development is a 
growing fashion to increase national competitiveness. In addition, Packaging STP 
confined its R&D activities to the pre-competitive stage. The term cross-subsidisation 
may be more suitable to describe the indistinct and indirect grant to the technology 
development for the industrial sector. In the case of Teamate project, the open-to-all 
policy thereby avoided conditions of asymmetric competition in the monopoly case by 
selecting only one or a few large firms. It can not be argued that government subsidised 
SMEs to compete with large firms since all firms could join the Alliance according to
"  This matches the suggestion of Porter (1990:635) that some Japanese firms participated in MITTs project based on 
defence to avoid benefits giving to their competitors. Unlike Taiwan whose SMEs were heavily dependent on public 
research institutes to support their technology, Japan's firms put more effort into their own private research in the same 
technological field, rather than those of the MITI'i cooperative projects.
57 According to Pass & Lowes (1993:106), cross-subsidisation is the practice by firms to shift resources between 
different departments -  the internal subsidies from the profits generated by one product or department to certain 
products or departments. This is normally as a means of financing new product development, diversification into new 
areas, or to support price cuts to cope with intense competition. The meaning of cross-subsidisation for the application 
in a national setting in this chapter was derived from its two characters: cross-sectoral subsidy and financing new 
product development.
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their own corporate strategies. Therefore, as far as the government policy is concerned, 
the government had invested a large amount in the development of related technology 
and hoped to diffuse technology into the private sector in as far-reaching a way as 
possible (Interview No. 13).
Competition also produced two problems, one was the fear of collusion in theory, 
and the other was over-competition by price variations in practice. Economically, the 
process of firms striving against each other to secure customers for their products, 
defined as competition, is a form of market structure. The nature and strength of 
competition has an essential effect on market performance from a public-interest angle. 
There is a worry that the side effect of R&D collaboration between firms in an industry 
will create an anti-competitive environment in which firms tends to collectively collude 
(J.C. Wang, 1991:23-4). Nonetheless, it is unlikely to happen in the case of Teamate. 
Taiwan’s products did not have a significant market share with which to manipulate 
world markets by a domestically collusive agreement and by anti-trust regulations 
applied by most countries in an international setting. In Taiwan’s market, import 
liberalisation and Fair Trade Law also countered collusion. All this suggests that the 
risk of collusion is very slim.
After the NPC product was marketed competition became unpredictable. When 
the relation between firms turned from cooperation in the R&D period to competition in 
the manufacturing period, firms acted individually in a capitalist way to raise market 
share rather than collectively in a conspiratorial fashion to monopolise the market and 
maintain a high profit. Anti-competitive practices did not occur, instead fierce 
competition developed by (low) price variations, not by product differentiation or by 
low cost. As a consequence, many members of the NPC Alliance were bankrupted.
A very high rate of bankruptcy was presented as the failure of NPC Alliance in 
corporate terms. The closure of companies is very common in Taiwan’s SME- 
dominated economy, but this does not mean the closure of business is mainly caused by
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bankruptcies. Companies may leave a business because of low profit or may shift from 
one sector to another. For less than ten among 46 members to survive was abnormal. 
The basic character of high-tech industry is high profit, and it also denotes high risk. To 
survive in the high-tech product/industry, as well as technology-intensive and the 
capital-intensive requirements, speed is very important38. Many firms underestimated 
the risk and this led to a wrong corporate strategy in terms of further investment without 
integrating high speed product innovation into marketing. Besides, no one could expect 
46 rivals, emerging from Taiwan and competing in the international market to survive 
at the same time.
The present situation on the NPC market reveals the low achievement of the 
surviving NPC members in the field of NPC industry. It demonstrates that the NPC 
producers now are not those in the initiative group. There are only two members 
(Tatung & Mitac) still among the top ten producers in Taiwan’s NPC industry. Many 
other existing firms’ main products are not NPC, for example, Proton (electronics, TV, 
and monitor), Dbtel (telephone-related & electric product), ADI (PC peripherials), and 
AOC (TV & monitor). The features which the survivors share are that they are not 
SMEs and have experience of manufacturing in the relevant industry.
However, seven years is quite a long period of time to observe the evolution of a 
high-tech industry. It is far more difficult trying to trace the mobility of trained 
engineers and the movement of participating firms because of the high mobility rate of 
engineers and capital in Taiwan. The information about the mergers between 
participating firms, mergers between participating firm and outsiders, and re­
engineering of firms, is unobtainable. Also, whether there were other cases where large 
enterprises joined the Alliance through their spin-off companies, like Mitac did, is hard 
to prove now. 51
51 According to Interview No. 18, the product of high technology characterised os 6-3-3 modcl-6 months for R&D, 3 
months for fast marketing, and 3 months on the decline. Thus, the speed-oriented product innovation is the core to 
capture the market. The determinants of speed are, time to market, time to volume, time to cost of goal, time to 
customer satisfaction, and time to decision making.
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4.3. The Influence o f  NPC Alliance
The influence of the NPC Alliance in Taiwan was very positive except for the 
management issues and the failure of some members’ corporate strategies relative to the 
deployment of manufacturing and marketing. Taiwan not only created a competitive 
product for export, but also built a new arrangement for technology diffusion in 
accordance with the model of NPC Alliance. One point that has to be made is that the 
success of the NPC Alliance could not have been achieved, if there were no support of 
technology from the public research institute and no support of a sound infrastructure 
for the PC industry.
4.3.1. Standardisation and creating a competitive product
The NPC Alliance had two very basic results from the development of a uniform 
Teamate. First, it built a very competitive product. Second, the Alliance standardised 
the NPC which would take a longer time to reach an agreement if let the firms to 
compete each other with their own formats. In other words, the Alliance had facilitated 
the establishment of product standardisation.
The standardisation of a NPC makes a crucial contribution to the PC industry as 
the advantages described by Mowery:
‘The establishment o f  technical standards can assist the adoption o f new technologies, since they can 
reduce uncertainties concerning the performance o f a new device or technology, reduce the costs o f 
"customizing” a p iece o f equipment to be connected to  other devices, and may facilitate entry into 
the production of a new technology, thereby lowering prices The process o f  establishing technical 
standards also generates considerable information about the performance characteristics and other 
aspects o f  a new technology that may assist broader public programmes of technology extension and 
assistance to  potential adopters All o f these characteristics o f standards are likely to be especially 
important to information and electronics-based technologies, since there are often applied in 
networks and require the interconnection o f numerous components that are often produced 
independently’ (M owery, 1995:536)
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Table 5 J  The Productivities and Value of Outputs in Taiwan's NPC Industry 
_____ ________________ _______ (1990-96) __________________________ ^
Productivity Value of Outputs
Year Thousand
Sets
Growth
Rate
Million
(USS)
Growth
Rate
Memo
1990 217 - 319 - Teamate project
1991 534 146% 688 157% -
1992 861 61% 947 38%
Market share in order: Japan. US. 
Germany. Taiwan
1993 1,291 50% 1,667 76% World 3rd largest NPC producer
1994 2,057 59% 2,729 64%
World 2nd largest NPC producer 
(28% world market)
1995 2,592 26% 3,339 22%
Japan's produced 2,650 thousand 
sets. Taiwan produced 2,592 
thousand sets (27% world market).
1996 3,370 30% 5,300 59%
World largest NPC producer; 32% 
world’s NPC market share; 90% of 
NPC for export
Total/
Average 10,915 62% 14,989 69%
89% o f  NPC for export in 1992 
91% o f NPC for export in 1993 
94% o f NPC for export in 1994
Source: 1990-93 data from III (1994:10); 1994 data from DIT (1996b:3) and CDN (12/09/95); 1995 data 
from DIT (1996d:44) and Communication Bank (Nov. 1996:30); 1996 data from Economic Daily 
News (23/11/96; 24/03/97) Data for export ratio from 111 (1995:86)
The data in Table 5.3 shows the extraordinary growth of the NPC industry in 
Taiwan. The 1990-96 average annual growth rate of productivity is 62% after the NPC 
Alliance. In particular, the 1991-92 growth rate is 146% demonstrating immediate 
market return after the creation of a uniform Teamate. The total value of outputs is 
nearly US$15 billion, and the total R&D investment of the NPC Alliance is only US$2 
million. Thus, the cost-efficiency of this investment is tremendous. The cost-efficiency 
of NPC Alliance is 7,500 times in a 6-year span, if the outputs divided by investment 
(15,000 -f- 2 US$ million), but the investment merely indicates collective R&D which 
excludes the Packaging STP, investment in production and in further R&D by the 
private sector.
The international competitiveness of Taiwanese NPC and key components is now 
the highest in quantitative terms in terms of market share. This is not totally attributable 
to the NPC Alliance as the continued efforts to advance NPC technology also occupy at
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least the same weight, however, this Alliance broke the most difficult part -- the entry 
barrier, and provided a uniform model for future advancement which is invaluable. 
Moreover, the standardisation of components has had an essential effect on the further 
development of the NPC industry. This cuts down the waste on the duplication of the 
development of the production module within the industry, and more importantly, led 
Taiwan to becoming a principal supplier of NPC components. Intel’s Taiwan manager 
commented, ‘I don’t think any computer company can survive nowadays without 
buying from Taiwan. Taiwan has become the arms dealer of the computer wars 
(Business Week, 28/06/93:36).’ Table 5.4 demonstrates the procurement relationship 
between international corporations and Taiwan.
Table 5.4 The Procurement of the Eight International Largest Companies from 
_____________________ Taiwan in PC Industry in 1995_____________________
World Ranking Desk-top PC & 
Motherboard
NPC Monitor
1 Compaq 20-25% 15% 50-60%
2 IBM 35-40% 15-20% 50-60%
3 Apple 25% 20-30%
4 Packard Bell 50-60% - 65-75%
5 NEC 20-25% " 20-30%
6 Acer 1 0 0 % 100% 10 0 %
7 HP 60-70% 60-70%
8 Dell 50-60% 25% 80-85%
Source: M IC
4.3.2. Strengthening computer industry
Taiwan’s overall production value of computer products still maintained a high level in 
1991-93 in spite of a sluggish worldwide market. It is argued that the high growth rate 
of the computer industry will not be maintained without a constant increase in the share 
of NPCs among all PCs produced in Taiwan. According to Mr. Chang (Interview No.2), 
a researcher of NPC intelligence and author of III (1994 & 1995), the relative decline of 
the share of desk-top models is because of weakening demand and increasing 
production by overseas subsidiaries of Taiwanese firms. While the sluggish desk-top PC 
market stagnated the growth of Taiwan’s exports, the increasing export of NPC has
179
compensated for the decline. Also, the rapid growth of NPC export led Taiwan to be the 
nation with the third largest information industry in 1995, only behind the US and Japan, 
from the fifth position in 1993 (D1T, 1996d:43).
The high-value-added character of NPC has become the principal momentum of 
the growth of the computer industry. Figure 5.5 shows that the price of a single NPC 
was about 2.5-3 times that of desk-top PC. In 1993 (1994), the volume of the output of 
NPC shared 36% (40%) of the total volume of the output of PCs, and the value of the 
output of NPC shared 60% (64%) of the total value of the output of PCs. In 1993 (1994), 
the volume of the output of desk-top PCs shared 64% (60%) of the total volume of the 
output of PCs, and the value of the output of NPCs shared 40% (36%) of the total value 
of the output o f PCs. Accordingly, although the total volume productivity of NPC was 
less than that o f desk-top PC, the total value productivity was more than that of desk-top 
PC.
High value-added also led to indigenous production, unlike many other products 
of PC peripherals which moved out of Taiwan, looking for a cheaper cost production 
location. The timing of the rise in the NPC sector has weakened the possibility of 
deindustrialisation in the information industry, and also strengthened Taiwan as a base 
of information technology in the world. It does match the expectation of government 
that the more high tech, high value-added industries are rooted in Taiwan, the more 
possibilities Taiwan has to become a technology island. The continuing efforts of NPC 
R&D coping with other R&D fields related to digital and electric industries might make 
Taiwan form a strong R&D infrastructure (or a strong industrial cluster) in the next 
wave of high tech production.
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Figure 5.5 PC Outputs by Model, Value &  Volume
Source: 111(1993:88-9, 1994 9-10, 1995:86-7), DIT (1996b:3 & 1996d: 48), Communication Bank (Nov. 1996:3). 
N ote 1 In 1994, NPC shared 28% world market. Desk-top shared 8% world market 
In 1995, NPC shared 27% world market, Desk-top shared 10% world market 
N ote 2 In 1989, the NPC referred as Lap-top PC.
In 1990, the outputs o f  NPC combined NPC and Lap-top PC.
In 1992, the 98% outputs o f  NPC was ‘real’ NPC.
In 1993, the 99% outputs o f  NPC was ‘real’ NPC.
In 1994, the outputs o f  NPC included 3% o f Sub-Notebook-Sized PC.
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4.3.3. Accelerating technology diffusion and technician cultivation
A very important contribution of the NPC Alliance to the computer industry is speeding 
up the pace of technology diffusion and widening the effect of technician cultivation. 
The open-to-all policy to gather firms joining the Alliance had increased the difficulties 
of management, but it had a good effect on accelerating technology diffusion and 
technician cultivation. Through the process of ‘learning by doing’ with CCL’s 
researchers on the development of Teamate, engineers from the private sector have 
been educated in the latest technologies and packaging know-hows.
The number of engineers who benefited was hundreds. Every firm had to assign a 
few engineers to participate in the R&D activities in each R&D Technical Group, and 
there are six of them. In addition, many training courses, technical reports of every 
stage, and production modules organised by CCL certainly served as essential learning 
materials. At the time when NPC technology was still new to Taiwan's PC industry, a 
large amount of expertise did inject fresh blood into PC manufacturing. Although many 
firms disappeared, the additional skills would never vanish and they could always find 
places to apply their knowledge in Taiwan.
In terms of technology diffusion, NPC technology has been widely spread through 
the NPC Alliance. Without this Alliance and 46 participating firms, the pace of 
technology diffusion would have been slower. Even if many large firms invested in their 
own R&D, technology diffusion might take a longer time to diffuse to the whole 
industry. The number of firms with ability to manufacture NPC products increased from 
no more than 5 firms before the Alliance to two-digit firms after the Alliance, revealing 
a wide spread of manufacturing know-how.
To evaluate the effectiveness of technology diffusion is not easy, in particular, 
there is no statistical evidence to exhibit how and to what degree Taiwan’s NPC 
technological capability was promoted by the Alliance. Besides, it is also impossible to 
rule out how those ‘learning by doing’ teams were actually benefitted because no
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relevant material was obtainable. The phenomenon of free-riding the result of R&D by 
organising a perfunctory team, a layman or inexperienced team, to meet the 
requirement of IDB exists, very possibly in the teams of non-manufacturing members. 
This should shrink the scale of technician cultivation. If the increasing productivity and 
market share are the indicators, even though it is unclear that there will be a connection 
between production and technology diffusion and technician cultivation, then the 
effectiveness is clear.
4.3.4. Integrating o f  R&D and manufacturing
The pattern of technology transfer from the public technology-supplying institutes to the 
private sector was a waste of time in a new era of global competition. The key 
technology development and the industrial application of technology were separated in 
Taiwan in the past, although this pattern did not affect traditional industries and less 
sophisticated sectors seriously. However, this brought about two time-delaying 
consequences in meeting market demands, in particular, in the high tech sectors. Firstly, 
technologies developed by the research institutes supported by the government could 
not be transferred to the private sector until they were fully developed. The outcomes of 
R&D might be postponed by the public research institutes, and firms might not accept 
incomplete or obsolete technology. Secondly, it took a period of time for the firms to 
commercialise technology, even when they could apply technology to production 
successfully. This normally delayed the time of product to market.
In the case of NPC Alliance, the technology development and the 
commercialisation of technology proceeded synchronously. The government project, 
Packaging STP, sponsored CCL for the R&D of packaging technology which could be 
applied to the development of a miniature computer. Meanwhile, the Teamate project, a 
public-private cooperative product-oriented research plan led by CCL, attempted to 
create the uniform NPC for the PC industry. Two projects were developing 
simultaneously, which cut down the time for development and avoided a long process
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of technology transfer and of product commercialisation by the firms themselves.
The effectiveness of coordination between the government project and ITRl-firms 
consortium were not only shown in terms of the short time span for development, but 
also resulted in promoting the rapport between research-oriented innovative activities 
and manufacturing-oriented product design. The linkage of pre-competitive research 
and practical competitive production provide a feasible way to integrate technological 
development, technology diffusion, and industrial application at the same time. 
However, it would not be realised if the research groups of both projects were not the 
duplicate team from ITRI. Under this circumstance, the R&D of key technology and the 
design of Teamate became more efficient and manageable by the control of the same 
researchers. Before, the work was divided into two segments, each with a different team 
-  the pre-competitive work of technological development by ITRI and the transitional 
work of industrial application by the private sector.
Moreover, the vertical collaboration brought the laboratory-based experience of 
technological development and the practical experience of production-oriented 
development together which has had a cross-fertilisation effect on product development. 
The integration of different technological specialities and images into a R&D team 
fertilised the facility in the process of product development. It also provided a channel 
to exchange ideas and promote mutual understanding between two different levels of 
technology development.
5. NPC ALLIANCE AS A NEW STATE-LNDUSTRIAL ARRANGEMENT
5.1. Government-Industry Cooperation
The Teamate project succeeded because it involved technologies directed to industrial 
concerns which stimulated the aggressive interest of the private sector. However, it 
could not be effective without the contribution of the public sector. Rather than leave 
the private sector to discover the competitive advantages of their own, ITRI, a public
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sector research institute, was the leading actor in the project. It identified the 
importance of NPC as a new generation PC product, and initiated a proposal for 
organising a public-private R&D consortium.
Mutual trust is seen as a core factor for the effective operation of a cooperative 
project. However, the source of mutual trust came from the objective third party. It was 
not generated between the firms themselves. Given that the project only succeeded at 
the stage of R&D, not at the stage of production and marketing, CCL/ITRI, which did 
not involve any market interest, is important. It was mainly because ITRI played not 
only the role of a technology supplier, a facility provider, but also a R&D project 
organiser. Powerful and neutral representatives from ITRI mediated conflicts between 
firms in relation to the direction of technological development and accelerated the 
process of agreement on basic technical standards.
TEEMA played more a secretarial role than that of a decisive leader. As 
mentioned before, TEEMA provided all the necessary logistic support to cover the area 
that CCL was unable to tackle. It was also in charge of the administrative coordination. 
The participation o f business associations in the public-private cooperative project has 
become a part o f  institutional arrangements in technological development. The 
increasing weight of the association in the case of HDTV development will be 
examined in the following chapter. However, TEEMA did not involve itself in the role 
of interest representation to negotiate with ITRI or the government, and this is not what 
would be expected of a liberal corporatist agreement.
The final goal of government projects is to foster the competitive strength of the 
private sector which can only be realised through the operation of firms. Firms are the 
main actors which compete in the international market because the government and 
ITRI were not the manufacturers of any product. Firms brought their resources and 
engineers into the Alliance which enabled the Teamate project to achieve economies of 
scale normally enjoyed by large enterprises. The results sharing by the participating
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firms were created by the public-private cooperation which they would never acquired 
by their own efforts. Technology has been deeply and widely diffused to the industrv 
through the Alliance.
The relationships between different actors in the NPC Alliance was displayed in 
Figure 5.2. An unprecedented combination of the efforts of the government and industry 
in order to create new products is disclosed. This new relationship between the 
government and industry can be characterised as an institutional strategic partnership. 
ISP not only has had a key improvement on employing government resources in a more 
efficient way, but also put public and private resources together in the same field. The 
product-oriented R&D consortium served as the dynamic for public-private cooperation. 
This has overcome the distance between the two sectors and led to convergence in 
technological development. The government policy instrument, STP, was able to apply 
its technological outcomes directly to industrial products. Individual firms saw the 
Alliance as a main source for gaining technology and as a risk-sharing shelter. In 
particular, the government has been the largest risk-share for the very heavy investment 
in fundamental technology.
ITRI represented a surrogate for government intervention in civil technology 
development. In Taiwan, public research institutes have been one of the most important 
policy measures to implement the goal of upgrading technology. In the eyes of industry, 
public research institutes are partners to provide solution to manufacturing obstacles 
and to provide technology to increase productivity.
ISP has had a considerable effect on technology development and diffusion. This 
is an innovative attempt to establish cooperation between public agencies and the 
industry in the process o f  high-tech innovation. In the concluding chapter, the essence 
of ISP and its comparison with the next case study will be treated comprehensively, 
showing how a strategic partnership has been brought into an institution.
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5.2. The Effects of the Teamate Project on International Competitiveness
The influence of NPC Alliance on international competitiveness in individual firms and 
in the industry as a whole varied, is shown in Table 5.6. The influence of NPC Alliance 
in terms of export performance was positive in the member firms and the industry in the 
short term; in the long term, it was very successful in the industry as a whole, but the 
performance of member firms was determined by their technological capability and 
financial capacity.
Table 5.6 The Impacts of NPC Alliance on International Competitiveness:
A summary
Individual Firm PC Industry
Short Term Success Success
Long Term Depends on financial & 
technological capability
Very Successful
The instantaneous increase of NPC exports by 2.5 times in the following year 
after the creation of Teamate exhilarated the government in an expectation that other 
public-private cooperative research projects would follow suit by modelling the NPC 
Alliance. The public-private cooperation has been justified in aspects of avoiding 
duplication of effort and reaping economies of scale, and has been encouraged by fast 
commercialisation of Teamate. In the 1990s, many STPs were required by the MOEA 
that the proposal should have the industrial participation design-in. This symbolised a 
changing face of government intervention in terms of industrial technology 
development.
The effectiveness of R&D cooperation was hampered by management difficulties. 
However, those difficulties did not seriously destroy the technological outcomes, which 
happened mainly at the marketing and the production stage rather than at the R&D 
stage. In the following cases caution should be focused on correcting the defeats of 
management in the process of development. However, any collusive agreement arising 
from the cooperation should be carefully regulated by the government to ensure a fair
187
and competitive market.
The time lag with major new PC products of leading international companies has 
been narrowed since 1980s. The lag was 25 months for 286 PC in the 1980 (C.N. Wang. 
1994:16). However. Taiwan's NPC was in the market only few months after Toshiba's 
in the 1990 because the collective efficiency of Teamate project shortened the gap to a 
substantial degree. The time gap of new PowerPC microprocessor between the USA’s 
and Taiwan’s manufacturers was only one day in June 1995. The PowerPC 
microprocessor was a new product from the alliance of IBM, Motorola and Apple, 
intended to challenge Intel in setting a new industrial standard in the second half of the 
1990s. ‘Taiwan had achieved the technological sophistication to be the first outside the 
USA to develop a range of products based on PowerPC’ (Mathews & Poon, 1995:43). 
The development of PowerPC-based technology was through a NPC-like consortium 
called ‘Taiwan PowerPC Alliance’ with 30 participating firms.
This new alliance was organised by CCL-TEEMA axis in November 1993. CCL 
was still the driving force for technological progress and collective negotiations with 
foreign enterprises (IBM and Motorola). This new alliance has avoided many mistakes 
made by the NPC Alliance. Particularly, the improvements on identifying firms for 
membership and assigning members to different working groups have had decisive 
effects. Members of Taiwan PowerPC Alliance with reasonable size and strength were 
selected from PC industry and related industry covering the up-, middle- and down­
stream industry. The divergence of firms' backgrounds enabled the development of 
PowerPC to a wide range from special chips to final products. This also avoided the 
direct competition of members in the same market segment. Firms joined different 
working groups according to their sophisticated field of technology speciality, so the 
different voices about the direction of development had been disregarded. The 
convergence of technology in each group enabled firms to uptake the technology 
transfer. Thus, firms were able to differentiate the product. This case demonstrated the 
integration of vertical cooperation and horizontal cooperation for the development of
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new technologies and products, unlike the NPC Alliance which concentrated mainly on 
horizontal cooperation.
5.3. Changing Pattern of Technology Diffusion
Successful innovation is associated with institutional-specific routines, it develops over 
time and through trial and error. Taiwan took a period of time to search for a feasible 
arrangement so as to strengthen industrial competitiveness and to deploy government 
resources efficiently.
In the 1980s, the main effort of government in the development of industrial 
technology was concentrated on a less effective institutional array. This institutional 
type isolated technology development from industrial adoption. The implementation of 
STPs was solely organised by the public research institutes without the participation of 
industry. However, the information asymmetry between the government, research 
institutes and the industry meant that the research outputs might not match the demand 
of the private sector. Moreover, it also took some time for technology transfer and 
adoption by the firms.
At the end of 1980s, the government attempted to bring the private sector into the 
process o f R&D, but the results were not as successful as expected. Two public-private 
cooperative research projects, the Software Engineering Environment Development for 
the computer industry and the Two-stroke Engine for the automobile industry, with the 
government subsiding the full cost of R&D activities did not produce a decisive effect 
on the industries. The main reason leading to inefficiency was the research-oriented 
nature o f projects which could not stimulate the interest of the private sector (J.C. Wang, 
1991). The case of software development, organised by III with 32 participating firms, 
aimed to establish technical standards of which only a small part of the technological 
results can be transferred to firms. The case of engine development, organised by ITRI
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with 5 local participating firms59, produced mostly fundamental knowledge which could 
hardly be applicable in manufacturing immediately. Both projects, which were 
originally designed to run for three or four years, were terminated after one year of 
implementation because the government was dissatisfied with the results.
Since 1990, two main tendencies have influenced the pattern of STPs, inspired 
from the development experience of NPC Alliance. One is the incorporation of the 
private sector into the R&D activities instead of firms’ waiting for transferable 
technology. Another is the field with which firms participated, directly connecting to 
industrial concerns, which means that the nature of collaboration is product-oriented 
rather than basic research-oriented.
Table 5.7 NPC-related News During the NPC Alliance
D ate N e w sp a p e r T itle
14/02/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
Toshiba’s NPC, first to market
28/02/90 Industry and 
Commerce Dailv News
CCL makes suggestions to develop NPC in a form o f R&D consortium.
02/06/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
Technology for NPC maturing The orders for laptop PC declining
02/06/90 Economic Daily News 80386 SX NPC - the best 'Sharp W eapon’ in PC markets this year
04/06/90 Economic Daily News NPC and laptop PC become very popular in world’s PC market. But it is 
difficult for Taiwanese PC industry to compete with Japanese
07/06/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
In tel’s 386 SX NPC comes out. 15 companies are willing to join the 
alliance to develop NPC.
12/07/90 Economic Daily News 42  firms join NPC Alliance
03/08/90 Economic Daily News The prelude o f  NPC Alliance gets intensive. American and Japanese PC 
companies. Intel which intends to design specific IC, and Hitachi which 
intends to produce specific LCD in Taiwan
28/08/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
NPC Joint Development Committee is established, which contains four 
divisions
30/08/90 Economic Daily News NPC Alliance’s uniform model named as ‘TEAMATE’
05/10/90 Economic Daily News NPC uniform model will show on 09/10/90.
06/10/90 Economic Daily News 46 companies gather to raise consciousness
08/10/90 Economic Daily News Disagreements on the price o f  NPC
10/10/90 Economic Daily News The sample o f  NPC is presented to the public.
31/10/90 Economic Daily News N PC ‘Made In Taiwan’, developed by 46 allied companies, comes out.
02/11/90 Taiwan Hsinsheng 
Daily News
NPC comes out and will be produced next year
02/11/90 United Daily News Uniform NPC . A generator o f  second spring for information industry
02/11/90 Taiwan Daily News T he success o f  NPC R&D injects a strong ‘cardiotonic’ into IT industry.
02/11/90 Liberty Daily News Prototype Teamate comes out.
w There were ten automobile manufacturing firm* in Taiwan, but only five firms joined the cooperative research project 
The other five firms with a high percentage o f foreign shores relied on the supply o f technology from the foreign parent 
companies which would be more advanced than Taiwan's.
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04/10/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
Global NPC market will reach 13 billion US dollars There will be more 
than one hundred firms hoping to share the pie
08/11/90 Economic Daily News 47 companies reach agreements on the sales price
12/11/90 Economic Daily News NPC development problems key components dominated by Japan
17/11/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
US COMDEX’S Hot topic NPC. US, Japan and Taiwan are potential 
competitors.
20/11/90 Economic Daily News Teamate. unforgettable; Taiwan NPC. famous
22/11/90 Economic Daily News In order to stabilise the supply o f NPC key components, ITRI plans to 
produce by their own
26/11/90 Economic Daily News Disagreements on collective procurement among companies, which threat 
the NPC allied development plan
26/11/90 PC Week ‘30million NT dollars spent on only 100 NPC sets’ done by ITRI- criticised 
by NPC Alliance members
06/12/90 Economic Daily News Two different ways for NPC Alliance: Allied development— focusing on 
low price market, Development by individual—nearly 10 companies involve 
on higher level market
14/12/90 Economic Daily News NPC a threat to desktop PC and terminator o f  laptop PC
20/12/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
NPC Alliance decides to  show 1200 NPC sets in CEBIT, Hannover 
Computer Show.
25/12/90 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
IBM’s new-bom NPC will compete with portable PC which will be in the 
market in Feb 1991
28/12/90 Economic Daily News X window terminal A new alliance after NPC
01/01/91 Economic Daily News Many break-ups inside NPC Alliance
04/01/91 Computer World A broken NPC Alliance? Self-regulation o f firms will be the only force to 
effective development
05/01/91 Economic Daily News The number o f  company o f producing NPC has increased sharply 
Predicted that there will be a fierce competition
01/02/91 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
Strategic alliance becomes the most popular weapon for product 
development The second generation NPC attracts nearly 100 companies
27/02/91 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
1. NPC Alliance steps into the stage: large firms decide to manufacture by 
themselves, small firms by OEM All aim at CEBIT.
2. Inevitable Price War: small firms will adopt low-price competition due to 
the lack of brand name and productivity.
3 35 companies are willing to co-develop the second generation NPC
05/03/91 Economic Daily News NPC-makers search for ‘style’ because design and standard are alike
23/03/91 Economic Daily News Taiwan NPC becomes ‘Hot Topic’ in Hannover Computer Show. The 
order of NPC exceeds twice of the productive goal
05/04/91 Economic Daily News ‘Bloody-Price War’ between Taiwanese NPC companies at CEBIT 
Computer Show leads to  the NPC price down by 20 percent
12/04/91 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
The second generation o f  NPC Alliance becomes stronger and the joining 
companies increase to 60.
25/04/91 Economic Daily News Philips decides to produce NPC in Taiwan
25/04/91 Industry and 
Commerce Daily News
The second generation o f  NPC Alliance divides into:
1. Ultra-thin style-led by ITRICCL,
2 Portable sty le- designed by the companies themselves 386SX becomes 
the key model o f  the second generation o f NPC Alliance.
28/04/91 Economic Daily News The capacity o f  producing NPC is widely recognised by foreign companies
* List of 46 participating firms:
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C H A P T E R S I X
C A S E  S T U D Y : H I G H -D E F IN IT IO N  T E L E V IS IO N  C O N S O R T I A
The politics of high definition television provides a window into the 
world of business-government relations in a new international economic 
environment of intensive competition among the advanced industrial 
nations (Hart, 1994:213). The standards are usually decided on political 
rather than technical or logical reasons, a task that manufacturers of 
sets should not have to cope with, and HDTV is no exception (DataQuest, 
1992:6).
The development of high-definition television (HDTV) has been the focus of the TV 
industry in advanced countries since the middle of 1980s. Taiwan too, with its 
considerable strength in electronics, has realised the significance of HDTV in the light 
of market niches at the turn of century as a means of rescuing its declining consumer 
electronics industry. While the progress of the three main economies, namely, Europe, 
Japan, and the USA, is acknowledged, the efforts of the Taiwan government to probe 
the development of HDTV have received little attention.
It is still too early to predict that Taiwan will become a competitor in the field of 
HDTV, but its efforts, both in the public and private sectors, to establish its 
technological capability in this field deserve more recognition for two reasons. First, 
Taiwan has seldom been deemed an active actor in the frontline of technology 
development attempting to take part in the technology war o f HDTV. The difficulties of 
development in such an area lie not only in the technology itself, but also, since it is a 
new field, in the absence of internationally agreed standards. In these circumstances, 
how Taiwan obtained a foot hold in the development of HDTV is worth exploring. 
Second, the framework for developing HDTV which required more than just an 
industrial policy, was constituted from many policy fields and the interaction of many 
actors. By its institutional arrangement in technology development, Taiwan has revealed 
that a small nation with an SME-based economy can increase its technological
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capability even though its competitive advantage was relatively low in the beginning.
1. HDTV AS A FUTURE INDUSTRY
1.1. A Definition of HDTV
The development of HDTV is a revolution in the history of television. HDTV will 
improve the audio and video performance of TV, as well as the transmission of 
broadcasting. The merits of HDTV are summarised in Table 6.1. This shows that the 
product has a significant improving effect on living standards. The replacement of 
traditional TV by HDTV is a trend that can not be doubted, but the time for the coming 
of the HDTV era is unpredictable and has been delayed by the war between different 
systems. Two factors have fatally handicapped a worldwide standard: first, there is a lot 
of national pride in the standard adopted in a particular country or region; second, the 
acceptance of a foreign standard might lead to the huge market being dominated by 
rivals.
Table 6.1 A Comparison of HDTV and Traditional TV
H D T V T r a d i t i o n a l  T V
H o r iz o n ta l  
L in e  S o lu tio n
High --
more than 1000 scanner
Low -- 525 scanner (NTSC)* 
625 scanner (PAL & SECAM)*
S o u n d  S ig n a l Digital-quality stereo sound & 
multiple tracks
Analogue stereo (FM)
P ic tu r e  Q u a lity Excellent, the quality o f  movie Bad colour quality, flickers, 
interline flickers, ghost shadow, 
Interference between signals
A s p e c t  R a tio 16:9 4:3
M o n ito r Multi-functions TV screen
C o m p a t ib i l i ty  W ith  
P ro g ra m m e /M o v ie
Compatible Incompatible
I n d u s t r i a l  A p p lic a tio n Wide (professional, military, 
medical and industrial)
Limited
M a r k e t  S ca le New market, high demand in 
the future
Saturated market
* There were three TV systems that were incompatible to  each other in the sense that the programme 
produced in one system could not be directly broadcasted by the other two. Now, PAL and SEC AM 
become compatible USA-led NTSC (National Television Standard Committee) system covers 36 
countries including North &  South America, Japan, Korea, & Taiwan Germany-led PAL (Phase 
Alternation by Line) system covers 63 countries including West Europe, UK, China, and ex-European 
colonies France-led SECAM (Sequential Colour and Memory) system covers 42 countries including 
France, Russia, East Europe, & some African countries
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However, the race between HDTV systems came to an end by the end of 1993. 
The USA’s fully digital system overtook the other systems and became accepted 
worldwide. At the end of 1996, a technical report on the details of HDTV was published 
by Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This is likely to be adopted as the 
standard for the rest of world. Future development of TV will then, hopefully, integrate 
into the same system.
1.2. HDTV as a New Wave of Digitalised Consumer Products
The development of HDTV initially focused on the entertainment industry but it 
provides great opportunities for other industries in only a few years with the ‘go digital’ 
development. The video products industry, which has not been digitised, is the last 
virgin land among the consumer electronics industries. The creation of digitised visual 
products also led to the discovery of new markets, since the TV set and video recorder 
are necessary home entertainment equipment for every family, the ‘jewels in the crown’ 
for consumer electronics manufacturers.
The growing convergence of entertainment TV and digital electronics has eroded 
the boundaries between electrically-based industries. Chart 6.2.A demonstrates the 
application of HDTV technology to other industries. Following the standardisation of 
the world HDTV system, the hardware and software markets in the related consumer 
end products have also benefited. Chart 6.2.B shows the interdependence of stand­
alone (camcorder & digital camera), software-dependent (LCD player & VCR), 
broadcast-dependent (TV & Radio), and network-dependent (Cellular Phone & E-mail) 
products, all these products will take advantage of the digital technology derived from 
the development of HDTV (Cawson, 1994:145-8). Accordingly, the development of
HDTV can be justified as of strategic importance in three senses:
(1) it was regarded as the most important element in the new generation o f  consumer electronics 
products, and hence an important part o f  the strategic thinking o f any firm in this area. (2) its 
technology was agreed to be generic and was likely to  have an impact in many other domains of 
computing and communications, and, most controversially, (3) it was argued that the nature o f the 
technology is such that market outcomes are sensitive to  strategic behaviour o f  firms and 
governments. (Dai, Cawson & Holmes, 1996:150)
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Chart 6.2 The Industrial Application and Linkage of HDTV Technology 
A. Classification by Industry Source: CEPD. 1991 401
B. Classification by Consumer End Products 
------------ Audio ------
Source: ITRICCL, 1994:2.
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However, the strategic significance of HDTV in terms of market size is much 
more difficult to prove. The forecasts of HDTV market size change from region to 
region, from institution to institution, from time to time, and with different concerns, 
but all of them share the same optimistic view that the market will grow rapidly6'1. None 
of the forecasts has a scenario for failure. Nonetheless, HDTV was not an instant 
success because of the delay in establishing a world standard. ‘Thus, some scepticism 
about the timing, if not the size, of HDTV’s eventual market success seems 
warranted.... The likely effect of HDTV on other electronics markets seems clearer60 1’.
Moreover, the strategic significance of HDTV for the competitiveness of the 
electronics industry varies from country to country. It might not noticeably change the 
competitiveness of US industry as a whole in HDTV market terms, but it would 
seriously affect Taiwan’s competitiveness in the electronics industry because of the 
economic centrality of this and related industries to exports and to the economy as a 
whole.
‘Competition for the future is competition for opportunity share rather than 
market share (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994:31)62’. The HDTV development reveals 
competition for the future given that HDTV market is still a ‘potential’ instead of an 
existing market. In this sense, the countries in the race for HDTV development intended 
to maximise the share of future opportunities which a nation could potentially access.
60 Some examples arc: the USA Darby report -  annual sales of 18.6 million units and $16.2 billion by the year 2008; 
the USA Electronic Industries Association -- 13.1 million units by 2003, the American Electronics Association -  11 
million units and $10.9 billion by 2010 (above data from Congressional Budget Office. 1989: 5-8); Japanese Forecast 
Volume — 4 million units sales in Japan by year 2000; USA ACATS — 6.2 million sets in the USA by 2000. 
DataQuest -- I million sets in the USA bv 2000; DataQuest -- 45 thousand sets in Europe by 2000 (above data from 
DataQucst. 1992:7-17); and ADL -  US$50 billion by 1995 (ADL. 1989:4).
“  This quotation is from USA Congressional Budget OfTice's summary (vi) which might have a negative influence on 
the Bush Administration's decision to turn down the idea to subsidise the HDTV industry. It also suggested that HDTV 
is unlikely to play a pivotal role in the competitiveness and technology development of the electronics sector as a w hole. 
However, it can be justified by reasons of employment, national prestige and scientific advancement, other than 
competitiveness.
61 The meaning of market share in markets that are not currently existing, can not explain what a company is competing 
for. Hamel & Prahalad (1994:31) asked the question: ‘how can one maximise market share in an industry where the
product or service concept is still underdefined, where customer segments have yet to solidify, and customer 
preferences are still poorly understood?' They identified the highlight as the bid to capture a share of future 
opportunities -  ‘how to attract and strengthen the skills that form the competencies that provide a gateway to future 
opportunities'.
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The strategy for competition in a future industry, or ‘to gain a disproportionate share of 
future opportunities’, is to possess the requisite competencies presented as ‘the patient 
and persistent accumulation of intellectual capital’ (ibid.).
The core requisite competency in HDTV development is the technology for the 
Motion Picture Expert Group (MPEG). The importance of the MPEG lies not only in 
the fact that it is the core technology tor digital-visual products, but also in the wide 
convergence covering the communication, computer and broadcasting industries 
(HDTV Newsletter, Oct. 1995:27). The US standard for the HDTV by FCC has been 
postponed several times (from 1994-96)6\  The industry, in particular, the television 
industry, finally gave up its insistence on using interlaced scan in Nov. 1996, instead, it 
was agreed that the digital-visual transmission would adopt interlaced scan or 
progressive scan64. The reason might be that there has been a shift of interest from 
HDTV to emerging phase-in visual products which are also new products with 
immediate viable profits. HDTV is seen, therefore, as far more than a short term 
commercial reality, but a long term digital dream. Even though HDTV is unlikely to be 
a global commercial success in this century, the application of MPEG in the 1990s has 
created a substantial market for visual products. For a country with investment in the 
development of MPEG, it means hopefully that competencies have been built up and 
the competitiveness of products derived from the application of MPEG has been 
strengthened. Table 6.3 lists some MPEG-applied products which have become 
available in the 1990s, and their current development. *
43 The standardisation of HDTV took FCC ten years, starting from the advanced TV standard in 1987 and concluding 
with a digital TV standard on 03/04/97. A digital TV standard was expected to be reached in 1994 (Grand Alliance 
formed in the middle of 1993), but three interest-involved industries (consumer electronics, computer, & 
communication) disagreed about the standard in terms of scanning (MPEG accepted by all walks) (HDTV Newsletter. 
Jun. 1997:1-2).
** This decision led to a competition in the digital visual products between the consumer electronics industry and 
computer industry because that computer industry can use the computer technology of progressive scan in the 
production of visual products (HDTV Newsletter, Jan. 1997:10).
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Table 6.3 The Commercialisation of Digital Visual Products
P ro d u c t
T ech n o lo g ica l 
A p p lic a tio n  a n d  P ro d u c t  
C h a ra c te r
C u r r e n t  S itu a tio n
V C D
(Video CD)
MPEG-I (which is a less 
sophisticated technology than 
M EPG-II)
VCD is a lower cost product 
than LD, suitable for Karaoke, 
but not for film because o f  the 
low capacity o f CD (shorter 
time playing)
A replacement o f VCR in major developing countries where 
the previous VCR market was underdeveloped In particular, 
China & Southeast Asia have an increasing demand which 
overtook VCR. VCD, a relatively high-tech product, has 
replaced VCR
D B S
(Direct
Broadcasting
Satellite)
MPEG-11
Multi-channel broadcasting, 
transmission by direct satellite 
(wide signal coverage) & 
excellent picture quality. A 
major threat to Cable TV (high 
cost on  the establishment o f  
transmission wire).
American Electronics 
A ssociation-'The most 
successful consumer o f  
electronics product in history’ 
(DBS reached 1 million users 
in one year compared with 
C olour TV (in 8 yrs), VCR (4) 
& CD (3)
USA— was the first to use DBS (1994 by DirecTV). There 
are 6 companies (DirecTV, USSB, Primestar, EchoStar, 
Alphastar, MCI/News) in this business which led to a price 
war (the price dropped from US$700 to 200). About 50% of 
DBS users transferred from Cable TV. USA subscribers 
reached 4 22 million by 1996.
EU-- DBS service was started in Apr. 1996 by Canal Satellite 
Numérique The European DVB-S (Digital Video 
Broadcasting) standard, widely adopted by European and 
Asian countries, which might become the standard with the 
largest number o f participating countries.
Japan’s— NHK BS (Broadcasting Satellite, not digital DBS) 
emerged in 1984 and a quarter (10 million) o f Japanese 
families are BS subscribers. Perfect TV (DBS) commenced in 
Oct. 1996, and DirecTV Japan and SkyB in 1997.
W T V
(W ide-Screen
Television)
MPEG-I/MEPG-II 
W TV although not defined as 
HDTV was marketed because 
it is cheaper than HDTV. It 
transformed 4:3 picture to 
16:9 one to cope with laser 
disc and new programmes The 
audio/video quality is much 
better than traditional TV.
The manufacturing o f WTV does not need extra cost to 
improve production equipment which can be done on the 
standard TV assembly line. In 1996 alone, the sale o f WTV 
increased in Japan (3.5 million sets-very close to traditional 
TV sales) and Europe (0.5 million sets) due to the 
broadcasting o f 16:9 programmes There was no WTV 
market in the USA because there was no match o f TV 
programme, but large screen TV emerged (more than 30” 
and projection TV) as new product The share of WTV in 
TV market will reach 22.3% in 2000 from 4.5% in 1996, 
according to the forecast o f  Electronics Industry Association, 
Japan, because o f  the development o f digital technology and 
more 16:9 TV programmes
S T B
(Digital Set­
up  Box)
MEPG-11
STB is used as the home 
receiver equipment to connect 
with video, audio, or data 
services which can transform 
incoming signals (through 
cable, satellite, or terrestrial 
broadcasting) to  display on TV 
or monitor. STP for using on 
digital DBS also known as 
1RD (Integrated Receiver 
Decoder), STP will play an 
important role in the visual 
industry, at least until the TV 
market has been fully replaced 
by all-digital-design-in TV.
The wide application o f  STB created a huge market It can be 
used in many ways, such as cable TV decoder, DBS receiver, 
or emerging interactive TV tuner, and it also enables 
traditional TV with an additional STB to  show digitised 
programmes -  the cheapest way to receive digital signals 
(but the quality is not as good as WTV or HDTV). This type 
o f  STB has the largest business opportunity until traditional 
TV becomes obsolete, given that most TV sets in the world 
are still in analog format
The semiconductor industry has benefited from the high 
demand for chips and chip-sets by STB production. 
According to DataQuest, STB brought about US$1.1 billion 
market to  the semiconductor industry, and this number will 
rise to  3 billion. The same source suggested that the market 
will increase from 5 million sets in 1996 to 1.15 billion sets in 
2000 in DBS-STB alone
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D V D  
(Digital 
Video Disk o r  
Digital 
V ersatilité 
Disk)
MPEG-II
DVD, with better audio & 
video quality, will become the 
future VCR The data storage 
o f  DVD (4 7GB) is 7 5 times 
that o f  CD (650MB) in the 
same size disc (120mm 
diameter). DVD has distinctive 
characteristics, such as a 
rewritable (if the pirate copy 
can be regulated), world 
standard (valid for different 
TV systems-NTSC, PAL & 
SECAM, and adjustable for 
4:3 & 16:9 TV), computer 
compatibility (DVD-ROM will 
replace CD-ROM), multi­
language function (choices o f  
8 languages and 32 different 
characters), multi-viewing 
function (up to  9 angles from 
which to  watch the 
programme), and flexibility in 
story-line (choices of 
preferring ending or content, if 
pre-recorded when produced).
The products o f  DVD divided into Movie DVD-ROM 
(player, consumer electronics), M ovie DVD-RAM (player & 
recorder, consumer electronics), DVD-ROM (player, 
computer accessory), DVD-RAM (player & recorder, 
computer accessory) Movie DVD-ROM was marketed in 
1996, and the rest will be on the market before 2000 The 
following discussion focuses on M ovie DVD (thereafter 
DVD) only
DVD was advanced by Sonv/Philips (called MMCD or 
HDCD) at the end o f 1994, but Toshiba/Time Warner Group 
(with 7 joiners, called SD-Digital Video Disc) proposed a 
different format at the beginning o f  1995. Two groups 
reached an agreement on a standard format (DVD) to  avoid 
another format war (like VHS vs Beta) in the end o f  1995. 
The forecasts o f  DVD player sale are various depending on 
the price, but all believe DVD will eventually expel VCR out 
o f market
The titles (software) o f  DVD will not be released for mass 
production until two facts are agreed between title suppliers 
and player producers. One is the standardisation o f the 
anticopy regulations (SFF-8090) in the early 1997. The 
other, far more complicated, is the de-intemationalisation o f 
the DVD standard Nowadays, video cassettes have been 
released at different times, to different regions, and by 
different languages that would maximise the profits o f  film 
companies In particular, the world standard and multi­
language function which will lead to  the integration o f  the 
three systems into one and the easy access by any nation or 
region. An agreement between software suppliers and player 
producers reached that players will be produced in 
accordance to 5-7 regional standard for software supplier to 
control film distribution.
Others
MPEG-11 Card will be widely utilised at the multi-media equipment. 
ITV (Interactive TV) might be developed at the turn o f next century
1.3. The Rise and Fall of the TV Industry in Taiwan
The consumer electronics industry was the first established of the electronic-related 
industries in Taiwan in the 1950s65. It was one of the leading export sectors in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The TV set was the champion product for the consumer electronics industry 
in which black & white TV was the product with the highest productivity before 1976. 
Colour TV took over in 1977-1989 except in 1984 when it was the radio cassette & 
Walkman (CEPD, 1991:317). The production value of colour TV increased rapidly at an 
average annual growth rate of 14.7% from the middle 1970s reaching its peak in 1987 
(Figure 6.4).
45 It is difficult to give a precise definition o f the consumer electronics industry because it overlaps with the markets o f 
telecommunication, information system s, office products, and electronic toys. Besides, the manufacturing activities o f 
major consumer electronics companies are involved in most o f  these sectors The use o f consum er electronics products 
here refers to traditional consumer electronics o f the home and personal application.
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Figure 6.4 The Production Output of Taiwan's TV7 Industry
28.480
NTSmiliion
Source: CEPD, 1991:316.
Year -Colour TV - Black & White TV
However, the economic importance of the consumer electronics industry and TV 
products has decreased dramatically since the late 1980s. The share of the consumer 
electronics industry in the whole electrics-related industry fell from 49.5% in 1978 to 
18.5% in 1989 (CEPD, 1991:315). The output of colour TVs dropped by half in only 
three years (1987-90). All these have been caused by the rising productivity of the PC 
industry. The compatibility of the consumer electronics industry with the PC industry in 
terms of manufacturing assembly, has allowed many consumer electronics companies to 
transfer their production lines into the relatively high-value-added PC-related industry. 
Besides, outward investment from Taiwan’s consumer electronics industry to other 
countries has had a serious impact on the performance of this sector. In addition, the 
competitiveness of Taiwan’s TV exports to the USA has been seriously affected by a 
14.2% anti-dumping tax since 1972 which followed an accusation by Zenith (HDTV 
Newsletter, Aug. 1994:12-3).
The fast rise of the PC sector squeezed the space of the consumer electronics 
sector and changed the industrial structure (Interview No. 17). The rise of one sector at 
the expense of the deindustrialisation of the other has given the government serious 
concern about how to deal with the accelerating withdrawal of a past national champion
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export product. Thus, the government had to consider whether to tolerate the decline of 
or to revitalise this sector by effective measures. By transferring traditional consumer 
electronics products to a more high value-added products provided a promising solution, 
as an IDB technocrat suggested (Interview No. 13). The potential market which might be 
created by HDTV in the late 1990s is seen as a possible means of regaining the glory of 
Taiwan’s consumer electronics industry in the eyes of policy-makers in the end of 
1980s.
A state-industrial arrangement in which public resources, as well as private 
resources have been mobilised into the development of HDTV technology and products 
derived from the process of technology development, has been put into action to revive 
the withering consumer electronics industry.
2. ¡INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO ANALYSIS
The international development of HDTV system among the world economic triad 
presented different pictures of government-industry relationships, and revealed a serious 
race to take the lead in the standards of HDTV system. From Table 6.5, the evolution of 
world competition in HDTV systems can be observed. Japan was the first to develop a 
feasible MUSE/HiVision based on analog technology, hoping to become the 
international standard. The European countries strongly opposed the Japanese HiVision 
as an international standard, and decided to go for its own approach fearing commercial 
losses and cultural invasion'*’. While European and Japanese version were of mainly 
analogue transmission, the USA electronics industry pushed for a fully digital HDTV 
approach motivated by a chance to re-enter world electronics markets if their system 
became the international standard.
“  At a time when USA delegation for 1986 CCIR meeting was supporting the NHK proposal. EC feared the 
acceptance of HiVision would be same as the concession to the combination of ‘Japan, Inc. ’ in terms of market share in 
the consumer electronics industry and of 'Hollywood1 in terms of inviting penetration o f non-European films and 
programmes (Hart, 1994:215). In particular, Japan's Walkman and cordless telephone were examples of products which 
changed people's lifestyles and captured a large market share Will the HDTV follow suit? European manufacturers 
belatedly woke up to this danger and began to develop their own alternative HD-MAC after 1986 CCIR meeting 
(Financial Times. 20/03/90 & 03/12/90).
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Table 6.5 The Chronology of International HDTV Development
Date Main Events
1968 Japan- NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai) initiated HDTV R&D
1970 Japan- NHK started the R&D of HDTV & wide screen monitor
1974 International Radio Consultative Committee/ International Telecommunications Union
(CCIR/ITU) established a commission to research a possible HDTV standard under the 
request o f 1972 NHK proposal_________________________________________________
1978 UK- BBC advanced 1501-line standard
1979 Japan- NHK’s first test transmission
1980 Japan- the public unveiling o f  HDTV broadcasting by NHK
1981 USA- CBS started HDTV R&D
1982, Jun. Audio standards were decided by CCIR
1982, Nov. USA- FCC permitted direct Broadcast Satellite (D B S) application
1983, Jan . USA- RCA unveiled MAC system for DBS
1983, M ay USA- Advanced Television System Committee (A TSC) was set up
1984, Jan. Japan- adopted Multiple Sub-Nyquist Encoding (M U SE) as HDTV standard
1985, Feb. Japan- first programme o f  experimental broadcasting of HDTV in the world
1986, M ay Japan- proposed MUSE as international standard to  CCIR, but EC rejected in an 
international meeting in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia.
1986, O ct. EC- Eureka 95
1987 USA- FCC set up an industry-run advisory committee, which began evaluating 23 rival 
systems
1987, Jun. Japan- HiVision promotion committee created
1988, Jun. USA- the establishment o f  Advanced Television Testing Center (ATTC), a non-profit 
corporation for HDTV testing
1988, Dec. USA- Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) planned a $30 million 
R&D project to HD displayer and displayer processors
1989, M ar. USA- Congress proposed ‘HDTV Competitiveness Act of 1989’
Japan- 18 enterprises planned to invest $18  million to  develop large size HD monitor 
S Korea- government subsidised 400 billion Korea dollars to HDTV consortium
1989, Jun. Japan- MITI proceeded the production o f HDTV programme
USA- American Electronic Association (AEA) proposed a commercial plan to 
Congress and asked an assistance o f  SI.35 billion. Government objected 
______ DARPA’s subsidy to  5 companies__________________________________
1989, O ct. EC- exhibited HD-MAC system
1990, Feb. Taiwan- evaluated on the feasibility o f HDTV development
1990, Jun. USA- one (Digi Cipher) o f  5 R&D Teams adopted digital system
1990, Jul. S. Korea- 5-year plan for HDTV R&D
1990, O ct. S Korea- Samsung & Goldstar exhibited MUSE system
Japan- MUSE system for home application marketed
EC- vision 1250 to promote the programme production in MAC standard
1991, Feb. Taiwan- plan for the R&D o f  HDTV technology
USA- ATTC tested 5 HDTV system, NHK’s withdrew from FCC competition
1991, Jul. S Korea- gave up analog MUSE shifted to digital HDTV 
Taiwan- ITR1 commenced “5-year HDTV STP’
1991 EC- failed to persuade satellite broadcasters to use an  early version of Europe’s HDTV, 
despite offering a subsidy
1991, Nov. Japan- NHK started to broadcast daily 8 hours o f  M USE programmes
1992, Nov. EC- ministers failed to agree on the further subsidies
1993, Jan. China- listed HDTV technology among ten key technologies
1993, Feb. USA- the result o f  FCC test came out, ‘digital’ is th e  direction, but ‘no superior system 
which led to the merge of four systems*
1993, M ay . USA- the birth o f  Grand Alliance 
EC- totally abandoned HD-MAC plan
1993, Jul. EC- subsidised to the production o f 16:9 programme
202
1993 , Aug. C h in a - th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  R a in b o w  (tR tl) E le c tro n ic s  C o  to  e n g a g e  o n  th e  R & D  and 
p ro d u c tio n  o f  H D T V
1993 , SeD. E C - D V B  P lan  fo u n d ed
1993 , Oct. T a iw a n - ex h ib ited  H D T V -re la te d  p ro d u c ts  bv H D T V  c o n so n ia -c o m p le x e s
1995-96 U S A -d ig ita l T V  s ta n d a rd  h ad  b e e n  p o s tp o n e d  sev era l tim es
1997 , Apr. U S A -th e  s ta n d a rd  fo r d ig ita l T V ' &  tim e tab le  fo r  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  o f  d ig i ta l  T V
2 .1 .  G r a n d  A l l i a n c e  in  th e  U S A
State policy for the development of HDTV in the USA was mainly driven by a 
government authority -  FCC, which is responsible for setting broadcasting standards. 
Two efforts calling for privileged policies towards the industrial sector, one by DARPA 
and one by AEA, were blocked by the Bush Administration in 1988-1990. DARPA 
announced a new US$30 million grant for the development of HD displays and display 
processors in order to push for greater government leadership in promoting civilian 
technology in 1988, but the administration did not share the enthusiasm of DARPA and 
Congress in 199067. The end result was that only US$20 million out of DARPA’s 
discretionary fund was awarded in 1988-90, and the head of DARPA, an important 
supporter of HDTV policy in the Department of Defence was removed. The efforts of 
the AEA and allied members of Congress in 1988-90 linking the issue o f HDTV to 
broader industrial policy concerns to get government funding of US$1.35 billion 
(US$350 million direct subsidies and US$1 billion loan guarantees) were also 
unsuccessful.
The USA government policy towards the development of HDTV was defined by 
the FCC as the policy ‘to reconcile the interests of consumers and broadcasters with 
those of the electronics industry’ (Hart, 1994:225). On the one hand, it protected the 
interests of traditional TV owners (in the phase-out period decision) and local 
broadcasters (in the simulcasting decision that a HDTV standard would be compatible 
with the current 6 MHz channelisation plan); on the other hand, it protected the
47 The 1988*90 government subsidy (from DARPA) allocated to the development of HDTV in the private sector has 
been cited as evidence of American style corporatism in that this is a bureaucratic decision to assist civilian technology 
development (Hanson et a l . 1992). However, this decision was backed by the director of DARPA, not the central 
administration. In fact, this particular type of HDTV policy was a lower priority item in the national agenda, and the 
highest levels desired to avoid ‘endorsing any form of industrial policy for any purpose whatsoever' (Hart, 1994:218).
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interests of the USA electronics industry in favour of a digital system (ibid.).
Although direct government subsidies on the development of HDTV were limited 
before the USA system dominated the world standard, the contribution of the political 
rejection of the NHK. narrow MUSE system on the ‘free competition’ in the process of 
testing existing systems by FCC was far more substantial than any financial assistance. 
The Japanese system was forced to leave the test when FCC announced its preference 
for a digital system at a time that MUSE was still the most practically sophisticated one 
in the world. The result o f  the test was that there was ‘no superior system’ among the 
four tested systems68. In order to shorten the time for development and save the cost of 
re-testing after allowing the teams to perfect their systems, a merger between the four 
systems formed the Grand Alliance, made up of 25 participants, none of whom were 
Japanese. Soon after the digital system appeared likely to become the world standard, in 
1994, the Clinton Administration provided a subsidy of about US$700 million for an 
essential HDTV component field (flat panel displays) where Japanese technology and 
manufacturing led the world. This revealed that the USA government and industry 
shared the fear of losing market in a strategic part of HDTV.
The success of the USA digital HDTV system can be attributed to two main 
factors. First the factor that manufacturing firms are prepared to fund the technology 
and system which lacks compatibility with Japanese and European plans for technical 
standards in transmission and reception. This is adventuristic bearing in mind the 1988 
requirement of FCC that future HDTV should not outdate current TV receivers. The 
breakthrough in compressing the two-bandwidth signal into one bandwidth by 
converting it into a digital signal by General Instruments has denoted the coming era of 
digital HDTV. Second, the co-determination of ‘digitisation’ by FCC and the industry 
suggests a protectionist cooperation to defend the interests of the USA electronics
M The four systems are developed by three technological teams: (I) Digital Spectrum Compatible by Zenith, AT&T & 
Scientific Atlantic, (2) Digicipher & MIT system by General Instrument & the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT); (3) Advanced Digital TV by Philips, Thomson, David SamoAT Research Center, Compression Labs & NBC; (4) 
CC-Digicipher by Gl & MIT.
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industry. The digital system is different from the European MAC or Japanese MUSE 
and is unique to US industries where they may have a lead in components and 
technology development.
In 1997 the FCC digital TV standard (through terrestrial transmission) was 
published. However, it is unlikely to become a world standard in the short term because 
the European DVB standard (through satellite transmission) has been established and 
accepted by many countries, and Japan also has its own standard (through satellite 
transmission).
2.2. Japan's Analog HiVision
Japan was the first country to broadcast HDTV and the first to have HDTV sets in the 
shops based on analog MUSE/HiVision. However, it has been overtaken by the USA 
digital system and that has led to much embarrassment for the government, NHK and 
the companies who supported the MUSE standard. It is politically unthinkable at 
present for the Japanese to shift their standard to an all-digital one immediately since 
they have invested at least ¥60 billion in the infrastructure and broadcasting costs by 
1992. Japan will keep on developing MUSE for the domestic market until next century 
when MUSE will be nearing the end o f  its life-cycle (DataQuest, 1992:4).
Japan lost its battle in the standard war to the USA which means it lost its chance 
to monopolise the world market with its MUSE standard. This does not necessarily 
mean that Japan has been forced out of HDTV markets. The USA has set the standard 
which is not a guarantee that US companies will win in manufacturing low-cost digital 
TV sets, VCRs, and receivers (Valigra, 1994:78). Japanese companies have already set 
up many laboratories in the USA to keep abreast of USA standards. In fact, many of the 
key components and internal designs of HDTV receivers and studio equipment are 
already in digital formats except for transmission in Japan's HiVision.
Two major agencies at the ministerial level governed the government policy for
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HDTV in Japan, namely, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) & M1T1. 
MPT, the regulatory body over NHK (semi-public broadcaster and developer of MUSE) 
and other broadcast and communication systems, which responded to viewer needs and 
saw itself as the guardian of the strategies of the manufacturers of consumer electronics 
equipment. Even in the early 1990s although the breakthrough of digit HDTV 
technology was clear, MPT and NHK were still the main force behind the continuing 
support for HiVision standard. MITI, viewed itself as a servant to the Japanese 
globalising industry, and was not as stubborn about standards as MPT. MITI believed 
that ‘whatever standards are used in any country or region the Japanese should be happy 
to make them’ (DynaTech, 1992:14). Time has shown that MITI may be right and 
MPT’s position was too impractical09.
There are many public and private organisations working closely to make up a 
large body o f interest focused solely on HDTV (see Chart 6.6). MITI with a 
contribution less than US$6 million established the HiVision Promotion Center (HVC) 
in Tokyo to promote HDTV development in 1988, which is now supported by over 100 
companies with an annual budget of US$75 million. HVC’s main tasks are to encourage 
the growth of HiVision-related industries and to spread the application of HiVision 
software. There are also some private organisations involved in the development of 
HiVision in Japan, which are mainly made up from the industrial sector and 
communication sector. NHK is actively participating in all organisations regarding 
R&D and promotion of HDTV system.
m According to Japan's 1997 reform proposals, which will slim 22 ministries and agencies to 12 or 13, the MITI will 
lose its control over energy policy and seize long-sought control over telecommunication industry from its long-term 
rival, MPT, while the MPT will be dismantled with telecoms distnbuted to the MITI and other tasks privatised (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 04/09/97:63). If so, there will be a more cohesive policy towards HDTV development under 
a giant ‘Economics Ministry’ in Japan in the future
206
Chart 6.6 The Framework of IIDTV Development in Japan
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2.3. European HD-MAC
It may seem to outsiders that there was a cohesive government industrial policy towards 
HDTV in Europe. In fact, there were numerous fragmented policies under a more 
formal influence of the European Community in a directorate of the Commission 
known as DGXIII (Cawson & Holmes, 1995; Dai et al., 1996). The Eureka HDTV 
project EU95 was set up in 1986 to develop a MAC (Multiple Analog Component) 
system that would enable Europe to create a single emission standard and make pan- 
European broadcasting with several languages simultaneously70.
In July 1990, the first European Economic Interest Grouping was formed, which 
was a European Commission sanctioned unit which permitted collaboration for the
70 EU95 was an evolutionary programme on the gradual introduction of HDTV by three compatible phases (D2-MAC 
4:3, D2-MAC 16:9, & HD-MAC 16:9) to ensure that no part of the audience is cut off from their programmes and no 
broadcaster is cut off from its audience. The initial EU95 project proposal came from Bosch, Philips, Thomson, and 
Thom EMI (later became part of Thomson). Nokia and a consortium representing participants in Italy also joined the 
Directorate in 1990-91. In addition to the five members o f Directorate, there were at least 40 'B-participant' companies 
and organisations involved in the project from 11 countries in Europe
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early mutual development of industries in pursuit of common objectives. This first 
group was called Vision 1250 and was made up of members including the EC itself and 
most of the television set and production equipment manufacturers. Its aim was to 
stimulate growth in the interest of producing programmes of MAC standard. The total 
government direct funding for Vision 1250 is about US$200 million71.
The 1986-1992 budget for the Eureka HDTV project, according to official reports, 
was 625 million ECU from the Commission, a figure which excluded national 
government contributions (Bruce & Buck, 1994:171 )72. While the Eureka project 
funded by public money had a blueprint for the industry in developing MAC technology 
(ignoring its technological obsolescence), the project’s benefits for European 
broadcasters, consumers or taxpayers were hard to identify (Peterson, 1993:511).
In the case of the Eureka HDTV project, collusion between DGXIII and the 
electronics industry took place to adopt an interventionist industrial policy to support a 
European standard against USA and more particularly, a Japanese standard. At the end 
of 1992, the EU officially announced that it would give up its effort to build its own 
standard and adopt the digital system chosen by FCC.
The failure to establish a European (let alone world) HD-MAC standard for 
HDTV led EU, in particular, DGXIII, to take the blame for an inappropriate policy 
decision. However, the leading firms did not suffer from the collapse of the HD-MAC 
system because they absorbed new analogue technology from MAC development and, 
in the case o f Thomson and Philips, kept abreast of digital development by undertaking 
R&D in the USA. As Dai et al. (1996:158-9) argued, the leading European firms’ 
behaviour also undermined European HDTV policy in the sense that they lobbied the
71 Most of the funding was for acquisition of equipment suitable to produce the HDTV programmes and receivers for 
the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. The receivers were placed at government/industry expense in public locations to inspire 
the public to buy at least a wide screen TV when wide screen MAC was an intenm product (HDTV would not be 
introduced until 1995).
72 In Britain, the Independent Broadcasting Authority and BBC were funded to seek a new HDTV standard, in France, 
Thomson (state-owned enterprise) received 366 million ECU IVom the government in 1991; in 1990, Philips and 
Thomson agreed to spend USS3.2 billion on HDTV joint venture (Bruce & Buck. 1994.171-2). According to Times 
(10/02/92), EU95 had spent 2.682 billion ECU (12 billion) by the beginning of 1992, o f which half was from the EU 
member states (from Dai et a l , 1996:155)
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European Commission to keep analogue HD-MAC going in Europe, even though they 
had lost interest in it, while forming a R&D consortium to propose digital techniques 
for FCC’s testing.
At the end of 1993, the Commission shifted its support from the revised 1992 
MAC directive to DVB which has developed common standards to foster the 
prevalence of all-digital TV (WS & digital television formats) in Europe. This change 
revealed ‘a movement from industrial policy concerns favouring producers, towards 
more general measures to stimulate demand for new television technologies, and more 
emphasis on competition policy measures rather than enforced technical standards in 
order to regulate the supply side (Cawson & Holmes, 1995:650).’
2.4. Different Approaches
The US government’s only involvement in HDTV is through FCC and there was no 
direct government funding and leadership in developing the HDTV industry in the 
1990s. FCC invited firms to join a competition where the standard would be selected 
from proved technologies. In contrast, Japan and Europe adopted the concept of 
industrial policy as a way of development in favour of the manufacturing sector in the 
1980s and early 1990. The government-backed R&D consortia were monopolised by 
leading actors who could not take the lead in high technology competition. Neither the 
Japanese nor the European consortium, termed as ‘pre-competitive collaboration’, made 
a breakthrough in technological progress as did the American style of free competition, 
termed as ‘pre-collaborative competition’ (Cawson, 1994:152). It can be argued that the 
ideas of technology development in the pre-competitive collaboration were pre­
dominated by certain obsessions (such as MUSE and MAC) which significantly 
constrained innovative dynamics.
The direction of technology diffusion was different in Japan and Europe. Japan’s 
NHK was the developer of MUSE system and then persuaded the manufacturing sector 
to accept technology/standard, while European giant TV makers (Philips and Thomson)
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pushed private satellite broadcasters to accept MAC in Europe. Japan was from 
broadcaster to manufacturers, Europe (and Taiwan), the other way round.
3. TAIWAN’S GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS HDTV DEVELOPMENT
Table 6.7 The Formation of HDTV Policy in Taiwan
Date Main Events
06/88 ITRI advanced the idea o f HDTV development
02/89 1DB/MOEA established a strategic planning group to evaluate the feasibility o f  HDTV 
development for Taiwan
09/89 IDB suggested to  CEPD and confirmed that the HDTV industry would be the ‘star’ 
industry according to Arthur D Little’s report
02/90 ‘Year 2000 Strategy For Emerging Industries Conference' reconfirmed H D TV  as one 
among ten rising star industries
05/90 ITRI presented ‘5-Year Plan for the Development o f  HD Video Technology’ to 
DIT/MOEA.
06/91 Two research reports by USA-based DynaTech Development Corporation and 
DataQuest helped to plan the development of HDTV.
07/91 * Inter-ministerial seminar on ‘The HDTV industry Development Programme’ hosted by
MOEA.
* ‘5-Year HD Video System & Products Development Plan’ was ratified by  DIT.
* HDTV-related industrial consortia established
10/91 CEPD reviewed the ‘The HDTV industry Development Programme’
11/91 ‘The HDTV industry Development Programme’ was authorised by the Executive Yuan
04/92 ‘The HDTV industry Promotion Office, MOEA’ was approved by the Executive Yuan.
3.1. HDTV Policy Formation
The HDTV policy is not solely decided by the central government in Taiwan. There are 
many actors involved in the process of policy making including economic technocrats, 
technical specialists, vested interests, and even foreign advisors. All of them have their 
own contributions in the process of policy making. It can be said that the government is 
still the driving force in the process of HDTV development. However, an active state 
can not produce an effective HDTV policy without an active response from the 
industry.
Some characteristics of economic policy, such as, its centrality in the political 
process, high internationalisation, highly technical character, and specialised important 
institutions are also important for success (Grant, 1993:3-5). In relation to the economic 
policy for the development of industrial technology, these characteristics are far more 
explicit. Their importance to the case of HDTV development will be illustrated in the
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subsequent discussions.
3.1.1. The process o f  'picking winners'
Although the concept of 'picking winners’ is still debatable in western societies, some 
successful examples in the East Asian countries have demonstrated evidence to justify 
this concept on theoretical grounds7'. However, it is arguable whether bureaucratic 
foresight of government economic planners can be as successful at foretelling the future 
of an industry as the private sector does. If industrial technology policy is determined 
within the bureaucracy the result can be an policy implementation which lacks 
feasibility, misdirecting technology development against the international trend. Then, 
the risk of bureaucratic failure is certainly more likely than market failure. The EU95 is 
a case in point. If the European Commission had left the private sector to take the risks 
according to their own judgements, there would not have been a huge public investment 
in vain, especially, when an all-digital format was emerging as a future tendency.
The selection of the HDTV industry as a targeted industry was modestly 
considered in the late 1980s in Taiwan. In order for Taiwan to stay on its economic 
trajectory as the year 2000 approached, new opportunities need to be pursued and new 
strategies for capturing these opportunities need to be designed. The government 
recognised this and acknowledged that ultimately industry and, principally, the private 
sector will have to take responsibility for moving ahead aggressively. However, in its 
capacity for creating an appropriate environment for meeting the challenges that lie 
ahead, the government is seeking to identify what some of the more promising new 
directions might be and how Taiwan can seize them. The government picked ten ‘star’ 
industries as industrial priority targets for technological development in the 1990s74.
71 The rise of the semiconductor industry in Japan. South Korea, and Taiwan pro\ ides a very persuasive case explaining 
the nature of 'picking winners'. These three countries arc among the top four competitive manufacturers in the world 
Japan's case was cited as the effective operation of industrial policy by MITI (Okimoto. 1989), while the other two 
were the evidence of institutional arrangements in terms o f industnal policy (Hong, 1997) or the argument of the 
developmental institutions o f  developmental resource leverage (Mathews. 1995)
74 Ten priority industries were put into three categories 1. Export-oriented industries (consumer electronics, 
information, telecommunications, semiconductors and automation & precision machinery) to promote international 
competitiveness of Taiwan's products; 2. Primarily support-oriented industries (advanced materials and specilaty 
chemicals & pharmaceutical products) to underlay the demand of whole manufacturing industry; 3 Domestic market-
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And many sets of industrial policies have been designed to fulfil the “Taiwan year 2000 
industrial development approach’* 75.
Many seminars have been held by public agencies and the departments concerned 
(mainly CEPD, DIT, and IDB) with active participation from the industrial sector, 
business associations, and research institutes, to discuss the selection of promising 
fields (industries, technologies, and products) within the sector. Regarding the industry 
of consumer electronics, the focus was on the new generation of television and visual 
product technology, as a reflection of the predicted high market potential and also that 
HDTV, by then will be an international race between Japan and Europe.
In 1988, CEPD and IDB commissioned Arthur D. Little (ADL), an international 
technology management consulting firm based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to 
undertake a two-phased investigation of industrial opportunities for Taiwan early in the 
next century76. A workshop, held at ADL’s headquarters on 9-11 January, 1989, 
presented its results, together with written support material to Taiwan’s delegation with 
representatives from CEPD, IDB, and ITRI. The final version of the report was 
submitted to the authorities in Taiwan in March 1989. It recommended ten emerging 
industries for Taiwan to develop in the 1990s. The content of each individual industrial 
report included international trends in technologies, products, and markets, as well as 
an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan in entering that particular 
industry.
The 1989 ADL report has had a very decisive effect on the choice of emerging 
industries in Taiwan. The ten recommended strategic industries by ADL are very 
similar to the final decision of the Taiwanese authorities except that the aerospace
oriented industries (aerospace, pollution control, and medical & health care) to reduce heavy dependency on imports.
75 Except 10 emerging industries, there are also 8 key technology fields. 24 key products, and 42 key parts and 
components selected by the government Most of those technologies, products, and components are supporting the 
development of ‘winners’.
74 The objective of the first phase has been to identify some of the more promising opportunities for Taiwan; the 
objective of the second phase is to recommend specific strategics for pursuing these opportunities. In the first phase, 
the consultants based their preliminary conclusions and recommendations on their own insights into industry trends 
over the next decade and general information provided by FDB about Taiwan's capabilities and goals. (ADL, 1989:1*2)
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industry and pollution control replaced the food processing industry and biotechnology. 
It is because, as supposed, food processing was not a high-valued-added industry and 
the foundation of Taiwan’s biotech industry was too weak in terms of experience and 
expertise. The importance of this report on picking winners was underestimated by 
some interviewees, and this might be because appreciation of this report would lead to 
the devaluation of indigenous contribution by national expertise. However, this report is 
not only for ‘reference’, as one interviewee termed it. In fact, many development 
directions and strategies in Taiwan’s policies are influenced by ADL’s report. But it is 
difficult to rule out whether the local elites shared the same insights with ADL, and 
‘who is the chicken and who is the egg’.
The foreign advisors of STAG also had a role in the process o f ‘picking winners’. 
They provided their professional insights into the specific industries at the 1991 
National S&T Conference which identified the international trends in technological 
development and encouraged the government to proceed with the ‘Year 2000 plan’.
The decision of selecting strategic industries has been highly influenced by 
foreign actors. CEPD and IDB had to be assumed to be confident that the right 
industries were chosen, at least in terms of international trends, before any further 
government policies were put into action. This revealed an internationalised process in 
which government decision making depended more on international sources than on 
national sources (Keohane & Milner, 1996). More international information, less the 
chance of choosing wrong sectors. The government could not be too careful about 
picking promising sectors and avoiding the failures of investment in the future.
The criteria for ‘winners’ lies in their value-added characteristics and their 
contribution to the future economy. Thus, the government decision on the selection of 
winners was independent from private influence.
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3.1.2. Preparation for the development o f new technology
The government agent consulted with the consumer electronics manufacturers in 
relation to their technological needs and the products that they would develop in the 
next few years. The government feared that the technological investment of the 
government in ITRI might not diffuse to the manufacturing sector, they needed the 
commitment of firms. However, the industry was not very interested in the ultimate 
product of HDTV in the short term, but expressed their desire to upgrade the 
technological capacity for visual products to capture the foreseeable market. This was 
quite important in order that the private sector could repay their heavy investment in 
new products. As far as the industry was concerned, products, such as advanced TV, 
projection TV, and the electronic still camera are more realistic than HDTV (Interview 
No.8 & 10), Although the fact that the HDTV would dominate the whole TV market in 
the long run was widely perceived, in the eyes of manufacturers, the time was still too 
far ahead. They were reluctant to take the risk of supporting a long term government 
policy.
The industrial sector concentrated more on products, which can be derived from 
the application of visual technologies to the process of development, than on the 
technology itself, while the government was more interested in the effect of technology 
diffusion. The divergence of views between the public and private sectors has been 
reconciled by elastic measures. A phase-in approach was decided on to fulfil the 
requirement of the industry, and the industry had committed itself to a long term 
support to a HDTV policy.
The phase-in approach keeps product development abreast of technology 
development at each stage in which the ITRI took the responsibility for the R&D of 
visual technology. In the meantime, the private sector organised product development 
consortia to absorb the phase’s outcomes of technology. In the 1991-96 HDTV STP, 
there were thirteen product development consortia in operation and each lasted for 1-2
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years. So the private sector could take part in the development of technology and the 
commercialisation of technology simultaneously.
The development of HDTV policy in Taiwan took place according to the 
‘Programme for the Development of HD Video Industry’ (^,3 i m m x m m f i * ) .  This 
programme was initiated by IDB as a result of consulting with other government 
agencies in July 1991, reviewed by CEPD in October 1991, and ratified by the 
Executive Yuan in November 1991. However, two foreign reports by DynaTech and 
DataQuest were very influential in guiding the direction of the HD video industry and 
providing the information on the international technology movement77.
ITRI advanced its plan for applying ‘5 Year High-definition Visual Technology 
Development’ in May 1989. After reviews by IDB, DIT, NSC, and STAG, a ‘5-year 
Special Technology Project for the Development of High-definition Visual System and 
Products' (HDTV was granted to ITRI
from July 1991.
3.2. Government Technological Investment: Technology Innovation and Product
Creation
The development of technology supported by MOEA can be divided into two different 
functioning policy measures administered by DIT and IDB (See Chart 6.8). IDB is the 
competent authority in charge of the strategic planning of sectoral industry development 
and general industrial policies related to incentives, subsidies, and loans, while DIT 
technically initiates the directions and fields of technology development at sectoral 
level to support the goals of strategic planning by IDB.
77 The DynaTech Development Corporation is a USA consultant firm which has built a close relationship with the 
second division of IDB since 1988 It had produced many consulting projects in strategic planning and high-tech 
industry studies in the late 1980s. and a series of studies regarding the development of a HDTV industry in Taiwan 
DataQucst. another USA consultant firm and databank, also has a long term relationship with IDB Its tasks included 
strategic marketing studies on global trend and the movement of large international electronics enterprises in relation to 
products at each stage through the J-ycar HDTV policy Besides, two international firms, Understanding & Solutions, 
Inc. and Scientific Technology , Inc., also engaged in collecting intelligence for ITRI in a form of up-to-date from-timc- 
to-time memo rather than a form of precisely full analysis
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The public-private interactions in relation to technology innovation and product 
creation are classifiable into four development stages by time series, namely, 
technological innovation, technology diffusion, product creation, and goals 
accomplishment stages. At each stage, the role of actors changes in functional terms 
and different measures are employed to fulfil the phase’s aim.
Chart 6.8 The Relations among Supporting Policy Measures, Technology 
Innovation, and Product Creation
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3.2.1. Stage one: technology innovation
In this initial development stage, DIT is the financial sponsor to back the activities of 
technology innovation necessary for industrial development. The policy measure is a
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special funding, STP, to public research institutions78. The STP recipients, such as ITRI, 
should take the duty of technology innovation as designed in the proposals whose 
progress and budget were reviewed by D1T quarterly. The government maintains the 
right to cease funding if the phase outcomes do not meet the target.
In the case of HDTV STP, CCL/ITRI was the recipient, in which the Visual 
Information Technology Division was the powerhouse in R&D. HDTV STP was 
divided into six main R&D projects to underpin the development of the HDTV industry 
which included Signal Processing Technology, Display Technology, Image Acquisition 
Technology, Video Tape Recording Technology, Advanced Media Technology, and 
Visual IC Components & Process Technology. The research outcomes of each sub- 
project would apply to different types of products. In particular, these sub-projects were 
essential core technology to the video industry.
HDTV STP was a supra-industrial development project involved with electronics, 
electrics, advanced material, opto-electronics, and machinery research, which required 
the coordination and integration of R&D efforts among related laboratories in ITRI. 
CCL was the leading laboratory in HDTV STP, other research institutions (ERSO, OES, 
MIRL, & MRL) had their respective responsibilities in HDTV STP.
3.2.2. St age two: technology diffusion
The success of STP very much depends on effective technology diffusion which would 
spread STP’s technological fruits to the industry sector. The means of technology 
diffusion from public research institutions to the private sector, taking ITRI as an 
example, include:
71 The STP funding to R&D was limned to the public institutions before 1997. In the 1998 fiscal year starting from 
July 1997, the private research institutions and enterprises with ability to conduct large-scale R&D also allowed to 
apply for the Civilian STP (WKWIf), their proposals were passed by the DIT and their technological outcomes could 
benefit industrial upgrading. A budget of NTS285 million allocated to Civilian STPs in the 1988 fiscal year There 
were eight Civilian STPs approved by DIT that the government has funded NTS187 million plus the matching funds 
from the private sector which was NTS58 million (CDN, 26/05/97). There were still some proposals waiting the results 
of review on May 1997.
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(1) Subcontracting: A small part of technology , which can be developed by a firm and is 
necessary to STP, is allowed with the consent of MOEA, to be subcontracted to the 
private sector from the STP finance.
(2) Joint Specialty Definition: For a new product or a new standard in the industry , 1TR1 
will invite firms to define the specialty jointly. This would accelerate the pace of 
technology diffusion.
(3) Technology Transfer: A typical method of technology diffusion from ITRI to firms 
in which firms can get technology that is ready and available by paying a royalty and 
licence fee. The instances of this static technology transfer have decreased since 
1990 since the new, and more effective, approach has been found.
(4) Early Licensing: This is a method where firms have to pre-pay the royalty and 
licence fee before the commencement of R&D activity. Generally, the payment for 
early licensing is less than technology transfer. Firms have to share the risk of R&D 
failure, but they can get access to the process of R&D from the very beginning. 
Early licensing lets the firms gain the experience of technology innovation instead 
of taking research outcomes as given, which might promote their ability to conduct 
R&D in the future. It is normally applied to the development of core technologies.
(5) Joint Development: The objectives of joint development can be either of product or 
technology. Under conditions where firms have a certain degree of capability to 
develop technology, or intent to develop a product, but still need ITRTs technical 
support, joint development between ITRI and firms may be set up. The genesis of 
joint development was around 1990, and this method has been intensively employed 
since the NPC Alliance has brought about its market share-accelerated consequence.
3.2.3. Stage three: product creation
No matter by what means the firms obtain the technology necessary for product
development, another government agency, IDB, will provide subsidies, loans, and other
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incentives to assist the private sector. These advantageous measures reduce the 
financial burdens of firms in the process of product creation, as well as motivating the 
private sector to engage in new high value-added products.
At this stage, IDB is the competent authority in distributing financial resources to 
the private sector according to SUI. Under the SUI, loans, subsidies, and incentives 
regarding matters of upgrading industry are supplementary to enhancing the 
competitiveness of national firms which have been approved by IDB. Two policy 
measures, in particular, leading to product creation, TLP and NIP, deserve to be 
mentioned again here, while other detailed operations of financial assistance are 
referred to in Chapter Four. TLP is a subsidy measure assisting the development of 
‘targeted leading products’ by which an approved plan can be granted 50% of its R&D 
cost, while NIP is a semi-subsidy measure encouraging the development of ‘new 
industrial products’ by which up to 50% of R&D cost in the approved case can be 
loaned interest-free. That is to say, if a plan of product creation by the industrial sector 
qualified for both NIP and TLP, it does not even take a penny out of firm’s pocket in the 
process of product development.
Fourteen cases related to HDTV development have been subsidised by TLP by 
July 1996 (HDTV office, 1996:50)79. Only two cases (WS ATV and DAT) are 
consumer end products, the rest are key components of HD video industry. This was 
because each leading firm in the product development consortium was granted 
subcontracting fees respectively to conduct product creation. The subcontracting fee to 
a leading firm was equivalent to the amount of H P  subsidy. Therefore, TLP subsidies 
to the HDTV industry were focused on the development of key components.
TLP has exploited the international regulations on industrial subsidy and the 
countervailing measure of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at a very marginal
79 During 1991-July, 1996, there were 173 approved LTP applications Tor ten star industries and the budget for LTP 
was around NTS3.8 billion The approved amount Tor one fiscal vear was NTS 10 million, NTS450 million, NTS925 9 
million, NTS8662 million, NTS8S54 million, NTS72S million from 1991 to 1996, respectively 
(http //www moea gov tw/~mcco/EcoDcv_c/o071 htm)
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limit, in which the subsidies to the precompetitive stage of production should not be in 
excess of 50°/o. Moreover, NIP as a supplementary measure to TLP has provided 
another half of the cost in the form o f repayment-deferred interest-free loan. And the 
loans for product development remain an issue of domestic policy away from 
international scrutiny, so far.
3.2.4. Stage four: the accomplishment o f  policy goals
The government’s attempt to create a new product/industry relies primarily on two- 
levels of support, upstream level for technology innovation by DIT and public research 
institutions, and downstream level for product creation by IDB and the industrial sector. 
It covers the comprehensive process from the generation of technology, to the 
application of technology, finally leading to the commercialisation of the product. All 
efforts are aimed at creating a competitive product/industry.
It is easy to understand how this development process will result in a new product, 
but it is necessary to explain how it will lead to the formation of new firms and industry. 
According to the preceding discussion, a STP is a series of relevant sub-subjects on 
developing a cluster of technologies in a confined industry. Among the outcomes of 
those sub-subjects, a single technology might apply to one product (digital still camera), 
or some technologies might jointly contribute to the needs of a product (HDTV). There 
will be many opportunities in product terms that could be derived from the technology 
diffusion of a STP. The new products range from components to industry end products 
covering up-, middle-, and down-stream industry. In the case of HDTV STP, the 
derivation of visual technology created many key components, systems, functions and 
more than ten industry end products. Thus, a new digital visual industry was built in 
Taiwan80.
10 There were some examples of creating the new industries, all of them benefited under the STPs, for example, the 
semiconductor industry and the computer industry in 1980s. This is not to say that all STPs can lead to the generation 
of new industries, rather more STPs are concentrated on continuing upgrading of industrial technology to as to sustain 
the competitiveness of established industries.
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If a public research institution makes a technology innovation which is a totally 
new technology to Taiwan's firms and the firms have no ability to undertake this 
technology, the researchers who made the breakthrough will be encouraged, and 
assisted in most cases, to form a new firm to apply the new technology. For instance, 
many semiconductor companies, included the first fabrication one -- United 
Microelectronics Corporation, were formed as the spin-off companies from ERSO/1TRI 
with technical staffs from ITRI81. Accounting the heavy weight of total outputs of these 
companies, technology diffusion through spin-off is the most important and effective 
way of creating Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Taiwan Aerospace Corporation 
(TAC), a spin-off aircraft maker, split off from CIS, so as to build a civilian aircraft 
industry in the late 1980s . TAC is a joint venture between the government and KMT 
(Chen et al., 1991:80), in which 29% o f initial capital (US$50 million) from the 
government and the rest from ‘the private sector’ (MOEA, 1995:62). It is arguable that 
public development technology spun off to become a mostly party-owned company in 
the sense that Aerospace is a monopoly industry in Taiwan and there should be a clear 
line between the state and the ruling party. No wonder KMT is the richest political party 
in the world because it has invested on many profitable high technology companies by 
taking advantage of its position as a half-century ruling party in Taiwan. For a full 
discussion of KMT-state capitalism refer to Chen et. al., 1991, in which a deeply
"  Four companies in the semiconductor industry spun off from ITRI. namely. United Microelectronics Corporation 
(UMC) in 1979, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in 1987, Taiwan Mask Corporation (TMC) 
in 1988. and Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation (VISC) in 1994. In addition to the contribution of 
technology and technical staffs from ERSO/ITRJ, the public sector played a role as a joint venturer UMC was entirely 
a creation of ERSO/ITRJ which provided designed products, technologies, facilities and staffs in the beginning, and 
MOEA raised a capital of NT$500 million (the contribution of private capital w as limited) TSMC began operations by 
leasing fabrication facilities from ITRI and the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan as the major shareholder 
(47.5% out of US$145 million, together with 27.5% from Philips). The initial situations of TMC and VISC were 
identical to those of UMC and TSMC. with 43% out of NTS350 million from ITRI's venture capital fund in the case of 
TMC, and 33% (the estimated value in the form of manpower, technology and assets) out of NTS 18 billion in the case 
of VISC (Data for the public shareholders from Mathews, 1995:67, 73-4,95, & 102). In 1995. UMC and TSMC were 
the top two manufacturing companies in Taiwan, and the total productivity value of these four spin-ofTs was NT$59. 1 
billion. 42% of value outputs in this industry (ITRI). In this respect, technology diffusion through Spin-ofT companies 
is the most important and effective way of creating new industry in Taiwan. Taiwan's semiconductor industry ranks at 
the fourth in the world In 1996, TSMC was the largest semiconductors manufacturing firm in the world, shared 7% of 
US$130 billion world market (CDN, 09/07/97).
n  The technologies, technical staffs, and facilities of TAC benefited from the national programme for the development 
of IDF fighter, a military programme conducted by CIS. TAC now shores 40% of McDonnell Douglas's commercial- 
aircraft division, but that is not to say that TAC has built its ability to manufacture entire aircraft (but some 
components) because McDonnell sold its stake for US$2 billion to TAC to pay ofT a US$2.6 billion debt in 1991 
(Nester, 1997:174).
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intertwining relationships between state-owned enterprises, privatisation, and KMT- 
owned enterprises has been explored.
There are two spin-offs, Ho-Bang Electronics (ñftMT-)  and Chien-Cheng Vision 
(Pffi&Üafl), from CCL/ITRI in the HD video industry so far. The technical staffs of both 
companies are mainly from the researchers trained under the 5-year HDTV STPs:’.
4. A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR HDTV DEVELOPMENT
Unlike other experiences of countries and regions in the development of HDTV, 
Taiwan set up a temporary functioning office at central government level in charge of 
the coordination of all HDTV-related activities to assist the establishment o f the HDTV 
industry. The reasons for the establishment of a supra-ministerial office was threefold 
(Interview No. 13). First, the development of HDTV has involved more than 
manufacturing concerns, a domestic enabling environment for HDTV development is 
also important, under which broadcaster, market, software, and transmission standards 
will influence the spread of HDTV, In this respect, the coordination of many 
government forces in HDTV development becomes of paramount importance. Second, 
IDB’s administrative capacity is such that it can not burden its second division with this 
extra task. Moreover, IDB can not coordinate with other ministerial organs, such as, the 
Ministry of Transportation (in charge of transmission standard), the Information Bureau 
of the Executive Yuan (in charge of broadcasting system), and the Ministry of 
Education (in charge of engineer training), because of its lower level in the government 
hierarchy. Third, a functional office to promote the HDTV development would 
harmonise vertical cooperation and horizontal integration. It can shorten the time taken 
to circulate information and promote administrative efficiency.
15 The Deputy general manger (Mr. Chang who was co-director of HDTV STP), three out of four directors, and, many 
project managers, in the Ho-Bang F.lectronics came from CCL. General Manager (Mr Feng) and many core stall 
members of Chicn-Chcng Vision arc also from CCL. Mr. Chang and Mr. Feng believe that the contribution of HDTV 
STP to Taiwan's emerging visual industry is extremely important in terms of technology diffusion and the cultivation 
of experts (HDTV OfTice, 1996:34-5). The main products of the former are key components (visual 1C) in the visual 
industry, and those of the later are video-on-demand relative products
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4.1. High-Definition Video Industry Promotion Program Office (HDTV office)
The idea of setting up an office to handle HDTV development and promotion was 
advanced by MOEA in the Programme for the Development of HD Video industry. 
However, the functions and objects of this office and its committee were planned by 
DynaTech Development Corporation. DynaTech’s report was drawn from a survey of 
four key consumer electronics companies, opinions from related government agents and 
ITRI, and the experiences of foreign countries in promoting the HDTV industry.
According to observations, the basic operation and framework of HDTV office 
(Figure 6.9) in 1992-96 are identical to the policies and strategies suggested by 
DynaTech’s planning of a steering Committee/Programme Office except for details in 
staffing, budget, and subcommittees. It was argued by DynaTech that the HDTV office 
should follow a Japanese-style operation in the promotion o f the HDTV industry. 
Nonetheless, the promotion activities of Taiwan and Japan are quite different in their 
nature. While Japan's HVC (initially established by MITI) and HPA are operated by the 
industrial sector to coordinate and promote HDTV development, Taiwan's HDTV 
office is a functioning organisation solely supported and supervised by the government. 
In particular, the budget to run the office is from IDB and professional and technical 
staffs comes from CCL. Taiwan is unique in establishing a promotion office to 
administer HDTV development at a central government level84.
14 HDTV Promotion Office was the first industry-specific promotion office established in Taiwan. There are another 
Tour offices to promote strategic industries, including aerospace, biotech & pharm., precision machinery, and 
information industry. An Advanced Material Promotion Office may be established in the near future. It shows that the 
government valued these industriel, and gave promotion offices special status and budget in order to manage the 
development of strategic industries
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Figure 6.9 HDTV' Office/Steering Committee Organisation Chart
Project 
Management3
Members o f the Steering 
Committee consisted o f the local 
HDTV experts & th e  heads o f  the 
following organisations: 
technology advisors in MOE, 
DIT/MOEA, MOT, STAG; 
Broadcasting and T V  Division of 
the Information Bureau; Planning 
Division of CEPD; Engineering 
Division o f NSC; Training 
Division o f the Labour Council, 
Development Fund; Bank of 
Communication; ITR I; III; IDIC; 
association concerned, 
Telecommunications 
Laboratories.
Coordination
)
Working Group 
(headed by deputy general 
director o f IDB) 3
^ HDTV Office
(Convenor: The general 
director of IDB)
Cross-Ministry 
Steering Committee I
Working Group, also known as the 
programme office, implemented the 
decisions made by the Steering 
Committee and Subcommittees.
Dr. Chao, the head director o f  
HDTV STP at CCL, is the de facto 
executive o f Working Group
Members o f each special 
functioning Subcommittee made up 
o f specialists and the heads o f  
public agencies concerned in the 
field
The main tasks of HDTV office, including a Working Group and a Steering 
Committee are summarised below:
1 To coordinate with the related ministries concerned, ITRI, and other research institutes to carry 
out the R&D projects and transfer the resulting technologies to industries (key components and 
products).
2. To w ork with the government branches concerned to develop a plan for cultivating skilled labour 
for the visual industry
3 . To w ork  with related agencies to  develop a system for the promotion, taxation, and rewarding o f  
the H D TV  industry
4 To coordinate with the Ministry o f  Transportation and Information Bureau to develop domestic 
HDTV standards, the broadcasting system and to plan a schedule for HDTV broadcasting
5. To set up  an HDTV system demonstration centre.
6. To develop other important activities related to the development o f  the HDTV industry
The framework for the development of the HDTV industry under the HDTV 
office is deliberate. It incorporated all the necessary forces into a centralised entity so as
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to coordinate activities, and intended to create a favourable environment for HDTV 
development. The cost for the operations of the HDTV office was solely supported by 
government, there was no private contribution^. In 1994, the budget for HDTV office 
was about 7% of that of HDTV STP (NTS420 million) (IDB, Dec. 1994:344) which 
revealed that the government had invested more on manufacturing industry than on the 
TV media & broadcast industry. However, the efficacy of its outputs is less satisfactory 
than expected in some Subcommittees.
Table 6.10 Taiwan's Initial Timetable for HDTV industry Development
Fiscal
Year
Policies Strategies Industries Broadcasting
1992 -Plan & promote the 
HDTV industry in 
Taiwan
-Set up a Steering 
Committee to 
coordinate all 
Taiwan’s HDTV 
activities
-Organise interest 
group 
-Share test 
equipment
-Study foreign 
HDTV studio 
equipment 
-Test broadcast ATV
1993 -Establish 
government 
funding 
programmes to 
encourage industry 
R&D
-Promote R&D & 
develop sources 
for HDTV key 
components
-Work with CCL/ 
ITRI on key 
components R&D 
-Increase own R&D 
efforts
-Set up Taipei demo 
centre
-Use mobile studios 
for live 
broadcasting
1994 -Select and develop 
Taiwan’s own 
HDTV 
broadcasting 
standards
-Study standards o f  
leading countries 
-Train skilled labour 
force
-Automated 
manufacturing 
-Product cost 
reduction
-Start test 
broadcasting using 
own standards
1995 -Promote 
international 
cooperation to 
develop a global 
market for HDTV 
products
-Establish strategic 
alliance
-Promote HDTV 
products export 
from Taiwan
-Export local 
products
-Seek joint sales & 
marketing channels 
with foreign firms
-Work with industry 
to promote HDTV 
receivers 
-Produce 
programming
1996 -Achieve 5% world 
market share 
-Begin Taiwan’s 
own HDTV 
broadcasting
-Provide easy 
transition from 
NTSC to HDTV 
-Use local market to 
help develop the 
HDTV industry
-Create domestic 
market o f  own 
HDTV equipment 
-Promote foreign 
sales
-Start local 
commercial 
programming
Source. DB.
*’ The budget for the HDTV office, directly from 1DB, wa* around US$ 1 million each year to cover the expense of 
HDTV demo centres. HDTV experimental broadcasting equipment, broadcast testing centres, HDTV programme 
productions, special research projects, committee meetings, and HDTV conferences. The budget in a fiscal year for 
HDTV office was NTS22 million in 1993, NTS30.1 million in 1994, NT$28 million in 199$, and NTS24 5 million in 
1996 (http://www.moea.gov.tw/~meco/EcoDev_c/a071.htm).
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According to Table 6.10, the aim of HDTV broadcasting indigenous HDTV 
programmes was expected to be achieved and the export sales of related products in the 
world market was targeted at 5% by the end of 1996. However, neither of these could 
be proved to have hit the targets. The plan and the goals have been amended almost 
every year (in particular, in 1993) since this initial development plan announced by IDB. 
It is argued that the plan has been transformed from its ambitious outlook to a more 
practical approach. The reason leading to the anti-climax of the plan, according to many 
interviewees, was the delaying of an international standard for HDTV. In their language, 
US Grand Alliance has postponed advancing the standard since 1993 and this affected 
Taiwan’s timetable for determining its ‘own’ standard.
There were other factors influencing HDTV development, not in Taiwan alone, 
but worldwide. First, the forecasting of the HDTV potential market was 
overexaggerated by most international actors, in particular, in terms o f its optimal 
timing marketed in the middle of 1990s, This made all the countries and regions mark 
the start of HDTV broadcasting around the mid-1990s, but none of the countries or 
regions achieved this goal except Japan’s 8-hour MUSE programmes daily. Taiwan, on 
the suggestion of foreign advisors (ADL, DynaTech, and DataQuest) believed that a 
worldwide standard would be reached before that time. Second, there was no 
consensual standard among international rivals. Europe, Japan, and US had developed 
their own standard, not to mention their different formats. This technically disintegrated 
development delayed the timing for HDTV broadcasting. Taiwan has technically 
followed US development and can not determine its standard without referring to US 
standard.
Third, the motivation for broadcasters to go digital high-definition was not very 
strong, even with the subsidies allocated to them. The cost of re-establishing equipment 
for them was larger than their commercial returns in the sense that the buyers of 
commercial advertisements, the main source of income to broadcasters, would not pay 
extra money to get the space for advertisements when the programme was high-
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definition. The cost for a TV station to change from an analogue to a digital one is 
estimated about USS8-10 million in the USA, and this excludes the cost for frequencies 
(HDTV Newsletter, Jun. 1997:12). So the broadcasting industry had no interest in 
changing to a digital system, unless the government forced them to do so. A paragraph 
was written by Interview No.30 which showed that the task of promoting HDTV in 
terms of TV programmes and broadcasting was very frustrated: The inputs of TV 
programme producers, broadcasters, and industrial sector were very limited. This 
should be politically pushed through the communication between the high level of 
government and the leaders of those key enterprises so as to let those enterprises to 
accommodate the whole strategic planning. Then, the promotion of HDTV shall be 
moved ahead (IDB, Dec. 1994:348).’ This implied that the effects of Transmission 
Regulation & Standard Subcommittee, and Broadcasting System Subcommittee were 
obstructed by the reluctant behaviours of TV media.
The government policy will change in the near future to end the distribution of 
frequencies for analogue broadcasting (and sell off the frequencies for mobile 
communications), then the broadcasting industry will have no choice but to transform 
its system to cope with digital transmission. When all programmes are broadcast in 
digital form, then the market for HD video products will take off. This shows that the 
HDTV development is highly politicised. If the state did not make a deadline for full 
digital broadcasting, there would never be an HDTV era.
Fourth, HDTV seemed suddenly to fade out before the mid-1990s. The term -  
HDTV, the original ambition of this wave of television revolution, was soon substituted 
by digital TV, which is not necessary high-definition. One of advantages of digital 
delivery systems is the increase of channels that is probably preferred to ‘HD’ by 
consumers because HD programmes reduce the amount of channels broadcasted. Unless 
you want to receive the new WS pictures, or even HD pictures (if delivered), a 
traditional TV with a decoder will suffice for digital broadcasting. In relation to 
transmission, there will be three ways to choose from -  terrestrial, cable, and satellite.
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Indeed, the US is the only one country to insist on a digital terrestrial HDTV. The merit 
of terrestrial delivery is that you do not need to put a dish on roof or to connect a cable 
to the TV. However, consumers will do nothing and wait to see what happens when 
they face three competing digital delivery systems (Financial Times, 19/05/97).
Last, but not least, the consumer factor was the main determinant in the lack of 
HDTV development. 'It is difficult in advance to be certain about consumer reaction (to 
radically new products), and very large investments can be made’ (Cawson et al., 
1995:1). The benefits that consumers can get from the HDTV programme are better 
quality in vision and audio, and more channels (depends on what kind of broadcasting 
system, cable, satellite, or terrestrial). The problem is that these benefits do not merit 
consumers paying several times the price of a conventional TV. The market reflects that 
consumers will not pay such a high price to buy a WS TV/HDTV if it is available 
because they have become used to TV being relatively cheap86. A black box, a STB 
which can decode digital signals to analogue ones by adding it to traditional TV, is the 
cheapest way to receive a digital programme, but without a wide-screen picture. 
According to a survey in Taiwan, consumers would be only willing to pay 20-30% price 
difference between traditional and ‘high-tech’ TVs (Interview No.28).
The whole structure of the HDTV office was led by IDB, and all the measures 
and the functions of the Subcommittees were designed to accommodate the 
development of the HDTV industry. Moreover, IDB is the competent authority in 
charge of industrial development, so a departmental preference for the electronics 
industry comes naturally. It, thus, tended to focus on the benefit to manufacturing 
industry rather than on those of broadcasters and consumers. Furthermore, the F1DTV 
industry as one of ten emerging industries demonstrated its privileged position on the
M Japan is the only country in the world broadcasting HD programmes and has HDTV sets in the street shops currently. 
However, the sales of HDTV were grown at a very slow rate in the past The total sale of Hi Vision TV was 126,000 
sets by the end of 1995. The sale of HiVision TV was 22,000 sets in 1994 and 87,000 sets in 1995. The 1994-95 
annual growth rate was nearly four times. The reasons leading to the sharp increase of sale are the price, down to 
US$4,000 (was five times in the early 1990s) and more programmes being made available (HDTV Newsletter, 
Mar. 1996: 17).
228
national agenda.
‘An enabling environment' has two special meanings, one is to stimulate the 
domestic market for HDTV products if the broadcasting system could deliver HD 
programmes; the other is to strengthen the export competitiveness of the HDTV 
industry by enlarging the domestic demand in order to reduce the production costs 
based on the doctrine of economy of scale. Most of the government measures decided 
by the HDTV office were biased towards the renaissance of the consumer electronics 
industry rather than the protection of the interests of the broadcasting industry and 
consumers.
If the preceding analysis is correct, HDTV development in Taiwan is represented 
chiefly by the development of HDTV-related products. All other efforts, it could be 
argued, assist the growth of video industry. That is to say, four subcommittees are 
supporting actors while the industrial cooperation subcommittee is the main actor.
4.2. Tactics for the Technology Development
The direction of technology development for the HDTV industry was considerably 
affected by certain factors which indicated the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan’s 
consumer electronics industry. The following discussion addresses the factors which 
have constrained, as well as provided opportunities for technology development. Five 
tactics have been employed to guide the direction of R&D.
4.2.1. Standard tactic: all-digit
Digital TV was the standard that Taiwan intended to develop. Taiwan has followed the 
US NTSC for several decades, a technical change of standard in USA would be easier 
for Taiwan to adjust to than the Japanese and European ones. The HDTV standard war 
changed very quickly with new proposals coming from every quarter, but no system was 
yet in widespread use at the turn of the 1990s. Taiwan had to choose one system. 
Fortunately, it chose the right one, even though the Japanese MUSE was the most well-
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developed system at that time. Besides, all-digit, the language of the computer, matched 
the strength of Taiwan's computer and semiconductor industry where some 
technologies are compatible with HDTV technologies.
This might be the answer to why Taiwan's technologies in HDTV are a step 
ahead o f Korean (Interview No.3), even though Korea’s HDTV R&D was launched 
much earlier than Taiwan’s effort (about 1.5 years). Korea bet on the wrong side of this 
technological race in which the large Korean industrial conglomerates worked closely 
with NHK of Japan to develop the MUSE system in the beginning. They shifted their 
concentration to digital HDTV after the USA all-digit system became the lead in the 
field. But many investments and time have been wasted.
As far as the standard is concerned, Taiwan gave up the ambition to be involved 
in establishing any regional standard. This was on the advice of DataQuest, a major 
consultant to IDB in terms of product information and technology suggestion. A
paragraph of recommendation on HDTV standard influenced the decision of IDB:
'T h e  history o f  broadcast standards has led to many twists and turns which, from a manufacturers
viewpoint, has led to a vast waste o f  money and resources......... The R O C. has no control or input
to any o f  the major regional standards, it just has to accept them when they become solidified, a 
status not achieved in any o f  the major regions The R O C. must therefore watch the market and not 
the standards. In addition, since the market is influenced by other factors than just a standard, the 
standard is just one o f  the issues in an increasingly complex maze ’ (DataQuest, 1992:6)
4.2.2. The market tactic: focus on the US
The market was also a factor which led to Taiwan’s following US standards. Taiwan’s 
attitude towards the markets of future HDTV and relative products can be described as 
looking first at the US market in spite of the short term Japanese market and ignoring 
the European market. The US market was the main destination for Taiwan’s exports in 
the past, so the concentration on the US meant easier access than European and 
Japanese markets, at least, in terms of existing distribution connections or existing 
assemblies within the countries of North American Free Trade Agreement. The 
Japanese market was the only one which had the soon-to-be-blooming sales, but to 
break the fortress of the strong distribution system in Japan seemed as difficult as to
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make a technological breakthrough87 *The European market was also hard to get into, in 
particular because of Taiwan's weak connection with this market. As DataQuest 
(1992:15) suggested, the diversity of Europe and current confusion in systems would 
result in an insignificant number of HDTV sets sold within Europe™ For the rest of the 
world outside the triad, the market for HDTV sets shared only a negligible contribution 
in the near future.
4.2.3. M anpower tactic: utilising overseas Chinese engineers
Research manpower was essential to develop the technology. However, Taiwan was 
lacking in experts in HD video industry in the beginning. There were almost no trained 
engineers for the TV industry from Taiwan’s Universities and Polytechnics in the 1980s 
because TV manufacturing was simply assembly. The technology was provided by 
Japanese companies, so the course on TV development (deemed as sunset technology) 
was less popular than those of computer and other electronics. However, there is no 
lack of such experts abroad. The fast way to build brainpower in HD video industry was 
to incorporate overseas Chinese engineers and many Taiwanese who studied and 
worked in the US, were headhunted to Taiwan. Those returning engineers have been the 
main force for technological development since the 1980s89. At CCL and the industrial 
sector, many of the researchers were formerly employed at AT&TW. This factor that 
engineers and researchers were mainly from the US led to the development of HDTV in
17 It proved to be a correct decision to abandon Japan's market in 1990-91. In 1995, Japan's colour TV sales was 11.5 
million sets in which high value-added model (WS TV & HiVision TV) was solely manufactured by Japanese domestic 
firms, and 7.5 million sets of traditional TV were imported from Japan's overseas subsidiaries in China and South East 
Asia (HDTV Newsletter, June 1996:17).
"  The market data showed that DataQuest's forecasting in HDTV sales in Europe was incorrect. Even the WS TV is 
not the real HDTV, there were no WS TV sale in the US up to 1996 because o f  no broadcasting programmes and focus 
on HDTV. The sale of WS TV was 0.5 million sets in Europe (3.5 million sets in Japan) in 1996 (HDTV Newsletter, 
April 1997:1) which could be the cflicacy of PALplus, a broadcasting of WS programmes started in 1994 
r) One in four candidates for doctorates in electrical engineering at American universities is from Taiwan (Economist, 
16/11/91). In 1980-89, returning postgraduates (including scholars, experts & newly graduated students) were 14,822 
persons, about 44.4% of the all postgraduates (including masters & doctorates) from domestic universities in the same 
period. In 1990-94, the number o f  returning highly-educated experts increased to 23,613 persons (Sun, 1996:10) This 
shows that Taiwan has experienced a process of high-tech industrialisation since 1990 which provided more jobs for 
industrial experts.
*° An AT&T Alumnus Club, organised by returning engineers used to work at AT&T, has more than one thousand 
members in Taiwan (Interview No.2l). They are the momentum to push the development of many electronic-based 
industries.
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Taiwan being biased towards an all-digit format. Even the industrial sector might prefer 
that to an analogue system because some firms had strong links with Japanese firms. 
The public sector researchers took their lead from a direction of R&D familiar to them.
4.2.4. Produci lactic: user-end producís
Figure 6.11 Industrial Connections in HD Video Industry
The equipment products in the HDTV industry included broadcast equipment, 
programme production equipment, and user-end equipment (see Figure 6.11). However, 
Taiwan’s strength lay in current manufacturing and assembly industries in terms of 
consumer electronics manufacturing rather than broadcast and cinema equipment 
manufacturing. ADL suggested that Taiwan should focus on user-end products, and not 
on the development of broadcast and cinema equipment because there heavy R&D and 
investment favoured large enterprises. There was almost no broadcast and cinema 
equipment industry in Taiwan, thus it could not compete with others. As for software 
production, Taiwan might have an opportunity to capture the markets in China and 
Hong-Kong, and overseas Chinese by providing Chinese movies, and TV programmes 
in the future.
It was the original expectation of government to build a consumer electronics
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industry as one of the strategic industries, not a broadcast and cinema equipment 
industry. HDTV development became the catalyst to revitalise the consumer electronics 
industry, in particular, HDTV user-end products. These are in the rising field of the 
consumer electronics industry.
4.2.5. Technology tactic: product-oriented development
In order to maintain the effectiveness of STP, the tactic for technology development 
was left with intermediate product development (Interview No.3). This was partly 
because of the requirements of the private sector, and partly because of the fear that 
ITRI might fail to develop the complete technology or that HDTV market might fail to 
take off after the end of plan. Technology development in HDTV STP concentrated on 
core technologies and key components for relative products rather than on technology 
for new standards.
The product-oriented technology development served as the base for product 
development consortia, which were prerequisites to support the HD Video industry. 
Indeed, the HDTV did not take off as predicted but some interim products have been 
marketed, and the investment of HDTV STP and of private sector has not been wasted.
4.3. Other Technology Sources
201 HDTV-related projects funded to leading national universities during 1991-96 by 
NSC from which 82 patents were derived (HDTV office, 1996:45). However, the 
importance is not the funding of these projects, but the application of R&D results by 
the industry. The R&D outputs by university professors, if applicable to HDTV 
products development, have been transferred to CCL for developing key component 
prototypes. These prototypes could then be manufactured by local companies to be used 
in their HDTV products.
ITRI has been actively engaged in incorporating technologies from international 
sources. ITRI represented the whole industry in negotiating technology transfer with
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foreign institutes. In the case of HDTV, the finance for technology' transfer from foreign 
sources was paid by HDTV STP. In other words, it is the government incorporating 
technology- for local industries, an invisible subsidy.
Figure 6.12 AT&T/ITRI Patent License Agreement
300 patents/years 
active valuable 
Patents 800
--------------------------------- ►
800-900 patents/year 
active valuable 
Patents 10,000
Grant Area Communication, semiconductor, optical Information Products
18 fields o f use
Benefits Efficient Royalty Collection Scheme Avoidance o f  patent infringement
Increase use o f AT&T patents in Taiwan Royalty rate reduction
* Taiwanese vendors that sign on the patent license agreement to access AT&T patents 
Source ITRI
Figure 6.12 shows the cross-license agreement between AT&T and ITRI which 
benefited those firms who signed a contract with ITRI. In this example, ITRI provides 
the access to AT&T’s patents for the industrial sector. Without ITRTs efforts to marry 
with international institutions, local firms would find it difficult to get the technologies 
they wanted by their own efforts. However, Taiwan is not only just a technology 
importer but adopter and improver of technologies acquired (Mathews, 1995:244).
5. HDTV-RELATED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT CONSORTIA
In the preceding chapter, a product R&D consortium was the key leading to the rise of 
the NPC industry in Taiwan. The NPC Alliance linking the research institute with the 
industry in order to ‘create’ a strongly competitive product bridged the time gap 
between the development of generic technology and of product commercialisation. This 
model of effective operation of the product developmenj ponsortium has become an
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institutional norm in Taiwan’s innovation system. Since then, under the requirement of 
MOEA, the incorporation of ‘industrial cooperation’ has developed into one of the very 
important criteria used to assess the application for STP by the public research institutes 
(Interview No.6 & 27). The government intends to bring the industrial sector into the 
process of technology development from the very beginning which would possibly be 
the most effective method of technology transfer ever employed in Taiwan. Moreover, 
the connections between research institutes and the industry have improved ‘mutual 
understanding’ through the product development consortia.
The operation of each HDTV-related product development consortium is very 
similar to the case of the NPC Alliance. The following discussions will stress the 
improvements and the characteristics of these consortia. The advantageous benefits of 
these consortia, have been expressed in chapter 5. The most distinctive difference 
between NPC and HDTV is the scale of product creation. The NPC Alliance focused on 
just one product, HDTV consortia on more than ten products in five years that intended 
to build a ‘new’ industry. The analysis will be biased towards the collusive cooperation 
of all participating firms and its impact on the development of the HDTV industry 
rather than on the operation of an individual consortium.
5.1. The Formation of Joint Development Consortia
The formation of consortia was divided into three periods, namely, design period, 
warm-up period, and contracting period. The whole process was organised by CCL and 
TEEMA. In the design period, CCL and TEEMA invited leading firms, who had better 
manufacturing experience and R&D capability, to discuss about developing certain 
products in their expert fields. If the firm was willing to lead a product development, it 
should advance a plan to define the time, manpower, and budget needed in the R&D 
process, and to design the functions and standards of product.
In the warm-up period, CCL and TEEMA held seminars on new technologies/ 
products, inviting firms to join development consortia. TEEMA collected the initial
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agreements signed by those firms interested in consortia after the seminars. In the 
contracting period, ITRI, TEEMA, leading firms and firms interested, discussed the 
contract in terms of technology, product, and details for cooperation. Normally, the 
contract could be agreed in a short time. If it was too extensive and the technology was 
too complicated to be determined immediately, a preparation committee (with a little 
money pay by firms to cover costs) would run for 2-3 months until agreement was 
reached by all parties. Thirteen consortia were formed under HDTV STP in 1991-96. 
The criteria for selection restricted participation to those firms with considerable 
manufacturing experience in the related industries. In order to avoid market disarray 
after the product was created, the number of firms in each consortium was less than ten 
except the ITV/STB consortium which aimed at creating domestic standardisation.
Chart 6.13 HDTV-Related Product Development Consortia
1991-93
Consortia-Complex
---- ATV
WS monitor 
— PTV 
— DSC 
— DAT 
GC
1993-96
Consortia-Com plex 
— PTV (I)
— PTV (III)
---- H D T V  Rx
---- W S ATV
---- V ideo in fo  Rx
----- ITV/STB
---- H D -D SC
ATV: Advanced TV 
PTV: Projection TV 
WS: wide Screen 
DSC Digital Still Camera 
DAT Digital Audio Tape 
GC: Ghost Canceller 
Rx: Receiver 
ITV: Interactive TV 
STB: Set-top Box 
(I): 1 lens; (III): 3 lenses 
Videoinfo: Video
information
All HDTV consortia were organised by and affiliated with TEEMA except that 
technology per se was still associated with ITRI. TEEMA functioned in the same way 
as in the NPC Alliance, but the tasks were much heavier because several consortia 
operated simultaneously. Nominally, consortia hosted by TEEMA, and ITRI became 
contractors in two technological terms, transferring techhologies to firms through early
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licensing contracts and entrusting product development to leading firms by 
subcontracting.
Chart 6.13 demonstrates the relationships of all HDTV-related consortia in which 
13 consortia belong to 1991-93 and 1993-96 consortia-complexes respectively. Table 
6.14 shows the details of each consortium regarding the leading firm, participating 
firms, time span, and finance.
Table 6.14 HDTV Consortia, 1991-96
Consortium Plan time Subconitracting Early Licensin g
Leading
firm
Contracting 
fee, NTS
Participating
firms
Licence 
fee (total)
ATV 01/07/91-
30/06/93
Proton 15,500K Proton, Sampo, Sanyo, Chung- 
Shin Tatung
7,000K
WS Monitor 01/07/91-
30/06/93
Sampo 15,500K Proton, Acer, Sampo, Tatung, 
Sanyo, Sony, Kolin, Matushita, 
Teco
12,600K
PTV 01/07/91-
30/06/93
Tatung 15,500K Proton, Sampo, Acer, Tatung, 
Sanyo, Sony
8,400K
DSC 01/07/92-
30/06/94
BTC 14,000K BTC (extended to 30/06/95) 2,500K
DAT 15/01/92-
15/09/92
L ong-Shine L653K Long-Shine 2,000K
Ghost
Canceller
01/07/91-
30/06/93
CCL 40,000K Proton, Sampo, Kolin, Tatung, 
Sanyo, Sony, Teco, Matushita, 
Cung-Hsing
900K
PTV(l) 01/08/93-
30/06/95
Sony 16,000K Tatung, Sony, Proton, Sampo, 
Teco
4,000K
PTV(III) 01/08/93-
30/06/94
Tatung 16,000K Tatung, Sony, Proton, Sampo, 
TeCO (extended to 30/06/% )
4,000K
HDTV-Rx 01/01/94-
30/09/97
Sampo 38,000K Tatung, Sony, Proton, Sampo, 
Teco, Kolin, Matsushita, Sanyo, 
Chung-Shin
27,000K
W.S.ATV 
(32” & 36”)
01/08/93-
30/06/95
Proton 23,900K Tatung, Proton, Sampo, Teco, 
Sony, Matsushita, Acer
14,100K
Videoinfo
receiver
01/03/94-
31/12/95
TECO 12,000K Tatung, Sony, Proton, Sampo, 
Teco, Matsushita, Acer
3,500K.
ITV/STB 01/07/95-
30/11/95
CCL - Tatung, Sampo, Acer, Philips, 
etc 21 firms in total
2,100K.
IID-DSC 01/07/94-
30/06/96
Umax 15.000K Umax (another two firms 
suspended)
2.000K
Total 5 years m 183.053K 86 time/firms 88,000K
Source: ITR1 (Mar 1996:29-30). K * 1,000.
Note: Sony, Matushita (National/Panasonic), Sanyo and Philips are joint ventures o f  Taiwan's capital and
foreign firms.
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5.2. The Operation of a Single Consortium
5.2.1. Contract relations
The relations between ITRI. leading firms and participating firms were identical in all 
HDTV consortia. Figure 6.15 displays a general picture of the interaction within a 
consortium. Unlike the NPC case where the private sector as the unity interacted with 
ITRI in the process of product development, the participating firms divided into two 
parts to make a contract with ITRI. The leading firm took the responsibility of product 
creation and other firms were simply technology recipients.
Figure 6.15 Relations between ITRI, Leading Firm, and Participating Firms
ITRI played the role as a technology innovator to develop supporting technologies 
for product development. However, it was no longer doing the job of product creation. 
This might be a response to foreign criticism of ITRTs R&D activities being directly 
involved in commercial production. In order to avoid further criticism, or even more 
worse results, such as violating international regulations leading to the imposition of 
economic sanctions by trading partners, ITRI retreated from the commercialisation of 
technology, and concentrated on pre-competitive technology development.
Subcontracting and early licensing underlay the new model of joint development.
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The leading role of product creation performed by ITR1 has been shifted to leading 
firms by subcontracts. The subcontracting fee to the leading firm was paid from the 
HDTV STP budget, which was at ITRTs discretion, in order to cover the costs of 
product creation. The main work of the leading firm was to create a product as defined 
in the contract with necessary support from ITRi, such as core technologies, facilities, 
and technical advice. The R&D team was organised solely by the leading firm's 
engineers. According to the contract, the leading firm had to submit technical reports to 
CCL, to hold meetings to teach engineers from participating firms quarterly. CCL 
monitored the progress of R&D.
Early licensing, or pre-competitive technology transfer, is the contract between 
ITRI and firms. This is designed to encourage firms to take part in the process of 
technology development in order to cultivate their own research experience. 
Participating firms (including the leading firm) should pay the early licensing fee as a 
condition of joining the consortium. Being a member of a joint development consortium, 
a firm can obtain two kinds of technological resources, one is core technologies from 
ITRI, and the other is manufacturing know-how (including a prototype product in most 
cases) from a leading firm. Product differentiation is the task of the individual firm so 
as to avoid a high convergence of products. The only involvement of a participating 
firm in relation to technology was the definition of the product in the pre-operation of 
the consortium.
More detailed operations of a consortium, using the ATV consortium as an 
example, will be illustrated91. This was a consortium led by Proton with another five 
participating firms. The supporting technologies from ITRI were ghost cancellation, 
analogue-digital signal conversion, and image compression and process, and these 
technologies were transferred to participating firms as well. All other TV technologies
*' There were too many HDTV-related consortia in operation in 1991-96, so it is too difficult to elaborate every case 
Two interviewees (Interview No.8 A 10) are the heads of RAD departments in two leading firms (Proton A Tatung). I 
have better knowledge about four of the consortia, which are ATV and WS ATV by Proton, and PTV and PTV (HI) by 
Tatung. I use the ATV consortium si the demo esse because this product can be seen as the closest to previous 
products of HDTV.
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applied on ATV were from Proton’s own research.
The subcontracting fee to Proton was NTS 15.5 million paid by ITRI, and the total 
early licensing fees to ITRI were NTS7 million. The difference between the two fees 
was invisibly subsidised from HDTV STP in the name of subcontracting. This kind of 
subsidy can not observed from the national budget which was hidden inside the budget 
of STP. The firms did not need to burden the participating consortium with a large 
R&D investment because most costs were paid by the government. As far as the firms 
were concerned (Interview No.8), the benefits of obtaining new technologies and 
entering the field of new products are tremendous compared with the small sums of 
money needed (about US$55,000 in the each case of ATV, WS monitor & PTV) for the 
early licensing fee. No wonder three main TV manufacturers (Proton, Tatung & Sampo) 
joined 11 out of 13 consortia.
Normally, technical consultation meetings were held every three months at 
TEEMA with up to five engineers (most of whom are senior engineers and R&D 
managers) attending from each firm. Proton had to answer the requests advanced by 
participating firms and gave lectures to those attending. Meantime, technical reports 
(containing design type, structure, materials and material sources), submitted to CCL 
quarterly, were given to firms. The production line of Proton was open for visiting by 
other firms to assess and understand the manufacturing procedures. Most importantly, 
Proton would teach technology recipients how to make adjustments in terms of product 
functions and system integration. Thus, participating firms would learn the technology 
know-how necessary for product differentiation.
According to Mr. Chuang (Interview No. 10), director of Proton R&D department,
the new model of the consortium has the following competitive advantages:
‘(1) Subcontracting the TV product development to the leading firm is very wise because the 
manufacturing firm is the expert on product design which ITRi may not able to cope with. ITRI 
should put more energy into developing generic technology with patent rather than on 
commercialisation.
(2) It promotes the quality and experience o f  engineers for product design and system integration It 
strengthened the technology foundation o f  firms, both leading firm and members
(3) It saves the resources o f  the industrial sector. If there were no such consortium organised by
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IT R I a n d  T E E M A , e a c h  f in n  w o u ld  d e p lo y  re s o u rc e s  to  do  th e  sam e  p ro d u c t , an  o v e rla p p in g  
w aste .
(4 )  It r e g u la te s  th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f  th e  p ro d u c t by  all m em b ers  b e fo re  th e  c o m m e n c e m e n t o f  th e  
c o n s o r t iu m  co u ld  in te g ra te  te c h n o lo g y  d e v e lo p m e n t an d  p ro d u c t c re a tio n  IT R I c o u ld  d e v e lo p  
c o re  te c h n o lo g ie s  a c c o rd in g  to  d e fin ed  s ta n d a rd s  a n d  d esig n , an d  s u p p o r tin g  te c h n o lo g ie s  f ro m  
IT R I c o u ld  b e  im m ed ia te ly  ap p lied  in p ro d u c t w h ich  d id  n o t n e e d  to  b e  tra n s fo rm e d  to  fit in .’
5.2.2. Supervisory relations between actors
Figure 6.16 Supervisory Relations in a Consortium
Supervision from the 
government and TEEMA 
on technology innovation 
and product creation
Supervision from members 
on technology innovation
Supervision from ITRI and 
participating firms on 
product creation
The progress of technology innovation and product creation are the top concerns 
in a consortium. Three kinds of supervision represent the expectations of different 
actors in order to ensure the quality and timing of research outcomes (Figure 6.16). The 
objects of supervision are the ITRI and the leading firm which conducted R&D 
activities. These intertwining relations monitor the efficiency of a joint development 
consortium.
The highest supervision came from the Industrial Cooperation Coordination 
Subcommittee which represented the MOEA branches (DIT, IDB, ITRI, and 
Department of Accounting) and TEEMA in monitoring the operations of the consortium. 
DIT authorised HDTV STP to CCL/ITRI and presided over the effectiveness of the 
technology project. IDB, in charge of industrial technology development supervised the 
movement of the consortium to match the strategy for the development of the HDTV 
industry. The Department of Accounting scrutinised the use of HDTV STP budget 
allocated to ITRI and the subcontract to leading firm. ITRI and TEEMA, the co­
organisers of the consortium, took the responsibility for the success of the consortium.
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Beside the supervisory functions, a Subcommittee coordinated all participants to enable 
the smooth running of the consortium. This Subcommittee, mostly representing the 
government, monitored the process of product creation and technology' innovation 
aiming at the effectiveness of technology diffusion.
The supervision from leading and participating firms was on technology 
development conducted by 1TRI. In contract terms, they paid the early licensing fees in 
order to transfer the technology results, so they have the right to monitor progress. In 
particular, the leading firm depended on supporting technologies to further product 
creation. Any delay of technology innovation would affect the headway of product 
creation.
The supervision of the progress of product creation came from ITRI and 
participating firms. ITRI subcontracted the task of product creation to leading firms, its 
role was to supervise the R&D outcomes as defined in the contract. As the technology 
recipients of a joint development consortium, participating firms also have the right to 
monitor the leading firm in order to get the best technology know-how. Teco, the 
leading firm of Videoinfo receiver consortium, was replaced by Sampo in 1996 because 
other actors were not satisfied with the progress made. At that time, Teco had 
difficulties to obtain a certain key component and to solve some obstacles.
ITRI and the leading firm were both under supervision from three directions. The 
relations between consortium actors can be characterised as the combination of 
collaborative cooperation and mutual supervision.
5.3. HDTV Consortia-Complexes
It seemed that the essence of collaborative research has changed to the extent that only 
the leading firm and ITRI were conducting R&D, while the rest of members were 
passively waiting for technology transfer. This might be so in observing only one 
consortium. However, another story is apparent when one observes the operations of all
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HDTV-related product development consortia as a whole. Collaborative research is 
deeply rooted in industrial cooperation which was realised by an innovative 
arrangement -- consortia-complex.
This innovative arrangement was constituted by a tew consortia in the process of 
HDTV development. Through their multiple-benefited behaviour, the members of all 
consortia intimately collaborated in the work of product creation. Firms committed to 
each other devoted their resources to enlarging their returns and manufacturing know­
how to many products. The government interest in this arrangement is to revive 
consumer electronics and to create a new video industry, and that of member firms is to 
obtain technology capabilities to emerging products as much as possible.
The product-oriented technology development of HDTV STP led to the 
generation of many products. Thirteen industry end products and several key 
components were developed under HDTV STP and related projects92. Most industry 
end products derived their technologies from HDTV STP. In order to absorb interim 
technological outputs, joint development consortia were organised keeping abreast of 
technology and product development.
None o f these products aimed at ultimate HDTV, which was the experimental 
task of ITRI. As far as firms were concerned, they would not take part in projects that 
could not lead to production in a short time. The attitude of leading firms towards 
accepting a project was simply based on the commercialisation of a product. As frankly 
stated by Proton (Interview No. 10), ‘if we failed to create a commercial viable product 
on piloting the R&D of a consortium, how could we face those participating firms and 
the government’? Under these circumstances, markets were the main driving force 
behind multi-dimensional product development consortia.
All HDTV consortia can be divided into two groups of consortia-complex in time
”  There were many consortia aiming at the development of HDTV-related key components which were operating at the 
same time, for example, consortia for CRT (cathode ray tube), thin-film-transistor LCD, and many 1C modules. 
However, some component consortia were under the aegis of HDTV STP, while others were related to other STPs.
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order, a 1991-93 consortia-complex and a 1993-96 consortia-complex. The former 
contained six consortia, the later seven. The characteristics of the 1991-93 consortia- 
complex is less clear than the 1993-96 one because two consortia (DSC & DAT) in 
1991-93 were joint developments between one firm and ITR1 rather than a leading firm 
and a flock of participating Anns. The picture of the 1993-96 consortia-complex is 
more explicit in the sense that only the HD-DSC consortium was a one firm consortium, 
the other six were in the form of a cross-benefit grouping network.
The 1993-96 consortia-complex will be elaborated to explain the new type of 
collective mutual-collusive congruency in terms of interactions, supervisory relations, 
cross-grouping networks, and intra-industrial trusts.
5.3.1. The dynamics o f  industrial cooperation: jo in t development
Technology development has been regarded as the dynamics of industrial cooperation. 
However, industrial cooperation is not a guarantee of the success of innovation. 
Because of the heavy competition among large companies, the R&D efforts of a large 
company are normally conducted internally. Although some of them were strategically 
allied with others, the joint development did not appear to be well coordinated. The key 
to a successful joint technology development depends not only on effective 
management of the alliance, but also in mutual trust and consensus.
Taiwan’s domestic strategic alliances like the case of HDTV consortia have three 
significant features in comparison with its foreign counterparts. First, Taiwan’s 
alliances were public sector R&D institute-generated cases. Unlike international 
alliances formed by an agreement between firms, firms in Taiwan were invited to join 
consortia by ITRI and TEEMA. The deep involvement of ITRI in forming R&D 
consortia shows the importance of the public sector in promoting industrial cooperation.
Secondly, joint development including the efforts of ITRI and the government 
(HDTV STP) was the main motivation for industrial cooperation. Essential technology
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developments were contracted out or financially subsidised from the government to the 
private sector in most advanced countries, while Taiwan took advantage of public 
laboratories for the development of industrial technology. To maintain a R&D team 
which is considerably larger than those of most multinationals93, is unthinkable for 
Taiwan's firms, let alone its regular finance (given as STPs) from the government.
Thirdly, the benefits of industrial cooperation by consortia were twofold; one is 
technology transfer from 1TR1, the other is manufacturing know-how transfer from 
leading firms. While technology development and format/system standardisation are 
basic reasons for the formation of international alliances, only very few alliances aimed 
at product development. Therefore, product creation as the dynamic for industrial 
cooperation in Taiwan was rare in an international perspective. As with the rules of 
MOEA with regard to STPs in the 1990s, the incorporation of industrial cooperation 
into STP was essential, in particular, early licensing and product creation (Interview 
No.27).
5.3.2. Cross-grouping network: a fa ir  mechanism o f  division o f  labour
The initiation of a cross-grouping network reflected two facts that led to a new division 
of labour. The first is that the retreat of ITRI on product development is unavoidable. 
Besides, it is an impossible mission to develop a new area of digital video technology 
and to commercialise several new products at the same time according to CCL’s 
manpower and time limitation. The foundation of digital video technology in Taiwan 
was weak, almost started from nothing. Thus, ITRI had to concentrate on the 
development of generic technology rather than on the creation of a prototype product 
model as the Teamate project did. The tasks of product creation shifted to the hands of 
leading firms.
The second fact is that to maximise resource utilisation the R&D of a product
*’ In March 1995, the number of employees in ITRI was 3,780 in which half had postgraduate degrees and 37.7% (31%) 
had more than 10 (5* 10) years professional experience. It is almost impossible for the private sector firms to keep such 
a R&D organisation not only because of huge personnel expenditure, but also because of its non-profit operations.
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must be allocated to firms. The R&D manpower could only learn the process of product 
creation but not cultivate their own experience on product design and integration when 
1TRJ was in charge of product commercialisation. Moreover, many research resources 
in the private sector were idle (may be they were doing their own work, but not for the 
whole industry). While many participating firms in a consortia-complex were assigned 
R&D tasks, the R&D resources should be efficiently and collectively deployed in the 
targeted field. In this way, firms conducted the product of their responsibility and they 
could still access the process of technology innovation by ITRI and of product creation 
by other leading firms.
Table 6.17 Cross-Grouping Network in 1993-96 HDTV Consortia-Complex
ITRI-TEEMA Axis
Consortium WSATV PTV(III) HDTV-Rx PTV(I) Videoinfo Rx ITV-STB
SampoLeading
firm
Proton Tatung
P a r t ic ip a t in g  I
firms
A cer
Matsushita
1
□ a
p
□
Kolin
Sanyo
Matsushita
Chung-Hsing
P
5
Acer
Matsushita
□  □
a
total 21
fim w
I I = Proton = Tatung j i = Sampo = Sony [ ] :Teco
The operation of the consortia-complex was based on a ‘cross-grouping network’ 
in which a network has been constituted by interacting groups. On Table 6.17, the 
leading firm of each consortium is also a participating firm in other consortia. Therefore, 
there are overlapping identities of leading firms in every consortium. For example.
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Sampo was the leading firm in the HDTV-Rx consortium while Proton, Tatung, Sony, 
and TECO were participating firms in this consortium, but they were also leading firms 
in other consortia. Another four firms (Kolin, Sanyo, Matsushita, and Chung-Hsing) 
were simply participating firms in HDTV-Rx consortium, those firms did not charge 
any R&D for product creation as well in other consortia.
The cross-grouping network has created an effective division of labour and 
fairness. Five firms with double identities were the cardinal members of the 1993-96 
consortia-complex. Each of them was in charge of the development of a certain product, 
and also the participating firm in another five consortia (ITV-STB was led by CCL). 
This led to six R&D teams operating at the same time, and the leading firms could get 
access to all technologies and products in the consortia-complex (except HD-DSC) 
while the participating firms could get the same in their respective consortia.
The cross-grouping network enlarged the number of products for development 
which meant members could obtain technologies to the maximum extent in the same 
period of time. Cross-benefited results to each member were at the heart of the 
feasibility of the consortia-complex. The division of labour was the principle underlying 
the cross-grouping network. This is to say, one firm only devoted its resources to one 
product creation, but accepted technological know-how for six products. It could be 
argued that if the R&D tasks were not equally allocated to leading firms, and the R&D 
outputs were not discriminatingly shared by leading firms, the operation of a consortia- 
complex would be impossible. It is the way that all firms can work together -  cross­
grouping benefits.
Fairness was important to the effective operation of the consortia-complex in the 
sense that leading firms could not monopolise the technological outcomes. It was the 
rule of MOEA that the ownership of these technologies or patents belonged to the 
government rather than the firms which developed them. As the subcontracting projects 
were entrusted and core technologies were supported by ITRI, firms only had the right
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to use technologies but not to own them. Members still need to pay royalties besides 
early licensing fees when they use technologies. It is normally about 1-2 % of the 
product price. In the case of a TV set, a fixed fee of NTS150 (less than US$6) per set is 
payable. The rationale leading to state-owned technology is that MOEA hopes the 
technology can be diffused as widely as possible (Interview No.27). If some non­
member firms wish to transfer that technology during or after the running of a 
consortium, they have to pay a higher amount for technology transfer, for instance, the 
payment for technology transfer was increased by 40% per year, and fixed at the highest 
amount after the end of consortium in the case of 1991-93 consortia-complex.
It might be criticised as unfairness to leading firms that the participating firms 
shared the same outcomes by paying a tiny amount for early licensing without doing any 
R&D activities. They might want to develop a product on their own (because the 
government paid for it) but their R&D capabilities did not qualify them (those partly 
Japanese-owned assembly companies normally lacking a R&D department) or they did 
not have experience in the development of related products (Acer produced monitor but 
not TV). It seems that participating firms without R&D responsibility free rode in the 
consortia-complex. Again, as far as the government is concerned, technology diffusion 
is the priority. Thus, leading firms had to accept this fact before they participated. 
However, the disadvantage of sharing technologies with others was superseded by the 
interests of being a member. These were obtaining several product technologies at the 
same time and saving on huge R&D investments. Besides, if R&D standards applied 
were against trends, especially international ones, then the research outcome was 
meaningful (Interview No.8). If a firm did closed door product R&D regardless of 
domestic or international standards, it was likely to lead to a useless product on the 
market when there was a group of firms operating according to the standards set by the 
consortium.
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5.3.3. Àlutual-supervisory relations: the efficiency o f  consort ia-complex
According to the preceding analysis, the key to the efficiency of a consortium is the 
supervisory relationship in monitoring the quality and timing of technology 
development and product creation. CCL and leading firms were the bodies to be 
supervised from three directions, namely, top-down supervision by Industrial 
Cooperation Coordination Committee, bottom-up supervision by participating firms, 
and CCL-leading firm mutuality. The supervisory relationships in the consortia- 
complex have similar characteristics to those in the single consortium. However, the 
scale o f  the supervisory relationships between a consortia-complex is larger than that of 
a single consortium. Supervision was imposed on ITRi by all members, the same as on 
leading firms. The Industrial Cooperation Coordination Subcommittee has to monitor 
all the R&D activities under the consortia-complex. Supervision between actors has 
created positive pressure on innovators keeping their progress as planned. These 
webbed mutual-supervisions led to the efficiency of technology development and 
product creation.
In addition, a new type of supervisory relation has formed among leading firms. 
This relationship embraces competition and cooperation among leading firms. Leading 
firms acted as technology providers when they led a product development and as 
technology recipients when they were participating firms at the same time. The 
meaning of cooperation under the consortia-complex has crystallised so that leading 
firms collusively developed several products through the division of labour in order to 
accumulate technological and manufacturing know-how.
There were two kinds of competition which might occur during the running of a 
consortia-complex. One is positive competition concerning the ‘face’ problem among 
those leading firms which were large consumer electronics manufacturers in Taiwan. 
All firms in the field would assess their R&D results and judge which firm produced the 
best commercially viable product. If the results would not satisfy technology recipients, 
this would damage the reputation of technology providers in the industry. The face
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problem seriously concerns Chinese family-based firms94. Leading firms did their best 
to perfect their product commercialisation. Proton, the leading firm of ATV and WS 
ATV, put 80% of its researchers and time into developing products for consortia, while 
Tatung, leading firm of PTV and PTV (III), also deemed the consortia's projects as the 
priority' and put advanced technology' into the product95. Positive competition based on 
‘value of face’ did promote the R&D performances of leading firms. According to a
survey about the evaluation of technical outputs by the leading firms, most firms gave a
• % certain answer .
The other is negative competition connected to market considerations between 
leading firms. Unlike ITRI, a public sector institution which does not aim at 
commercial returns but at providing technologies to the industrial sector, leading firms 
under the consortia-complex will be future competitors on product sales. There is a 
possibility that a leading firm might conceal part of the technology from other members 
in order to strengthen its own competitive advantage. Once a firm’s self-interested 
behaviour is discovered, others might follow, then the selfishness of firms could 
jeopardise the operation of the whole consortia-complex.
There are means of preventing negative competition which might occur in the 
consortia-complex. For instance, ITRI could examine the periodic outputs from 
technical reports, and participating firms could sense whether a leading firm had 
concealed something by testing the functions and physical design of products. Besides,
94 It has to be admitted that this cultural assertion is neither well-justified nor theory-backed, rather a personal sense 
that derived from the long experience of living in Taiwanese society for more than two decades. Most consumer
electronics firms are family-run Customarily , Taiwanese put business name in front of family name when referring to a 
family with large business, for instance. Tatung Lin family and Sampo Chen family . Thus, the reputation of a family is 
closely linked to that of the enterprise The negative image of enterprise is seen as damage to the family This is also 
applied to the cases of product creation by leading firms, because the outcomes were comparable 
9 Tatung has long-term cooperative relations with Japanese Toshiba Those technologies used in PTV products derived 
from the cooperative development between Tatung and Toshiba As the statement of Interview No 8 demonstrates, if 
Tatung was unwilling to publicise its technologies, Tatung would not have joined the consortia 
"  This survey was based on the three consortia (ATV, PTV & WS monitor) in the 1991-93 complex The indicators of 
evaluation of the product were classified as high, middle, and low satisfaction Only one firm answered as high in all 
three consortia, and this firm is the leading firm itself In the ATV case, three firms answered in the middle and one 
firm in the low, in the PTV case, all firms in the middle, and in the WS monitor case, five firm in the middle and three 
in the low According to the finding of this survey (J.F Lee, 1904), the evaluation hat been affected by the firms' 
attributes This was similar to the findings of the NPC Alliance case by D Ijcc (1992)
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the stronger the positive competition and mutual benefit results, the weaker the negative 
competition and selfishness. Inter-firm trust needed to be established within the 
consortia-complex to erase any selfishness and speculation.
5.3.4. Intra-industry trust: based on intermediate organisation
The intermediate organisations are important factors in establishing intra-industry trust. 
Firms compete with each other to increase their market shares. Although strategic 
alliances tie them together, conflicts of interest can not be avoided, such as resource 
sharing, duty allocation, and the management of alliance. ITRI, TEEMA and Industrial 
Cooperation Coordination Committee have played the role of third parties with no 
profit motive or vested interests. Coordination by these intermediate organisations has 
been accepted as the norm by all firms.
The intra-industry trust stemmed from three sources, all with direct connection to 
intermediate organisations. In financial terms, there were no financial relations between 
members, so firms can expect mutual trust. The government undertook most R&D cost, 
and firms only paid a little for early licensing fees. Each leading firm has been granted a 
substantial amount for product creation, which was independent of members. In 
technological terms, core technologies transferred to firms, and manufacturing know­
how cross-benefited members, equivalently. ITRI was the central point dealing with 
technology transfer, in which generic technology transferred from ITRI to members, 
and manufacturing technology submitted to ITRI by a leading firm was then transferred 
to members. In cross-grouping network terms, the ITRI-TEEMA axis designed the 
framework of consortia-complex. Thus, firms participated in consortia based on their 
trust in intermediaries rather than on other firms.
Once the inter-firm trust has been established in an industry, further consortia in 
the future will be easier to form and run. The relationships between firms through the 
running process of consortia would grow as long as that cooperative experience was 
satisfactory. These relationships include personal network, centre-satellite system,
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channels for exchanging technology and information, and most important, the mutuality 
of trust.
Intra-industrial trust mutuality is hard to establish. Three conditions are essential 
for building trust mutuality: cooperative opportunity, satisfactory experience and equal- 
shared benefits. In fact, HDTV consortia were not the first cooperative case in Taiwan's 
TV industry. In 1980-81, there was a cooperative project for a common TV set with 11 
participating firms97. However, the effects of this project were relatively small and did 
not decelerate the decline of TV exports. This did nothing to help the development of 
trust between firms. The HDTV case is an example of establishing intra-industrial trust 
by these three means.
5.3.5. Non-conflict congruency: the key to success
The similarity of intention in the development of HDTV for both the public and private 
sectors are the foundation of success. An outward-oriented goal was the common 
characteristic of all parts.
The government is the main support for the consortia-complex in terms of budget. 
The final aim was to promote the international competitiveness of the strategic 
consumer electronics industry. STPs were the policy instruments to enhance the 
technology capability of selected industries. ITR1 was the implementor of HDTV STP 
so as to provide basic digital video technologies needed for competitive products. 
HDTV consortia-complexes have been institutionalised as a means of keeping 
technology diffusion and product creation under the associational management of ITR1 
and TEEMA.
The aim of the industrial sector was concentrated on international markets. All
97 This was a typical ‘administrative guidance' case in forming a consortium in which IDB required TV industry to 
organise a project for the development of common set in order to reduce production cost when Taiwan's TV exports 
had been seriously threatened by more competitive Korean products The government only paid lip service, and 
assigned Tatung as the directing firm in charge of all efforts (Interview No.8 was the director then). There was no 
subsidy from IDB, the costs were shared by members This w u  not ■ sector*initiated case, but a case that firms had to 
keep the face of IDB by following its guidance.
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members' attempts to create a strong industry have converged on the competitive 
products. In answering why large firms joined consortia, Tatung stated (Interview No.8), 
‘it hopes to inspect and learn from each other's work so as to strengthen the 
infrastructure of industry’; and Proton stated (Interview No. 10), ‘only in an industrial 
environment where everyone is strong, then one can become strong because we (leading 
firms) focus on overseas markets’. While multi-product creation through consortia- 
complexes brought about industrial cooperation, firms have cohesively collaborated to 
achieve the same goal of learning more technology know-hows by fair division of 
labour. Products are the objectives to achieve ambitions either for promoting industrial 
competitiveness by the government or for increasing international market shares by the 
industry. Many interim products have been marketed as the achievement of consortia- 
complexes.
The non-conflict congruency of all actors leading to the formation of tacit 
understanding in HDTV development is the key to the successful operation of 
consortia-complexes. The congruency resulted in vertical integration of the efforts of 
different levels, namely, strategic planning of the government, technology innovation of 
ITRI, and the product creation of the industrial sector; and horizontal division of labour 
by leading firms.
6. STATE-INDUSTRIAL ARRANGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITIVENESS
6.1. State-Industrial Arrangement in HDTV Development
After the NPC Alliance, the incorporation of industrial cooperation coupled with the 
public research institutes has been institutionalised as a new mechanism of government- 
industry interaction in conjunction with technology innovation and diffusion. In this 
new state-industrial arrangement, the state plays a significant role in the strategic 
planning and funding of technology innovation. The responsibilities of technology 
innovation and design of joint product development are performed by the public
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research institutes, while the tasks of product creation have been allocated to the 
industrial sector. Business associations functioned as intermediaries providing 
necessary logistic support for consortia and coordinating ITRI, leading firms and 
participating firms.
The HDTV development has been presented as a model of an institutional 
arrangement in which all necessary forces were organised into a coordinating 
framework under the HDTV office. This was expected to create an enabling 
environment for the HDTV development. The Steering Committee and functioning 
Subcommittees were in charge of respective tasks. It could be argued that whole 
operation of the HDTV office was state-mandated because the Committee and 
Subcommittees had representatives from many public agencies. Functionally speaking, 
the HDTV office could be seen as a small IDB in charge of the development of the 
video electronics industry alone, while there are also another five industry-specific 
offices in charge of respective work in relation to other strategic industries.
As for the concerns of technology diffusion, consortia-complexes are the best 
mechanism ever created in Taiwan. ‘Successful innovation relies on interaction among 
different activities (Mowery, 1995:515)’, which means that scientific/technological 
research alone is not sufficient without the accommodation of industrial application. 
Consortia-complexes are not only linking the industry and knowledge-based institutions, 
but also integrating activities of technology innovation and product creation. The 
effectiveness o f consortia-complexes on technology diffusion is comprehensive through 
which almost every firm in the consumer electronics industry has benefited.
The momentum of consortia-complexes lies in DIT’s HDTV STP. Government- 
funded projects can be characterised as a diffusion-oriented technology policy in which 
R&D outcomes lead to commercial products and technology activities have cooperation 
and participation from the industrial sector. Thus, the outlook of consortia-complexes is, 
to a large extent, defined by the state and the detailed operation and formation of
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consortia-complexes is left to the ITRI-TEEMA axis.
The HDTV development was sublimated to a higher level of government 
concerns which has affected the nature of public-private cooperation. The whole plan of 
HDTV development was to upgrade the added value of the digital video industry and, to 
some extent, to create a new industry by substituting existing products with new ones. 
Unlike the NPC Alliance which concentrated on a product, HDTV consortia-complexes 
focused on a wide range of products generated by new digitalised video technologies. 
As a result, the degree of government intervention has increased in the sense that the 
many public agencies concerned were directly involved in the process, instead of just 
using ITRI as a surrogate. The institutional arrangements of public-private cooperation 
are confined to technology ditYusion, apart from which the state dominated most 
activities supporting the development.
The nature of state-industrial arrangements on technology diffusion remains the 
same as the NPC Alliance, but the coverage of arrangements has been expanded by 
cross-grouping consortia. Industrial cooperation has been mobilised maximally so as to 
spin off a sector-wide collaborative complex leading to the commercialisation of many 
products simultaneously. The process of technology diffusion, however, was still under 
the dominance of ITRJ-TEEMA axis.
It is the state that set up TEEMA and firms to accommodate its policy by 
deploying NT$2 billion STP and other incentives which were an irresistible attraction to 
industry. This is the method to promote industrial cooperation without authoritarian 
coercion. It relied on interdependence between the two sectors since the state needed 
industry to promote international competitiveness and the industry was lured by public 
investment. The state did not apply neocorporatism, nor industrial dirigisme. 
‘Neocorporatist theories of organised interest intermediation between state and civil 
society offer the possibility for the assertion of public authority, but under limited state 
sovereignty (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997:15).’ It is right that TEEMA offered an
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entering point for the assertion of state intervention into the industry, but TEEMA acted 
more as an intermediary to implement state policy rather than to negotiate collectively 
with the state. The state has moved from its regulatory role to a more enabling role, and 
the nature of its policy has released it from unilateral action (administrative guidance) 
to voluntary exchange (beneficial interdependence). Even in 1990s, the Taiwanese state 
is certainly not a state which does nothing, but one which supplies almost everything 
except interfering with the operation of firms.
This style of state-industrial arrangement was not created spontaneously by the 
public-private interaction, but by gradual institutional evolution. This arrangement has 
been modified through time and learning from errors. Effective state intervention has 
been perceived as one means of economic management (Developmentalist literature), 
rejecting the market as the ideal and universal economic arrangement, but state- 
industrial arrangements like that in Taiwan are assumed to be an integral part of 
successful capitalist development. Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997) concluded that (1) 
‘any institutional arrangement has its strengths and weaknesses; (2) such institutions 
evolve according to a logic specific to each society; (3) institutions continuously 
respond to changing circumstance, and are not static entities’.
6.2. Its Impacts on International Competitiveness
The measurement of the effects on international competitiveness of the state-industrial 
arrangement for the HDTV development in Taiwan faces the same difficulties as trying 
to measure the output of S&T activity. ‘It may be able to indicate industries where 
(R&D) returns have been specially high or low, but it will not be able to tell us whether 
a particular proposed R&D project is a good bet or not (Griliches, 1995:80-1)’. There 
are only two kinds of measurable data, concerning the contributions of R&D, in 
industry and national real output accounts (ibid.:83). In terms of industry, the growth of 
productivity can be observed from the market indicators (domestic sales and exports). 
However, to evaluate the R&D outputs of HDTV STP and consortia-complexes in this
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respect is far more difficult at this stage since markets for digital video products are still 
very new and reliable statistics for sales are unavailable. Moreover, even if reliable 
market statistics for both domestic sales and exports were available, it is still difficult to 
distinguish digital and advanced TV from traditional TV because TV products are 
categorised now only as Colour TV or Black and White TV.
However, the exact time structure of the effects of R&D on productivity is 
difficult to estimate. It might take decades to prove the contributions of R&D to a 
particular industry. For instance, the technology investment of Taiwan government in 
the IC industry was initiated in the 1960s, however, the commercial returns only 
became positive in the early 1980s; the same situation happened in the automation 
industry in which a spin-off company from ITRI took seven years to start making profits 
(Interview No.27). Some invisible effects of technology investment can not be simply 
observed in such a short time. Increasing technological capability and cultivating 
industrial specialists are of paramount importance to the industry as a whole and 
influence long-term competitiveness rather than the immediate growth of productivity.
It is too risky to jump to a conclusion that HDTV STP and consortia-complexes 
are failures by judging the productivity outputs of the video industry. HDTV STP is a 
courageous attempt by the Taiwan government to develop a future industry in which the 
product market is currently unpredictable. The uncertainty and risk of a technology 
project which is one step ahead of the market are greater than those of following the 
market, but the opportunity and profit of the former are relatively higher than those of 
the latter. It always means that the opportunities and high profit period have gone when 
the market is certain and the direction of product/technology is clear. Moreover, in 
developing this sort of future industry there will be competition with large international 
firms. Thus, the government should take the risks and pay the ‘tuition fee’ for the 
industry, even if the investment is eventually proved to be wrong, as suggested by the 
head of DIT (HDTV office, 1996:6).
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HDTV STP is a government investment entirely. The total input was NTS2 
billion and 850 person/year in five years. The income from technology transfer fees was 
NTS88 million, shared only 4.4% of total STP budget (HDTV office, 1996:22). The 
investment of the private sector in the process of R&D was negligible except for inputs 
of brainpower. It was the government which selected the consumer electronics industry 
as one of the strategic industries within which digital video technology had been chosen 
as a key technology to revitalise the industry. The huge investment in HDTV technology 
served as a temptation to attract local firms to participate in the process of technology 
innovation and product creation.
The effects of HDTV STP and consortia-complexes are easier to measure in other 
terms than in competitiveness terms. In terms of technology innovation, Taiwan has 
narrowed the gap with early developers. It started to catch up with the development of 
digital video technology in 1991 when most advanced countries had accumulated 
several years of experience. Betting on the right side (all-digit not analogue) saved so 
many resources which might have been deployed in the wrong direction. The 
substantial achievement of HDTV development is shown by CCL’s director of HDTV 
STP (Interview No.3), ‘we did not have digital video technology five years ago, but we 
have had more than 60 patents after 5 years efforts’. Taiwan has built a considerable 
foundation of digital video technology, although it is a 1-2 years behind the most 
advanced technology generally (ibid.).
The explicit evidence of the progress of technology was the experimental results 
in HDTV (HDTV office, 1996:23). In December 1993, CCL produced the fifth HDTV 
decoder and the third ghost canceller in the world. CCL finished a prototype HDTV set 
in June 1996, and a small trial production will take place through industrial cooperation 
with Sampo in 1997. The R&D of ‘real’ HDTV was solely done by ITR1 because the 
private sector deemed HDTV to be a ‘hot potato’ project. Taiwan’s progress in HDTV 
relieves it of competition from developing countries in the traditional TV market, by 
entering the high-value-added advanced TV market. Basically speaking, the technology
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needed for production of ATV/HDTV was handy but it was waiting for the market 
boom (Interview No.9 & 28).
In terms of product creation, many readv-to-market and marketed products have 
been developed through consortia-complexes. The development of these interim 
products (consumer end products and components) upgraded manufacturing technology 
as well as their added values. Many firms are manufacturing or have plans to 
manufacture some products. For example, WS ATV, WS Monitor, PTV (I), DSC, VCD, 
and STB have been marketed. Only a little data about the sales of these new products 
can be found so far. The export of STB by OEM was about 1 million sets in 1996, and 
estimated to be about 2-3 million sets in 1997 (HDTV newsletter, Dec. 1996:5-6). In 
1992, the sale of ATV was 1,500 sets and the output value was NTS72 million. During 
1993 to 1995, the domestic sale of WS ATV was about 15 thousand sets and the total 
output value was over NTS 1.2 billion which shared about 60% of the budget HDTV 
STP (ITRI, Mar. 1996:31). The sale of a single product (exports excluded) amounted to 
over half of STP’s budget in only a 3-year sale. As a consequence of HDTV STP, sales 
should be achieved in total which are several times the STP investment. The judgement 
of the effect o f HDTV STP on productivity should wait for another five years, when 
there will be enough information.
In terms of technology diffusion, it is argued that the case of HDTV was very 
successful in the sense that digital video technology has been widely transferred to the 
industrial sector. Firms absorbed technology know-how as well as application know­
how, not confined to the field and the product alone but to all of the newly emerging 
innovations in the digital video industry. It would be impossible for a firm to develop so 
many technologies and products in only a five year span with as little money as the fees 
which they are required to pay. Taking a firm joining 11 consortia as an example, it is 
estimated that about NTS 15 million would have been paid in early licensing fees, but 
the returns in the form of technology transfer and manufacturing know-how were 
invaluable.
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In terms of the externalities of technology- development, firms and the industry 
have benefited from the spillover effects. Beside the possession of the technology and 
the product, the process of consortia-complexes served as the best on the job training 
opportunities for engineers in the private sector. According to the opinions of Proton 
and Tatung (Interview No.8 & 10), access to the process of technology development at 
the CCL and the technical meetings provided by other leading firms have had very 
strong impacts on strengthening the capacity of engineers. The experience which 
engineers absorbed and learned in five years has been worth at least ten years of 
professional experience. This was also one of the reasons that firms participated in as 
many consortia as possible. The establishment of cooperative experience and intra­
industrial trust could be the dynamics for further collaboration. Moreover, regarding the 
joint development efforts with public sector research institutes, the leading firms were 
actively engaging in the development of HDTV by consolidating their own resources 
(finance, research manpower, and experience) with outside research organisation and 
other companies. The strong technological innovator-adopter linkages, on an 
unprecedented scale in this industry, have enhanced processes of learning and 
creativity.
In a word, Taiwan’s competitiveness in this industry is still ambiguous at this 
stage. The past five year should be deemed as a training period for domestic firms. The 
effects of training can only be measured when the soldiers are in the battle which is not 
far off now. If Taiwan could get a certain position in the battle as it did with the 
computer and semiconductor industry, then the consumer electronics industry would be 
revitalised; if Taiwan missed the opportunity, it might become an assembly line for 
foreign firms and a low-end products manufacturer forever.
7. CONCLUSION
Two points deriving from the Taiwan’s experience of HDTV development should be 
addressed here. One concerns the question whether the market or the state was the
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driving force behind the development of HDTV. The second is whether this new form 
of state-industrial arrangement, seen as the non-economic by-product of the HDTV 
development, is a feasible institution for Taiwan's technology development.
The press (Liberty Time, 07/04/96) criticised the effectiveness of the HDTV STP 
in the sense that many core technologies for products (such as DVD, digital vision 
process technology, and HDTV set) were underdeveloped, and the ultimate target of 
HDTV, to broadcast, failed by the end of project. The time to broadcast digital 
terrestrial TV is by the end of 1998, almost at the same time as most advanced countries. 
Although the press understood the long delay in achieving international standards, 
which was an obstacle to further development, the reason lay behind that, probably, 
there was no market data to be assessed. However, the non-economic results were 
ignored by most of the analysis while attention was focused on technologies and 
products.
It is right to suggest that the market is much more important than the state in the 
development of HDTV. The cases of Europe, Japan and Taiwan all show that the efforts 
of government still can not create an enabling market environment for HDTV. The 
market factors (price sensitivity, willingness of broadcasters and consumers’ preference) 
seem to be the driving force to raise the new market for HDTV. With the 
accommodation of the market, HDTV might be necessary living room equipment in 
every home. Technology alone which is where the government’s efforts focused (at 
least in financial terms), is insufficient to promote the growth of the HDTV industry.
This is not saying that the state is less important than the market in HDTV 
development. Without the support of the state, the HDTV R&D would never have
reached its present level in Taiwan. The private sector was reluctant to invest in the
%
development of frontline technology because of the lack of short term commercial 
returns. Therefore, the government encouraged by foreign advisors took the 
responsibility for the development of HDTV technology. HDTV technology, as the
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technology o f ‘if-we-don’t-do-today-regret-tomorrow’ (Interview No.6), is essential for 
the consumer electronics industry. Furthermore, those interim products which sprung 
from the HDTV development would not be available if there was no STP to promote 
the technology innovation and product creation.
As for the concerns about the motivation of the state, it can be interpreted in 
Chinese language terms. The government hopes to cause the effects of ‘to throw a brick 
and to get gems in return’ (i$6$3[3i)- a polite term in making a donation (investment) 
to a worthy cause in the hope that others may follow suit. The NT$2 billion investment 
of HDTV STP was the brick and the future investments of the private sector in 
production were the gems. The calculation of the state was that the R&D investment of 
government would stimulate private investment by more than ten times98. In other 
words, the public investment has been multiplied several times by private investment 
which the private firms would not have made without the endorsement of the 
government in basic technology investment.
It is argued that the best achievement of HDTV development in Taiwan is 
increasing its opportunities for the future video industry. By concentrating the HDTV 
development process on product-oriented technologies, in particular, MPEG, 
technological competencies have been established.
The emerging trends in technology and global markets will continually present 
new opportunities and challenges in the video industry. Thus, the government has 
approved another STP, Digital and Interactive TV STP for another three years, to stay 
abreast of the international trend which has shifted its emphasis from HDTV to 
practical digital and interactive TV. It is argued that the market is important, but the 
government is also important in Taiwan’s case of HDTV development. The market is
91 According to Interview No.27, the ratio between public investment on technology and private investment on 
production was varies from industry to industry Generally, the ratio was at average ten times, higher in high-tech 
industry and lower in traditional industry As for the efficiency of LTP (for new products in high-tech industry). the 
private investment was about 17 times that of public investment by IW5 (http //www tnoea gov tw/~meco 
/EcoDev c/a071 htm)
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the driving force for the HDTV development, while the government is the driving force 
for innovation.
The state-industrial arrangement in HDTV development could be deemed to be 
an institutional innovation. It is also the by-product of HDTV development in terms of 
forming a feasible arrangement. However, it is the factor that should not, and could not, 
be measured by economic assessment. The non-economic fruit from the experience of 
HDTV is at the heart of public-private cooperation, and it will be deployed to most 
cases linking public research institutes and the industries in the near future. 
Subsequently, many strategic sectors have followed this state-industrial arrangement, 
which is likely to lead to an economic institution for technology innovation and 
diffusion. There is an implicit influence of this new state-industrial arrangement on the 
process o f high-tech industrialisation which the next decade will reveal.
The new state-industrial arrangements can also be characterised as an 
‘institutional’ strategic partnership, but it differs from the NPC case. The strategic 
partnership in the NPC Alliance is an accidental event which has not been pre-arranged 
by economic bureaucrats, while the strategic partnership in the HDTV case has been 
subsumed under the STP structure. The concept of ISP will be discussed in the 
following chapter, and the differences between both cases are compared in Table 7.1.
263
C H A P T E R S E V E N
C O N C L U S IO N
State-societal arrangements have been considered as an endogenous and institutional 
factor which forms a necessary part of the explanation and understanding of the 
promotion of international competitiveness. As a consequence of the rising domain of 
global markets the domestic policies, in particular in an outward-looking economy like 
Taiwan, have been sensitive to the moves of the international political economy. 
‘Technology matters to international relation/intemational political economy because it 
alters state power and adds to the agenda and instruments of state policy - not the least 
because it changes the competitiveness of nationally based sectors of economic activity’ 
(Talalay et al., 1997:3). In the case o f NPC Alliance and HDTV consortia-complexes, 
the generation of innovative activities were motivated by rising and potential market 
demands.
It is less possible that the state can act on its own and impose an IP on a specific 
sector without the active participation of the industrial sector. Under circumstances of 
fierce international competition, rapid technological changes, and heavy investment 
(physical and human capital) for innovation, conditions are created that favour an 
institutional arrangement in which the state actors and industry can cooperate and 
associate. Besides, domestic political and economic changes also forced the state to 
change its IP from direct involvement in the market towards a functional one in order to 
adjust the industrial structure.
1. INSTITUTIONALISED STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
1.1. Lessons from Empirical Findings
In chapter four the policy activism on the issues o f upgrading technological capability
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can be identified from the pervasive assistance to the private sector. These measures 
have been widely deployed to promote the willingness of the industrial sector in 
engaging R&D activities, as well as to stimulate industrial investment on high-tech and 
high-value-added industries. Many of them have exploited the international regulations 
to their marginal allowance, and this shows that, on the one hand, state policies are 
considerably limited by international political economy, and on the other hand, the 
Taiwanese state is enthusiastically promoting industrial development. However, a high 
concentration of policy measures on high-tech industries denotes the nature of selective 
intervention. In addition, a national innovation system favouring the development of 
industrial technologies has also contributed to the pace of high-tech industrialisation. 
The effectiveness of state efforts is evidenced by the facts that the manufacturing share 
of high-tech industries in the economy has rocketed and their share of total exports has 
increased to be more than half.
The NPC Alliance initiated a noticeably successful case of cooperation between 
the government laboratory and the industrial sector. It not only combined the resources 
of both sides, but also discovered a paradigm which incorporated the efforts of the 
industrial sector into the implementation of government technology projects. This case 
has shortened the time needed for technology diffusion, and finally, led to a ‘Made in 
Taiwan’ champion product. Moreover, the efficiencies and merits of this alliance have 
attracted the attention of economic bureaucrats, and the consequent result is that the 
incorporation of private cooperation has become the condition for STP. It could be said 
that an accidental event has been sublimated into an institution.
The case of HDTV consortia-complexes illustrated how GI cooperation has been 
brought into an institution and how it operated in an industry-wide setting. The 
‘paradigm’ of one product creation has been extensively deployed in order to revitalise 
a declining industry by introducing many products' creation. Afier GI collaboration 
became an institutional arrangement, the operations of these consortia have been 
redesigned to cure the shortcomings that had happened in the NPC Alliance. However,
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we also detect that state involvement in this new state-industrial arrangement has been 
deepened in the sense that the coordination and management of these activities was 
undertaken by a government established HDTV Office except those for technology 
development.
Table 7.1 Comparisons of STP, NPC Alliance and HDTV Consortia-Complexes
STPs in the 
1980s
1990-91 NPC Alliance 1991-96 HDTV 
consortia-complexes
C h a r a c te r Government policy Tripartite contract between 
ITRL, TEEMA. firms
Complex contract 
relationships
S T P ’s ro le - Back-up for product 
creation
Back-up for product 
creation
C o o p e ra tiv e  m eth o d - Strategic alliance Group o f  consortia
B u d g e t  so u rc e Government Participating firms Mostly government
R & D  ty p e Technology
innovation
Product creation Technology innovation 
& product creation
Management/
S u p e rv is io n D1T/MOEA CCL-TEAMA Axis HDTV Office
F irm ’s b a c k g ro u n d - Multiple Intra-industrial
N u m b e r  o f  F irm s - 46 86 time/firms
S ta te  in v o lv e m e n t A policy measure Low High
C o m m e rc ia l is a t io n No Yes (by ITRI) Yes (by leading firms)
T e c h n o lo g y  
t r a n s f e r /d  iffu s io n
Indirect/slow Direct/fast Direct/fast & 
industry-wide
T e c h n ic ia n
c u lt iv a tio n
Confined on ITRl’s 
researchers
Wide Industry-wide
M a in  b en e fits Upgrade
technological
capability
Creating an effective way 
o f  public-private 
cooperation
Institutionalisation of  
public-private 
cooperation
In Table 7.1 the differences between the case of the NPC and HDTV industries 
are compared and the evolution of STP in the 1990s in terms of coping with the 
creation of one new product and the creation o f a series of new products is indicated. 
Although both case studies can be described as strategic partnerships, each one provides 
different lessons to be leamt in relation to the promotion of innovative activities. In an 
institutional perspective, the NPC case can be deemed as the inspiration of a new 
institution because it has not yet been subsumed under the STP framework, while 
HDTV has been institutionalised fully. In terms of organisation, both cases are similar 
in their effective way of creating produces). The NPC case is through a strategic
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alliance in which the relationships between 1TRI and firms are singular, and these 
relationships are plural in the HDTV case where a consortium is constituted by two 
different contracts between ITR1, the leading firm and participating firms, and the 
consortia-complex is composed of a group of consortia. However, the nature of 
cooperation is the same and is aimed at simultaneous operations of technological 
innovation and product creation. Furthermore, there is no state intervention except with 
supporting technologies from Packaging STP in the NPC case, but there is much more 
intervention in the operations of HDTV complexes because HDTV development 
involved cross agencies coordination.
The major change of STPs in the 1990s by incorporating GI cooperation in the 
process of STP implementation, has evolved the attribute of STP from a simple 
government policy measure which was enforced by public research institutes to a joint 
GI effort by which STP/technological diffusion would be achieved in a more effective 
mode. This institutional evolution has led to direct and fast technology diffusion instead 
o f indirect and passive technological transfer.
1.2. Three Elementary Characteristics of Institutionalised Strategic Partnership
1.2.1. IP-driven institutionalisation
The state has put forward a set of IPs to help capture the economic rents from tacit 
knowledge, which has been termed ‘the new mercantilism’ by Sharp (1997:105). ‘The 
new mercantilism looks to value-added and seeks to maximise the value-added of local 
activities’, while ‘the old mercantilism focused on the location of production' (ibid.). In 
Taiwan, most IPs are aiming at promoting value-added industrial activities, a feature of 
the new mercantilism.
IPs are the main elements which underlie the institutional mechanism for state- 
industrial cooperation. Two different types of IP have turned the ISP into an institution, 
a cardinal technological IP (STP), and diverse general IPs. STP, a tool to promote the
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R&D of industrial technology, to bring private enterprises and public research institutes 
together in a form of strategic alliance or consortia-complex, is seen as a vital part of 
ISP. Cooperation between both sectors was carried out within the operation and 
limitation of STP which is under the careful supervision of the industrial authority. 
General IPs, ranging over every aspect to upgrade industrial development are deemed to 
be complementary policy instruments to cover the areas where STP is disabled.
‘Policy is an essential ingredient in the transition from one institutional regime to 
another’ (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997:441). It is not an exaggeration to state that 
current state-societal arrangements in Taiwan are mainly shaped by the enforcement of 
IP instruments. Taiwan’s institutional arrangements shifted from a state-dominated 
system towards a state-industrial cooperation that can be attributed to the replacement 
of the policies for encouraging investment by the policies for industrial upgrading. Thus, 
IPs, both functional STP and supplementary IPs, are the driving forces behind the 
evolution of institutional change.
1.2.2. Selective intervention
The new pattern of arrangements is concentrated in the emerging industries, the so- 
called winners, those considered to have enough growth potential for the state to place 
heavy bets on them. More state efforts on technological IPs are concentrated on 
accelerating the process of the creation of winners, and fewer on decelerating the 
deterioration of losers.
In Taiwan’s technology development, state intervention is not a negative 
occurrence in relation to technology diffusion, but it is hardly a matter of life or death. 
If there was no such institutional push from the state, the industry would find its own 
solutions either by sector-generated cooperation or international linkages. It is just a 
matter of time. However, state intervention has shortened the time for technology 
diffusion, integration of technology innovation and product creation, and efficiently 
combined resources in both sectors. This had a constructive impact on international
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competitiveness so that, if Taiwan’s products are not the first-to-market, at least, they 
are one of the fast followers. This would allow Taiwanese products to be on sale in a 
market skimming period.
There is a popular image that the state might reduce its influence over the 
economy as a consequence of globalising industrial activities. In Taiwan’s case, the 
state has liberalised some harsh regulations, such as trade control, and the ban on 
private banking, but it pays more attention to the technology development of rising 
industries. Those measures o f economic liberalisation concentrated on the areas that 
were highly regulated by international organisations or had been deregulated under 
pressure from the USA (Kao, 1995). They are no longer controllable by the state. But, 
in the grey area, notably state intervention in technology innovation, the state is 
aggressive in setting a framework, and redistributative in allocating resources, to 
promote strategic industries.
Collaborative innovation between the state and industrial sectors creates a new 
form of state intervention which is functional, interactive and associative, and different 
from direct, paternalistic and authoritative. State intervention aims at the function of the 
mechanism of innovation and not at directly involving the market. ISP would not be 
possible without the responsive actions of the industrial sector to associate with the 
public sector. This view is distinct from the paternalist view that the industrial sector 
would endure what ever was imposed on it by the state and the authoritarian view, that 
it would be unable to resist state intervention based on power.
1.2.3. State-industrial reciprocity
In the partnerships between government, business associations and firms, the 
government’s role is that of facilitator, catalyst, financial sponsor, and, to some extent, 
banker to new firms. The role o f business association is that of administrative assistant 
and impartial broker, but never a pressure group. I f ‘bargaining’ is one of the corporatist 
characteristics, then the application of corporatism does not explain both cases. The
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firms' role is that of participants in the innovation process and performers in promoting 
competitiveness. The GI relationship is not adversarial, rather, it is cooperative and 
reciprocal, also ‘partnering’. Industry obtained the resources necessary for R&D from 
the state, whereas the state catalysed more private investment in the respective areas. As 
a consequence, state-industrial reciprocity has been established by increasing 
competitiveness in the sense that national competitiveness in specific industry was 
promoted, and the technological competency and market share of firms in certain 
products upgraded.
Partnerships are built based on the circumstances in which the state is willing to 
support the development of key technologies financially and firms are willing to 
‘voluntarily accommodate’ policy measures. The former is because key technologies 
are deemed to be of strategic importance to emerging industries, the latter is because 
firms benefitted from following state policy. While the policy itself is not attractive to 
firms, the policy accessories are attractive. Precisely speaking, government resources, 
including budgets for the research institutes and their scientists, as well as allied 
relationships with other actors, are the backbone of partnerships. This also made the 
selective intervention feasible.
The state sees the industry as a policy instrument to fulfil developmental 
strategies whereas the industry sees the state as a sponsor to corporate strategies. The 
outward-looking strategic convergence of the state and industry has served as the main 
dynamic to form a reciprocal partnership. Nonetheless, the state played the part of the 
senior partner and industry the junior partner. Three aspects show the relative autonomy 
of the state sector. First, the state picks the winners. There is no evidence to say that 
individual industry strove for its own privileged statutes. Secondly, the state sets up ‘the 
rules of the game’, such as how to form an alliance and consortium, and the criteria for 
participating firms (not in the NPC case, but subsequent cases). The firms can only 
bargain with the state in the areas of technological development and product creation. 
Third, money talks and the state provides the budget. Compared with the total
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negligible joining fees of firms, the state sponsored most R&D costs. Even so, it does 
not change the nature of ISP as a state-industrial arrangement. At least, state-industrial 
cooperation in relation to the materialisation of STP is consensus-based, reciprocal, and 
interactive.
In a word, this institutional arrangement creates a new form of industrial 
governance combining a partly top-down meso-policy and an implementation network 
on the basis of collective action from the industrial sector and public agencies (IDB, 
DIT & ITRI). It differs from the conception of one-sided interventionist governance and 
purely free market solutions. Rather, government policies and planning, information 
availability, the utilisation of social creativity by mobilising the capacity of industrial 
actor are synthesised into an institution.
2. THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS
2.1. Focal Theory: Hart’s Model
Three associated assumptions made in chapter one need to be examined. First, there is 
no difficulty in applying to Taiwan Hart’s model. A framework designed to analyse 
advanced countries would also be applicable to the situation in Taiwan as the rising 
technological competencies of Taiwan's industries in the 1990s showed. However, it is 
not suggested that it is generally applicable to 1980s and other decades since no data 
prior to 1990 is tested in this study, and very few industries, maybe none of them, had 
the ability to challenge top competitors at that time.
The second assumption (see also Figure 3.3) is shown to be correct because 
Taiwan moved from a state comer position, a position suggested by neo-statist theories, 
to the Japanese pattern, strong state and business. According to the analysis in chapter 3, 
this was the optimum move for Taiwan to make, and remain competitive. As argued by 
Hart (1992:290-2), state-societal arrangements in a two actor coalition position are 
more conducive to diffuse new technologies than these in a one actor dominant position.
271
negligible joining fees of firms, the state sponsored most R&D costs. Even so, it does 
not change the nature of ISP as a state-industrial arrangement. At least, state-industrial 
cooperation in relation to the materialisation of STP is consensus-based, reciprocal, and 
interactive.
In a word, this institutional arrangement creates a new form of industrial 
governance combining a partly top-down meso-policy and an implementation network 
on the basis of collective action from the industrial sector and public agencies (IDB, 
DIT & ITRI). It differs from the conception of one-sided interventionist governance and 
purely free market solutions. Rather, government policies and planning, information 
availability, the utilisation of social creativity by mobilising the capacity of industrial 
actor are synthesised into an institution.
2. THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS
2.1. Focal Theory: Hart's Model
Three associated assumptions made in chapter one need to be examined. First, there is 
no difficulty in applying to Taiwan Hart’s model. A framework designed to analyse 
advanced countries would also be applicable to the situation in Taiwan as the rising 
technological competencies of Taiwan's industries in the 1990s showed. However, it is 
not suggested that it is generally applicable to 1980s and other decades since no data 
prior to 1990 is tested in this study, and very few industries, maybe none of them, had 
the ability to challenge top competitors at that time.
The second assumption (see also Figure 3.3) is shown to be correct because
%
Taiwan moved from a state comer position, a position suggested by neo-statist theories, 
to the Japanese pattern, strong state and business. According to the analysis in chapter 3, 
this was the optimum move for Taiwan to make, and remain competitive. As argued by 
Hart (1992:290-2), state-societal arrangements in a two actor coalition position are 
more conducive to diffuse new technologies than these in a one actor dominant position.
271
This explains why Taiwan rapidly increased its competitiveness in the 1990s. Although 
the state plays the role of a senior partner in this new institutional arrangement, the 
enthusiastic participation of the private sector should not be neglected. Thus, it should 
be deemed as a pattern of strong state and business but weak labour.
The third assumption illuminates how the economic functions of the state, 
industrial policy and GI relationships will be affected by the changing domestic and 
international climate. This assumption is also proved true by the empirical findings. The 
role of the state in industrial development has been transformed from controller, 
regulator and protectionist into catalyst, sponsor and partner. IP has shifted its nature 
from governing the market towards facilitating the market in a narrow sense that IP is 
aiming at creating value-added and market share. The GI relationship is away from a 
state-dominated one, to ISP.
The validity of these assumptions can be justified not only in theoretical terms, 
that Taiwan fits into Hart's model in the position of state-business side, but also in de 
facto terms that it, as a NIC, is becoming a ‘rival capitalist’. Although Taiwan is in the 
same position on Harts’ triangular model as Japan, the state-industrial arrangements of 
both countries are distinctive from each other in relation to the influence of industrial 
sector. The Japanese Keiretsu-dominated industrial sector had increasing influence in 
competing with MITI in a meso-economic policy, in particular, in high-tech electronics, 
by the end of 1980s. The Taiwanese SMEs-dominated industrial sector still follows the 
guidance of 1DB in the 1990s, but not as much as in the past. It is premature to suggest 
that Taiwan’s industry will follow the path of its Japanese counterpart. Taiwan might 
pursue its own pattern based on ISP but with respective weight between both sides.
The theoretical application of Hart’s model is dynamic. It is conducive to the 
understanding of the diversity of institutional arrangements on the basis that every 
institutional arrangement was embedded in a national setting where the society, culture 
and ideology are variant from country to country. It provides a general model which can
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explain the institutional patterns of given countries which have competitive strength on 
world market, and distinguish the performance of different institutional arrangements. It 
does not confine the theory to a particular pattern, and this leads to a flexible 
adjustment to cope the evolution of institutional changes.
Also institutions themselves are not static, but evolving. Policies will be modified 
according to the changes in the domestic and international political economy. Policy 
changes bring institutional changes in their wake. Because Hart’s conclusions were 
about the patterns of five countries drawn on historical evidence, it is necessary to 
update his arguments. To name a few, the British pattern can no longer be seen as a 
labour dominant one, after nearly two decades of conservative government. The USA 
business dominant pattern, neglected state involvement in terms of trade issues, in 
particular, patent protection. The French state dominant pattern, should also incorporate 
the influence of large enterprises into account. The response of public policies to 
changing environmental constraints has reshaped state-societal arrangements. Any 
notion for a static institution may be appropriate in a short term perspective, but it is 
arguably not the case in the longer term.
Every institutional arrangement has its own advantages and weakness. The USA 
business dominant system was once the most competitive one among rival capitalist 
systems from 1950s to 1970s. Japanese state-business and German business-labour 
patterns arose as the more competitive ones in the 1980s and 1990s. It is not suggested 
that currently well-performing systems can remain competitive forever. The strength of 
one system could be the weakness of another, and the strength of the institutional 
arrangements might become a hindrance across time. The effect of institutional 
arrangements is only justifiable when it seizes opportunities and accommodates to the 
changes. Moreover, institutional advantages can not be established spontaneously, 
rather, they have to be accumulated gradually through time and learning from trials.
The element of contemporary international competitiveness requires an
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endogenous institution that can create institutional advantages rather than be subject to 
environmental constraints. Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997:477) argued that 'The most 
competitive firms, regions, or nations are not mimicking the market but on the contrary, 
they are struggling to manufacture consensus, trust, collective forms of governance, and 
long-term vision'. Thus, competitiveness can be promoted based on mutual trust and 
long-term cooperation between institutional actors. It concurs with Hart's conclusion 
that two actor coalition arrangements are more competitive than one actor dominant 
arrangements and also matches the empirical findings of this study, that a state- 
industrial arrangement has created an innovative institution, characterised as an ISP, for 
cooperation between actors.
Three further research directions can be indicated. First, at a national level the 
state-societal arrangements of those countries in Hart’s study must be updated in order 
to observe the evolution of institutional changes since the world economy and 
technologies changed in the 1990s at a faster pace than in any previous decade. If more 
countries were brought under the analytical framework of this model then the 
generalisation of Hart’s theory would be established, based on a wide range of data and 
a more precise comparison concerning the international competitiveness of countries 
could be made. Secondly, more sectoral studies are required in the different sectoral 
structural backgrounds because there is no single way of structuring economic units and 
coordinating their activities at meso level, as well as at national level. Hart’s assertion 
that sectoral state-societal arrangements tend to be similar in a country, lacks enough 
empirical data at meso level for its support. This study has the same finding, largely 
because two sub-industrial cases are subsumed under the electric-related industry. 
Thirdly, more studies concerning those highly competitive industries among world top 
rivals have to be done in order to understand how states and industries respond to 
international challenges, in particular in the industries such as telecommunication, 
information, electronics and biotechnics where their technological progress moves fast. 
All this research will contribute to our knowledge by exploring the world of
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institutionalism and the varieties of capitalism in both national and sectoral 
perspectives.
2 .2 . Background Theory: East Asian Developmentalism
Retrospectively, the three elements which have constituted the developmentalist 
theories are policy activism, strong state capacity, and relative autonomy. All are under 
the umbrella of an authoritarian interpretation. However, the strong authoritarian 
regime in Taiwan has been transformed towards a more democratic partisan one, 
although it is still a KMT-dominated state. The use of coercion is to be deemed no 
longer appropriate in the intervention of economic affairs. In the case studies, the state 
still intervened in technology development, but it was not by the means o f authoritarian 
power. The discussion which follows focuses on the drifting nature of the three basic 
elements after authoritarian withdrawal.
IPs is still the main instrument by which the state intervenes in industrial 
development. This is the very nature of developmental government using public policies 
to direct activities of the private sector. It could be said that the policy activism of the 
national government in the 1990s did not change the nature of selective intervention 
substantially, but the areas of policy activism have shifted from other protectionist and 
regulatory policy areas towards assistant and sector-biased polices for industrial 
upgrading. It denotes not only a change to cope with the needs of structural adjustment, 
but also a shift of IP from direct involvement in the market to functional involvement in 
product-oriented technology development.
Strong state capacity as the dynamics for policy implementation is somehow 
broken-down. The administrative capacity of the bureaucratic elite to control policy 
implementation and outcomes has deteriorated because the private sector would not 
accommodate policy measures if there was no institutionalised ‘sweetener'. It became 
more difficult for the state to push the private sector to follow its administrative 
guidance in the 1990s than in the authoritarian period. The most apparent example is
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the unsuccessful 'go-south' policy for outwards investment in which ‘the capable state' 
appealed to firms to invest in South East Asian countries instead of Mainland China so 
as to partly reduce the heavy dependence on China’s economy and as bargaining power 
for talks on the Taiwan Straits. The results were fruitless and upset the state because 
innumerable (including registered and 'illegal') firms still went west to Mainland China 
(many go-south firms are state-owned and KMT party-owned). It is because the 
investment decisions of firms depend on corporate strategies and the incentives 
provided by host countries rather than administrative guidance of home government. 
Institutional design-in benefits instead of the state capacity are the keys to the 
compliance of the industrial sector in 1990s. However, the failure of inadequate policies 
to prevent profit-seeking business from rushing to the mainland market (Leng, 1996) 
was because the benefit was one-sidedly obtained by the state to achieve its political 
ends which was not reciprocal in the eyes of business.
The relative autonomy of the state as the institutional foundation for policy­
making is slightly affected by influences other than the state. The political autonomy of 
the state elite to determine state interests and policy priorities in relation to economic 
and technological development remains quite strong but consultancies from the 
industrial sector in general and foreign sources in particular (most members of STAG 
and consultant firms) have influenced policy-making. This is not to say that the private 
sector has penetrated the policy-making process. At best, their opinions can be heard by 
the authorities. The decisions on picking winners are still in the hands of the state elite, 
while the implementation process leaves much space for participation from the 
industrial sector.
It could be argued that the characteristics of sectoral influence, or meso- 
corporatist decision making, was not explicit in the process of picking winners. 
Considering the fact that only a few selected industries (semiconductors, information, 
and the consumer electronics industry) had strength in the economy at that time, the 
choices were, in very large part, dependent on international information and suggestions.
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However, the economic centrality of the electrics-based industries is too significant to 
be neglected by the government. Naturally, these industries were targeted. Some 
industries were either too weak to compete internationally (machinery' and 
telecommunications) or too new (aerospace and pollution control) to Taiwan. These 
industries were unlikely to affect the decision making. In fact, some traditional 
industries had more political power than new industries in the sense that they have built 
a long term relationship with the bureaucracy. However, only one (specialty chemicals 
& pharmaceutical products) of the traditional industries was privileged. All labour- 
intensive and low-value-added industries were excluded. So the decision making 
process was not penetrated by the private sector in general.
Nonetheless, it seems that state autonomy in terms of traditional industries has 
considerably declined compared to high-tech industries. The reality is more concerned 
about state strategy than the decline of state autonomy. Those traditional industries have 
been seen as losing their competitive advantages to those of other rising countries which 
are based on labour intensiveness. It is the state that gave up these industries by 
removing resources from them to emerging sectors. It is natural that the state should 
lose its control over these sectors when they could not expect any institutional benefit 
from the state.
The authoritarian interpretation as the theoretical base of East Asia 
developmentalism is dated, new directions should be advanced to capture the recent 
changes in these countries. When the three basic elements of the developmentalist 
theories have been fundamentally converted, an incorporation of institutional 
arrangement perspective into developmental ist theories is desired. This will provide a 
new approach that explains the economic growth/competitiveness of these countries in 
the 1990s in a different way which emphasised institutions for GI cooperation rather 
than the state as an prevalent actor. In addition, international and technological factors 
are brought into the analysis instead of being trapped in the debates between ISI and 
EOI which have mirrored the response to economic globalisation.
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There is a need to re-examine these developmental states in a non-authoritarian 
era. According to 1997 World Development Report (World Bank, 1997), the effective 
state, in relation to the effectiveness of promoting state policies and institutions, is the 
key leading to high growth rather than the capable and autonomous state. It is a sign of 
a sudden U-turn of the World Bank, who never exaggerated the role of the state in the 
economic development and favoured a liberal market, starting to emphasise the 
importance of the state. ‘An effective state....is central to economic and social 
development, but more as partner and facilitator than as director (ibid.: 18)'. Bearing 
this in mind, further research in the developmentalist perspective will have to be 
concentrated on the changing nature of state’s role and its interaction with societal 
actors to respond to the changes of technology and international political economy.
It is also necessary to analyse why the 1997 and 1998 financial crises jeopardised 
those countries, such as Korea, Indonesia and Thailand where currency values have 
dropped by more than 50%, more serious than Japan and Taiwan where the drop is only 
about 10-15%. Generally speaking, the political regimes of the former countries tend to 
be more authoritarian and the latter ones more democratic. At least, the former’s 
financial measures are more dirigible by the state while Taiwan’s is more liberal 
(Economist, 03/01/98:73). If this implies a connection between the vulnerability of 
financial structures and their political regimes, then a fundamental reversion of an 
authoritarian explanation in financial terms is very obvious. The voice of some Asian 
NIEs who defended so called Asian values, which were strongly related to authoritarian 
measures of economic development, against western based democracy in the high 
growth era, have disappeared since the economic crises, in particular after negotiating 
with the International Monetary Fund for assistance. The reality of crisis leads to a 
doubt about the abilities of developmental states to manage financial crisis. In 
advocating the policy measures of developmental states which would result in a higher 
growth rate, now and in the future, it is necessary to consider the weakness of these 
measures to avoid economic crisis.
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3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ISP
We can not talk about Taiwan's industrial development without referring to its future 
and the forces that might influence it. The ISP as an institutional arrangement will be 
subject to politics. Many political developments are seen to have had a considerable 
influence on ISP. Three aspects of political changes, namely the China-Taiwan relation, 
power structure and the KMT party-state structure will potentially altered the operations 
of ISP. Although the China-Taiwan relation does not directly affect ISP as the other two 
factors do, it is the greatest uncertainty for Taiwan. The future of Taiwan is uncertain, 
no writer would give a concrete answer to the question such as political ‘take-off from 
China, military participation of foreign governments in the issue of China-Taiwan 
conflicts, and changing government in Taiwan (Ferdinand, 1996; Klintworth, 1995; Wu, 
1995).
3.1. Hostile Relations across the Taiwan Strait
If Taiwan were occupied through force or reunited through negotiation with China, 
Taiwan’s domestic environment, both political, economic and social, would have a 
dramatic change. It is predicted that ISP will be substantially affected, or disappear if 
Taiwan becomes ruled by China. The following discussion is concentrated on the 
relationship between China and Taiwan, rather than on how the political economy of 
Taiwan will be shaped after reunification because that is a premised question not a 
realistic condition. However, the hostile attitudes of both governments might lead to a 
situation that the Taiwanese state puts more resources to strengthen ISP in order to 
encourage high-tech business to stay on the island rather than to invest in China, 
implicitly speaking.
The deterioration of China-Taiwan relations since 1995 was principally caused by 
the trend of démocratisation and the Taiwanisation of political legitimation (Chang, 
1996), which have been taken as a move to independence by China. Consequently, a 
large scale military exercise in the East China sea in the 1995 summer and a series of
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missile tests surrounding Taiwan in the early 1996 before Taiwan's first presidential 
election were seen to be a message of warning from China to Taiwan for its inclination 
to independence even though there is no obvious attempt for independence, just some 
non-governmental assertions and the state strategy of ‘pragmatic diplomacy' (Hsieh, 
1996). This warning did not make reunification any closer, but led to indignation and 
understanding of the ruthless nature of China. The aggressive behaviours and the 
possibility of using force by China also led to a crisis of national identity which together 
with the China factor presented the biggest threat to democratic consolidation (Yu, 
1996; Wu, 1995).
The political hostility brought about the consequent result o f the Taiwan 
government wanting to reduce its economic dependence on China by discouraging 
outward investment to the Mainland. Only those declining industries are permitted 
outward investment to China. This, together with diplomatic activities, has annoyed 
China further, and seen in Taiwan's challenge to China because China’s economic 
development relies on foreign investment substantially. In fact, Taiwan’s high 
dependence on China’s economy, and also China’s dependence on Taiwan to a lesser 
extent, made the issues between both sides of the Taiwan Straits more complicated 
involving not only the two governments but also Taiwanese business (Ngo, 1995). 
China wants to absorb more Taiwanese investment on the one hand and to depress 
Taiwan’s international role on the other hand. Taiwan also claims its own definition of 
one China and officially rejects the idea of formal independence, while Taiwan refuses 
to talk in unequal terms as a rebel province and insists on the possibility o f reunification 
only with a democratic China and its living conditions close to Taiwan’s.
Moreover, international forces, in particular the deep involvement of the USA, 
have played an important role in regulating the relations between both sides (Klintworth, 
1995). It is the result of China’s own strategy of 1995-96 military deterrence which has 
brought the USA from backstage to the forefront in fear of a war and the military 
expansion of China after 1996 that was evidenced by sending two fleets to the Taiwan
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Strait in the crisis of March 1996, expansive explanation in the USA-Japan security 
treat to cover the surrounding areas of Japan, and developing a ‘strategic partnership' 
with China in order to crystallise and constrain its military'. The future of Taiwan 
depends very much on international politics, but a peaceful status quo is accepted by 
many actors under the conditions of no independence and no force.
Economic prosperity and democracy, in Taiwan’s point of view, are the essential 
factors resulting in the protection from the USA (although the USA has its own interests 
and global strategic consideration on this matter). Thus, Taiwan will keep on promoting 
economic growth and political reform. High-tech industries, seen as the dynamics of 
growth-oriented export, will be treated in a privileged way. However, further economic 
liberalisation and the attraction of the mainland market might lead to a more foot-loose 
high-tech sector. In this circumstance, not only for the economic growth but also for 
security, ISP will be deployed continuously by using the institutional ‘sweetener’ to 
induce this sector to remain in Taiwan.
3.2. Power Structure
Rapid political development in the decade since 1987, including the lifting of martial 
law and the ban on new political parties, the opening up of elections at all levels, and 
constitutional reform, have been deemed as a ‘political miracle’ after an ‘economic 
miracle’. After démocratisation domestic politics have changed to party competition, 
nowadays, KMT is a majority party rather than one dominant party even though it has 
never left the government for the past half a century in Taiwan.
The increase o f parliamentary power in shaping major political issues can be 
observed over the last ten years. The role of the Legislative Yuan in relation to the 
Executive Yuan'has changed from ‘a rubber stamp bureau of the Executive Yuan’ into 
an influential institute in the process of policy-making with which the Executive has to 
consult regularly. After the 1995 legislative election, KMT commands only a tiny 
majority in the Legislative Yuan but it remains in near-total domination of the
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Executive Yuan. On some special interest issues, the KMT government has to 
compromise its policy with the demands of the major opposition party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), because it can not discipline its members in.the Legislative 
Yuan effectively. However, these compromises have concentrated more on social and 
welfare issues than on economic ones, because the former topics have attracted more 
voters’ concerns so KMT elected politicians tend to be more independent in that area.
The state control over the issues concerning the future economic development is 
still autonomous as public spending is unequally distributed with a bias to economic 
growth. In the realm of policy for economic development, there are fewer disputes 
about the budget for technology development and IPs but not in the cases of economic 
infrastructure. In particular, in public construction projects there are disputes where 
several interests are involved and more corruption exposed. Moreover, these high-tech 
sectors also produce an outstanding performance and use budget resources more 
efficiently. At least, corruption and interest conflicts have yet to be disclosed in this 
area. If the situation does not experience a fundamental change. STPs and their 
supplemental IPs will continue to be used.
As electoral politics increases its importance in the redistribution of political 
influence, further changes at the national level may have a considerable impact on 
economic issues. The KMT might lose its majority in the Legislative Yuan to the 
opposition parties, a large DPP and a smaller New Party in the future. Unless DPP can 
obtain more than half of the seats, a coalition government will be necessary. If this is 
the case, a coalition between the KMT and the New Party is more likely than a coalition 
between the DPP and the New Party in the ideological sense that the DPP prefers an 
eventual independence and the New Party tends to a reunification in the future with the 
KMT somewhere in between. However, political aspiration and consciousness are 
generally agreed between political parties regarding continued economic prosperity as a 
'economy and trade first’ strategy when faced with the potential threat of China at all 
times. Even if the KMT left the government, the centre-line of national development is
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economie rather than political and social.
3.3. KMT Party-State
As we discussed in section 4.3. of chapter three, the KMT, a quasi-Leninist structure 
party, is the power, more than state leadership, involved in Taiwan's economic 
development. Party decisions were the major factors in shaping the consequent state 
policy. The change of KMT ideology from actual authoritarian convictions to 
democratic ones by using the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat-sen in a pragmatic 
way has undoubtedly facilitated the democratic transition of Taiwan’s political system 
(Hao, 1996). However, although the KMT ideology changed, this was not in order that 
as a political party in office, it should cease speculation on the national economy.
Although the administration of a government that is highly influenced by the 
ideology of the ruling party has been recognised, the whole state system and most 
political resources that have been manipulated through its party mechanism are 
unjustifiable. This is an authoritarian rather than a democratic approach. As Taiwan can 
be deemed a democratic regime now, the KMT’s institutional capacity should confine 
itself to state affairs based on administrative regions. State policies should be the 
outputs of the interaction between public agencies and civic and economic associations 
on the formation of policy, and between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan 
on the ratification of these policies.
There is also a change inside the KMT in terms of the relationships between the 
party and its followers. It is argued that 'the nature of the long existing patron-client 
relationship’ has been replaced by the influence of money politics, factional strife, and 
even organised gangsters, all of which are directly connected to local politics (Kau, 
1996). This kind of ‘informal politics is dominated by factions selling influence for 
money, challenging party discipline and integrity’ (Scalapino, 1996:227). This explains 
why KMT was defeated in the middle-level local election in 1997 (held 8 out of 23 
magistrates and mayors) and won in the basic-level election in 1998 (held 233 out of
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319 town and village leaders, 524 out of 890 councillors). However, there is no 
effective rule in the KMT to regulate the behaviours of informal politics. Increasing 
public dissatisfaction about social and economic justice might become more serious, if 
informal politics still dominate the local politics, even at the national level in the future.
Nonetheless, a full democracy should at least embrace two elements, a 
government shift between political parties and a separation of the party from the state. 
As argued by Leng & Lin (1993), more remains to be done in the transition to 
democracy for the KMT to draw a clear line between the party and the state. According 
to the findings in the empirical chapters, many new high-tech spin-off firms are jointly 
ventured by the government and the KMT. These new profitable firms benefitted from 
technology innovation subsidised by the government STPs. Criticism will be developed 
on this matter as to why the advantages created by the economic institutions should be 
exploited by the ruling party. This party-state capitalism will have to be scrutinised 
stringently.
ISP as an economic institution should not become an auxiliary vested interest of 
the KMT. Otherwise, it will create the condition that the ruling party takes advantage of 
the state policy and the economy in an intolerable way. The KMT is already the richest 
political party in the world. And this kind of corrupted interest conversion makes the 
KMT stronger and the opposition parties relative weaker. If this phenomenon continues, 
politics only becomes worse and the party competition less just.
4. THE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN
Policy measures for industrial development in 1990s suggest that there are some 
internal economic impacts that the Taiwanese government should manage. This study 
suggests that ISP, as an institutional model to diffuse technology under state-industrial 
collaborative efforts, has an important effect on international competitiveness in both 
the NPC and HDTV sectors. However, further research in other sectors is required 
before this state-industrial arrangement is generalised to other Taiwan’s industries. In
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general, traditional industries are unlikely to suit this model, and it is applicable to 
technology-based industries because of policy activism in this area.
However, Taiwan will be exposed to a danger no matter how effective or 
ineffective this new type of state-industrial arrangement. If the new state-industrial 
arrangements do not perform very well for all emerging industries, there is a real danger 
for Taiwan in the sense that the adjustment of industrial structure towards a high-tech 
industry-dominated one has failed. Even worse, those traditional industries have slid 
away because, the ongoing IPs which focused mainly on the emerging sectors made 
most high-tech industries stay at home to enjoy the privileged measures provided by the 
state, while labour-intensive industries voted with their feet. In reality, manufacturing 
deindustrialisation in terms of labour-intensive industries has already occurred in 
Taiwan, which also reflects the fact that the investment decision of firms depends, in 
large part, on what kind of IP the state enforced. High-tech industries are now the only 
hope for Taiwan since those ‘walk-out’ industries can not possibly be reinstalled. 
Taiwan is at the point of no return where high-tech industrialisation must carry on.
If it does work, it would lead Taiwan, on the bright side, to be one of the 
important bases for technological development. On the dark side, heavy dependence on 
the development of high tech industries would ensue. An economy which relied mostly 
on technology-based industries would be very sensitive to changes in the international 
political economy. Many factors seriously affect the development of these industries, 
for example, new international regulations, world economic recession, new 
international entrants, and slowdown of sectoral market demand. Too high a 
concentration on winners is dangerous. To be or not to be a technological island is the 
question which requires the wisdom of the state and societal elite to consider what is 
best for Taiwan’s future development.
A potential threat for the future of ISP might be the reduction of government 
financial support on technology projects since STP budget has effectively lured
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cooperation from the industrial sector. Government resources for industrial R&D have 
grown steadily in the past (chapter 4), but expanded welfare proposals and military- 
expenditures probably have squeezing impacts on it (Ferdinand, 1996:60-2). It is 
assumed that ISP would be weakened when STP resource was extracted.
Taiwan wants to be a key player in a game of international competition but more 
and more depends on creating its own terms. The innovative ISP can serve as an 
institutional foundation for technology development, but must modify its operation to 
take account of sectoral difference and environmental changes.
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Appendix List of Elite Interviews
No Name Institute Position Date
1* Chang, Alan
m m t)
Acer Inc. Special Assistant to 
Chairman
20/03/96
2 Chang, Huai-Chi
(«?«£)
Market Intelligence Center/lII Manager of System 
and Peripheral 
Research
30/05/96
3 Dr. Chao,
T.H. Steve
im?%)
-HD-Video Industry Promotion 
Program Office/MOEA 
--Visual Information 
Technology Division. 
CCL/ITRI
-Executive Secretary
--Director o f HD- 
Video Program
12/04/96
4 Chia, Jack T.C. 
( * * « 0
General Chamber o f Commerce Deputy Secretary 
General
26/12/96
5 Chen, John ITIS & Promotion Project 
Program Office/MOEA
Director of Program 
Office
22/04/96
6 Chen, Jee-Yuan
m m c)
DIT/MOEA Advisor 08/Ó5/96
7 Chen, W.J.
m&m)
TEEMA Director of Business 
Department
06/05/96
8 Cheng, Linche
(M »€)
Tatung Co. General Manager of
Telecommunications
Division
10/05/96
9 Cheng. Sandy L.C.
imum)
Industrial Research Department, 
CCL/ITRI
Manager 12/05/96
10 Chuang, C.K.
(ftffB )
Proton Electronic Industrial Co., 
Ltd.
Director o f R&D 
Department
30/04/96
11 Chuang, Chun
m m
STAG/the Executive Yuan Researcher 26/04/96
12 Ho, Malcolm C.M.
( m
National Federation o f Industries Section Chief 24/12/96
13 Horng,
Jinn-Hsyong
(mmm)
Second Division, IDB/MOEA Technocrat o f  
Electronic Industry
07/05/96
14 Hsu, David W.L. Products Office of 
Planning/ITRI
Program Manager 18/04/96
IS Huang, Chih-Peng
( « I ß )
Sixth Division, IDB/MOEA Director 07/05/96
16 Kuo, Qundi Chinese Association for 
Industrial Technology 
Advancement
Executive Vice 
General Secretary
18/12/96
17" Hwang,
Chin-Young
(»Ä H )
Market Intelligence Center/IIl Director 28/03/96
18* Jong, Dennis
m m )
C&C Inventec (£ * ta * « |) Executive Vice 
President
20/03/96
287
19* Lee, I.J. Mitac International Corp. President, Video 
Product Business 
Unit
27/03/96
20 Dr. Lee, Jen-Fang Graduate Institute of 
Technolog)' and Innovation 
Management, National 
Chengchi University
Professor 29/04/96
21 Lin, Hsiu-Ching
w æ a o
IDIC/MOEA Researcher 27/12/96
22 Lin, Lily
( m m
HDTV Office/MOEA Project Manager 08/05/96
23 Lin, Michael M.K.
( m n )
Strategic Planning Department, 
ERSO/ITRI
Manager 17/04/96
24* Liu, Lung-Lung
( M i l )
Products Development 
Division/III
Director 22/03/96
25 Lo, Barry 
Ta-Hsien
(H ilf?)
Office of Planning/ITRI General Director 18/04/96
26 Sue, Yin-Lin
m m )
Program Office of Key 
Components/ITRl
Program Manager 18/04/96
27 Sun, Chen-Yang
m m m
DIT/MOEA Researcher 09/05/96
28 Tarng,
Huey-Huey
(M M )
Industrial Research Department, 
CCL/ITRI
Industrial Analyst 18/04/96
29 Tseng, Ta-Yu STAG/the Executive Yuan Researcher 26/04/96
30 Wang, Sid H.C. 
(£$S$)
DIT/MOEA Researcher 23/12/96
31* Wang, Steve
( £ ^ 0
United Microelectronics Corp. Director, Sales 
Division
21/03/96
32 Yang, James K.C. 
(töÄM)
HDTVOffice/MOEA Project Manager 15/04/96
Note: (1) The appearance o f  interviewees is according to the alphabetical order o f  their surname 
and the institute o f  each interviewee is accurate when the interview was conducted
Fhe position
(2) 6 interviews (1, 17, 18, 19, 24, and 31) were conducted in an informal condition when the author 
joined a two week intensive course concerning the operation and management o f  high technology 
industry. The author advanced questions in seminar or at class breaks Some interviewees (9, 20, 23, and 
25) also lectured in the course, but the author arranged another longer time to conduct an interview if 
the interviewee’s position was highly relevant to this study.
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